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1. Introduction 
The papers in this volume were prepared by independent 
experts from Western Europe and the former Soviet Union 
at the request of the Directorate-General for External Re-
lations (DG I) and the Directorate-General for Economic 
and Financial Affairs (DG II) in the framework of the Com-
mission's efforts to analyse and assess the process of reform 
in the former Soviet Union. 
This research was initiated after the Commission had com-
pleted its own study of the Soviet economy1 and launched 
its first technical assistance programme. At that time (spring-
summer 1991), it was clear that a major research effort into 
the economics of Soviet transformation was a necessary 
companion to the European and Western assistance pro-
grammes. As in the case of the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe,2 it was therefore decided to commission 
empirical research by Western experts. Fruitful professional 
contacts established during the preparation of the Com-
mission study gave the opportunity, a few months later, to 
commission parallel studies by young Soviet economists 
associated with reform circles. As events developed in the 
autumn of 1991, it turned out that most of these people 
became more and more involved in the definition and in-
ternal implementation of reform policies. Most of them were 
nevertheless able to complete their studies, and to participate 
in a seminar in Brussels on 24 and 25 October 1991. Final 
manuscripts were received at end-1991 or at the beginning 
of 1992. 
As editors of the volume, we hesitated to publish it when 
events accelerated dramatically with the break-up of the 
Soviet Union and the implementation of radical economic 
reform in Russia. As the reader will observe, some of the 
issues which are discussed by the authors have been settled 
by history. This relates especially to the discussion - whose 
echoes can be found in many of the papers - of the costs 
and benefits of decentralized as against centralized reform. 
Other topics already seem very distant in time, such as the 
discussion of Gorbachev's economic policies. 
Commission of the European Communities. (1990), 'Stabilization, lib-
eralization and devolution; Assessment of the economic situation and 
reform process in the Soviet Union', European Economy, No 45, De-
cember. 
Commission of the European Communities. (1990), 'Economic trans-
formation in Hungary and Poland', European Economy, No 43, March; 
(1991), 'The path of reform in Central and Eastern Europe', European 
Economy, Special edition No 2. 
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We finally decided to publish these studies, however, for 
three reasons. First, a large part of the underlying analysis 
remains valid for today's successor States of the former 
Soviet Union. Even issues which have for several months 
been about to be settled, such as the introduction of new 
currencies or the convertibility of the rouble, remain unde-
cided. Second, post-Soviet reform debates have been charac-
terized by an extreme focus on the very short term. The 
studies will give the reader an opportunity to take a longer 
view on these debates. Third, this volume is also a contri-
bution to the history of economic policy in the former Soviet 
Union. Although this is not its main purpose, we thought 
readers would be interested in the analysis and the views it 
presents. 
The volume is organized in four parts. Part I deals with 
macroeconomic issues. Part 2 is devoted to structural reform. 
Part 3 specifically addresses the inter-republic (or interstate) 
dimension. Part 4 is wider in scope, as it envisages the 
transformation process in its political economy and cultural 
dimensions. 
2. Macroeconomics 
At the end of 1991, the Soviet Union had been experiencing 
several years of macroeconomic deterioration. Against a 
background of stagnation in real income, the succession of 
high and rising budget deficits had led to the accumulation 
of involuntary savings which became conventionally ident-
ified as a 'monetary overhang'. Successive ambitious but 
unimplemented reform plans had helped to educate policy-
makers in the issues of reform design, but were also respon-
sible for widespread confusion regarding the aims and the 
pace of economic policy. Furthermore, permanent disputes 
between the Union authorities and emerging republic leader-
ships contributed to procrastination and confusion. After 
being appointed in the context of the conservative backlash 
of end-1990, the Pavlov government launched a stabilization 
package. However, the measures it took were both partial 
and poorly designed, such as the ill-conceived monetary 
reform of February, or the partial price liberalization of 
April. Furthermore, ambiguity persisted as to the aim of 
these policies, which could be seen either as preliminary 
steps towards liberalization, or as an attempt to reintroduce 
central control over the economy. Budgetary restriction and 
monetary control also proved impossible to implement in the 
context of permanent disputes between Union and republic 
governments. 
The reform errors and failures of the last Gorbachev years 
were clearly a major factor in the deterioration of the macro-
economic picture that the new authorities had to face in 
XI 
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1992. After Mr Pavlov's failed attempt at stabilizing the 
economy through administrative measures, a new policy 
course was taken, at least in Russia. But analysis of the 
main macroeconomic issues of the last Gorbachev years also 
shows that major policy dilemmas have in large measure 
persisted. This is apparent in the three contributions by S. 
Alexashenko on the budget, A. Vavilov and 0. Vjugin on 
inflation, and A. Vernikov on the convertibility of the rouble. 
Alexashenko's title is prophetic in tone. Yet his pessimism 
is rooted in his analysis of the structure of the budgetary 
system: he shows that quite apart from policy mistakes, the 
structural sources of the budgetary crisis were the lack of a 
genuine tax system and of an expenditure control system, 
and the absence of any effective mechanism that could foster 
budgetary discipline at the various government levels. Both 
resulted from the relaxation of the procedures associated 
with the command economy and the lack of alternative 
mechanisms that could ensure control over the budget during 
the transition to a market economy. It is by now conven-
tional wisdom to emphasize the importance in the sequencing 
of economic reform of introducing early on a package of 
reform of tax and expenditure. Alexashenko's paper clearly 
illustrates this view, but also shows the specific contribution 
of the Soviet disintegration process. 
Vavilov and Vjugin carefully analyse the sources and mech-
anisms of inflation in the former Soviet Union. After re-
calling how inflationary pressures had been developing in 
the traditional command system, and how perestroika con-
tributed both to aggravate these pressures and to relax the 
control mechanisms, they provide a detailed and quantitative 
assessment of Mr Pavlov's macroeconomic policy, especially 
as regards the aggregate and distributional consequences 
of his price and tax measures. They point out that the 
administrative price reforms, whose goals were to redistrib-
ute income towards the State, to correct relative price imbal-
ances and to confiscate excess savings, completely failed to 
achieve the first aim, brought only limited success in the 
second, and only succeeded in reducing the 'monetary over-
hang'. This last conclusion may seem paradoxical, since price 
liberalization at the beginning of January 1992 resulted in a 
500% price jump. Yet it is consistent with all available 
estimates of the overhang. This indicates either that involun-
tary savings were significantly higher than estimated, or that 
the price jump did not result from their excess, as is generally 
thought. 
Convertibility has for more than one year been on the agenda 
for the immediate future. Yet it remains an ever-distant goal. 
Andrei Vernikov's paper first reviews the Soviet policies and 
the debate on this subject. He then moves on to discussing 
the pros and cons of current account convertibility. His main 
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conclusions are that current account convertibility should 
accompany price liberalization (because liberalization would 
otherwise result in price distortions), but that pegging the 
exchange rate could only be advisable after the main in-
flationary consequences of liberalization have been borne. 
He advocates an early introduction of current account con-
vertibility for residents, but emphasizes a number of precon-
ditions, among which are internal stabilization and the im-
plementation of clear rules for inter-republic economic re-
lations. It is evident that these conditions have not yet been 
met. 
3. Structural reform 
Structural reform in the former Soviet Union was bound to 
require even more pain and hardship than in other post-
communist countries. Even without the inter-republic di-
mension, the virtually all-encompassing nature of the State, 
the near complete elimination of market relations and pri-
vate property, especially in agriculture, the long-standing 
isolation from world markets, the extent of distortions in 
industry and the size of the military complex were clearly 
adverse factors that would make successful transition par-
ticularly difficult. The extent of the recession that unfolded 
in 1992 confirms that the costs of the transition to a market 
economy will be significantly higher than in Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
Four papers investigate specific issues in structural reform. 
Philip Hanson assesses the various efforts to reform the 
economic law framework. Susanne Oxenstierna analyses the 
situation in the labour markets. Olga Ivanova examines how 
the CMEA collapse affected Soviet trade with Central and 
Eastern Europe. Gerard Duchene and Claudia Senik-Ley-
gonie provide a quantitative assessment of the relative price 
distortions in the Soviet economy. 
In all the countries in transition to market economies, a 
priority in setting up the legal framework is to lay down a 
clear basis for the acquisition and protection of property 
rights. Philip Hanson examines this aspect of various pieces 
of actual and proposed legislation from 1989-91, from the 
Union, the Russian republic and the Shatalin programme 
approved by the Russian Parliament in September 1990. He 
concludes that all were intended to liberalize with regard to 
property rights, and were clearly aimed at establishing the 
legal framework for a mixed economy. Their main short-
comings were that they failed to deal adequately with the 
ownership of land; that they contained too many loopholes 
that would undermine their effectiveness; that their political 
underpinnings were fragile, as the conservative backlash of 
1991 revealed; and that their implementation would require 
the development of skills and institutions, which would 
take time to accomplish. None the less, he suggests that 
privatization can contribute to stabilization, because it 
promises to change the prevailing patterns of microeconomic 
behaviour of enterprises that help to generate inflationary 
pressure. 
By 1990, the wage reform of 1986 and the Law on State 
enterprises of 1987 had already brought observable changes 
in the Soviet labour market: employment in the State sector 
was declining, while legal private employment was ex-
panding; unemployment was increasing; and nominal wages 
were rising steeply. Susanne Oxenstierna challenges the view 
that the reforms dampened labour demand in the State 
sector. She suggests instead that the fall in State-sector 
employment was due at least as much to supply factors 
and points out that labour force participation rates were 
declining among the active population, albeit with sharp 
differences among republics. Enterprises, faced with the re-
quirement to raise wages and the freedom to set prices, in 
the absence of competition preferred to raise prices rather 
than to shed labour or improve profitability. Unemployment 
did rise, however, and Oxenstierna estimates that in 1990 
the true rate was between 3 and 6%. She sees the much 
higher rates that will appear as transition gets under way 
raising particular concerns: mismatches between the unem-
ployed and the new job opportunities, coupled with uncer-
tainty about the new opportunities and hence about what 
retraining is appropriate; the budgetary cost of supporting 
the unemployed; and the need to improve on the very limited 
provision of employment offices. 
On 1 January 1991, all trade among CMEA members 
switched to world prices and hard-currency settlement. 
Available estimates indicate that the US dollar value of intra-
CMEA trade flows contracted sharply in 1991 in comparison 
with 1990. However, several factors - recession and disor-
ganization in the Soviet Union, relative price changes, short-
age of hard currency - may account for this collapse. Olga 
Ivanova's paper analyses changes in the Soviet Union's trade 
policy vis-a-vis the Central and East European countries. It 
does not provide a clear-cut decomposition of the factors 
behind the collapse, but it shows how domestic recessions, 
policy errors which created obstacles or disincentives to 
trade within the CMEA, and a shortage of hard currency 
all contributed to it. 
The goal of Gerard Duchene and Claudia Senik-Leygonie 
is to assess the consequences for the former Soviet Union of 
a switch to world prices. R. McKinnon has conjectured that 
the peculiar relative price structure of the Soviet economy 
could result in the existence of value-subtracting industries 
when value-added is measured at world prices. There is, 
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however, no standard way of measuring ex ante an industry's 
value-added at world prices. Duchene and Senik-Leygonie 
use Soviet foreign trade prices as proxies for the world price 
of tradables and compute similar prices for non-tradables 
under the assumption that the mark-up rate for non-trad-
ables is equal to that for tradables. They confirm that value-
added can be negative when measured at world prices, and 
that profit in many industries would be too low to finance 
further investment. They also indicate that, using the same 
prices, private consumption represented a meagre 40% of 
total GDP. These figures indicate how deep the structural 
transformation needs to be in the former Soviet Union. 
4. The inter-republic dimension 
The struggle between the Centre and breakaway republics 
began in 1990 to interfere strongly with the process of 
economic reform and led at the end of 1991 to the break-
up of the Soviet Union. This interaction between two major 
dimensions of the Soviet transformation process became 
apparent when the elaboration of the economic reform plan 
prepared by Professor Shatalin at the request of President 
Gorbachev revealed how difficult it was to design a reform 
policy in an unstable and rapidly evolving context. During 
the 1990-91 period, Soviet and Western economists inten-
sively discussed the implications of this interference and 
assessed alternative options. Chief among the issues under 
discussion was the monetary regime, as some scholars em-
phasized the potential benefits from a quick move to separate 
currencies while others underlined the possible disruptions 
it could imply for trade and payments. 
A qualitative change occurred at the end of 1991 with the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the choice by President 
Yeltsin of a 'Russia first' option. However, many of the 
economic issues which had been discussed in the years before 
have not yet been settled. The rouble remains the currency of 
most republics, trade rules are far from clear, and Moscow's 
economic policies still determine to a large extent those of 
the other States. As demonstrated by the difficulties of 
controlling monetary emission and by the rising cost of 
disintegration, these issues remain key for any reform policy 
in Russia and the other States of the former Soviet Union. 
Three contributions in this volume specifically address the 
interstate dimension. Vladimir Maschits (who completed his 
contribution shortly before being appointed Minister for 
Inter-republic Economic Relations in the Russian Govern-
ment) gives an overview and an assessment of the relations 
XDI 
Reform issues in the former Soviet Union - Introduction 
between the Union and the republics until end-1991. Jacques 
Sapir draws on the regional features of the Soviet economy 
and the history of Soviet federalism to discuss the costs 
and benefits of disintegration, and Peter Bofinger assesses 
alternative monetary frameworks for organizing interstate 
monetary relations. 
Vladimir Maschits considers that the last chance of preserv-
ing some form of unity in the Soviet Union was lost when 
the Union authorities refused to endorse the compromise 
reached in the negotiations on the Shatalin plan. After this 
chance was wasted, the trend towards disintegration became 
irresistible. Maschits has no illusions as regards the possi-
bility of finding stable arrangements between the former 
republics. He expresses deep pessimism as regards the risks 
associated with the rise of nationalism. 
Jacques Sapir addresses the inter-republic issue from a differ-
ent angle. He emphasizes that decentralization has been on 
the rise since the death of Stalin, but does not take for 
granted the decomposition of the former Soviet Union into 
republic units: he rather emphasizes a transversal opposition 
between a relatively prosperous manufacturing belt in the 
north-west and less-developed south-eastern regions. He also 
stresses that the degree of interdependence between the for-
mer Soviet republics is actually higher than indicated by 
recorded trade flows, because of the low degree of substituta-
bility between suppliers. Conscious both of the risks of 
introducing republic currencies and of the unstable character 
of a single-currency regime, he advocates that the West 
be involved in the management of inter-republic monetary 
relations. 
Peter Bofinger examines the two main options for the future 
of monetary relations among the former republics: a monet-
ary union and the introduction of republic currencies. The 
yardstick he chooses for assessing these monetary arrange-
ments is their ability to achieve the right balance between 
discipline and flexibility in the financing of budget deficits 
and in the provision of credits to loss-making enterprises. 
An excessively rigid system (such as, for example, a currency 
board) could lead to a massive contraction of output; a 
system without disciplinary devices (as a pure republic cur-
rency system might be) would lead to hyperinflation. Bof-
inger concludes that on these grounds, the arguments in 
favour of a common currency are strong, but that such an 
arrangement could only be efficient if international insti-
tutions became involved in its management. However, he 
does not consider this outcome to be realistic. (In fact, 
however, in the course of 1992 the IMF became involved in 
the drafting of rules and settlement of disputes regarding 
the management of the rouble zone.) Therefore, he advocates 
the creation of a payments union in order to avoid trade 
being disrupted by the introduction of non-convertible re-
public currencies. 
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5. Political economy and economic culture 
Economists tend to reduce the process of economic trans-
formation to familiar economic categories. Hence, the usual 
focus on stabilization and liberalization. Yet the transform-
ation of the former republics into democratic societies and 
market economies is bound to be a much more complex and 
chaotic process, in which different dimensions of change 
interact. Two papers in this volume broaden the scope of 
the analysis and discuss the interactions of economic trans-
formation with political and social change. Gerard Roland 
draws on recent developments in the political economy 
literature to examine the path of reform in the Soviet Union 
since the beginning of perestroika. Yaroslav Kuzminov 
stresses that economic reform will also require a complete 
change of economic culture, assesses the implications of this 
transformation and discusses the role that Western assistance 
could play in this process. 
The recent revival of research in political economy provides 
analytical tools for analysing the interactions between the 
economic and political dimensions of change in the post-
communist countries. Gerard Roland concludes from his 
brief survey of this strand of research that gradualism is a 
sustainable strategy for irreversible reform if the sequencing 
of policies leads to the creation of constituencies in favour 
of reform and if at any point in time the cost of returning to 
the old system exceeds that of implementing further reform 
measures for the majority of the population. This is broadly 
the strategy that was followed under perestroika, but Gerard 
Roland considers that Mr Gorbachev failed at a critical 
juncture to use the momentum created by the first steps in 
democratization and liberalization. Roland also discusses 
assistance policies to the former Soviet republics. He doubts 
that stable relations will emerge spontaneously and advo-
cates that international assistance be conditional on the 
conclusion of inter-republic agreements. 
Yaroslav Kuzminov takes up a point from Philip Hanson's 
paper: establishing the legislative and regulatory framework 
of a market economy is essential, but to make it effective 
there must be proper implementation. Kuzminov sees the 
ability to participate in a market economy and to observe 
its rules as requiring a deep cultural change, involving the 
acquisition of not only new knowledge and skills, but also 
new values. Since it would be impossible to reach everyone 
individually, actions to change economic culture should 
focus in the first place on researchers and teachers, in the 
expectation that they will influence politicians, managers, 
officials and ultimately the rest of the populatiOJl. Kuzminov 
points out, however, that changing what he calls mass con-
sciousness may be difficult, particularly because people in 
the former Soviet Union have become suspicious of anything 
that smacks of ideology and will judge the market economy 
by how their personal well-being is affected. 
We would like to express our gratitude to all the people who 
contributed in one way or another to this volume. Jorge 
Braga de Macedo, who was then Director for National 
Economies in DG II, was a driving force behind the whole 
effort, which benefited from the support of Jean-Louis 
Political economy and economic culture 
Cadieux, Deputy Director-General for External Relations, 
Giovanni Ravasio, Director-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs, and Michael Emerson, head of the Com-
mission's delegation in Moscow. We would also like to thank 
for their contribution the discussants in the October 1991 
workshop: Anton Brender, Daniel Cohen, Daniel Gros, 
Alexander ltalianer, Fleming Larsen, Ivan Materov, 
D. Mario Nuti, Richard Portes, Andre Sapir, Jiirgen Voss 
and Rutger Wissels. 
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Introduction 
In 1991 the Soviet Union experienced severe financial up-
heavals: suppressed and open inflation were mounting, and 
hyperinflation became a real possibility. The high level of 
the budget deficit' which in recent years had not fallen below 
10% of GNP, and probably rose by some 5 percentage 
points in 1991, the loss of control by the State over the 
evolution of the monetary situation as well as the non-
existence of any instruments to monitor it, all brought the 
country to the edge of financial catastrophe. This statement 
is no exaggeration, in view of the size of the country, the 
acuteness of the political contradictions tearing it apart, and 
the absence of any practice of resolving financial problems 
in a civilized way during the last 60 years. 
Nowadays, many people believe that the breakdown of the 
fiscal system in the USSR was caused by the perestroika 
process, and its inconsistent and slow movement towards a 
market economy. They also believe that the old system 
enabled us to cope with all the problems that have been 
encountered. 
On the contrary, the majority of the financial problems that 
the Soviet Union faced in 1991 resulted from the functioning 
of the old system. This is what I shall try to show in the first 
part of the paper, in which I will analyse the problems of 
the old budgetary system, the distribution of expenditure 
among different levels of government, and the function of 
the budget deficit. 
The period 1990-91 was one of the most critical in Soviet 
history: dramatic changes took place in the economy, poli-
tics, State organization and ideology. Of course they influ-
enced the development of the economic situation and the 
decision-making process. Unfortunately for economic re-
form, most of those changes had a negative effect on t~e 
budgetary system, and made the success of macroeconomic 
stabilization even more problematic. In the second part I 
will analyse the development of this process and the trans-
formation of the old Soviet budgetary system. 
The third part is devoted to a quantitative analysis of the 
changes that took place in 1991. Taking into account politi-
cal decisions, and the aggravation of the economic crisis, I 
shall try to estimate recent imbalances in the Soviet budget-
ary system. 
Here and elsewhere I analyse the consolidated deficit of the Soviet 
budgetary system including extra-budgetary funds, unless indicated 
otherwise. 
The inheritance of the past 
In the fourth part I shall try to analyse the possible trans-
formation of the Soviet budgetary system in the near future, 
taking into consideration different viewpoints on this ques-
tion existing in the USSR. 
1. The inheritance of the past 
Nowadays, many people believe that the breakdown of the 
fiscal system in the USSR was caused by the perestroika 
process and its inconsistent and slow movement towards a 
market economy; they hold that the old system enabled us 
to cope with all the problems encountered. 
I, for one, do not find this point of view sufficiently_justifi~d. 
The majority of the financial problems that the Soviet Umon 
faced in 1991 resulted from the functioning of the old system, 
from manifestations of its fundamental features that had 
been suppressed for a long period of time. The point is that 
within the command economy the fiscal system, as well as 
money in general, did not play any active role. It was more 
like the financial service of some gigantic corporation, the 
objective of which is to augment the system of inner material 
flows, accounted in a special system of inner prices, and to 
effect mutual settlements of accounts so as to bring about 
the required reallocation of funds. 
The Soviet fiscal system coped with this task rather success-
fully as long as it was possible to continue expanding pro-
duction by drawing more and more new resources (natural, 
human, etc.) into production. When all these were exhausted, 
some internal trends of its evolution manifested themselves. 
This became evident from the mid- l 980s. 
1.1. The old system: income side 
Ever since 1931, when budgetary reform in the Soviet Union 
was implemented, there had been no real taxation system. 
The main sources of budget revenue were contributions 
from enterprise profits, turnover tax, and revenue from 
international economic activity. 
Financial contributions of enterprises to the budget in the 
USSR were for decades based on administrative principles, 
under which the ministries responsible for particular indus-
tries drew up individual financial plans for enterprises, tak-
ing into account to a limited extent their need for investment 
resources and for funds for social expenditure. The rest of 
their profits were transferred to the budget and/or to the 
centralized funds of the sectoral ministries. Since the ministry 
decided how the enterprises' profits were distributed, the 
enterprises could ask the ministry for additional resources if 
s 
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their situation changed. To put it more accurately, until 
recently enterprises paid no attention to money at all, be-
cause the most important thing for them was to receive 
material resources, quotas and other types of 'ration cards'. 
This system has been in operation for almost 60 years, 
successfully performing its functions - from the viewpoint 
of the command economy. In 1987-88 the first step towards 
a tax system was taken: fixed 'economic rates' were intro-
duced. The absolute amounts of payments set in financial 
plans were replaced by fixed percentage rates. These rates 
were, however, set for each enterprise individually and 
ranged from Oto 94% of profits. 
In addition, enterprises paid social security contributions 
(rates differed from one ministry to another, and ranged 
from lO to 18% of wage and salary expenditure) which 
covered no more than 65% of expenditure for these purposes 
(these sums were included in production costs and, with 
prices fixed by the State, had no tax leverage on the profits 
of enterprises). There was also a tax on the wage fund and 
a tax on transport facilities calculated per unit of engine 
power. 
A turnover tax also existed in the USSR. But although it 
sounded very much like its Western counterparts, in fact it 
was very different (Raiklin, 1988). All books and manuals 
define it as follows: 'Turnover tax is a form of centralization 
and redistribution of part of net income'. What this means 
is that by creating a centralized system of prices, with re-
duced prices for raw materials and excessive prices for con-
sumer goods, the State withdrew sizeable sums from circu-
Table 1 
Income structure of the consolidated budget of the USSR, 1985-91 
1985 1986 
Total expenditure 100,0 100,0 
National economy 56,3 56,3 
Subsidies to prices 17,9 18,1 
Defence 4,9 4,6 
State management and security 2,3 2,2 
Science 3,5 3,5 
Social and cultural activities 29,0 28,7 
Security and insurance 15,1 15,2 
Foreign economic activity 0,6 1,2 
Sources: 1985-88: A study of the Soviet economy, 1991. 
1989-90: Gosudarstvennyi budget SSSR, Moscow, 1990. 
1990-91: Ekonomika i Zhizn', 1991, No 25, and own calculations. 
6 
lation. Moreover, this tax included excise duties on certain 
types of goods (cars, tobacco, alcohol, etc.). The system of 
fixed prices made it possible to set the rates of the turnover 
tax as absolute sums per quantity of goods. 
Revenue from international economic activity derived from 
the inconvertibility of the rouble, the State's monopoly on 
international economic activity, and the substantial differ-
ences between domestic and world prices. As a result, the 
budget received huge incomes from the export of raw ma-
terials - whose domestic prices were relatively low - and 
from the import of consumer goods - whose domestic 
prices were relatively high. 1 
The overall structure of budgetary incomes is shown m 
Table 1. 
1.2. The old system: expenditure side 
Budgetary expenditure was also linked to the command 
economy (Table 2). The State, being the owner of almost all 
property and having organized the economy as a single 
factory, was obliged to carry a heavy burden to support the 
functioning and development of this mechanism - more 
than one-third of total expenditure in the consolidated 
budget was directed towards investment, subsidies to loss-
making enterprises, and price subsidies. 
Also included in this income were foreign credits received by the govern-
ment; their share is impossible to distinguish. · 
(%) 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
54,5 44,2 41,5 38,1 22,9 
17,9 20,7 20,8 22,1 12,7 
4,7 12,5 15,6 13,9 10,6 
2,1 2,1 2,1 2,3 2,2 
2,9 3,7 2,1 2,2 1,8 
29,7 29,2 28,9 31,8 30,2 
15,3 15,2 14,6 14,8 17,1 
2,8 3,4 5,9 5,4 2,8 
Table 2 
Expenditure structure of the consolidated budget of the USSR, 1985-91 
1985 1986 
Total income 100,0 100,0 
Turnover tax 26,2 24,6 
Taxes (contributions) on enterprises 32,1 34,9 
Personal taxes 8,1 8,4 
Income from international activity 19,1 17,3 
Social security contributions 6,8 7,1 
Sources: 1985-88: A study of the Soviet economy, 1991. 
1989-90: Gosudarstvennyi budget SSSR, Moscow, 1990. 
1990-91: Ekonomika i Zhizn', 1991, No 25, and own calculations. 
Another mechanism that had to be supported was the Soviet 
military machine, which consumed a substantial part of 
national product and of budgetary resources. 
There is no doubt that the build-up of Soviet military power 
during that period contributed to the worsening of the econ-
omic situation and to the financial destabilization, but in 
the absence of authentic statistics, it is rather difficult to 
assess the impact of this factor. The official data quoted by 
S. Akhromeev (Table 3) indicate that from 1976 to 1989, 
Soviet military expenditure increased by 90%. Whatever the 
true level of military expenditure, 1 it could not but bring 
pressure to bear upon the economy. In spite of the military 
cutback in 1990-91, which reduced expenditure by 10 to 
14%, military expenditure still constituted a heavy burden 
on the economy. 
The third most important category of budgetary expenditure 
was social programmes. The command economy entails an 
informal, peculiar social contract between the State and 
society: the State undertakes all the functions related to 
managing and developing the economy and guarantees that 
a certain set of individual needs will be met, hence the bulk 
of social services is distributed free of charge and equally; 
members of society, for their part, promise to discharge their 
production duties in relative good faith and do not demand 
The traditional ways of concealing the full expenditure on defence in 
the USSR were either to hide the individual articles of the military 
budget (the expenditure on military space appeared in the science sec-
tion, military pensions were paid for outside the framework of the 
Ministry of Defence budget, military construction was not always indi-
cated), or to use the price system. 
The inheritance of the past 
(%) 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100,0 
25,0 26,7 27,8 27,1 20,0 
33,7 31,6 28,8 26,2 14,4 
8,6 9,5 10,4 10,8 6,9 
18,3 16,5 16,8 15,2 9,9 
7,4 8,0 8,3 10,0 21,0 
too much from the State as regards either the level of their 
remuneration or the quality of social services. 
The observance of such an agreement requires many efforts 
on the part of the State as regards the organization of the 
redistribution system: the amounts to be redistributed have 
to grow much faster than in market economies. 
Table 3 
Soviet military expenditure, 1976-90 
( R billion) 
Year Budgetary Revised Revised estimates 
data estimates as a share of: 
NMP GNP budgetary 
expenditure 
1976 17,2 39,8 10,4 7,8 17,5 
1977 17,2 41,2 10,3 7,7 17,0 
1978 17,2 43,7 10,4 7,7 16,8 
1979 17,2 45,9 10,6 7,8 16,6 
1980 17,2 48,9 10,8 7,9 16,6 
1981 17,1 51,1 10,7 7,8 16,5 
1982 17,1 53,4 10,5 7,8 15,5 
1983 17,1 57,6 10,7 7,9 16,3 
1984 17,1 60,9 10,9 8,0 16,4 
1985 19,1 63,5 11,2 8,2 16,4 
1986 19,1 66,3 11,5 8,3 15,9 
1987 20,2 69,4 11,9 8,4 16,1 
1988 57,3 72,8 11,8 8,3 15,8 
1989 76,9 76,9 11,5 8,1 15,3 
1990 70,7 70,7 10,6 7,4 14,5 
Sources: Megapo/is- Express No 8, 1991; A study of the Soviet economy, 1991. 
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1.3. Perestroika: What has happened? 
In the history of the USSR, the share of the net material 
product (NMP) 1 reallocated through the budget system 
never fell below 50%, i.e. approximately 37 to 38% of GNP 
(Graph I). 
The high level of this indicator during the pre-war and war 
years (up to 75%) is understandable. After declining from 
1950 to 1958 as a consequence of post-war restructuring, it 
remained approximately at the same level (52 to 55% of 
NMP) until 1974. The rates of growth of budget expenditure 
and of NMP during that period were almost equal. 
From 1975, Soviet economic growth began to slow down, 
and the growth of budget expenditure continuously exceeded 
the growth of NMP. To fulfil the social contract, the State 
was forced to look for new sources of revenue, in the first 
Net material product was the most important macro-indicator in the 
USSR until 1987, when GNP began to be calculated. 
place by increasing exports of raw materials; the increase in 
world oil prices - the basis of Soviet exports - certainly 
played in its favour. 2 All this resulted, between 1974 and 
1982, in an increase in the share of the budget expenditure 
in NMP from 55 to 67-68%. At that time the Soviet people 
had the impression that their living standards were being 
significantly upgraded, and later the situation of the early 
1980s was used to demonstrate the losses inflicted by peres-
troika. 
In 1985 came the next stage in the increase in the share 
of budget expenditure. It was caused by the initial policy 
undertaken by the new leadership: the so-called acceleration 
( uskorenie) of the development of machine-building cost the 
budget about R 20 to 25 billion of additional expenditure 
from 1985 to 1987. It did not produce any real effect, 
and the implementation of the previously planned social 
programmes began against the background of practically 
zero economic growth (Graph 2). 
Soviet oil export revenues from 1974-82 were USD 180 billion higher 
than in the previous nine years . 
GRAPH I: Share of budgetary expenditure in GNP and NMP, 1955-91 
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GRAPH 2: Comparative growth of nominal NMP and budgetary expenditure, 1955-90 
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At that time, the Soviet leadership discussed whether the 
five-year plan should be fulfilled and the beginning of the 
radical reforms in the economy postponed, or whether the 
implementation of the five-year plan should be abandoned 
for the sake of economic reform. The first point of view 
won, and at the second Congress of the People's Deputies 
of the USSR in December 1989, the government presented 
a programme that stipulated the reinstatement of adminis-
trative management within enterprises and the stabilization 
of the economy on that basis. However, the recession in the 
economy became obvious in the summer of 1989, and all 
the attempts to make the old system work for any longer 
proved futile. The plan was not fulfilled , and the reform was 
not begun. At the same time, all the planned expenditures 
were made. 
One component of social policy is to keep retail prices for 
foodstuffs at a low level, through ever-growing subsidies to 
collective and State farms. By 1990 the share of subsidies on 
prices of agricultural products (irrespective of an increase in 
the arrears to the Agroprombank of the USSR) in total 
budget expenditure reached 25%. 
The beginning of the democratization process in Soviet so-
ciety in 1989 led to a much sharper growth in budget expendi-
ture, while the recession in the economy became quite ob-
vious. Newly elected law-makers at all levels of power rushed 
to adopt one new programme after another. In 1989 this 
was done only by the Union Parliament, but its efforts 
proved to be sufficient to increase the share of budget expen-
diture to more than 80% of NMP. In 1990 the republic 
parliaments and local councils followed suit. Legislated in-
creases in expenditure on social programmes (irrespective of 
the price rise in 1991) amounted to R 47 billion, which was 
higher than in the previous five years. By my calculation the 
aggregate expenditure of the Soviet budgetary system in 
1991 was actually planned to be equal to NMP, i.e. the level 
of reallocation of funds became proportionately much higher 
than in the old system. 
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1.4. Quasi-fiscal federalism 
After serious fluctuations in the Khrushchev era, because of 
the initial break-up of the administrative system and the 
numerous restructurings in the system of running the coun-
try, the distribution of budget expenditure by level of govern-
ment remained practically unchanged for 20 years (Graph 3). 
A slow rise in the share of central (Union) budget expendi-
ture was observed, while the share of the local budgets 
decreased. All this reflected the general strengthening of 
centralization of administration and the reinstatement of the 
command system (Knight and Waxman, 1991). 
With the beginning of perestroika, sharp variations started in 
the distribution of expenditure between the different budget 
levels. The years I 986-87 were marked by attempts to inten-
sify the centralization, with a view to realizing the then 
declared concept of acceleration and to supporting the pro-
GRAPH 3: Structure of budgetary expenditure 
motion of machine-building. A year later, it became obvious 
that these plans had failed . In 1988, with the advent of the 
democratic changes and the strengthening of the role of the 
republics in managing the economy, the share of the Union 
budget started to decrease and the share of the republic 
and local budgets started to grow. This evolution became 
particularly pronounced in 1991 , when laws extending the 
independence of the republics and local authorities came 
into force, and when centrifugal forces within the Soviet 
federation intensified. As a result, in 199 I, for the first time 
since 1965, the share of the Union budget expenditure fell 
below 50% of total budget expenditure, and even less if 
extra-budgetary funds are taken into account. The soaring 
share of the republics' budget expenditure, which now 
roughly equalled the share of the Union budget, testified to 
the serious decentralization of the budgetary system in the 
USSR. (This problem had another side - the loss of control 
over the consolidated budget of the country and the growth 
of the budget deficit, but this will be dealt with below). 
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1.5. The budget deficit ,._ 
The budget deficit in the USSR has been concealed by 
official statistics for a long time: it was acknowledged for 
the first time in 1989, but according to experts' assessments 
it had been in existence since the mid- l 960s, though small 
in size. However, within the conditions of the command 
economy it is difficult to speak about a real deficit. The 
State was free to dispose of the funds of all enterprises and 
was able to withdraw funds from them to the required extent. 
Therefore, it seems commonplace and unworthy to speak 
about the accumulated internal State debt or about the 
deficit of the past. 1 It is more important to note that by the 
beginning of perestroika (1985) the current budget deficit 
and the internal debt of the USSR had not been insti-
tutionalized. It is this fact that created a multitude of prob-
lems in the Soviet budgetary system, the majority of which 
were never resolved (Ofer, 1989). · 
A sharp increase in the budget deficit began in 1986, when 
simultaneously with the change in economic conditions (es-
pecially the change in the Soviet Union's terms of trade 
resulting from the fall in oil prices), a number of measures 
were taken which aimed at stepping up State investment and 
social expenditure and also reduced the revenue base of the 
budget (Table 4). At the same time, because of the gradual 
weakening of State control over the activities of enterprises, 
the State was gradually being deprived of the possibility of 
Soviet financial statistics concealed the methodology used in the compu-
tation of the budget deficit and the internal State debt. As a result, the 
state of affairs was extremely intricate and not quite clear, even to 
specialists. 
Table 4 
The inheritance of the past 
using, at its own discretion, the earnings of enterprises, 
which achieved a certain degree of independence regarding 
the utilization of their earnings. As a result, the share of 
wage increases in the growth of national income was two-
thirds from 1986 to 1988; in 1989 it approximated 100%; 
and in 1990 the real remuneration oflabour increased against 
an absolute reduction in real NMP. 
Tax receipts were drastically reduced, while simultaneously 
budget expenditure was stepped up. As a result, the average 
annual increase in budget revenue from 1986 to 1989 was 
less than R 10 billion, and that of expenditure over R 60 
billion. Consequently, the budget deficit and the internal 
State debt began to climb. 
In these conditions the government chose to patch up the 
holes in the budget by raising funds from the credit resources 
of the USSR Gosbank. These loans frequently carried no 
interest, no terms of repayment were specified and there was 
no commitment on behalf of the State to repay. 
An attempt was made in 1990 to shift to civilized methods 
of coping with the budget deficit - by issuing State bonds 
to the amount of R 75 billion. The experiment failed: neither 
the public nor enterprises wished to buy the liabilities of the 
State. It was only possible to sell bonds for R 60 billion, of 
which R 49 billion were bought by the Gosbank of the 
USSR. 
The increase in the budget deficit became one of the main 
reasons for the deterioration of the economic situation in 
the USSR. However, while in the course of 1991 the central 
,. ,,4 ,,, . 
Current deficit of the USSR State budget and domestic State debt, 1985-91 
(R billion, according to the methodology of the USSR Ministry of Finance) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1 
Budget deficit 18,0 47,9 57,1 90,l 91,7 88,0 170,0 
in% of GNP 2,3 5,9 6,9 10,4 10,3 9,8 17,0 
Internal debt 102,5 149,8 216,9 307,0 399,0 550,0 950,0 
in% of GNP 13,l 18,7 26,2 35,5 44,5 60,7 54,3 
Seigniorage (Ml increase to GNP ratio) 5,3 5,9 6,2 8,7 20,0 
I Own estimates. 
Sources: 1985-88: A study of the Soviet economy, 1991; 
1989-90: Gosudarstvcnnyi budget SSSR. Moscow, 1990; 
1990-91 Ekonomi/ca i Zhizn', 1991, No 38. 
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government seemed to realize the pernicious effect of under-
estimating the role of finance in the economy, the decentra-
lization of the fiscal system and the weakness of republic 
governments threatened to lead to a further increase in the 
deficit. 
2. Reorganizations: 1990-91 
The period 1990-91 was one of the most critical in Soviet 
history: serious changes in the economy, politics, State or-
ganization and ideology took place. Of course they influ-
enced the development of the economic situation and 
decision-making process. Unfortunately for economic re-
form, most of these measures had a negative effect on the 
budgetary system, and made the success of macroeconomic 
stabilization more problematic. 
2.1. Introduction of a tax system 
The legislation on taxation was adopted by the Soviet parlia-
ment in the spring of 1990 and became valid from 1 January 
1991. Much has been written about the Soviet taxation 
system, and there is no point in repeating what has already 
been stated (Aven and Alexashenko, 1991; IMF et al, 1991). 
Before the adoption of the tax laws there was a discussion 
in the USSR on the structure of the tax system and one 
widely accepted conclusion was that in any case it would 
not be possible to establish a fully-fledged tax system at 
once. The specific ways in which Soviet enterprises concluded 
their activity imposed many restrictions upon the freedom 
of choice for the authors of the tax system. Time proved 
that analysis right. Moreover, the final months when the 
tax system was in force showed that none of the taxation 
principles put forward by Adam Smith (equity, certainty 
and simplicity) were realized in the Soviet Union. 
(I) Horizontal equity, understood as uniform treatment of 
all taxpayers, was realized neither in personal taxation nor 
in the taxation of enterprises. Unevenness, of course, is 
permitted to some extent both in theory and in practice, if 
the purpose is to differentiate the taxation of incomes ac-
cording to their origin. But in the USSR the main reasons 
for uneven taxation were not these considerations but the 
ideological views of the creators of the tax system. 
Thus, in personal income taxation five different schedules 
were used depending on the type of labour activity (wages 
and salaries at the principal working place, earnings from 
combining jobs or non-recurrent payments, incomes from 
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creative act1V1t1es, entrepreneurial activities and peasant 
farms). In enterprises' profit taxation, the tax rate could 
vary depending on the form of property, the kind of activity, 
the size of the enterprise and even on whether the enterprise 
was under Union or republic jurisdiction (such a ruling 
was found in the legislation of the Russian Federation). 
Moreover, the legislation provided for possible variations in 
the turnover tax rate not only in accordance with the kind 
of commodity, but also in accordance with the specific 
manufacturer. 
Furthermore, the laws established numerous forms of tax 
relief which depended on the kind of enterprise. Such fea-
tures of the Soviet taxation system are easily explained: 
many such privileges and exemptions had existed before, 
each of them being supported by a certain stratum of society 
which had ways and means of exerting pressure upon the 
parliaments. But the absence of a uniform and universal 
approach towards all taxpayers was indisputable and would 
have been quite difficult to overcome. 
(2) The Soviet tax system showed an even smaller degree 
of certainty. The general political uncertainty caused by 
confrontation between the centre and the republics was 
manifested in contradictory laws and confusion in the legis-
lative field. But even Union tax legislation was subject to 
uncertainty: new taxes could be introduced by presidential 
decree and by a decision of the Cabinet of Ministers, alter-
ations in the law could be introduced within 10 days after 
its coming into force and then again within three months, 
the sales tax (for a wide range of goods) could be cancelled 
two and a half months after its introduction by a decision 
of the Council of Federation, a body which had no legislative 
rights. 
Such uncertainty in the construction of a tax system, fre-
quent changes in legislative acts, and lack of experience in 
the regulation of a tax regime resulted in a poor quality of 
the laws: many provisions were not clear or simply absent, 
and the solution of many questions was left to the discretion 
of the Cabinet of Ministers or the Ministry of Finance. 
Taken together these factors led to a 'departmental creation 
of rules and regulations', i.e. distortions in the nature of the 
laws by ministerial administrative documents. The most 
dramatic proof of the above was the replacement of the sales 
tax by a value-added tax by means of an instruction of the 
Ministry of Finance (February 1991). 
(3) Simplicity or complexity? For all practical purposes this 
question did not even confront the authors of the Soviet tax 
system: as the tax reform was bound not to change seriously 
the financial situation of enterprises, it was impossible to 
rely on a small number of taxes. 
Parliamentarians refused to discuss the problem of intro-
ducing an inheritance tax and a property tax. Because of the 
lack of acceptable methodological approaches, the declared 
environmental tax was not introduced. Because of poorly 
developed market relations and lack of basic land valuation, 
the land tax did not come into force, and the attempt to 
delegate this question to the republic level or the level of the 
local soviets was seemingly 'buried'. 
As a result, everything that was left, including taxes on 
profit, income, turnover, transport and sales was applied. 
But such an approach to taxation led to a loss of integrity, 
and not only because of the failure to introduce certain kinds 
of tax, but also because of the structure of the existing tax 
system. Thus, there were such anachronisms as the collective 
farmers' payroll tax being paid by collective farms as a 
substitute for personal income tax, or a turnover tax which 
could not be even called a proper tax because of its structure. 
But the most serious disadvantage of the Soviet taxation 
system was not that its structure contradicted theoretical 
principles, but that it did not fulfil its most important func-
tion - the fiscal one. In other words, it failed to provide 
the budget with the necessary funds. 
True enough, no reasonable tax system could have collected 
75% of GNP, which was the amount of State planned 
expenditure for 1991 (through the budget and extra-budget-
ary funds). But in addition, the steps undertaken by the 
republics in order to decentralize public finance and tax 
systems led to a relaxation of control over taxation, and to 
losses in the amounts collected. As a result, the consolidated 
budget deficit threatened to reach 15 to 18% of GNP in 
1991. In such a situation, the only option left to the State 
was to introduce the worst of taxes - the inflation tax. 
2.2. System changes in 1991 
2.2.1. Decentralization 
In the 1970s the old budgetary system acted as a brake on 
the development of the initiative of the Union republics and 
local authorities. 
The simplest way to receive necessary financial resources 
was to request the centre to include additional investments 
or social programmes in the plan, which resulted in the 
allocation of additional financial resources. Any arrears of 
local taxes were compensated for by additional allocations 
of funds from the centre. As a result, the expenditure of the 
republic budgets over the 10 years to 1991 doubled, while 
,• Reorganizations: 1990-91 
their own revenues increased only one and a half times. 
Neither the Union republics nor local authorities even tried 
to utilize their legal rights to develop an independent taxation 
base. 
However, the traditional low awareness of all financial as-
pects of the economic system and the conservatism of the 
Ministry of Finance resulted in the lack of any serious 
changes in the budgetary system of the country until 1990. 
In spring 1990, the Soviet parliament adopted the laws on 
'Fundamentals of economic relations of the USSR', Union 
and autonomous republics, and on 'General principles of 
local self-government and local economy in the USSR'. 
Most of their provisions were so general that they could not 
be put into practice. The most important aspect was the 
provision of the 'Fundamentals' which provided for indepen-
dence of the budgets at all levels. But the campaign to declare 
the republics' sovereignty had not yet started at that time 
(except in the Baltic countries) and no official paid special 
attention to that fact. 
By autumn 1990, however, the conflicts between the central 
authorities and republics were at their height. The country 
was dragged into the 'war oflaws', 'war of banks', 'budgetary 
war', etc. In such conditions, the implementation of the 
budgetary independence principle resulted in an actual 
breaking up of the country's budgetary system into numer-
ous isolated fragments. No mutually acceptable solution 
regarding the distribution of revenue between the Union and 
republic budgets could be reached before the start of the 
1991 fiscal year, and January began without an approved 
budget. Neither side wished to abolish its laws which contra-
dicted those of the other. The answer was found in signing 
a budget agreement valid for one year which regulated 
distribution of revenue between the different budgetary 
levels. 
This agreement could have played a certain stabilizing role, 
but it had four significant shortcomings: 
(i) it was not agreed upon by the republics; after the agree-
ment was signed by the Union and Russia, a number 
of republics made their signature conditional on a re-
duction of their contribution to the Union budget or 
an increase in the transfers from the Union budget; 
(ii) the agreement did not entirely regulate the distribution 
of expenditure between the budgets, with the result that 
certain expenses were not planned in any budget (for 
instance the subsidy to prices of agricultural products); 
(iii) the agreement did not stipulate any control over the 
status of the country's consolidated budget, any regu-
lation of the deficit in the Union and republic budgets 
or of the methods for its financing; 
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(iv) the agreement did not provide for any responsibility for 
its non-fulfilment and hence the republics received 'full 
rights' to ignore the obligations they had undertaken. 
Taken together these factors resulted in a substantial deterio-
ration of the country's financial position in 1991; control 
over the national finances was completely lost. 
2.2.2. The reform of the social insurance system 
The separation of the social insurance fund from the budget 
and the establishment of extra-budgetary funds was another 
important step in the transformation of the Soviet budgetary 
system. 
Until 1990 contributions of enterprises for social insurance 
amounted to about 50 or 60% of social insurance and social 
security expenditure. The remaining funds were allocated in 
the budgetary frameworks from other sources. Conse-
quently, social security was an integral part of the Union 
and republic budgets. Such a system was in full accordance 
with the concept of finance in a command economy: the 
State did not care what the sources of funds were , and since 
the overwhelming majority of enterprises was its property, 
subsidies to the social systems proved to be subsidies to 
enterprises. 
By 1990, on the one hand, a quite conspicuous non-public 
sector of the economy had emerged and the State could not 
pay subsidies to this sector too, and on the other hand, the 
financial situation in the country had become so dangerous 
that funds had to be procured to replenish the budget. In 
spring 1990 a new all-Union law on pensions was adopted 
in coordination with the forthcoming price reform. 
According to the law, the system of social security was 
separated from the budget. A Pension Fund of the USSR 
was created, which was to be managed according to the 
principles of self-financing. It was necessary therefore to 
double the rates of contributions for social insurance. A 
payroll tax of 37% on enterprises was created for this pur-
pose, and in addition employees had to pay 1 % of their 
salaries. 
Naturally, decentralization of the budget entailed decentrali-
zation of the Pension Fund. In spite of the central govern-
ment's plans, some republics (Russia, Ukraine, Baltic repub-
lics, Georgia) rejected participation in the all-Union Pension 
Fund and established their own independent funds. As a 
result, the opportunity to redistribute financial resources 
through the Pension Fund of the USSR to the benefit of the 
regions where the demand for social security services was 
14 
higher than the receipts (primarily Central Asia) was lost. 
In autumn 1990, Russia and other republics which did not 
join the all-Union Pension Fund adopted their own pension 
laws. According to the these laws, the existing surpluses of 
the republics' pension funds were allocated to an increase in 
the level of the benefits. Thus, the united system of social 
security, which was based on a principle (uniform rates of 
payment and uniform scales of pensions and allowances) 
was demolished. To discharge the obligations regarding pay-
ment of pensions and allowances, a deficit of R 5 billion 
was stipulated in the consolidated Pension Fund of the 
USSR for 1991. 
2.2.3. Extra-budgetary funds 
In 1991, the establishment of extra-budgetary funds came 
into fashion with the authorities at all levels. By the middle 
of the year, two all-Union and about a dozen republic extra-
budgetary funds had been established. Unlike those of other 
countries, the Soviet extra-budgetary funds were created, as 
a rule, not for resolving a specific problem, but as a separate 
part of the budget. 
It is possible to classify all extra-budgetary funds in two 
categories according to the source of income (budgetary 
funds or captive funds) and two categories according to the 
purposes of their existence (general or special). 
The first all-Union extra-budgetary fund - the Fund for 
Economic Stabilization -was established under the decision 
of the President of the USSR at the end of 1990. 1 It received 
its own sources of income, and a number of outlays from 
the budget (investment, scientific research, transfers for less 
developed regions, etc.) were transmitted to this fund. Simi-
lar funds were created in the republics. 
The second fund - the Inter-republic Fund for Social Secur-
ity of the Population - was created in accordance with the 
decision to carry out the reform of retail prices of 2 April 
1991. 
Its receipts were supposed to consist of contributions from 
the republic budgets of resources acquired as a result of the 
retail price rise, and its expenditure was to be on payments 
of compensation and allowances to the people of the Central 
Asian republics and to all-Union consumers (armed forces, 
prisoners, etc.) 
The idea of establishing such a fund was initially put forward in the 
'500-day programme'. Its task was to support under rigid terms and 
conditions such enterprises which might be threatened by bankruptcy 
or could suffer serious damage in the course of an accelerated transition 
to a market economy, but whose survival was considered necessary for 
social or technological reasons. 
In addition, the republics now actively created extra-budget-
ary funds for a variety of purposes (road building, elimin-
ation of the consequences of natural calamities and techno-
logical catastrophes, regional support, etc.) 
3. 1991, the year of financial catastrophe 
3.1. Budget planning 
On the eve of 1991, the Soviet leadership faced for the first 
time the task of preparing a budget while the State had 
lost hold of the management of enterprises' activity and 
proclaimed that it was setting course for a market economy. 
Furthermore, the onset of this year coincided with major 
policy changes such as the reform of wholesale and retail 
prices, the introduction of new tax and pension legislation, 
and with changes in the conditions of foreign economic 
activity (new rouble exchange rate and CMEA reform). 
It should be noted immediately that both Union and republic 
leaders failed to solve this problem, and that errors made in 
drawing up the budget for 1991 in many respects predeter-
mined the course of events (Alexashenko and Yasin, 1990; 
Alexashenko, 1991 b ). 
(a) As already mentioned, no agreement was reached be-
tween the Union and the republics regarding the budget-
ary structure of the country (revenue and expenditure, 
distribution and limitation of the budget deficit). 
(b) In the planning of the budget, absolutely unrealistic 
assumptions regarding the economic prospects of the 
country were made: although industry was entering a 
recession, a general expansion of the economy was pre-
dicted; revenue increases from foreign economic activity 
were also forecast, in spite of the obvious decrease in 
oil production. 
(c) The coming to power in the republics (and first of 
all in Russia) of populist-minded pseudo-democratic 
leaders resulted in the republics starting to set their tax 
authority higher than that of the Union; in competing 
with each other in their populism, they began to increase 
expenditure without ensuring that it was backed by any 
real financial sources. 
As a result of this, control over the consolidated budget and 
the deficit was lost. The general status of the budgetary 
system in 1991 and its changes as compared with 1990 are 
shown in Tables 5a and 5b. 
The Union Government, avoiding difficult negotiations and 
an honest search for compromises, proposed an unrealistic 
1991, the year of financial catastrophe 
Union budget for 199 l. It tried to shift the major part of 
the deficit to the republics (Alexashenko, 1991b). The lack 
of will to reach an agreement and the lack of understanding 
of its vital importance for all parties resulted in an agreement 
for 1991 being signed by all parties which proved to be only 
formal (Orlov, 1991). 
Starting from the first months of 1991 many republics, in 
spite of the agreement, decided to retain a sizeable portion 
of the resources due to the Union budget and to the extra-
budgetary funds to be established at Union level. The contri-
butions from republic budgets to the Union budget in the 
first half of 1991 amounted to 50% only of the planned 
figure, and to less than 25% for the Fund for Economic 
Stabilization, and nothing was transferred to the Fund for 
Social Security. The Union Government was forced to resort 
to the credits of the State Bank of the USSR, which was 
tantamount to a monetary financing of its expenditure, and 
a promise to depreciate the rouble further. 
As a result, the total deficit of the budgetary system may 
have amounted to 15% of GNP in 1991. 
3.2. Price reform 
The fulfilment of the comprehensive reform of wholesale, 
purchase and retail prices, conceived and elaborated in 1986-
87, was delayed for more than a year in the USSR. The first 
step was to raise purchase prices for grain on 8 May 1990, 
and the last was the price increases of 2 April 1991. This 
step was one of the essential milestones of the economic 
strategy worked out by the Ryzhkov-Pavlov governments. 
The programme was intended to carry out a comprehensive, 
centralized and simultaneous price-rise accompanied by a 
partial price liberalization. Apart from other goals, not rel-
evant to this paper, the price reform was supposed to im-
prove the country's financial situation by reducing subsidies 
for agricultural goods and only partially compensating the 
real income loss that individuals suffered because of the 
retail price rise. In addition, it was intended to solve to a 
certain degree the monetary overhang problem by a de-
preciation in the savings of individuals and enterprises, and 
also the State debt. 
As expected (Alexashenko and Yasin, 1991 ), the price reform 
failed to fulfil its major goals. True, the rise in retail prices 
reduced subsidies for agricultural products from 14,4 to 
7,3% of GNP, halved the real value of the accumulated State 
debt and of enterprises' monetary reserves, and devalued 
personal savings by 45% (taking into account the legislated 
compensation). On the whole, these results were positive. 
But, the fiscal goals were not reached. According to the price 
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Table 5a 
Changes in budgetary revenues, 1990-91 
(R billion) 
Incomes 1990 Factors causing change Unallocated 1991 1991 
plan2 for=st 
Tax Decline in Decline in Price refonn Price refonn Rouble 
legislation I production exports wholesale retail devaluation 
(-10%) (-10%) 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Enterprise taxes 
(contributions) 117 -24 -20 25 3 101 145 
Sales tax 66 1,5 67,5 20 
Rent payments 18 18 18 
Turnover tax 121 -23 80 -38 140 140 
Revenue from 
international ac-
tivity 67,8 -11 -5 10 7,2 69 35 
Geological fees 4,4 3,3 7,7 7,7 
Personal income 
tax 48,1 -2,1 10 -8 48 52 
Other revenue 44 6 50 56 
Total budgetary 
revenue 402,3 39,9 -33 -11 41,3 86,5 -30,8 6 501,2 472,7 
Non-budgetary 
revenue/Social 
Security Fund 44,7 77,2 25 146,9 148 
Stabilization 
Fund 120 120 45 
Total revenue 447 159,9 -33 -11 118,5 111,5 -30,8 6 768,1 665,7 
I All legal acts concerning taxation (laws, presidential decrees, government orders). 
2 Plan updated for 1 January 1991 taking into account Pavlov·s projects for retail price reform. 
Note: This table displays the main categories of budgetary revenues in 1990 and 1991 and an analytical decomposition of the change in several contributory factors. Colums 2 to 8 give the 
contribution of various policy and non-policy factors, so that (9)=(1)+(2)+ ... +(7)+(8). Column 10 gives the author's forecast for 1991, taking into account other factors (especially funher 
changes in economic conditions and tax compliance). 
reform draft proposed by Prime Minister Ryzhkov in May 
1990, retail prices were to be raised by R 200 billion on 
a full-year basis,1 135 billion of which was supposed to 
compensate individuals while the budget deficit would be 
reduced by R 65 billion. 
Calculations (Table 6) show that according to the govern-
ment's plans the retail price rise of April 1991 was expected 
to result in retail price increases amounting to R 270 billion 
in the last nine months of 1991. The population was to 
receive various forms of compensation totalling R 215 billion 
and therefore to incur net losses of R 55 billion. 2 
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According to the Soviet tradition, price rises are measured not in 
percentage terms but in absolute terms, i.e. as (P1-P0 ) Q0 , with P1 
new prices, PO = old prices, Q0 = (old) quantity. 
Correspondingly, R 360, 292, and 68 billion over the entire year. 
In reality, by I August 1991 prices and tariffs had risen by 
an additional R 45 billion.3 But the additional increase in 
the population's income in the form of various additional 
compensation and social plans (including those adopted 
by the republics), salary increases implemented under the 
pressure from various groups of employees, etc. amounted 
to more than R 107 billion for the same nine-month period. 
As a result, instead of a net loss, the population had gained 
some R 7 billion in income.4 
In nine months, thanks to the retail price rise, enterprises 
were supposed to gain about R 40 billion, taking into 
4 
R 60 billion on a full-year basis. 
This does not correspond to a gain in purchasing power in the standard 
Western sense, since the calculation refers to the additional nominal 
income as compared to the additional cost of a constant consumption 
basket. 
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Table 5b 
Changes in budgetary expenditure, 1990-91 
(R billion) 
Expenditures 1990 Factors causing change Unallocated 1991 1991 
plan1 forecast 
Price reform Price reform New budgetary 
National economy subsidies to prices 
Socio-cultural expenditures 
(excluding social security) and sciences 
International economic activity 
Defence 
Public administration and security 
Other expenditures 
Total budgetary expenditures 
Non-budgetary expenditures/Social 
Security Fund 
Stabilization Fund 
Total expenditures 
(I) 
194 
90 
27,7 
70,8 
12 
32,5 
427 
83 
510 
wholcsa!e 
(2) 
80 
8 
30 
2,6 
120,6 
120,6 
1 Plan updated for I January 1991 taking into account Pavlov's projects for retail price reform. 
retail 
(3) 
-120 
96 
14,6 
3 
-6,4 
29,2 
22,8 
programmes 
(4) (5) (6) (7) 
40 11 205 240 
46 240 250 
27,7 20 
-4 lll,4 103 
6,2 23,8 25 
17,5 50 60 
88,2 28,5 657,9 698 
44 156,2 160 
135 135 100 
132,2 163,5 949,l 958 
Note: This table displays the main categories of budgetary expenditure in 1990 and 1991 and an analytical decomposition of the change in several contributory factors. Columns 2 to 5 give the 
contribution of various policy and non-policy factors, so that (6) =(I)+ (2) + (3) + (4)+ (5). Column 7 gives the author's forecast for 1991, taking into account other factors. 
Table 6 
Income distribution effects of the April 1991 retail price reform 
Increase in retail prices and tariffs 
Compensation for price increases 
Changes in taxation 
Increase in income of population apart from 
compensation 
Subtotal 
Increase in budget expenditure resulting from 
retail price reform 
Total 
Note: All figures refer to the I May to 31 December period. 
Sauret: Author's calculations. 
Budget 
plan actual 
90 
131 
85 
- 29 
15 
15 
90 
145 
83 
- 73 
- 45 
- 28 
- 73 
Enterprises 
plan 
180 
- 47 
- 93 
40 
40 
(R billion) 
Population 
actual plan actual 
225 - 270 - 315 
- 62 178 207 
- 95 8 12 
- 30 29 103 
38 - 55 7 
38 - 55 7 
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account the fact that they enjoyed the benefit of the price 
rise, but had to pay out compensation to their employees 
and pay more taxes. Actually, it is estimated that in nine 
months they had gained about R 38 billion. 
What happened to the consolidated State budget (consoli-
dating the Union and republican budgets)? According to the 
plans, in nine months the budget was to receive R 205 billion 
by way of subsidy cuts and tax revenue increases, whereas 
all its additional expenditure was estimated at R 197 billion. 
In reality, as of I August one could estimate that with almost 
no additional income during the same period, its expenditure 
would go up by R 73 billion (including R 40 billion due to 
the social plans adopted by republics). Consequently, the 
budget deficit grew roughly by R 73 billion instead of being 
reduced. 
3.3. The transfer problem 
Until recently, this problem had not been the subject of any 
discussion in the Soviet Union, because unlike assistance to 
less developed regions, internal redistribution to less de-
veloped regions was taken for granted. Nobody in the Minis-
try of Finance, in the State Planning Committee, or in the 
Academy ever asked himself for what amount, to whom, in 
what way, on what terms and for what purposes these 
transfers took place. 
As the State arrangement of the Soviet Union became the 
subject of radical restructuring, this issue acquired a particu-
lar acuity for the recipient republics of Central Asia. Indeed, 
according to certain estimates, the volume of consumption 
in these republics substantially exceeds that of NMP. 
The old system solved the problem of republican income 
equalization the following way: the central economic bodies 
held individual negotiations with representatives of republics 
(i) to decide what part of the profit, withdrawn from en-
terprises, should be transferred to the republican 
budgets, in what proportions the yields from the turn-
over tax and private income tax should be divided 
between the Union and republican budgets, 
(ii) to determine the amounts of direct transfers (subsidies, 
subventions) to be made from the Union to the republi-
can budgets and the republican social security funds, 
and 
(iii) to decide upon the territorial allocation of centralized 
investments. 
It was all done within the framework of the general financial 
planning and redistribution of financial resources. 
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After the donor republics in 1990 declared their aspiration 
for independence and control over the collection of taxes, 
they cast doubt on the advisability of further free-of-charge 
regional support within the USSR. 1 In 1991 it was envisaged 
to carry out transfers at the expense of the all-Union Econ-
omic Stabilization Fund. But in practice, it turned out that 
the money-raising campaign for the fund failed - for the 
first six months of 1991 about 5% of the planned sums were 
received. 
As mentioned, the retail prices reform of 2 April 1991 
brought about the establishment of the Inter-republic Social 
Security Fund. Its conceptual objective was to redistribute 
the receipts from price reform in favour of the regions whose 
budget income did not suffice to cover payment of all-Union 
compensation and compensation of expenditure of all-Union 
consumers. But, as mentioned, instead of income the budget 
received new expenditure. Therefore this fund had no re-
sources. It was thus evident that in order to pay out compen-
sation, new resources would be needed. Thus, all methods 
of regional redistribution of resources in the USSR turned 
out to be blocked for various reasons, which could not but 
lead to new social conflicts and an aggravation of the finan-
cial situation in the country. 
4. Looking ahead 
The coup of August 1991 put an end to the development of 
the command economy in the Soviet Union, and in fact it 
became the demonstration of the impossibility of this system 
to resolve the problems that appeared in its path. The crash 
of the budgetary system and the inability to service the 
foreign debt indicated that the socialist State had become 
practically bankrupt internally and externally. This is the 
essential result of its own development. 
The victory of democratic forces does not raise serious hopes 
for a rapid resolution of the budgetary problems and a 
successful balancing of the budgetary system in the Soviet 
Union (or on its territory). Rather, the opposite tends to be 
true. The non-signed Union Treaty included provisions that 
could have facilitated future budgetary stabilization on the 
basis of rights/responsibility, and revenue/expenditure shar-
ing between central and republican levels of government. It 
could have led to some extent to the implementation of the 
principles of fiscal federalism. The defeat of the coup and 
This attitude also applies to intra-republic transfers. The largest of all 
republics, Russia, where regional differences are no less explicit than in 
the USSR as a whole, allocated only 3% of its consolidated budget to 
regional transfer expenditure. 
subsquent move to independence of the Soviet republics led 
to the refusal of the Union Treaty and to the disappearance 
de facto of the single country and of the federal government. 
Nevertheless, life is going on. Market reform not only be-
comes more necessary, but also more hard, both as regards 
~he measures which have to be implemented, and as regards 
its short-term effects. The cost of reform will of course be 
greater, if its implementation is delayed. 
Macroeconomic stabilization, and especially the stabiliza-
tion of the budgetary system, has to become the background 
for the whole reform, otherwise its success will be extremely 
problematic. The scenario and perspectives of macro-
economic stabilization itself depend on the answer to the 
question: how will the Soviet republics implement their re-
forms? There are two principal scenarios, joint reform or 
separate policies whose probabilities are nowadays roughly 
equal. In the short term, the choice for one or the other 
option will be more conditioned by political ambitions than 
by economic calculations. 
The first possible way - economic independence - may be 
realized in two variants: within some type of economic 
community (i.e. with coordination of monetary policies, a 
~egulated system_ of exchange rates, etc.), or on a completely 
mdependent basis. To my mind, this last possibility would 
!ead to a real economic war, because of the high degree of 
mterdependence of the real economies, which implies that a 
rupture of the existing economic links between enterprises 
ca_nnot be compensated by a recourse to alternative sup-
phers. There would be no winner among Soviet republics, 
and the population would be the main victim. Any rational 
economic policy would be impossible in such circumstances. 
The creation of an economic community - even very loose 
- w~uld mean that the republics are not able to pursue a 
fully mdependent fiscal policy. As the community implies a 
fixed exchange rate for currencies and freedom of capital 
movement, it will mean that the participating nations will 
lose part of their independence. The counterpart of rejecting 
monetary independence will be the consent by members at 
least to limit the financing of their budget deficits. Further-
more, an acceptance by the community members of budget 
deficit ceilings must be backed with efforts to find appropri-
ate methods of regional reallocation of financial resources. 
The second possible way was implicit in the Treaty on 
Economic Union. It is based on a single currency and a 
common fiscal policy. It presumes that republics will be 
responsible for determining their tax base, tax rates, and 
other essential elements of taxation, and for collecting taxes. 
Looking ahead 
Part of tax revenues in this case would go to cover central 
government expenditures.' 
Political confrontation, strong decentralization, and cen-
trifugal trends are making it hard to build a fiscal system 
patterned on a classic model with a strong independent 
central budget. Work in 1991 has shown that, at least, it is 
necessary to find solutions to several major problems: 
(a) coordination in the design of the tax systems and the 
determination of the overall tax burden, agreements on 
tax matters, and mechanisms to prevent tax evasion; 
(b) agreements on setting ceilings on the size of Union 
and republican budget deficits and methods of covering 
them; 
(c) arrangements to guarantee revenues for the Union 
budget, the financing of inter-republican programmes 
and fines on defaulting republics; 
(d) fixing the size of republics' contributions to the Union 
budget; and 
(e) sharing among the republics of receipts from turnover 
tax and from external economic activities (customs tar-
iffs and import and export taxes). .. , 
The search for solutions to the abovementioned problems 
will take much time and energy and calls for concord and 
compromise. In my view, the present generation of Soviet 
political leaders is not ready for this. Maybe documents will 
be signed, but their implementation is extremely doubtful; 
this increases the likelihood of the country's disintegration 
since it is impossible to resolve the budgetary crisis on this 
basis. The introduction of republican currencies and fiscal 
decentralization will become unavoidable. 
Conclusion 
The Soviet Union is trying to begin its market-oriented 
reform. Unfortunately this attempt coincides with the col-
lapse of old structures in the country. Political transform-
ations and battles among the politicians have relegated econ-
omic reform to second place. The largest part of the obstacles 
on the way of implementation of economic reform arises 
from the lack of a clear political future. 
In such conditions chaos in the USSR becomes more and 
more possible. The crash of the budgetary system in 199 l 
showed the impossibility for the old mechanism to continue 
It !s quite clear from a theoretical viewpoint that this approach is 
senously flawed because it would deprive the central government of 
fiscal p~licy as a macroeconomic instrument, but nowadays this is only 
one vanant acceptable to republics. 
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to support the functioning of the economy. No new mechan-
ism has been created yet, and its creation has even been 
delayed. 
Whatever kind of changes the Soviet republics may choose, 
they will have to answer the following questions when insti-
tutionalizing a new fiscal system: 
(i) Will there be a common monetary system? 
(ii) Who will be in charge of the macroeconomic policy and 
what instruments will there be at his disposal? 
(iii) In what way will revenue, expenditure and responsibility 
be distributed between the various levels of power? 
(iv) How will the tax burden be regulated and how will the 
tax regime be unified? 
(v) How will the budgetary deficit be limited and financed? 
The Soviet republics are facing the most dramatic transform-
ations in the budgetary system, they need to find solutions 
for many issues, and there is hardly any experience available 
that they can use. In my opinion, the Soviet disintegration 
has gone much too far. It is very likely that the member 
States of the community will introduce their own currencies 
and put an end to the common Soviet budgetary system. 
Former Soviet republics will face all budgetary problems on 
their own. 
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Postscript 
The events of November-December 1991 seriously changed 
the situation. The Soviet Union was disintegrated com-
pletely, the negotiation process on an economic community 
was broken under the initiative of Russia and the Ukraine 
- the largest countries on the territory of the USSR, all 
republics became independent States and were recognized 
by the world community. But as regards macroeconomic 
and financial stabilization nothing was done, and in the last 
weeks of 1991 republics began a new financial war, with 
Russia conquering the Gosbank and Goznak (printing press) 
in an attempt to influence the behaviour of other republics 
so that they would follow Russia in economic policy. 
The deficit of the consolidated Soviet budgetary system 
reached 18% of GNP in 1991 and not one republic took 
steps to correct this. The crucial questions for the future 
reform - how to reduce the budget deficit, how to coordi-
nate financial policy having a common currency unit -
remain without answer. And this means that all projects of 
reform and macroeconomic stabilization have no serious 
background as yet. 
January 1992 
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Introduction 
Attempts to transform the Soviet economic system during 
the years of perestroika delivered a severe blow to the stab-
ility of the financial and credit systems and the monetary 
circulation in the Soviet Union. Over the course of five years, 
beginning in 1986, monetary stability has been replaced by 
the threat of hyperinflation. 
The rise in inflation had its origins in the comprehensive 
destruction of the very basis of the command economy, 
and later was stimulated by changes in the State system of 
macroeconomic regulation. These destructive processes freed 
inflationary mechanisms that were inherent in the Soviet 
economic system from the beginning. Meanwhile the con-
structive processes of building a market economy and re-
forming macroeconomic policy on a Union-wide scale were 
carried out spontaneously, by economic actors at various 
levels, rather than directed from the centre, and then only 
with a delay. Moreover, progress in this direction was re-
strained by the central government and at present is blocked 
by 'acute political problems arising from the process of redis-
tribution of powers among the former republics of the Soviet 
Union. 
In Section 1 we describe the principal inflationary mechan-
isms that existed in the Soviet command economy before 
perestroika and remained intact during the transitional per-
iod of 1986-90. We also discuss how the influence of certain 
of these mechanisms has been sharply enhanced by fruitless 
and erroneous innovations in the area of economic manage-
ment. 
In 1991 a new phase of inflation began, as the measures 
undertaken by the administration of Prime Minister 
V. S. Pavlov, intended to stabilize the economy, in fact 
speeded up the disintegration of the centralized system of 
macroeconomic regulation. In Section 2 we show that by 
leaving in place the economic mechanisms inherited from 
the old paternalistic system, these drastic measures were 
doomed to failure. The economic and political contradic-
tions between the republics in effect blocked any attempts 
to bring about financial stabilization within a single-currency 
system. 
In Section 3 we consider the likely further development of 
inflation in the Soviet Union under alternative political and 
economic conditions that might result from future agree-
ments among the republics. We present estimates of the 
inflation rate under the assumption that a new stabilization 
programme is implemented within the framework of an 
agreement to maintain a single-currency system and a single 
macroeconomic policy. We also give estimates for a scenario 
that assumes that the republics conduct independent macro-
economic policies within the existing monetary system. 
Soviet inflation: sources, mechanisms and effects 
The combined balances of income and expenditure for the 
State, enterprises, and the population (Annex 1) are the 
methodological bases for our analysis of inflation. In Section 
3 we use the model of Dornbusch (1990) as well as our own 
model (Annex 2) to estimate inflation prospects. 
1. Soviet inflation: sources, mechanisms 
and effects 
I. I. An overview of the inflationary process 
A tendency toward inflation has always existed in the Soviet 
economy. Its causes lie in the way a centrally planned econ-
omy functions, in the structure of its budgetary and banking 
systems, and in the price mechanism, which will be analysed 
in this part of the paper. 
Although nominally the Soviet budget deficit remained mini-
mal until the mid- l 980s, in reality unlimited State credits to 
finance the deficits of inefficient enterprises gave rise to 
excess liquidity - the so-called monetary overhang. The 
dynamics that generated the overhang were a constant, on-
going process. However, the State had at its disposal mech-
anisms to restrict inflation and eliminate the overhang. The 
expenses of all State enterprises (which made up an over-
whelming majority of the productive sector in the Soviet 
economy) were subject to the control of higher administrat-
ive bodies. Departures from planned rises in wages were 
severely punished. Unspent money balances were confiscated 
for the budget at the end of the year. However, wages and 
other incomes paid to the population and not spent for 
current expenditure could not be confiscated in the same 
way. This is why prices were regularly raised, reducing the 
value of money in the hands of the population and thus 
reducing the overhang. Moreover, restrictive monetary re-
forms were carried out in 1933 and 1948, and in the 1950s 
compulsory loans by subscription were used to absorb excess 
liquidity as well. Although sometimes such mechanisms tem-
porarily resulted in an equilibrium, they suffered from grave 
shortcomings: 
(a) the annual confiscations of enterprises' assets gave en-
terprises an incentive to spend all unused money balances 
before the end of the year, regardless of whether the 
money could be used efficiently; 
(b) the balance improved for only a short time after the 
centralized rise in prices, whereas in the long run short-
ages were regularly observed; 
(c) the rises in what had been fixed prices engendered in-
flationary expectations, which promoted increases in the 
excess stock of money. 
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The liberal reforms of 1987-88 eliminated the major instru-
ment for maintaining macroeconomic equilibrium in a cen-
trally planned economy, namely, administrative control over 
enterprises' expenditures and the confiscation of enterprises' 
assets for the budget. No sooner were these reforms im-
plemented than it became evident that the existing price 
system and the central government's budgetary, wage-price 
and banking policies suffered from grave shortcomings. They 
proved to be unsuited to a programme of economic lib-
eralization. 
• Under these new circumstances the budget began to lose 
tax revenues as a result of differentiation of tax rates for 
enterprises. These revenues were instead being accumu-
lated on the enterprises' accounts. Also, as open inflation 
strengthened in 1991, budget revenues began to be subject 
to the Tanzi effect. The irrational distribution of tax 
receipts among the different levels of government (local, 
republican, and Union) exacerbated the budget deficit. As 
the disintegration of the budgetary system proceeded, the 
local governments gained a certain advantage because of 
their more reliable revenue sources. The rapid growth of 
the central-government budget deficit was accompanied 
by the accumulation of surpluses on the accounts of the 
local budgets in the republics. Finally, these factors and 
the growth of social pressure on the budget due to populist 
forces resulted in enormous deficits in the State budget 
system. 
• Paternalism in the ministries blocked the implementation 
of income policies. Each ministry strove to provide the 
enterprises under its direction with a larger wage fund, 
to enhance its branch ministries' prestige. The so-called 
normative method used to determine the wage funds and 
the economic stimulus fund guaranteed this result (see 
Section 1.3). Despite the energetic efforts of Prime Minis-
ter N. Ryzhkov's government, the rise in household in-
comes got out of control. 
• The effective implementation of price reform was pre-
vented not only by the deep-rooted paternalism in the 
minds of the economy's leaders, but also by the coexistence 
of sectors where prices remained fixed with other sectors 
where prices escaped State controls. This structure resulted 
in a permanent need for subsidies. The implementation of 
price reform was also prevented by the social and econ-
omic situation that developed in the country after 1985. 
• Under these circumstances, attempts to initiate banking 
reform also weakened financial stability. The right to 
allocate credit to enterprises was transferred from the 
ministries and departments to the newly established 
branch banks, weakening State control over the emission 
of credit. Whereas the ministries were well informed about 
the financial position of the enterprises under their control, 
and could effectively use the credit mechanism to support 
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inefficient enterprises, the new special banks solved this 
problem less effectively. Therefore, the pressure for subsid-
ies increased. 
These several factors in effect blocked the use of the tra-
ditional instruments for maintaining macroeconomic equi-
librium and promoted the accumulation of the monetary 
overhang. The continued transition to a market economy 
was seriously complicated by the existence of this overhang 
on an unprecedented scale. The need to implement special 
stabilization policies, which threatened to derail the move 
to a market orientation, led to the coming to power of a 
government whose only goal was the overcoming of the 
crisis. 
As economic and political disintegration proceeded apace, 
the Pavlov government assumed a stance of gradualism in 
macroeconomic policy. Its macroeconomic and price policies 
in effect legalized and strengthened the inflationary mechan-
isms that had existed before. After a corrective price rise, 
prices were decontrolled in a number ofmultiproduct indus-
tries. At the same time, prices for staple foodstuffs, agricul-
tural products, fuel, and raw materials remained fixed and 
subject to State control. In the absence of effective mechan-
isms to limit budget deficit and credit emission, already by 
the middle of 1991 the rise in those wholesale prices which 
had been liberalized led to the need to restore subsidies to 
the fixed-prices sector on an even greater scale than before 
the reforms. The situation in the consumer goods sector was 
made worse by the failure of the government's restrictive 
incomes policy and by the fall in output and imports. After 
the price decontrol measures of April 1991, about 60% of 
the retail turnover of State trade was in principle to be sold 
at flexible (either free or regulated) prices, but hopes that 
this would play a balancing role proved unjustified. The 
right to set prices was never passed to the independent shops, 
but instead was left in the hands of the trade bureaucracies, 
which were not interested in negotiating equilibrium prices. 
The majority of 'free' retail prices proved to be quasi-fixed 
prices. As a result, open and suppressed inflation appeared 
simultaneously on the consumer goods market. 
The further strengthening of financial destabilization by the 
maintenance of fixed prices eventually destroyed the basis 
for trade among the republics. The country began gradually 
to make the transition from a 'war of laws' to economic war 
among the republics. Instead of carrying out salutary policies 
of liberalization in their own economies, the republics' 
governments sought to improve their trade balances and 
terms of trade by manipulating fixed prices and commodity 
flows. It is evident that before they understand the error of 
this policy, the collapse of the general economic space will 
push the republics towards the collapse of their own econom-
ies. Possible scenarios are described in Section 3. 
Measuring inflation 
As increases in wholesale and retail prices take place in the 
presence of a monetary overhang, to measure inflation on the 
basis of observations of sale prices and trade deals is inaccurate. 
Commodities whose prices are fixed are sold at irregular inter-
vals, and a tendency toward barter is observed. In such a 
situation, how best to estimate inflation is a matter of contro-
versy. One way, suggested by Soviet economists, is to measure 
the components of inflation: increases in prices together with 
Table 1 
Annual rates of consumer price inflation 
1986 
Inflation in the consumer sector, total of which: 5,0 
open inflation (the rise in prices and tariffs) 2,3 
repressed inflation 2,6 
(I) January to March; (2) January to June; (3) January to July; (4) January to August. 
Source: Reports of Goskomstat of the USSR. 
Inflation is calculated according to the formula: 
i = P + [(s - sn)/(1 - s)][l + P] 
1987 
5,5 
2,1 
3,3 
(I) 
where p is the rate of open inflation, s is the actual rate of 
savings in the current period, and sii is the 'normal' rate of 
savings. The first term of the equation reflects the rate of price 
increases, or open inflation; the second reflects the rate of 
suppressed inflation, together with a joint effect. 1 
Different approaches to the estimation of the 'normal' saving 
rate sii exist. The simplest method is based on analysis of the 
long-term dynamics of the rate of savings during a period 
Derivation of this equation (I) is as follows. Stan with the definition of repressed 
inflation as i1 = (s - s,,.)I/P _ 1C, where I is nominal income and C is consumption. Define inflation as i • p + i..-
Since I = P C/(1- S) by definition, equation (I) follows. 
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increases in forced savings, considered as a monetary equivalent. 
Forced savings consist of balances that economic agents are 
keen to spend on goods and services but which they have no 
opportunity to spend under existing conditions. Taking into 
account the controversial nature of the question, we will describe 
our approach to the estimation of inflation in the consumer 
sector (Table 1) in some detail. The conditional character of 
these estimates results from attempts to apply exclusively monet-
ary terms to what is only a half-monetary economy, with inferior 
money circulation and where the exchange process is not always 
based on the leading role of money. 
( Change over the same period of pre,iDus year, % ) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 
(I) (2) (3) (4) 
7,5 12,3 14,9 39,7 78,5 94,9 104,0 
2,5 4,0 5,0 26,3 57,6 61,4 65,2 
4,9 8,0 9,4 10,6 13,3 20,7 23,5 
when a comparative equilibrium was observed (Volkonskii and 
Vjugin, 1990). More complicated techniques are based on sys-
tems of regression equations containing an unobserved variable 
for forced savings, which for estimation is eliminated by al-
gebraic transformations (Vjugin, 1986; Belousov and Polyakov, 
1990). For the calculations presented in Table I the simpler 
approach was used. Table 1 shows estimates of Soviet inflation 
in 1986-91. Inflation before 1988 - the year when economic 
reforms actually began - was about 5% per year. In 1988-90, 
it reached 10 to 15% per year. The year 1991 was a year of 
severe inflation. Inflation accelerated in the first quarter of the 
year as a result of the January wholesale price rise. Because most 
retail prices remained fixed, suppressed inflation also intensified. 
After the retail price rise of 2 April, suppressed and open 
inflation increased in tandem. Little by little, retail prices escaped 
State control in the course of the year. The rate of inflation 
increased from month to month. Prices in the third quarter of 
1991 were 44% higher than in the second, having continued to 
accelerate after the corrective price rise of 2 April. 
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1.2. The budget-credit nexus 
Money creation in the Soviet economy results from a system 
of interrelations between the budget and the banks on the 
one hand, and the budget and the enterprises on the other. 
The main institutional defect of the system is the subordinate 
status of the State Bank of the Soviet Union to the Ministry 
of Finance, which represents the interests of the budget. 
Despite the parliament's decision of November 1990 to grant 
the State Bank independent status, one year later the real 
state of affairs had not changed in any significant way. 
Within the present arrangement, the financing of the budget 
deficit is not carried out on a voluntary basis through the 
purchase of securities by investors and banks, but by admin-
istrative redistribution of the financial means of the national 
loan fund. The inability of the Soviet economy to satisfy the 
effective demand of consumers (because of fixed prices and 
rigidities in production) creates forced savings, which cannot 
be converted into goods. Excessive government expenditures 
to maintain ineffective industries (including the arms indus-
try) and expenditure for social purposes make it unavoidable 
to draw on these forced savings of the population to finance 
State debt. A vicious circle is created, providing for the 
continued growth of the State debt and of hidden inflation. 
This shortcoming of the existing system is the flip side of its 
advantages in the context of the centrally planned system of 
regulation. Within this structure it performs its functions of 
redistribution of financial means in favour of ineffective 
sectors of the economy, which under the system of central 
planning have as much claim as more effective sectors. 
However, under conditions of weakening administrative 
control over enterprises' spending of their financial re-
sources, the former - and to some extent logical - policy 
of highly centralized budgetary distribution of financial re-
sources results in a rapid growth of the deficit (see Table 2). 
Beginning in 1986 the scale of State Bank credits to the 
national economy began steadily to decrease, and the credit 
resources of the banking system began to be used for the 
support of the budget. By 1990 credits to Union and republic 
budgets amounted to 61 % of the assets of Soviet banks, 
compared with only 24% in 1986. 
Table 2 shows that the increase in deposits of the State, 
enterprises, and households in 1987-91 was provided through 
an increase in State debt to the State Bank. Therefore the 
increase in the net assets of enterprises and the population 
was accompanied by a reduction in the net assets of the 
State. The State borrowed money from the State Bank in 
order to lend it to enterprises. In 1991 the growth in net 
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assets of enterprises was supplied additionally by credits 
directly from the banks to the enterprises. 
Within the Soviet banking system, the repayment of bank 
loans by enterprises has never been strictly enforced; on the 
contrary, the overdue debts of the State enterprises and 
kolkhozes are routinely forgiven. In addition, until recently 
the interest rate for the majority of loans was very low and 
played an exclusively symbolic role. In 1990, however, debt 
forgiveness reached an unprecedented level. The hopeless 
debts of enterprises were written off their accounts and 
attributed to the State debt. In that year R I 04 billion worth 
of enterprises' bad debts (about 11 % of GNP) were written 
off. Thus, as far as the development of inflation is concerned, 
there was no significant difference between the two sources 
contributing to the growth of the money supply: credits to 
the budget and cheap credits to the national economy. 
The year 1991 witnessed the disintegration of the Soviet 
budgetary system. Flaws in the tax system added to the 
Union Government's mistakes, leaving the more reliable 
sources of revenue at the disposal of the local (i.e. municipal 
and regional) budgets. The lack of clear criteria for the 
distribution of budget revenues and expenditures among 
local, republic, and Union budgets led to deficits emerging 
at some levels (primarily the Union level) and surpluses at 
other levels. According to data collected by the Ministry of 
the Economy, in the first four months of 1991 the total 
assets of the local budgets increased by R 31 billion, while 
the Union budget lost approximately the same sum. The 
Union budget's total deficit for January through to April 
1991 was R 32,2 billion; only 26% of revenues planned for 
the first half of the year were actually received. After the 
new laws on local self-government were approved, the Union 
budget completely lost control of the levers of revenue rais-
ing. The redistribution of a number of State expenditure 
items among the various budget levels turned out to be the 
only way to soften the loss of revenues. As a result, the 
republic budgets too experienced large deficits (see 
Section 3). 
Another inflationary mechanism is at work in relations be-
tween the State banks and enterprises. It results from the 
lack of a clear instrumental criterion of efficiency and expedi-
ency in determining the volume and allocation of credit 
resources to the enterprise sector. 
In a centrally planned economy the banking system consists 
in fact in a single bank with a number of branches. In the 
old Soviet system, the emission of credit by the State Bank 
did not depend on the volume of funds available, but was 
instead determined by a centralized credit plan. Credit re-
sources allocated to enterprises were planned in the general 
credit plan of the State Bank. 
Table 2 
Financial flows between the State, enterprise, and household sectors 
1. Increase in deposits (including money m 
settlements) 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 1 
Total 1987-911 
2. Gross increase of liabilities to the State 
Bank 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
199-1 1 
Total 1987-911 
3. Change in net assets (3 = I - 2) 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 1 
Total 1987-911 
State 
2,0 
6,9 
2,1 
7,0 
31,0 
49,0 
60,l 
97,3 
92,l 
87,0 
99,7 
436,2 
-58,1 
-90,4 
-90,0 
-80,0 
-68,7 
-387,2 
I, 
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1· 
Enterprise Household Total 
·(; 
:-:2,3 32,0 31,7 
22,8 41,9 71,6 
19,7 61,8 83,8 
-12,7 80,2 74,3 
109,3 25,0 165,3 . .:1·. 
136,8 240,9 426,7 
-21,7 0,7 39,1 
-26,3 2,7 73,7 
-13,5 1,6 80,2 
-26,7 4,2 64,5 
70,6 170,3 
-17,6 9,2 427,8 
19,4 31,3 -7,4 
49,1 39,2 -2,1 
33,2 60,2 3,4 
14,0 76,0 10,0 
38,7 25,0 -5,0 
154,4 231,7 -1,1 
Note: The sum of changes in net assets of the State, enterprises and households is equal to the balance of payments with reversed sign (sec line 3). Increase of deposits minus gross increase of the 
debt to the banks is equal to the increase of net assets (I = 2 + 3 or 3 = I - 2). 
' 1991: January to April. 
Sources: Statistical yearbook of 1989; Dengi i credit, No 3, 1991; Economic review of Goskomstat of the USSR, 'Soviet economy in January to April of 1991'. 
The reform in 1987 that created the branch banks brought 
little change in the operating principles of the banking sys-
tem, but made it easier for these banks to create money. It 
was assumed that the branch banks and their local depart-
ments, but not the ministries, would decide on credits. But no 
credit policy was defined. As in years past, the government 
interfered in the credit process, influencing the distribution 
of the State Bank's credit limits. After central banks were 
established in the republics, the republic governments began 
to follow the same tactics. 
The springing up of new banks was followed by the establish-
ment of special settlement centres, which were to consolidate 
claims between banks. The so-called method of interbranch 
settlements emerged and was implemented by these centres. 
It became an additional source of money creation within 
the banking system, because the consolidation of claims is 
carried out with a long delay. As a result, financial resources 
are credited at one bank without being at the same time 
debited at another bank. In 1987-90, one could observe the 
lengthening of the terms of settlements on mutual banking 
orders, which were carried out by the special system of 
settlement centres. As a result, about an additional R 
75 billion were created on bank accounts during this period. 
In 1991 the Law on banks and banking activities and the 
Law governing the State Bank of the Soviet Union were 
implemented, completing the transition to a two-tier banking 
system. All the former branches of the specialized banks 
were transformed into independent commercial banks. For-
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mally, the right of emission was assigned solely to the State 
Bank. But in fact the volumes of emission (the so-called 
credit limits) are distributed among the republic central 
banks (the former republic branches of the State Bank), 
which are thus empowered to expand emission through 
political mechanisms. Under pressure from its government, 
and lacking any real autonomy, a republic central bank may 
be led to exceed the established credit limit. In theory, this 
could lead to a shortage of cash in the republic. In practice, 
however, republics are supplied with cash in accordance with 
their demands. In some regions shortages of cash have been 
observed, in recent months, but only because the USSR 
Goznak (a department of the Ministry of Finance) lacks 
adequate facilities for printing banknotes. In fact, since the 
'banking war' of 1990, the State Bank of the Soviet Union 
has Jost the strict control it once had upon the emission of 
credit. 
The assets and liabilities of the branches of the former 
specialized banks have been distributed among the new 
commercial banks. The greater part of the accumulated 
bad debts has been distributed among a number of small 
provincial commercial banks, which lack the resources to 
roll them over. Thus, they are compelled to seek the support 
of the central bank. A portion of these bad debts was written 
off in 1990, providing an additional source of inflation. 
Accumulated stocks of bad debts were thus inherited by a 
new banking system built in accordance with new principles, 
and prevent the use of available monetary policy instru-
ments. An increase in interest rates on interbank credits runs 
into opposition from the banks, which hold large amounts of 
bad debts. Furthermore, there is no mechanism for enforcing 
claims - no formal bankruptcy procedures, nor a developed 
market for second-hand investment goods. Reserve levels 
for commercial banks are sharply differentiated, and this 
tends to maintain the inefficient redistribution of credit. 
For the banking system to operate effectively it would be 
necessary to carry out a large-scale write-off of hopeless 
debts: only under this condition would an effective monetary 
policy be possible. 
1.3. The failure of incomes policy 
From 1988 to 1990, while the incomes of the population 
increased by 44%, and those of enterprises by 35%, State 
budget revenues increased by only 13,5%. These sharp differ-
ences were caused by a partial liberalization of the former 
principles governing economic activities. Two aspects of the 
liberalization of economic regulation at the microeconomic 
level exerted a major influence on the distribution of in-
comes, providing ample opportunities for their redistri-
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bution in favour of enterprises, and from them into wage 
funds: first, the strict centralized regulation of enterprises' 
earning and spending was abolished for those State en-
terprises operating on a fully self-supporting basis; instead, 
sums payable to the budget as well as economic stimulus 
funds and wage funds were to be determined in accordance 
with indices of the enterprises' output against established 
norms; second, cooperatives and other enterprises and or-
ganizations not subject to direct centralized control began 
to spring up. 
The Law on State Enterprises (1987) indirectly proposed 
that the standards under which enterprises had to operate 
were to be established or approved by higher ministries and 
departments. However, the branch ministries were in effect 
lobbyists for the interests of the State enterprises. So the 
right to establish the norms used to determine payments to 
the budget, to the economic stimulus funds, and especially 
to the economic incentive fund were used by the branch 
ministries in the interests of the State enterprises. Even 
during the first stage of economic reform, these norms were 
formed in a bottom-up fashion by the ministries and depart-
ments, which as a rule supported the interests of the en-
terprises under their administration. This resulted in a nearly 
uncontrolled channel for transferring profits and de-
preciation allowances into economic stimulus funds, and 
from there into wage funds. In 1988, 40% of enterprises 
had been converted to new operating conditions on a self-
supporting basis. Already in the same year, the rate of 
growth of the wage funds was 1,6 times higher than that of 
industrial output, up from 0,7 times in 1987. 
In an effort to offset these negative tendencies, State govern-
ing bodies tried to rely on incomes policy. In particular, they 
tried to limit increases in average wages by linking them to 
increases in productivity. Not fully trusting the ministries, 
the government instructed the banks to control the corre-
sponding normative ratio, but the ministries and depart-
ments also overcame this limitation by getting preferential 
normative ratios established for their enterprises, according 
to which a l % increase in labour productivity led to more 
than a 1 % increase in wages. 1 In 1989, the increase of the 
wage fund in industry exceeded the increase in output by 
5,8 percentage points. 
At the end of 1989, a Jaw establishing progressive taxation 
of increases in wage funds exceeding 3% was adopted. How-
ever, its influence was weakened by the introduction in 
This procedure was not applied at all to a number of enterprises and 
branches. For example, in the first quarter of 1989, only 32% of 
the enterprises controlled by Promstroybank (Bank for Industry and 
Construction) had a normative ratio exceeding I. 
practically all industries of a large number of preferences 
and exceptions. 
The distribution of the financial resources to cooperatives 
and other types of quasi-private enterprises was not con-
trolled at all. The increase in financial resources at the 
disposal of enterprises led to the widespread practice of 
cooperatives affiliating themselves with State enterprises, 
carrying out part of their work, and paying additional wages. 
At the same time, the wage funds of enterprises did not 
decrease. This created an additional channel for transferring 
money to the population. The creation of cooperatives at-
tached to enterprises (which now make up about 70% of all 
cooperatives) makes it possible, first, for the enterprises to 
increase their output and enlist additional workers; and, 
second, to reduce the number of workers directly attached 
to the enterprise and to redistribute the wage fund among a 
smaller number of employees. A decision of the Council of 
Ministers of the Soviet Union providing for a decrease in 
the wage funds of enterprises that entered such arrangements 
with cooperatives was never effectively implemented. 
A sharp acceleration in the growth of incomes in the self-
financing sector has rapidly spread to the other incomes of 
the population, including that part of the population whose 
income depends on the State budget. A considerable increase 
in pensions, grants, and wages in budget organizations be-
came practically unavoidable. Whereas at the beginning of 
the 1980s some R 2 to 3 billion were spent for these measures, 
or 0,5% of the total volume of incomes, in 1990 a total of 
R 13,5 billion, or 2% of the volume of incomes were spent, 
and in 1991 spending of about R 65 billion was planned, 
or 9% of the volume of forecast money income of the 
population. 
In 1991, a tax was introduced on the increase in enterprises' 
total spending for consumption (that is, the wage fund plus 
expenditures for social needs). The tax was equal to the sum 
exceeding the untaxed volume of these means, the untaxed 
level being calculated by multiplying the value of the con-
sumption fund of 1990 (increased by 4%) by the output 
growth rate in comparable prices. In addition, a decreasing 
coefficient was applied to the basic fund (this coefficient 
varies from branch to branch, from 0,4 to 0,9). Difficulties 
in calculating this tax, constant changes in the parameters 
owing to price reform, and the abolishment of the tax in 
Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic republics, and in part in 
Russia, made any reasonable incomes policy in 1991 imposs-
ible. The decision by the Pavlov government to set a 
maximum wage rate of R 700 for all kinds of enterprises 
sets up the only real barrier to the growth of high incomes. 
~. In other words, the monthly wage fund is limited to R 700 
times the total number of employees. However, the majority 
of enterprises have not yet reached such a high level of 
average wages. 
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1.4. The limits of price policy 
In the pre-reform period, prices could change by either of 
two means. The first was centralized price rises decreed by 
State authorities. Changes in these listed prices are recorded 
in official statistics. The second was uncontrolled rises in 
prices in multiproduct industries. 
Centralized control over prices is effective only in single-
product industries. As a rule, these are raw materials indus-
tries (for example, electric power generation, oil and gas, 
coal, metallurgy, and timber). In industries that produce a 
wide range of products, centralized control of prices has 
never been very effective in practice. These are, as a rule, 
manufacturing industries and other industries that produce 
final products. Price rises in these branches can be achieved 
to circumvent the authorities by substituting expensive goods 
for inexpensive ones. This 'hollowing out' of the range of 
inexpensive goods was a widespread practice in the Soviet 
system. Price dynamics of this kind were not measured and 
therefore were not reflected in the price indices published by 
Goskomstat (the statistical office). However, a number of 
researchers have estimated these dynamics (Hanin, 1981, 
1988; Faltsman, 1980, 1989; Volkonskii et al., 1986). For 
example, the annual increase in industri.al building costs for 
1970-82 was estimated by Faltsman to be 5 to 6%. In the 
1975-82 period the cost of I m2 of dwelling space increased 
by 3,4% annually. 
During the period of centralized price rises, prices for fuel, 
raw materials and foodstuffs were therefore stable while 
prices for other goods were increasing. As a result, dispro-
portions were arising: the relative prices of raw materials 
were being understated, and those for manufactured goods 
were being overstated. Periodic centralized mass price re-
visions attempted to correct these disproportions, only to 
have them reappear. This phenomenon can be illustrated by 
the ratio of price indices for various branches in 1949, 1967 
and 1981 (Table 3). The same table shows the profitability 
of these branches before and after price revision. 
As is obvious from the table, the profitability of multi prod-
uct manufacturing industries fluctuated and in practice 
changed little over time. At the same time, profitability in 
raw materials industries was steadily falling between price 
revisions, to be restored-only after a centralized rise in their 
output prices. 
Thus, centralized price rev1s1ons temporarily reduced the 
excessively high and inflationary financing of ineffective 
single-product industries whose prices were fixed. However, 
because of the invariability of retail prices for foodstuffs and 
other basic goods, the main burden of financial support for 
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Table 3 
Index of prices and profitability before and after centralized price rises 
Branches 1949 1966 
I p 
Metallurgy 2,75 9,2 
Coal 3,1 -18,0 
Oil and gas industry including: 1,2 11,1 
oil production 
oil processing 
gas 
Energy 1,53 4,3 
Construction materials 2,23 6,6 
Machine building 1,3 19,3 
Chemicals 1,71 17,5 
Forestry and paper 3,27 6,1 
Light industry 1,05 31,4 
Food industry 0,92 19,2 
Other industries 1,17 13,3 
Agriculture 
Construction 6,7 
Transport and communications 14,5 
Note: 1 = production price index, base previous year = I; 
P = profitability (ratio of profit to capital)(%). 
Source: Statistical yearbooks for 1968 and 1984. 
inefficient industries was gradually shifted to the budget in 
the form of expenditures for subsidies, resulting in a disas-
trous increase in the State debt. 
The same method was used for the reforms of 1991. More-
over, the decisions to maintain fixed wholesale prices for 
fuel and raw materials and fixed procurement prices for the 
main agricultural products were made simultaneously with 
the introduction of free prices for the output ofmultiproduct 
industries. Given the ineffectiveness of monetary control 
this has sharply speeded up inflationary processes in the 
economy. Maintaining stable fixed prices in some branches 
while free-market prices in the other branches are increasing 
requires rapid growth in State subsidies. 
The retail price reform of 2 April 1991 provided for three 
types of prices: fixed, regulated, and free (contractual) prices. 
The principal foodstuffs were to be sold at fixed State prices 
(meat and dairy products, eggs, bread, fish products, sugar, 
tea, etc.). Prices for ordinary (Le. non-synthetic) kinds of 
textiles, clothes, footwear, children's goods, and some house-
hold and cultural goods could be raised within limits estab-
lished by the government. These limits were defined in the 
price lists of the State Pricing Committee (Goskomtsen) of 
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1967 1968 1981 1982-84 1983-8S 
I p p I p 
1,47 19,2 7,1 1,22 11,0 
1,81 8,2 -9,4 1,43 4,5 
1,08 25,5 14,3 1,67 19,0 
6,8 2,2 23,5 
23,2 1,57 14,5 
14,4 1,38 20,9 
1,16 10,6 5,9 1,38 6,7 
1,19 14,2 3,2 1,12 7,9 
1,0 21,2 15,3 1,0 11,6 
1,0 19,2 14,6 1,0 9,4 
1,21 20,1 5,8 1,16 12,3 
1,0 39,6 24,7 1,09 25,3 
1,0 22,4 18,4 1,03 18,5 
1,08 20,1 11,5 12,4 
1,0 1,11 
I, 11 6,8 11,4 I, I 10,2 
1,0 18,9 10,8 I, I 12,3 
the Soviet Union and of the regional pricing bodies_ No 
changes were allowed in the prices of the following goods: 
medicines; coffee; synthetic textiles, knitwear, clothes, furs, 
hosiery, footwear, and toys; fuel for household use; vodka_ 
According to calculations based on Goskomstat data, in 
1991 fixed prices increased by 100%, and goods sold at these 
prices made up 40% of total retail turnover. This figure 
includes 12% of turnover sold at unchanged prices and 28% 
sold at fixed prices that were raised by about 150% on 
average. 
About 40 to 45% of goods were to be sold to the population 
at free (contractual) prices. 1 Free prices were negotiated 
freely between the producers and the State trading organiza-
tions, which regulated the deliveries to the shops. The retail 
price was strictly linked Jo the selling price: the mark-up 
This group included vegetables, fruits, and potatoes, free prices for 
which were introduced on 15 November 1990; also confectionery, ice-
cream, soft drinks and mineral water, imported tobacco products, natu-
ral textiles and textile goods, fashion and imported clo\hes and footwear 
of high quality, carpets, sporting goods, clocks and watches, certain 
kinds of radio and electrical apparatus, and other goods. 
could not exceed 20% (in some regions 30%) of the selling 
price. Free prices for imported goods purchased with cen-
tralized currency resources were established by the Pricing 
Committee of the Soviet Union and those of the republics. 
All other goods (15 to 20% of the total) were subject to the 
regulated prices regime, under which pricing bodies defined 
the key parameters that determined the level of prices. These 
parameters could be the following: 
(a) the maximum level of retail prices (for example, 5 co-
pecks for a box of 50 matches); 
(b) the rate of profitability, and the trade margin (in this case 
the producer based the selling price on well-established 
production expenses plus some level of profit not to 
exceed the permitted maximum; this selling price was 
then the base for the regulated price); 
(c) maximum increases for fixed listed prices (for example, 
the maximum coefficient for light industry production 
was 20%, and that for liquor production 30%). 
This system resulted in the State shops in fact not participat-
ing in the process of retail price formation. This right was 
granted to the Goskomtsen of the Soviet Union, to local 
authorities and to old trade bureaucratic structures, whir,h 
had no economic interest in establishing equilibrium prices. 
It soon became clear that regulated prices were quasi-fixed 
prices and that 'free' prices at least included regulated retail 
trade margins. 
1.5. Conclusions 
During the first phase of perestroika, up to mid-1990, acceler-
ating inflation resulted from attempts at liberalization that 
proved to be only cosmetic, since all the institutional features 
of the centrally planned system remained. These included in 
the first place the paternalism inherent in the system and the 
mechanisms of macroeconomic regulation. 
The existing budgetary and banking systems in the Soviet 
Union could not withstand inflation without administrative 
control being exerted over the spending of enterprises' finan-
cial resources and wages, and without confiscation of their 
balances for the budget. The price system stimulated an 
ongoing need for increasing subsidies to those enterprises 
whose output prices were fixed. Centralized price revisions 
were periodically needed to correct the levels of profitability 
and the price correlations among various products. As the 
reforms of 1991 did not change the fundamental principles 
of macroeconomic regulation, the above features remained 
in place. 
The economic consequences of Mr Pavlov 
As a result, in 1987-91 the processes by which budgetary 
financial resources were redistributed in favour of enterprises 
and households were sharply strengthened. This resulted in 
massive excess liquidity at the disposal of enterprises and 
households and in a sharp increase in the State debt. 
After the middle of 1990 coherence in macroeconomic policy 
was lost as the budgetary and banking systems began to 
disintegrate. The banks in the republics seized the oppor-
tunity to create money without any control of the State 
Bank. The second stage of perestroika began. 
2. The economic consequences of Mr Pavlov 
2.1. The economic strategy 
At the end of 1990 the authorities had the following alterna-
tives: 
(a) to restore centralized control and to confiscate ex~ess 
monetary holdings through monetary reform, postpon-
ing the transition to a market economy until better times. 
Political forces supporting this choice did exist in the 
Soviet Union, but in our view the chances of this hap-
pening were limited; 
(b) to liberalize quickly the conditions of economic activity 
in conjunction with a strict stabilization policy of the 
shock-therapy type. Realization of this alternative was 
also unlikely, because there was no practical way of 
implementing it; 
(c) to undertake a gradual mixed policy, aimed at both 
stabilization of the situation and liberalization of econ-
omic conditions. 
In the summer of 1990 some 20 different economic pro-
grammes were proposed, reflecting all three of these points 
of view. Only two were officially considered in the parlia-
ment. One of these was the so-called '500 days' plan, which 
called for liberalization and shock therapy as a measure of 
financial stabilization; the other was the programme pro-
posed by President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, which called 
for a mixed policy based on gradualism. The Gorbachev 
programme was the one actually implemented by the parlia-
ment. 
Thus, the third variant of economic policy among those 
listed above was the one chosen. But in reality the majority 
of decisions were made under the pressure of circumstances, 
not in accordance with a considered plan. The central 
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government had no plan for the consecutive liberalization 
of economic conditions and the creation of a market infra-
structure. Liberalization was in fact initiated from below, 
with improvements going on under pressure from economic 
agents themselves (entrepreneurs, directors of State en-
terprises, bankers, cooperative workers, and so on). Without 
giving a detailed analysis, we can offer several examples: 
commercial banks sprang up in 1988, even though the law 
governing these banks was adopted only in 1990; commodity 
exchanges sprang up in the middle of 1990, and even today 
there is no legislation concerning them; the foreign-currency 
exchange has been in existence for more than two years (in 
the form of auctions, currency transfers, and so on), whereas 
the currency exchange of the State Bank of the Soviet Union 
has been in operation for less than half a year, and cannot 
yet be considered successful. 
The main aim of the activities of the central government was 
to stabilize the economic situation. Until 1991 stabilization 
was understood as an attempt at maintaining existing com-
modity flows through administrative methods. In 1991, after 
V. S. Pavlov became Prime Minister, some measures aimed 
at achieving macroeconomic equilibrium were also at-
tempted. From our point of view, the main task of central 
government at the end of 1991 was stabilization. 
Within the framework it had set, the Pavlov government 
implemented (or tried to implement) a number of mixed 
measures aimed at eliminating the monetary overhang and 
achieving macroeconomic equilibrium: 
(i) increases in the level of taxation, notably to finance new 
social programmes adopted by parliament in the autumn 
of 1990; 
(ii) a restrictive incomes policy to stop the process of redis-
tribution of financial flows from the budget to en-
terprises and households. However, price reform and 
the resistance of local authorities kept both this and 
previous measures from being carried out; 
(iii) gradual increases in interest rates to limit the volume of 
banking credit to enterprises. This policy was not carried 
out in time because of the opposition of the Russian 
Central Bank; 
(iv) confiscation of a part of the population's cash holdings 
and a freeze on the savings deposits. These measures 
did not influence the financial situation in 1991 because 
the conditions under which they were implemented were 
too soft, reducing the results to a minimum (only 3,5% 
of the money supply narrowly defined was confiscated, 
and the freeze was cancelled at the end of February 
1991); 
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(v) price reform was the main measure aimed at stabilizing 
the situation. 
In the next section we consider the results of the main 
components of the mixed policy, namely, price and tax 
reforms. 
2.2. Price reforms 
Prime Minister Ryzhkov's government originally planned to 
carry out reforms of wholesale, retail, and procurement 
prices simultaneously, beginning on 1 January 1991. How-
ever, owing to social and political circumstances, the price 
reform was instead carried out in three stages. 
In the first stage, in July 1990, procurement prices for grain 
and some other foodstuffs were raised. This was done to 
stimulate the supply of grain, and the government planned 
to compensate for the budgetary consequences of this rise 
by raising retail prices for bread and grain products. The 
latter measure was, however, not carried out because of 
resistance from the parliament and the public. In the autumn, 
under pressure from the kolkhozes' lobby, the government 
had to raise prices for animal produce, because these had 
become too low in comparison with prices for forage. As a 
result, the rise· in procurement prices in 1990 imposed a 
budgetary cost of R 22 billion (2,4% of GNP) in additional 
subsidies for the full year. 
In the second stage, which began on 1 January 1991, whole-
sale prices and tariffs for services were raised. In the summer 
of 1990 the Ryzhkov government had planned to introduce 
basically fixed prices, but in October 1990 a presidential 
decree declared that contractual wholesale prices were to be 
established for about 40% of production. Liberalization of 
these prices was carried out in accordance with the so-called 
'product principle'. Theoretically fixed prices for total output 
were to be established in the same way, but in reality prices 
remained fixed for the share of production which met State 
orders, and the rest was sold at free prices. Fixed prices 
were established basically for undifferentiated products: fuel, 
agricultural products, and the greater part of foodstuffs 
purchased by the population. As a result, indices of whole-
sale and procurement prices (by gross product) increased in 
January by 66%, although they were initially planned to 
increase by 53%. For the first six months of 1991, the price 
index was 87% above the same period of the previous year. 
In reality, free-market prices changed slowly. Rapid changes 
could indeed be observed on the commodity exchanges, but 
the volume of trade there was too small - only a few percent 
of the total volume - to be considered as reflecting the 
entire market. The greater part of commodities were sold by 
contract. Changes in prices required changes in the terms of 
these contracts and are otherwise possible only upon the 
expiry of the previous contract, which might be from several 
weeks to several months. As at the same time monetary 
aggregates were increasing fairly rapidly, the result was a 
paradoxical situation where the price revision mechanism 
failed to keep up with the rise in demand. Thus, the deficit 
was maintained. However, the introduction of contractual 
wholesale prices and a gradual increase in their share resulted 
in a more rapid rise of the wholesale price index than 
in previous years. In July/August 1991 wholesale prices 
increased by 8 to 10% per month (Table 4). 
Table 4 
Wholesale price inflation, 1991 
Industry - total 
of which: 
intermediate and investment goods 
consumer goods 
n.a.: not available. 
Source: Report of Goskomstat of the USSR. 
Table 5 
Relative prices, 1991 
Branches 
Metallurgy 
Fuels and energy 
Machine building 
Chemicals 
Forestry and paper 
Construction materials 
Light industry 
Food industry 
Agriculture 
Construction 
Transport and communications 
Total 
1,71 
1,82 
1,25 
1,58 
1,83 
1,68 
1,28 
1,98 
1,20 
1,40 
1,15 
1,53 
Note: I = price index relative to the corresponding period in 1990; 
II """ change in relative prices, total =- I. 
First quarter First half-year 
+ 83 +100 
+ 85 n.a. 
+ 80 n.a. 
Plan 
II 
1,12 
1,19 
0,82 
1,03 
1,20 
1,10 
0,84 
1,29 
0,78 
0,92 
0,75 
1,00 
The economic consequences of Mr Pavlov 
At first, changes in the prices of fuel and raw materials (for 
which basically fixed prices were established) and manufac-
tured goods (whose prices were free and contractual) evolved 
in favour of the former. Later on, however, their relative 
price once again dropped to the level of the previous year 
(Table 5). Thus, the objective of price reform, to improve the 
structure of relative prices, was not fulfilled, and additional 
financing of the fuel and raw materials industries from the 
Union budget (about R 20 billion, or 1,3 % of GNP) and of 
the kolkhozes from the republic budgets (about R 25 to 30 
billion, or 1,6 to 1,9% of GNP) proved necessary. 
(Change over the same period of the previow year, %) 
April May June July August 
+ 112 + 118 + 122 + 139 + 154 
+ 100 + 111 + 114 + 119 + 121 
+ 123 + 135 + 136 + 158 + 186 
Actual 
January-March January.June 
II II 
1,68 0,95 1,75 0,94 
1,99 1,13 2,01 1,07 
1,73 0,98 1,79 0,96 
1,82 1,04 1,85 0,99 
2,11 1,20 2,17 1,16 
2,13 1,21 2,18 1,17 
1,90 1,08 2,20 1,18 
1,79 1,02 2,10 1,12 
1,60 0,90 1,61 0,86 
1,80 1,02 1,80 0,96 
1,22 0,69 1,22 0,65 
1,76 1,00 1,87 1,00 
Sources: Report of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, 'On the economic condition of the country and the transition to regulated market economy', Moscow, 1990; Reports of Goskomstat of 
the USSR. 
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At the beginning of 1991, the Government of the Russian 
Federation tried to cut subsidies for foodstuffs, having 
already permitted agricultural enterprises to sell up to 30% 
of their output at free prices. However, the output of food-
processing industries was sold at fixed prices, and so it was 
unprofitable for these industries to buy foodstuffs at free-
market prices. This led to cuts in the volume of production 
of meat and milk products (which received the largest subsid-
ies) by 12 to 14% in the first half of 1991. 
Our preliminary analysis leads to the following conclusions: 
(i) The mere fact that prices were liberalized for a consider-
able part of Soviet production was a positive develop-
ment. 
(ii) The reform of wholesale and procurement prices effec-
tively legalized and sharply speeded up the pre-reform 
dynamics, in which prices for raw materials remained 
fixed for long periods and were then raised sharply. 
During the periods between rises, prices for manufac-
tured products were steadily increasing, and this led to 
the level of prices for raw materials falling behind in 
relative terms. 
(iii) The underpricing of raw materials led to the need for 
financial support of all enterprises producing these 
goods, even the most profitable ones. Fixed prices and 
Table 6 
Retail price inflation, 1991 
State and cooperative trade 
Gorkooptorgl 
Total official sector 
Kolkhoz market 
Total goods 
Paid services 
State and cooperative trade 
Gorkooptorgl 
Total official sector 
Kolkhoz market 
Total goods 
Paid services 
' A special form of trade in the USSR. 
Source: Report of Goskomstat of the USSR. 
36 
First half-year Second quarter 
56,9 95,5 
83,9 115,3 
57,5 96,0 
84,4 91,8 
57,9 95,3 
39,5 57,6 
the lack of any market estimate of the level of necessary 
expenditure required financial support of any expendi-
ture. Such a situation requires enormous financial injec-
tions into unprofitable enterprises and does not permit 
any solution of the problems of balance in flows without 
large-scale redistribution through very high taxes and 
regular confiscation of enterprises' financial assets. 
The third stage of price reform addressed retail prices. On 2 
April 1991, new principles for retail prices were announced: 
prices for some goods (basically foodstuffs) were raised and 
kept fixed, while centralized price setting was discontinued 
for other goods, which however remained subject to regu-
lation by republic and local authorities. 
In the first quarter of 1991, retail prices increased by 26% 
over the same period of 1990. On I January wholesale prices 
were increased, and this increased the pressure on retail 
prices, especially those for which centralized price setting 
had been ended in November 1990. After the retail price 
reform of April, the retail price index stood at a level 95% 
above that of April 1990. But during the next few months 
prices increased by only I to 2% monthly, and by July prices 
had stopped rising altogether (Table 6.) 
Reductions in the real volumes of sales of goods and services 
to the population took place simultaneously with the rise in 
( Change over the same period of the previous year, 'Yo) 
May June July August 
95,0 97,0 98,3 102,1 
115,9 112,0 112,0 112,0 
95,5 97,3 98,6 102,I 
95,2 87,8 100,2 118,0 
95,5 95,3 98,7 102,9 
64,0 66,8 75,6 77,5 
(Change oW!r the previous monlh, %) 
May June July August 
2,3 1,0 0,2 0,5 
-2,0 -1,8 -5,3 -3,9 
2,2 0,9 0,05 0,4 
-5,1 -13,4 -10,2 -12,8 
2,0 -0,1 -0,4 -0,1 
108,0 102,0 105,0 101,6 
retail prices. Recession and price dynamics corresponded to 
the effect of the stabilization shock. Although in April retail 
prices and tariffs for services doubled, the cash money supply 
remained the same: on I June the cash holdings of the 
population amounted to R 133,8 billion, only slightly above 
the level of I January (R 132,7 billion). 
'. v· 
2.3. Tax reforms 
The staged implementation of price reform led to many 
wholesale prices exceeding retail _prices. With tax revenues 
constant at I 990 levels, such a disproportion could provoke 
a State budget deficit of more than 20% of GNP. To avoid 
such an outcome, the government proposed additional taxes. 
Some existing taxes were raised, some others lowered, and 
new taxes were introduced. 
On I January 1991 the following tax changes took place: 
• A profits tax was introduced at a rate of 45% (previously 
the share of payments from profits was about 55%); in 
Russia a 38% profits tax was introduced. 
• The tax paid by enterprises to cover social insurance for 
their employees was raised to the rate of 26% of the wage 
fund from its earlier rate of 7 to 14% depending on the 
industry. The law on pensions originally assumed that this 
rate would be 37%, but political pressure caused it to 
be brought down to the lower level. In addition, a I% 
obligatory payment was deducted directly from wages. 
• A stabilization fund was set up, with 11 % of the wage 
fund paid into it as a tax together with 20% of the 
enterprises' depreciation payments; some other deductions 
from incomes were also paid into this fund. 
• A 5% sales tax was introduced. 
• Rent payments were introduced in the fuel and raw ma-
terials industries, but at a low rate. 
• A tax on profits exceeding a maximum level was intro-
duced to limit price rises. 
Detailed analysis of the impact of these tax innovations is 
beyond the scope of this paper; here we limit ourselves to a 
few observations: 
1. The sharp strengthening of pressures to raise taxes begin-
ning on 1 January 1991 was caused by the need to bridge 
the financial gap in the State budget caused by the time-lag 
between the introduction of new wholesale and retail prices. 
Later on it became necessary to ease the pressure, especially 
after the introduction of new retail prices. The shares of tax 
contributions are given in Table 7. 
The economic consequences of Mr Pavlov 
Table 7 
Taxes on enterprise income 
( as a percentage of income) 
1990 1991 
plan from 1.1.1991 
1991 
(estimate) 
T/1 
T/(l=W) 
Note: W = wage fund; 
2r' 
44 
39 
68 
I = gross income of enterprises (including wage fund); 
T = tax payments to the budget and non-budgetary funds. 
Source: Authors· estimates on the data or Annex I. 
24. 
47 
As the table indicates, the shares of tax contributions were 
sharply raised (from 44 to 68%) and then reduced to a level 
that was still higher than in 1990 (47%). These measures 
had some success in bringing the budget closer to balance. 
2. The introduction of the new taxes was badly prepared, 
and the tax rates and their bases were being constantly 
revised; this contributed to the instability of budget revenues. 
The main goal of the government, to balance revenues and 
expenditure in the short term, was being carried out without 
careful analysis and without taking into account its very 
short-term consequences. However, it is quite possible that 
this was the only politically feasible approach. During the 
first half of 1991 the taxation system operated under a so-
called 'budget agreement' among the republics. In fact there 
was no agreement at all. The Union Government presented 
a proposal establishing fixed payments by the republics to 
the Union budget, with the size of the payments based on 
the assumption that GNP growth would be 3%. The repub-
lics signed the proposal only after including provisions for 
a possible decrease in the payments. In reality GNP fell by 
10%, the republics could not pay the sums required, and as 
a result the revenues of the Union budget dropped sharply. 
The lack of clear rules for the distribution of budget revenues 
had led to a situation in which the republics paid into the 
budget only as much as they considered that they could. As 
a result, the revenues of the Union budget in the first half 
of the year amounted to only 20% of those planned for the 
year as a whole. 
3. During 1991 the introduction and reform of taxes was 
not carried out as well as it could have been: 
(i) The profits tax was initially set at a rate of 45%, but it 
was reduced by the republics to 38%, and after retail 
price reform it was reduced by three more percentage 
points to 35%. The tax was paid in advance once or 
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twice a month, on the basis of expected profits, which 
were estimated independently. Of course, with prices 
rising rapidly, the expected profits and hence the ad-
vance payments were understated. At the end of the 
quarter the underestimate would be compensated for, 
but these additional payments would be depreciated by 
inflation. Hence these tax payments were subject to the 
Tanzi effect (Tanzi, 1977). On the other hand, social 
insurance payments increased in proportion to wages, 
and for these payments the lag between the origin of 
income and payment of the tax is minimal. Compen-
sation payments were also imposed by this tax, and this 
in effect indexed the tax at the same rate as the incomes 
of the population. In this case, therefore, the Tanzi effect 
was minimal. 
(ii) Enterprises did not pay taxes to the stabilization fund. 
For four months, payments of the wage tax and the 
depreciation ta]( should have amounted to about R 13 
billion to R 15 billion - in fact only about 1,5 billion 
were paid. This situation probably arose from a Jack of 
experience and a Jack of clear rules for transferring 
payments to the stabilization fund. However, the delay 
of these payments did not permit the planned expendi-
tures to go forward, and a special decision of the parlia-
ment on drawing credits for this fund was required. 
Thus, the tax contribution to the stabilization fund 
cannot be called good, but the separation of these taxes 
from the budget at least permitted expenditures to be 
held in check. 
(iii) It was initially proposed that the sales tax would be paid 
on every sale. However, its payment was soon abolished 
in those industries that produced primary and intermedi-
ate goods, and the tax ultimately applied only to goods 
for final consumption by the population. As a result the 
volume of receipts was reduced from R 100 billion 
to R 25 billion. Later, many consumer goods (mainly 
foodstuffs) were also freed from payment of this tax, 
and revenues derived from the tax decreased to R 10 
billion annually. 
(iv) Taxes on profits exceeding some maximum allowed rate 
of return and on increased consumption were ineffective. 
Under the conflicting legislation of the Union and the 
republics, some of which abolished these taxes, en-
terprises managed to avoid paying the taxes and to get 
around the limitations. 
(v) After retail price reform the average rate of income tax 
for the population was reduced, essentially by legislating 
that low incomes would not be subject to taxation and 
by lowering the maximum level of taxation for those 
with high incomes from 60 to 30%. 
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(vi) Revenues from the turnover tax and the import tax 
increased as a result of retail price reform. However, in 
a majority of cases, the turnover tax was, as previously, 
equal to the difference between fixed wholesale and 
retail prices, and the amount of this difference depended 
·on the product. Its transformation into an ad valorem 
tax on goods sold at unfixed prices was delayed. Raising 
the tax in this way lowered the effect of indexation 
of budget revenues and strengthened the Tanzi effect. 
Import taxes were set as a percentage of the cost of the 
commodity, and this could have the effect of indexing 
revenue from this tax to the depreciation of the rouble. 
However, this did not happen, because the commercial 
exchange rate (R 1,8 to USO l) was applied for settle-
ments. 
A detailed analysis of tax revenues is provided in Annex l. 
As a result of a change in the conditions of taxation in 1991, 
about 30% of budget revenues and off-budget funds (mostly 
social insurance payments) were indexed simultaneously 
with a rise in prices and money incomes of the population. 
An additional 35% of revenues could be indexed with small 
transformations in the proper elements of taxation or by a 
change in the exchange rate of the rouble (the turnover tax 
and the import tax). For all other taxes there was a Jong Jag 
between the origin of the income and the payment of the 
tax, and this caused revenues from these taxes to depreciate 
more rapidly as inflation accelerated. 
2.4. Income distribution 
The attempt by the government to raise tax rates and to 
set higher prices for foodstuffs and some other goods 
subject to subsidies was intended to depreciate existing 
money stocks. At the same time it was also aimed at 
halting the redistribution of financial resources from the 
budget to enterprises and the population. However, the 
idea was to achieve this aim without carrying out a 
full liberalization of the economy. The governing circles 
understood that these measures could be effective only if 
they were supplemented with a restrictive incomes policy, 
including in particular not granting large budget subsidies 
to compensate for the price rise. In addition, a more 
effective credit policy, limiting the access of enterprises to 
the credit resources of the banks, was needed. The state-
ments of Deputy Prime Minister V. Sherbakov about the 
important decisions being prepared in the area of credit, 
and the resistance of the cabinet to the demands of the 
workers for higher wages, prove this. But analysis of the 
data for the January to July period of 1991 shows that 
none of the government's intentions was fulfilled. 
The interest rate policy proved ineffective. Only in August 
1991, after long negotiations with the republics, did the 
Soviet Central Bank increase the annual rate on centralized 
credit resources (those issued by the Soviet and republic 
central banks) from 8 to 12%. This was done to limit credit 
emission. But with monthly inflation already at 10 to 12%, 
this level of the interest rate could not prevent the inflation-
ary expansion of credit emission. At end-1991, credits to the 
national economy were increasing by R 40 billion (or by 
about 10%) on average per month. 
The planned compensation and incomes policies were grad-
ually abolished. The republic authorities decided to give the 
population additional compensation from the budget (see 
Section 3 below). Ukraine, Belarus, Uzbekistan, and (in 
part) Russia abolished their limitations on rises in wages. 
The compensations policy was based on fixed allowances 
paid from the budget amounting to R 60 to 65 for adults 
and R 40 to 45 for children (this was equivalent to 20 to 
25% of the average wage rate, and 70% of the average 
pension). 1 Maintaining these compensations for the last nine 
months of 1991 would require R 104 billion in budgetary 
expenditures. 2 Compensations to the employees of those 
enterprises operating on a self-supporting basis were to be 
paid by the enterprises from their revenues (i.e. from the rise 
in output prices, and from the decrease in the profits tax 
rate). According to Ministry-of-Finance calculations, the 
total amount of compensation from all sources was R 225 
billion. This total included government and enterprise sub-
sidies to workers' canteens (May 1991). In fact, given the 
subsequent decisions on the rise in incomes of the popu-
lation, total subsidies for 1991 may well have reached R 270 
billion, including at least R 130 billion from the budgets of 
the various governments. 
As a result of the government's ineffective incomes policy, 
in the January to August period of 1991 the wage fund 
increased by 34% in spite of the fall in output. The introduc-
tion of compensation allowances led to a 14% increase. 
Measures for assuring the social protection of workers in 
public health, education, culture, and basic industries re-
sulted in a further increase by nine percentage points. The 
remaining 10 percentage points' increase was due to the 
redistribution of enterprises' incomes in favour of wages. 
The sharp increase in budgetary expenditures at all levels 
for payments directly to the population was the source of a 
rapid growth in incomes. More than 50% of the revenues 
lzvestia, 24.4.1991. 
Beginning in January 1991, average pensions were increased by 45%. 
In 1991 pensions increased their 1990 levels by 2,2 to 2,5 times. 
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of the consolidated budget of the Soviet Union went to the 
population in the form of incomes (social payments, wages, 
compensation allowances). In 1990 that share was only 34%. 
This is the main reason for the sharp rise in the 1991 budget 
deficit. The other sources of the rise in incomes of the 
population were the rapid growth of profits (180% in the 
January to August 1991 period) and bank credits. The price 
reform strengthened the tendency among enterprises to re-
distribute their profits quickly in the form of wages. Cheap 
bank credits provided the necessary liquidity. In 1991 a 
strengthening of the negative tendency toward inflationary 
redistribution of financial resources arose not only from the 
expansion of budgetary credit limits but also from a rise in 
direct bank credits to enterprises. 
Because monetary policy was weak, the price rise failed 
to depreciate financial flows significantly, while the money 
stocks were being gradually restored in real terms. The 
government increased the value of deposits and other finan-
cial assets held by the population by 40% to compensate for 
the retail price reform. About 25% of this sum could be 
used by the population after I July 1991, and the rest was 
frozen in special accounts until. 1994. These measures also 
promoted the re-establishment of the real volume of assets 
(Table 8). 
· I 
Table 8 
Nominal and real effects of price reform, 1991 
(Change over the same period of previous year.%) 
Flows ( change within a period) 
Enterprises (profits in industry) 
Population (money incomes) 
Enterprises 
Stocks ( change at the end of the period) 
Population: 
without compensations for savings frozen 
until 1994 
with compensations for savings frozen 
until 1994 
Source: Monthly statistical reports of Goskomstat of the USSR. 
January to July 
Nominal Real 
+102 
+59 
+54 
+22 
+46 
-5 
-1 
-27 
-39 
-27 
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Changes in incomes of the State, enterprises and population 
are given in Table 9. Detailed changes in flows in these 
sectors (as income and expenditures balance) are given in 
Annex l. 
Socialist enterprises do not strive for a rise in their profits 
but instead redistribute their incomes as quickly as possible 
through wage increases. It can be seen from Table 9 that the 
reforms in the areas of prices and taxation raised the profits 
of enterprises by R 135 billion, increased the budget deficit 
by R 90 billion, and decreased the incomes of the population 
by R 45 billion. However, macroeconomic changes reduced 
the profits of enterprises practically to zero and increased 
Table 9 
Annual changes in income flows in 19911 
I. Changes in net assets, 19902 
2. Effect of January wholesale price increase and tax reform 
wholesale price increase 
legislated tax reform 
3. Effect of April retail price reform 
changes in retail prices and tariffs 
changes in tax legislation 
compensation payments 
the incomes of the population to R 175 billion, while increas-
ing the budget deficit by the same amount. 
2.5. Have the reforms eliminated 
the monetary overhang? 
The size of forced savings in the Soviet Union has been 
estimated using different methods. A range of estimates have 
emerged: from R 115 billion (20% of total financial assets 
of the population) at the end of 1990 (CEC, 1990) to R 260 
billion ( 45,6% of the total; Belousov and Polyakov, 1990). 
(billion R) 
State Enter Households 
prises 
-80 14 76 
-15 25 -10 
-290 290 0 
275 -265 -10 
-75 110 -35 
130 240 -3703 
-35 20 15 
-130 -150 280 
compensation payments to household accounts and bonds to be paid in 1991 -40 40 
Subtotal effect (2 + 3) -90 
4. Changes in macroeconomic conditions 
social programme in 1991 -65 
wage increase -20 
Subtotal effect (2 + 3 + 4) -175 
Changes in net assets, 1991 -255 
5. Memo = full year theoretical effect of retail price reform4 
changes in retail prices 195 
changes in tax legislation -85 
compensation payments -140 
Full year total effect (2 + 5) -45 
Subtotal effect with changes in macroeconomic conditions (2 + 4 + 5) -130 
1 Total saving-investment balance differs from zero because of the balance-of-payments deficit. 
2 Only changes in taxes on incomes of the population and on the profits of enterprises (after taking into account the increase in profits). 
3 Including both the increase in prices and the decrease in real volumes. 
4 Effect of the price reform for the full 1991 year, instead of April to December. 
Source: Authors calculations and simulations. Sec Annex I. 
40 
135 -45 
-35 99 
- JOO 120 
175 
15 240 
290 -485 
70 15 
-200 340 
185 -140 
51 79 
The influence of price reform upon the size of forced savings 
has also been estimated in different ways. For example, 
according to Belousov's method, the nominal size of these 
savings will slightly increase. If one estimates the increase in 
the demand for normal savings in proportion to price 
growth, then forced savings should be zero. The increase in 
nominal demand for money (normal savings) can be esti-
mated in proportion to the growth of the nominal income 
of the population. Different estimates of changes in normal 
and forced savings are given in Table 10. 
As Table I O indicates, different methods of estimating forced 
savings after price reform yield results ranging from R -180 
billion to R 210 billion. (A negative value means that either 
the initial estimate was understated or some other method 
is needed.) In our view, the best estimate is in the range of 
R 60 billion to R 120 billion (8 to 17% of the accumulated 
financial assets of the population). This represents a return 
of the Soviet economy to the state of 1983-85, when forced 
savings were approximately the same size. Depreciation of 
forced savings stocks can be put down as a positive result 
of reform, for with liberalization of all prices their sudden 
change will not be so great as it would have been without 
the reforms of 2 April 1991. 
2.6. Conclusions 
Reforms of prices and taxes did not solve the problem of 
unbalanced flows and had little impact on the financial 
Table 10 
Alternative estimates of forced savings 
1. Monetary overhang at the end of 1990 
2. Normal savings at the end of 1990 :. t 
3. Volume of savings at the end of 1991 1 
4. Normal savings at the end of 19912 
variant 1 
variant 2 
5. Monetary overhang at the end of 1991 (5 = 3-4) 
variant I 
variant 2 
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situation in the economy: the real current budget deficit 
increased by 160%, the real State debt by 110%, and the 
savings rate from 13 to 20% (Table 11). 
The simultaneous introduction of free and fixed prices did 
not bring much profit to the State, and instead promoted 
the rise in its deficit. The enterprises cancelled out any gains 
to the State by rises in free prices and by the immediate 
payment of increases of profits in the form of wages, and 
thus promoted the quick restoration of the real purchasing 
power of the incomes of the population. The process of 
redistribution of incomes, which began in 1988, sharply 
speeded up in 1991. 
Tax reforms, which had sought to bring about a sharp 
strengthening of tax pressure on enterprises, for all practical 
purposes failed, and the share of tax receipts was left nearly 
at the level of 1990. 
Depreciation of the money savings of the population by 20 
to 25% sharply reduced the real size of forced savings, and 
in the short term this allowed price liberalization without 
fear of great sudden changes in prices. 
The principle of price regulation chosen by the central 
government maintained the policy implemented under cen-
tral planning. Fixed prices were established for fuels and 
raw materials and for foodstuffs. Between periodic revisions 
of fixed prices, manufacturing industries proceeded with 
(billion R) 
CEC IMF, IBRD, Belousov Polyakov 
EBRD,OECD 
.115 160 - 180 260 
425 360 - 380 .·280 
715 715 715 
,' .. :'-'.:. 895 755 - 800 590 
765 650 - 685 505 
- 180 ( - 40) - ( - 80) 125 
- 50 30- 65 210 
1 Estimated as the sum of savings at the end of 1990 and the increase in savings in 1991 (from Table 9). 
2 In variant I, the increase in normal savings is proportional to the price increase ( x 2), while in variant 2 it is proportional to the nominal income growth ( x 1,8). 
Sources: CEC, 1990; IMF, IBRD, OECD, EBRD, 1991; Belousov and Polyakov, 1990; authors' calculations. 
41 
Inflation in the Soviet Union 
price rises for their output. Liberalization of prices for this 
output sharply speeded up price increases, and this required 
more frequent revisions of fixed prices. Soviet prices for fuel 
Table 11 
Soviet economy: basic indicators 
l. GNP 
2. Internal debt 
in billion R 
percentage of GNP 
3. Increase of the internal debt 
in billion R 
percentage of GNP 
including: 
current deficit of the budget3 
in billion R 
percentage of GNP 
Enterprise debt forgiveness 
Compensation to accounts, bonds and insurances 
4. Net debt to the Central Bank 
in billion R 
percentage of GNP 
5. Money (MO) 
6. Money (Ml) 
7. Money (M2) 
8. Additional money balances frozen until 1994 
I Authors' estimates based on Gosbank and Goskomstat data. 
2 Absolute change in percentage points. 
3 Including quasi-fiscal deficit of the Central Bank for the payment of subsidies. 
and raw materials that were too low by comparison with 
world prices persisted, and this required additional subsidies 
to unprofitable enterprises and to agriculture. 
1990 1991 
l OOO 
550 
55,0 
184 
18,4 
80 
8,0 
104 
520 
52,0 
136 
534 
946 
actual 
(seven months) 
925 
375 
130 
63 
182 
880 
167 
715 
l 231 
120 
120 
1991 Change 1991 /90 
forecast (%) 
l 700 70,0 
l 020 85,5 
60,0 5,o' 
470 155,4 
27,6 9,22 
215 168,8 
12,6 4,6 
63 -49,5 
182 
970 86,5 
57,l 5,1 
240 76,4 
865 62,0 
1492 57,7 
120 
120 
Sources: National Economy in 1989; Reports of Goskomstat of the USSR; Dengii credit, No 3, 1991; authors· estimates. 
3. Prospects for inflation and possibilities 
for stabilization 
In 1991, the uncontrolled disintegration of the budgetary 
and banking systems became the main problem in the area 
of macroeconomic regulation. Attempts by the Union 
Government to implement effective stabilization measures 
failed and indeed only deepened the fall in output and 
consumption; the result was the emergence of the threat of 
high inflation and even hyperinflation. Besides the problems 
of macroeconomic regulation typical in countries with high 
inflation (Dornbusch, 1990), in the Soviet Union the spon-
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taneous process of redistribution of powers among the re-
publics became the most important factor restricting the 
chances of achieving stabilization. 
3.1. Instruments of macroeconomic 
regulation in 1991 
At present, macroeconomic policy in the various republics 
is not synchronized. In 1991 the republics took different 
approaches to fiscal policy, pricing, incomes policy, and 
monetary policy. 
One may distinguish three types of budgetary policy being 
practised in the different republics at present {Table 12). 
1. Inflationary financing of the budget deficit through credit 
expansion by the republic's central bank. Higher budgetary 
expenditures are mainly due to the financing of additional 
social programmes, payment of subsidies for foodstuffs, and 
support for unprofitable enterprises. The republics relying 
on these kinds of policies are experiencing an especially rapid 
growth of the money supply and of forced savings. This 
strategy has been used, for example, by Russia and the Asian 
republics. 
The so-called 'extraordinary budget' of the Russian Republic 
for the second half of 1991 envisaged about R 3 billion in 
additional expenditure, more than half of which was to be 
defrayed by credits from the Central Bank. During the first 
half of 1991 the Russian budget deficit (including the quasi-
fiscal deficit of the Central Bank for subsidies to the pro-
ducers of foodstuffs) amounted to about R 37 billion (about 
8% of Russian GNP). In 1991 we forecast the deficit of the 
Russian budget at a minimum to equal 6 to 7% of the 
republic's GNP, in addition to the deficit of the Union 
budget. 
This strategy is quite similar to the policy of the former 
central government. High levels of budget expenditure pro-
vide for the investment needs of the State structures of 
economic regulation and for populist measures aimed at 
increasing the nominal incomes of the population. 
2. The second approach is similar to the first, but in addition 
the authorities use various monetary surrogates - for exam-
Table 12 
Deficits of republic budgets in the first half of 1991 
Russia 
Ukraine 
Belarus 
Baltic republics 
Asian and Transcaucasian republics 
Total deficit of republic budgets 
Central budget 
Total deficit of consolidated budget 
Current deficit 
(billion R) 
37 
15 
0 
o .. 
11 
63 
61 
124 
Source: Ministry of Finance of the USSR. Ministry of Finance of Russia, (Orlov, 1991). 
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pie, coupons in Ukraine. This measure is used to defend 
the regional market from the demand of consumers from 
neighbouring republics, and from the excessive demand of 
its own consumers. The use of coupons in Ukraine results 
in a comparatively high level of equilibrium in the consumer 
market (coupons cover only 70% of the nominal incomes 
of the population). Excessive monetary savings not covered 
by coupons constitute a demand to be satisfied outside 
the republic. This measure cannot result in a long-term 
equilibrium, because it will inevitably lead to inter-republi-
can conflicts and to the closing of frontiers. 
3. The strategy adopted by the Baltic republics involves a 
liquidation of the republic's budget deficit. In Latvia this 
aim was achieved by restriction of expenditure while main-
taining the system of fixed prices, whereas in Lithuania and 
Estonia it was accomplished by price liberalization and the 
abolition of subsidies. 
Incomes policy in the republics also differed in 1991. The 
Union-wide level of compensations for price rises was set at 
R 60 per month for employees and R 65 per month for 
pensioners. In Ukraine, Latvia, and Estonia these compen-
sations were raised to R 85 to 90. In Ukraine, Belarus, 
the Baltic republics, and Turkmenistan; compensations for 
children were raised above the Union rate. 
Whereas in 1991 the Union minimum wage rate was fixed 
at R 160 per month, in Russia it was R 220 per month.I 
This refers to measures in force at mid-November 1991, i.e. for Russia 
before the new measures designed under the responsibility of Deputy 
Prime Minister Gaidar. 
Percentage of 
republic GNP 
8,2 
11,5 
0 
0 
9,2 
8,0 
7,8 
15,8 
Debt forgiveness 
(billion R) 
57 
63 
63 
Percentage of 
republic GNP 
13 
4,0 
4,0 
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Under the Russian law on indexation adopted in the autumn 
of 1991, the minimum wage rate would determine the rate 
of indexation of incomes: for incomes not exceeding twice 
the minimum wage rates the rate of indexation would be 
equal to 100%, for incomes equal to between twice and four 
times the minimum wage rates it would be 50% (for the 
part exceeding twice the minimum wage), and for incomes 
exceeding four times the minimum wage, there would no 
indexation (for the part exceeding four minimum wages). In 
the middle of the year the average monthly wage in Russia 
was R 360, and the average income was R 320 to 330 per 
month. Assuming that the distribution of incomes around 
the average level is stable, one can easily calculate that the 
indexation coefficient for gross incomes would be about 
0, 75. In Belarus and Ukraine, all limitations on increases 
in wages were abolished, and in Russia they were partly 
abolished. 
Differences in pri~ policy led to different price levels in the 
republics. The lists of goods sold at fixed prices in the 
republics differ, as did the levels of fixed prices for the same 
goods. Whereas the average Union price index rose by 95% 
from April 1990 to April 1991, in Uzbekistan prices increased 
by 83%, in Kyrgyzstan by 72%, in Belarus by 90%, and in 
Ukraine by 92 % . In Estonia prices for foodstuffs were raised 
at the end of 1990, and in the summer of 1991 all these 
prices were liberalized. As a result, prices for foodstuffs in 
Estonia were more than double the Union level, and the 
average wage rate exceeded the Union average by 90%, 
according to data from Goskomstat of the Soviet Union. 
In these circumstances monetary policy is not an exogenous 
parameter with respect to the other elements of macro-
economic regulation. Instead it accommodates the needs of 
the budgets to expand their expenditure. The lack of any 
bankruptcy mechanism results in the need to write off hope-
less debts, incorporating them into the State debt. The 
money-creation functions of the Central Bank are in fact 
distributed among the republics. Through political mechan-
isms the republics maintain the scale of emission necessary 
to cover their budget deficits. Under these circumstances 
any coordinated anti-inflationary policy is impossible. 
3.2. Stabilization: possible scenarios 
After the August 1991 coup two tendencies emerged. The 
Union Government wanted to keep all the instruments of 
macroeconomic management in its own hands. To achieve 
this objective, the Treaty of Economic Community was 
prepared and signed by the republics. But this agreement 
did not contain concrete arrangements and operational pro-
cedures. About 30 special arrangements were prepared but 
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not signed. Neither the Treaty nor these agreements con-
tained measures directed to economic reforms. 
During the autumn of 1991, Russia declared its intention to 
embark on economic reforms independently from the other 
republics. The Russian economy is so large (55 to 60% of 
the whole of the Soviet Union) that the other republics will 
be forced to follow Russia's lead, although an alternative 
for the republics is to introduce national currencies and 
attempt to carry out independent budget and monetary 
policies. 
A successful outcome to the Russian reforms will be possible 
only under the following conditions: 
(i) the Union and Russian budgets are consolidated; 
(ii) the State Bank of the Soviet Union and the Central Bank 
of Russia are consolidated, with control of monetary 
emission in the rouble zone taken over by the latter. 
Under these conditions the Union will cease to be the centre 
of economic management. The elimination of conflicts be-
tween the Russian and Union Governments will make it 
possible to arrive at a balanced budget, to stop excess monet-
ary emission, and to liberalize prices and foreign trade. 
These measures could produce a stabilization shock in the 
Russian economy. In order to estimate the results of such a 
shock, we used the model described in Annex 2. 
The model is a three-sector, two-period model aimed at 
describing the effects of a stabilization shock. Prices are 
supposed to be freed at once, simultaneously with a devalu-
ation and the introduction of current account convertibility. 
The model we use is a simplified three-sector, two-period 
model. Demand depends on income and relative prices. 
Nominal supply is linked to wages through a coefficient of 
financial pressure (elasticity of nominal output with respect 
to the nominal wage), which represents the impact of supply 
and demand policies upon enterprises' behaviour. For exam-
ple, higher taxes lead to an increase in this coefficient since 
enterprises tend to raise prices in response. Wages and more 
generally households' incomes are indexed on prices. The 
degree of indexation is characterized by a coefficient. Im-
ports depend on the real exchange rate. The nominal ex-
change rate is supposed to be set in order to achieve external 
equilibrium, taking into account partial debt rescheduling 
and foreign assistance. Finally, two cases are examined as 
regards the level of unsatisfied demand: in the first one, there 
is only an ex-ante disequilibrium in flows; in the second, 
inherited imbalances combine with those of the current 
period. 
The key parameters are displayed in Table 13. These are: 
(i) the indexation coefficient (0,75 or 0,95); 
(ii) the 'coefficient of financial pressure', i.e. the elasticity 
of nominal output to wages (1,1); 
(iii) the level of initial excess demand, both in flow (9,9% 
of supply) and in stock terms (0,0 or 16,3%). 
Table 13 
Changes in prices and real consumption under stabilization shock 
Variants 
Flow disequilibrium, moderate indexation 
Indexation coefficient = 0,75 
Coefficient of financial pressure, k = I, I 
Initial excess demand(%) 
in flows = 9,9 
in stocks = 0,0 
Flow and stock disequilibrium, high indexation 
Indexation coefficient = 0,95 
Coefficient of financial pressure, k = I, I 
Initial excess demand(%) 
in flows = 9,9 
in stocks = 16,3 
Source: Authors· simulation (Annex 2). 
If the Russian stabilization policy fails and the economies 
of the other republics are not closed, there is a very strong 
likelihood that monetary policy will be passive, because the 
authorities will aim at a relatively high household purchasing 
power target. Given a passive money supply, inflation will 
materialize whenever the sum of indexed real incomes ex-
ceeds the actual level of real income available. Free prices 
will be introduced in a situation in which there is excess 
demand. The initial price jump (because of the excess de-
mand) will come from indexation. Assuming that the supply 
of consumer goods and the velocity of monetary circulation 
are stable, the inflation rate is determined by the indexation 
coefficient (v) and the size of the initial price jump (p0). So, 
inflation can be estimated as: 
N 
p = II Pi, with Pi= VPi-l 
i=l 
(dotted variable indicates rates of increase), 
(II) 
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The first variant represents an ideal situation in which there 
is no imbalance and indexation is moderate. The second 
variant assumes soft indexation and a high level of initial 
imbalance. The coefficient of financial pressure remains the 
same (either real interest rates are stable and budget revenues 
are not depreciated or depreciation of revenues is compen-
sated by an increase in real interest rates). The first case 
results in a rise of prices by 100%. However, the second 
implies 420% price inflation. 
Price 
increase 
(%) 
100 
420 
Change in real consumption 
(%) 
-4 
-10 
Exchange rate 
(rouble per dollar) 
6 
8 
where N, the number of multipliers, is determined by the 
periodicity of indexation. This in turn depends on the exist-
ing system of wage, pension, and other payments. In the 
Soviet Union this system provides for only one or two 
payments per month. Acceleration in the velocity of money 
circulation in the Soviet economy is impeded by the existing 
system of intra branch banking settlements. 
The estimated initial price jump (Vavilov and Vjugin, 1991; 
CEC, 1990), given the existing overhang (see Table 10), can 
make up to Po = 1,5 with l 00% indexation; the price index 
would therefore reach: 
p = (l,5) 12 = 130 
Thus, according to these calculations, in 1992 inflation could 
reach up to 13 000%, or 50% per month. 
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3.3. Conclusion 
In 1991, the Union Government made several attempts to 
stabilize the economic situation in the Soviet Union. This 
was done in a context of deepening recession and growing 
political tensions between the centre and the republics, which 
led to the fragmentation of the fiscal system and to differ-
ences in price and incomes policies. Meanwhile populist 
decisions by the Union and republic parliaments (in particu-
lar to approve new social programmes) resulted in a 150% 
increase of the State budget deficit in real terms. 
Price reform led to devaluation of the internal State debt 
and of financial assets and flows, but current trends show 
that by the end of 1991 the real volumes ofthese assets and 
flows will be restored and even somewhat increased. Only 
household savings were really devalued, by 20 to 35%. This 
helped to restrict accumulated unsatisfied demand, which 
was perhaps the only positive result of the price reform. 
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The fiscal reform, aimed at reducing the State budget deficit 
and, correspondingly, restricting excessive growth of en-
terprise revenues and household incomes, actually failed. 
The tax burden on enterprise incomes grew by an insignifi-
cant amount. On the other hand, indecisiveness in price 
liberalization, the decrease in the size of the fixed price sector 
and growth of free prices required additional subsidies for 
those industries producing fixed-price goods. The coexist-
ence of fixed prices for fuel, energy, and foodstuffs with 
liberalized prices for manufactured goods helped to maintain 
relatively low prices for the former and relatively high prices 
for the latter (in comparison with the structure of inter-
national prices). 
The lack of unity and distrust in the idea of a single economic 
policy made strict stabilization measures, based on an agreed 
set of macroeconomic policy instruments, virtually imposs-
ible. Under these circumstances the acceleration of inflation 
in 1992 became practically inevitable. The initial conditions 
(the high level of imbalances in flows and the accumulation 
of excess liquidity) will definitely cause - in the very near 
future - monthly inflation rates in the two-digit range. 
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Annex 1 
Table A.1.1 
Incomes and expenditures of the enterprise sector 
(bU/ion R) 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (S) 
Income (a) 780 741 1 050 1 050 1 295 
including: 
Profit (b) 241 181 286 278 343 
Depreciation 95 100 100 100 100 
Expenditures 766 764 I 055 I 088 1 279 
including: 
Labour compensation of which: 404 419 419 526 670 
profit-related bonuses 49 71 41 22 122 
payroll tax (c) 40 41 105 130 166 
Contribution to stabilization fund (d) 40 6 6 
Sales tax ( e) 100 10 10 
Profit tax (e) 127 110 121 111 122 
Depreciation tax (f) 20 
Rent 30 18 18 
Investment (g) 145 155 165 232 232 
Other expenses 50 39 55 55 55 
Changes in net assets +14 -23 -5 -38 +16 
(I) 1990, actual; 
(2) 1991, planned without tax and price reform; 
(3) 1991, planned with wholesale price and tax reform; 
(4) 1991, forecast with wholesale price and tax reform; 
(S) 1991, forecast with retail and wholesale price and tax reform. 
Sources: Report or the Council or Ministers or the USSR, 'On the project or all Union forecasts on the fonctioning or the economy in 1991 by the Council or Ministers or the USSR', Moscow, 
1990; monthly reports or Goskomstat or the USSR; information or the Ministry or Finance or the USSR; authors' estimates. 
Notes to Table A. I.I 
(a) Incomes in 1990 are calculated as the sum or profit, depreciation and wages. On I January 1991, the change in wholesale prices was planned to be equal to 37,2 'lo. But in January, the increase 
in wholesale and procurement prices amounted to 6S,7%. Later on we had the growth or prices shown in Table A.1.2. 
(b) Profit is estimated as a difference between income and expenditure. Our estimates differ from those or the USSR Ministry or Economy and Forecasting, which include wages and compensations 
paid from the economic stimulus fonds (the source or which is gross profit). In the table these payments are included under the heading 'labour compensation'. 
(c) Payroll tax is estimated as 26 'lo or the wage fond. 
(d) Planned payments to the stabilization fond are equal to 11 'lo or the non-agricultural wage rund. In fact, the enterprises did not pay this tax and we estimate the revenue or the stabilization 
fond to be about R 6 billion. 
(e) For the sales, profit and depreciation taxes, estimates are given by the Ministry or Economy and Forecasting. 
(0 Payment to the stabilization rund (20% or depreciation). 
(g) Regarding investment from enterprises, i.e. excluding centrally financed investment in 1990, total investment amounted to R 210 billion (R S3 billion financed from the budget, R 14S billion 
from enterprises and R 12 billion from other sources). For 1991, enterprises investments are estimated on the basis of the following assumptions: a reduction in aggregate investment by 16-Jo (0°/o 
in the plan), 80 'lo inflation (4S 'lo in the plan), investments from the budget in new prices total R 80 billion (same as in the plan), and investments from the stabilization fond make up R 6 billion 
(R 60 billion in the plan). 
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Table A.1.2 
Determinants of changes in enterprise income I 
Prices 
Volume of sales 
Income 
Income (in·billion R) 
1 Period of 1990 to the same period of 1991. 
January 
65,7 
Not,: Variant I = forecast of the Ministry of Economy and Goskomstat; 
Variant 2 = our forecast. 
Sources: Goskomstal; Ministry of Economy; authors' estimates. 
For Table A.I.I, an average estimate of R I 295 billion is assumed. 
Prospects for inflation and possibilities for stabilization 
(Change ow,r the corresponding period of the previous year, %) 
January-February January-March January-April January-May January-December 
Variant I Variant 2 
71,5 76,1 80,5 84,0 101,0 91,0 
- 17,5 - 12,0 
+ 65,0 + 67,0 
1 290 1 300 
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Table A.1.3 
Revenues and expenditures of the State budget (including pension and stabilization funds) 
(billion R) 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Revenues 452 429 518 409 455 
Turnover tax 122 116 104 99 135 
Profit tax 127 110 121 lll 122 
Rents 30 18 18 
Taxes on households 47 50 50 53 38 
Revenues from external economic activities 68 75 81 86 100 
Sales tax 100 10 10 
Payroll tax 45 46 
Other revenues 43 32 32 32 32 
Expenditures 532 575 668 715 678 
Financing of the economy: 216 221 341 381 281 
investment 42 40 80 80 80 
food subsidies (a) · 119 115 160 200 100 
other subsidies 17 17 30 30 30 
operation expenditures 12 12 16 16 16 
other expenditures 26 37 55 55 55 
Expenditures for external economic activities 28 30 30 30 30 
Science 11 11 16 16 16 
Social programmes 162 205 110 110 110 
Military expenditures 71 67 99 99 99 
Debt service 15 12 12 14 14 
Other expenditures 29 29 60 65 65 
Compensation for price rises (b) 63 
State budget balance of which: -80 -146 -150 -306 -223 
Union budget -63 -81 -110 -126 -120 
republic budgets -17 -63 -40 -180 -103 
Revenues of pension fund 122 148 190 
Expenditure of pension fund (b) 130 130 177 
Balance of pension fund -8 + 18 +13 
Revenues of stabilization fund 60 6 6 
Expenditure of stabilization fund 60 6 6 
Stabilization fund 0 0 0 
Total revenues 452 429 700 563 651 
Total expenditures 532 575 858 851 861 
Total deficit -80 -146 -158 -288 -210 
(I) 1990, actual; 
(2) 1991, planned without tax and price refonn; 
(3) 1991, planned with wholesale price and tax refonn; 
(4) 1991, forecast with wholesale price and tax refonn; 
(5) 1991, forecast with retail and wholesale price and tax refonn. 
Sources: Report of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, 'On the project of all Union forecasts on the functioning of the economy in 1991 by the Council of Ministers of the USSR', Moscow, 
1990; monthly reports of Goskomstat of the USSR; infonnation of the Ministry of Economy of the USSR; infonnation of the Ministry of Finance of the USSR; estimates by Scrgcy Aleksashenko; 
authors' estimates. 
Notes to Table A.1.3 
(a) For 1990, subsidies include R 22 billion non-budgetary subsidies (non-reported in official budget data). These were financed through a Gosbank credit, which was not repaid at the end of the 
year. 
(b) Total compensations amount to R 110 billion for 1991, of which R 63 billion arc paid from the State budget and R 47 billion from the pension fund. 
The most reliable figures in this table arc shown in the first and last columns. The first column (I) is based on figures from the Ministry of Finance of the USSR. The last column (5) represents a 
forecast based on report figures for the first half of 1991 and on planned figures for the whole year. Intennediate variants arc based on different hypotheses. 
Column 2 represents 1991 figures with prices and taxes of 1990, taking into account social programmes and other expenditure introduced from I January 1991 (R 43 billion) and also assuming a 
5% drop in output, leading to a decrease in incomes of R 23 billion owing to a reduction of the taxation base. 
Column 3 represents 1991 figures at new wholesale prices, as planned by the Council of Ministers of the USSR from I January 1991 and also taking into account the tax refonns, adopted by the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the President and the Council of Ministers of the USSR and corrected by decisions of the republics' governments. 
Column 4 represents 1991 under the same conditions as in the previous column, but assuming a 10% cut in GNP and realistic estimates for food subsidies (R 200 billion instead of R 160 billion) 
and the sales tax (R 10 billion instead of R 100 billion). 
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Table A.1.4 
Incomes and expenditures of households 
(blllion R) 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Incomes 652 711 711 850 1 190 
Wages and salaries 447 464 464 570 730 
Other labour compensation 14 16 16 26 30 
Proceeds from agricultural product sales 
Pensions, benefits, and student grants 91 134 134 134 260 
Payments from financial system 28 27 27 30 70 
Other income 44 39 39 45 50 
Expenditures 
Purchases of goods and services1 497 472 472 447 850 
Obligatory payments and voluntary contributions 75 74 74 75 100 
Increase in savings 80 165 165 328 240 
(I) 1990, actual; 
(2) 1991, planned without tax and price rcfonn; 
(3) 1991, planned with wholesale price and tax refonn; 
(4) 1991, forecast with wholesale price and tax rcfonn; 
(5) 1991, forecast with retail and wholesale price and tax rcfonn. 
I Purchases of goods and services in 1991 are estimated for columns 2 and 3 with a 5% decrease in volwncs, and for columns 4 and S with a 10% decrease in volumes. 
Sources: Rcpon of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, 'On the project of all Union forecasts on the functioning of the economy in 1991 by the Council of Ministers of the USSR', Moscow, 
1990; monthly rcpons of Goskomstat of the USSR; information of the Ministry of Economy of the USSR; information of the Ministry of Finance of the USSR; authors' estimates. 
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Annex 2 
Estimating the stabilization shock 
Here we use a three-sector model, which includes production 
of foodstuffs, alcohol, and non-food products. We consider 
two periods: at t = - I, prices are supposed to be fixed, 
and supply/demand imbalances lead to rationing; at t = 0, 
prices are freed. The previous and current situations in each 
sector are described with two equations (we omit indexes of 
sectors): · 
J + S = D + E_ 1 
(I) 
(2) 
where J is the supply of imported goods, S is the supply of 
domestic goods, D is internal demand, and E is unsatisfied 
demand (all variables in nominal terms). Equation (I) means 
that at t = - I, the supply of each good was insufficient to 
satisfy the demand D _ 1. Equation (2) corresponds to the 
balance of supply and demand at t = 0 in a regime of free 
prices, taking into account accumulated unsatisfied demand 
E1. Combination of (I) and (2) leads to: 
(1-y) s + y j = (I + w)d + w (3) 
where y = J_ if(J _ 1 + S _ 1) is the share of imports in supply 
at t = - I, W = E _ if (J _ 1 + S _ 1) is the ratio of unsatisfied 
demand to supply at t = - I and j, s and d are the index 
values of J, S and D G = J/J_ 1). 
Nominal demand for each category of goods is a function 
of nominal income and relative prices: 
(4) 
where i is the rate of growth of income, and Pj is the relative 
price index for the sector under consideration. a and ~ are 
the corresponding income and price elasticities of demand. 
The supply of domestic goods in nominal terms is assumed 
to be directly proportional to sectoral wages: 
S=kw (5) 
where k is interpreted as an indicator of financial pressure: 
if k > I, then I% growth of wages leads to a bigger increase 
in nominal output. k is meant to represent the effect of 
(supply and demand) policies upon enterprises' behaviour: 
with the stabilization shock, the financial pressure is in-
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creased due to heavy tax and restrictive budget and credit 
policies. 
Wages and incomes depend on the price level: 
(W - I) = a(pc - I) 
(I - I) = v(pc - I) 
(6) 
(6') 
where a and v reflect the levels of income and wage indexa-
tion, and Pc is the consumption price index. 
To describe the supply of imported goods, we used Branson, 
Williamson and Braga de Macedo (1987). On the basis of 
this work: 
. e e J = e(-)-m = e(l - y)m ( - - y)-m 
p p (7) 
where e is the change in the exchange rate, and m is an 
elasticity coefficient. 
Aggregating equations (3) to (7) for each sector, we get a 
system of three equations (indexes of sectors are omitted): 
e y(I - y)m e(- - y)-m + (I - y)k(I + a(p0 - I)) = p 
(I + w)(l + v(p0 - I))a p~ + w (8) 
to which we shall add a definition equation for the consump-
tion price index: 
sh 1/p = ~ -
C ~ p (9) 
where sh is the share of each category of consumer goods 
in aggregate consumption. In solving the system for p, it has 
to be taken into account that shares y and sh change if prices 
change. Therefore, at first the system is solved with fixed 
shares. After the solution is found, shares y and sh are 
recalculated, and then the system is solved again until the 
iteration process stops. 
Using this model we estimated the effects of a stabilization 
shock for two situations: 
(i) at the beginning of stabilization there is only a disequi-
librium of flows; i.e. at t = 0 and at fixed prices nominal 
demand exceeds nominal supply because of the current 
period imbalances; 
(ii) at the beginning of the stabilization period, disequilib-
rium includes a stock component (accumulated forced 
savings). 
In both situations we made the following, we believe, re-
alistic, assumptions: the income policy is not strict, i.e. in-
dexation level is close to 1. The upper limit of the acceptable 
financial burden on enterprises is mainly dependent on the 
possibilities of diminishing subsidies and of increasing the 
nominal interest rates on credits. 
Table A.2.1 
Initial parameters and results of the stabilization shock 
Without stocks 
Foodstuffs Non-food Alcohol 
Structural, behavioural 
and policy parameters 
Consumption structure 0,342 0,535 0,123 
Indexation coefficient 0,750 0,750 0,750 
Share of imports 0,150 0,100 0,050 
Excess demand ratio(%) 
in flows 11,1 8,7 8,7 
in stocks 
Import elasticity -0,3 -0,4 -0,3 
Coefficient of financial pressure 1,1 I, I 1,1 
Price elasticity of demand -0,570 -0,430 -0,590 
Income elasticity of demand 1,030 0,918 0,830 
Exchange-rate devaluation 
Results 
Price index 2,1 1,9 1,8 
Output index 0,92 0,98 1,0 
Consumption structure 
of expenses 0,350 0,513 0,119 
Share of imports 0,210 0,136 0,072 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
Prospects for inflation and possibilities for stabilization 
The devaluation is defined proceeding from the assumption 
that a stabilization fund of USO 10 billion is created, and 
that the West grants a partial delay of payments on the 
external debt. In this case the currency resources would 
account for about USO 30 to 35 billion (USO 30 to 35 billion 
for export receipts, USO l O billion for the stabilization fund, 
and USO 10 billion for payments of about half the debts). 
The demand for imports expressed in roubles can be roughly 
assumed to be equal to the cost of imports in 1991 expressed 
in internal prices: R 230 billion. In this case the exchange 
rate will be as follows: 230/30 = 8 roubles per dollar, and 
devaluation will be equal to e = 4. 
With stocks 
Total Foodstuffs Non-food Alcohol Total 
1,00 0,342 0,535 0,123 1,000 
0,950 0,950 0,950 0,950 0,950 
0,150 0,100 0,050 
9,9 11,1 8,7 8,7 9,9 
17,6 14,9 12,4 16,3 
-0,3 -0,4 -0,3 
1, I 1,1 1,1 I, I 1,1 
-0,570 -0,430 -0,590 
1,030 0,918 0,830 
3,0 4,0 
2,0 6,6 4,9 3,9 5,2 
0,96 0,72 0,95 1,1 0,90 
0,347 0,531 0,122 
0,135 0,095 0,046 
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1. Smiet debate on rouble convertibility 
;, J 
·'· 
1.1. General remarks and concept definition 
.. . ~· : '. : ~ l • ...: ,'. : ' 
A new wave of theoretical debate on currency convertibility 
arose in the USSR from the mid-1980s. As usual for Soviet 
reform-thinking, this debate was launched in popular per-
iodicals rather than in professional publications. Very few 
writings on the topic were supported by technical details 
or calculations. The general mode of discussion and the 
terminology used might produce the impression that the 
phenomenon of convertibility is perceived very vaguely. 
Many Soviet authors have presented the problem as a dichot-
omy - convertibility versus non-convertibility; they often 
failed to differenti~te between diverse exchange restrictions 
and stages of convertibility on the path towards full converti-
bility. There was a widespread belief that establishment of 
convertibility meant a one-off assumption by the Soviet 
currency of all functions inherent in an international reserve 
currency. 
The evidence of the chervonetz (Soviet gold-backed convert-
ible currency of the 1920s) has often been brought to the fore 
as a historical and methodological reference (see Petrakov, 
1987). The glitter of the chervonetz has, for some authors, 
overshadowed the dualism of the NEP system and the limited 
scope given to natural market forces (Manevich, 1989; Si-
monov, 1990). As a matter of fact, the chervonetz was 
doomed from the outset, so it would be more proper to 
regard it as a negative lesson of a failed systemic transform-
ation rather than a success story. 
. . }' ' 
Relevance for the former Soviet Union of other countries' 
experience in establishing convertibility of their currencies 
remains a point of controversy. The majority of authors 
have emphasized a complete peculiarity of the Soviet case, 
which presumably requires a search for unprecedented in-
digenous scenarios of introducing convertibility of the cur-
rency. 
When still pushed to find reference points, Soviet authors 
have chosen the post-war economic history of Western Eur-
ope, but not the contemporary developments in the tran-
sitional economies of Central and Eastern Europe. This is 
despite the obvious systemic similarity with the economy of 
the former Soviet Union and the similar policy choices in 
the last decade. 
Soviet debate on rouble convertibility 
1.2. The rouble or a parallel currency? 
The dilemma between moving towards convertibility or in-
troducing a new currency has been at the centre of the Soviet 
debate. Starting from assessments of the inflationary rouble 
overhang - both in liquid and illiquid forms - and the 
loose monetary and fiscal policies, not a few Soviet econom-
ists abandoned the idea of stabilizing the rouble, and thereby 
opted for an alternative currency. The range of suggested 
scenarios has included the introduction of foreign currencies 
in domestic transactions ('dollarization'); a confiscatory 
monetary reform and the issue of new roubles; the issue of 
a new parallel currency; introduction of a gold-backed Soviet 
currency unit into foreign economic operations, etc. Along 
with relatively rational schemes, one can find also quite 
exotic projects, unimaginable for economic thinking in the 
West or in Central Europe, for example the plan of 'laun-
dering' the existing money through the consumer sector. 
Introduction of a new currency, meant either to be circulated 
along with the rouble or to replace it, was envisaged in a 
large proportion of papers submitted to an international 
contest for the best project of converting the rouble, held in 
Moscow in 1990 (see Dzarasov, 1990). The jury of the 
contest, however, gave its preference to projects that pursued 
a gradual strengthening of the rouble (Anulova, 1990; 
Panov, 1990). 
1.3. External or internal convertibility? 
In the majority of cases, the discussion in Soviet literature 
has placed the accent on external convertibility. It originates 
from the analysis of the post-war West European policies 
(Borisov and Kuzanov, 1989). An inverse algorithm - first 
internal, then external convertibility - has not been exam-
ined seriously in Soviet literature. Immediately after intro-
duction of internal convertibility (on current account, for 
residents) in Eastern Europe in 1990, most Soviet experts 
were extremely sceptical. The practical evidence from these 
economies did not exert a substantial impact on the course 
of the Soviet d_ebate during 1990 and the first half of 1991. 
The common argument for disregarding the scenario of 
internal convertibility for the USSR was that conditions in 
smaller East European economies differ too much from the 
USSR. (Do they really?) The implementation of external 
convertibility would require less resources, would imply less 
responsibility and credibility of policy-makers, and would 
bring about a much narrower range of consequences for the 
real sphere of the domestic economy. External convertibility 
of the rouble or of an eventual new currency was also 
expected to be more effective in attracting foreign investors 
to the USSR. 
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1.4. Timing and method 
'Timing' refers to introduction of currency convertibility 
either at an early or a later stage of reform, and 'method' 
signifies basically the option between shock and gradualism. 
In Western literature on East European issues, there is a 
growing consensus that transition to convertibility should 
be assigned to the early stages of the reform. Among Soviet 
experts, there are two well-defined camps - one for introdu-
cing a new convertible currency in the nearest future or 
immediately, and the other for convertibility at the very final 
stage of a market-oriented reform. The former group of 
experts envisages using a new hard currency as the main 
instrument of restructuring, while their opponents rely upon 
the 'classical' pattern of removing exchange restrictions in 
Western Europe. Over the past years, supporters of early 
convertibility have not dominated the debate, or at least 
their views have not been translated into the terms ofpolicy-
making. 
There has been a general reluctance to accept the relevance 
for the former Soviet Union of shock methods similar to 
those used in Poland. The preference for a gradual approach 
to currency convertibility was based on reasons of unbear-
able severity of the shock, hyperinflation and the high social 
costs of this kind of remedy (Sarafanov, 1991). Most experts 
did not believe that the Soviet market, if liberalized in one 
go, could clear and not destroy the entire economy. As of 
the second half of 1991, one can nevertheless evidence a 
radicalization of views on the method ofreforms, and 'shock' 
was no longer a dirty word in economic discussions. 
1.5. Convertibility within the strategy of 
reforms 
Rouble convertibility was invariably mentioned among the 
main hallmarks of economic reform in the USSR. Neverthe-
less, issues related to convertibility have usually appeared in 
the area of foreign trade and finance, i.e. somewhere at the 
periphery of the blueprints for reform. It clearly indicates 
that convertibility was not regarded as a key element of 
economic transformation, but as an externality. 
There has been little recognition of the impact that rouble 
convertibility would have on the economic regime and on the 
real sphere of the economy. Many Soviet experts suggested 
explicitly or implicitly that introduction of convertibility 
need not be synchronized with the rest of macroeconomic 
stabilization: hence, on the one hand, the recipes of very early 
convertibility, and, on the other, the formulas of stabilization 
and liberalization of the economy without convertibility. 
Fedorov (1990) wrote that 'regretfully, rouble convertibility 
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is noi today a feasible opportunity, nor a priority task. 
Furthermore, convertibility cannot appear as an uncon-
ditional requisite for economic prosperity'. 
2. Foreign exchange policies, 1986-91 
(a summary) 
Foreign exchange policies in the USSR from 1986 to 1991 
were shaped by the following main features: 
(i) partial decentralization of foreign exchange allocation; 
(ii) emergence of elements of regional and nationwide mar-
kets for foreign exchange; 
(iii) multiple exchange-rate system; 
(iv) 'dollarization' of the domestic turnover; 
(v) decreasing central reserves of foreign currency. 
In 1990, economic agents, other than specialized foreign 
trade organizations, carried out 57% of all Soviet imports 
and 33% of exports. Decentralization of foreign exchange 
allocation was embodied in export retention quotas and 
foreign currency accounts held by economic agents. Some 
20 OOO Soviet companies and entities were operating such 
accounts. It was intended that in 1991 the volume of reten-
tions by exporters would grow 2,5 times in relation to 1990 
figures. However, estimates suggest that up to 90% of all 
foreign exchange was still allocated through centralized 
channels. 
Foreign exchange auctions and, as of April 1991, the Mos-
cow foreign exchange market represented the first elements 
of market allocation of foreign currencies among agents. To 
begin with their scope was very narrow: no more than USD 
550 million was traded at the auctions over 1990, and USD 
81 million was sold at the Moscow foreign exchange market 
during the period from April to August 1991. Inflationary 
expectations of enterprises, multiform restrictions on foreign 
exchange and trade transactions and a huge rouble overhang 
might explain the unattractiveness of foreign exchange auc-
tions for potential sellers. This trend continued in 1991, and 
the average amount of foreign currencies traded weekly in 
Moscow never exceeded USD 10 million. Foreign exchange 
auctions held by republic banks in the Baltics, Belarus and 
other regions had a still smaller turnover. 
A multiple exchange-rate system evolved in the USSR from 
1986 (see Table I). By the end of October 1991, the following 
rates existed: 
(i) an official rate (R 0,6/USD I), applied mainly to oper-
ations related to settlement of rouble-denominated ex-
ternal credits; 
(ii) a 'commercial' rate (R 1,8), applied to foreign trade 
settlements; 
(iii) an 'auction' rate of exchange (R 73); 
(iv) a tourist rate (R 32 in Moscow); 
Table 1 
Rouble/dollar exchange rates, August 1990 to November 1991 
Rationale for rouble convertibility 
(v) a. 'black market' rate, averaging R 43,5 in Moscow; 
(vi) a 'currency transfer' rate (R 56), employed in non-
auction transactions between agents, with the inter-
mediation of commercial banks. 
.} 
~ ~ ~ - = ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ -1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1991 1991 1991 1991 1991 1991 1991 1991 1991 1991' 1991 2 1991' 
Official rate 0,6 0,6 0 0,5 0,6 0,6 0,5 
Commercial rate 1,6 1,6 1,7 1,6 
Tourist rate 5,7 5,7 5,6 5,5 5,6 5,6 5,5 
'Auction' rate 22,7 20,9 20,9 21,4 23,9 29,4 
Black market rate (pur-
chase rate, Moscow) 15,0 15,5 16,0 15,5 19,5 28,0 25,5 
I First half. 
2 Second half. 
3 Own estimate. 
Source: Official data from Gosbank; estimates by Kommersant, various issues. 
In few countries throughout the world has the premium 
between the official and the parallel rates of exchange 
reached 3 OOO to 4 000%, as in the former Soviet Union. 
'Dollarization' of domestic transactions has reflected a low 
'commodity convertibility' of the rouble and high inflation-
ary expectations. At first, the government itself had encour-
aged 'dollarization' and tolerated foreign currency payments 
between agents. In 1991, a presidential decree did ban dom-
estic transactions in foreign currencies, but in practice they 
remain widespread in disguised forms. 
The amounts of foreign exchange holdings in the household 
sector are very low - their estimates vary between USD I 0 
and 30 per capita. It is on a scale of magnitude less than the 
figures for other reforming economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe (Poland: USD 300 by the end of 1989). 
3. Rationale for rouble convertibility 
3.1. Main advantages 
Economic reasons for introducing convertibility of the rou-
ble are twofold: (a) to eliminate the inefficiencies and con-
straints of the present regulation of foreign exchange; and (b) 
0,6 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,6 
1,7 1,7 1,8 1,8 1,8 1,8 1,8 1,8 1,8 1,8 
27,6 27,6 27,6 27,6 32,0 32,0 32,0 32,0 32,0 47,0 
35,4 27,6 27,6 42,0 60,0 52,1 55,0 56,5 73,1 110,0 
23,5 31,0 28,0 30,0 30,0 33,5 35,0 43,5 50,03 56,0 
to use the advantages brought about by having a convertible 
currency. This paper discusses current account convertibility 
only, since capital account convertibility remains a target 
for a distant future. 
The defects of the present system of foreign exchange allo-
cation include, in particular: 
(i) non-economic, administrative methods of allocation; 
lack of transparent criteria; 
(ii) inefficient utilization of foreign exchange by all econ-
omic agents; 
(iii) dissipation of foreign exchange funds between a rapidly 
growing number of non-market agents with non-market 
motivations; 
(iv) low mobility of interflow of foreign exchange between 
regions, sectors, enterprises and individuals; 
(v) lack of incentive to exporters towards modernization 
and restructuring; 
(vi) decomposition of the circulation into the 'rouble area' 
and the 'dollar area'. 
To sum up, the foreign exchange allocation system created 
from 1986 to 1991 has no prospect of evolving into a fully-
fledged market. A further diminution of the State's claims 
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on enterprises' foreign currency revenues (suggested in the 
1990 report of the Commission of the EC as presumably 
one of the next steps in a gradual move towards converti-
bility) leads away from a unified domestic market and a 
single exchange rate. Nor is the system of currency auctions 
worth developing; such auctions have succeeded in no coun-
try of the world. 
The functioning of dual and multiple exchange rate systems 
in a post-planned economy creates additional distortions 
(Goldberg and Karimov, 1991). 
The main advantages expected from establishment of rouble 
convertibility can be summarized as follows: 
elimination of the defects of the present system; 
unification and development of the domestic market for 
foreign exchange; . 
realization of a consistent foreign exchange policy; 
'nominal anchor'; promotion of price reform, 
demonopolization and competition; 
expansion of the agents' economic freedom; 
encouragement to direct foreign investment; 
and last but not least, a radical change in the economic 
regime. 
3.2. Prices and a 'nominal anchor' 
Relative prices in the USSR remain heavily distorted with 
regard to world market prices. Consumer goods and manu-
factured products are 'overvalued', and raw materials, en-
ergy and services are undervalued (see Commission, 1990). 
The one-off administrative price increase in April 1991 did 
not eliminate the distortions. 
Administrative adjustment of prices is unable to achieve 
relative prices consistent with those in the market economies. 
It is also hard to select a 'model' country whose relative 
prices would reflect a combination of production factors 
and comparative advantages similar to the former Soviet 
Union's. Due to the influence of sectoral lobbies, adminis-
trative price adjustments usually fail to challenge the existing 
price distortions. 
It makes more sense, therefore, to rely on price liberalization. 
The common argument in favour of a price liberalization 
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before 'opening' the Soviet economy was that, given the 
magnitude and the comprehensiveness of its production 
structure, this country does not have to adopt 'alien' relative 
prices but can rely on its national basis for price-making. In 
addition, the USSR is not to a full extent a 'price-taker' for 
a series of industrial inputs. Nevertheless, this concept is 
misleading: no country in the world can afford using an 
exclusively national basis for pricing. 
A price liberalization, which occurred in Russia in the begin-
ning of 1992, cannot yield positive results within a closed 
and imbalanced economy. Intense shortages can produce a 
higher level of liberalized domestic prices vis-a-vis those 
abroad. As Portes puts it, 'it would be unnecessarily costly 
to go first to "rationalized" cost-plus prices, then to a closed 
economy equilibrium price structure, and only then to the 
open economy equilibrium, with many misdirected decisions 
along the way' (Portes, 1991 b ). 
The most reliable method for moving towards better relative 
prices is allowing world market prices to penetrate into the 
home economy through convertibility of the rouble and 
import liberalization. Prices of tradables would react almost 
immediately, while those of non-tradables would be more 
'sticky', particularly in the case of the former Soviet Union. 
Setting the rel~tive prices between tradables and non-trad-
ables would constitute one of the main points of reference 
or 'anchors' for the liberalized economy. 
Liberalization was expected to produce an overall price 
increase of 2,5 or 3 times (estimate by the Ministry of 
Economics) as a result of repressed inflation becoming open. 
If combined with rouble convertibility, price growth would 
gain additional momentum, depending on the rate of ex-
change. For example, the official wholesale price of one 
tonne of crude oil in November 1991 was R 70; the Jots 
allocated on the 'free' domestic market were traded at R 
I OOO on average. 
In order to reach the external level of USD 120, that equal 
to R 6 840 at the 'auction' rate of R 57 per dollar, the 
domestic 'free'· market price would have had to rise six or 
seven times. Under a more realistic rate of R 10 per dollar, 
the figure would still have been higher than the equilibrium 
level. Anyhow, the resulting prices would have exceeded the 
official prices prevailing at that time by tens of times (for a 
comparison of internal wholesale prices with world market 
prices, see Table 2). 
Under the presence of huge price distortions, the applica-
bility of the 'nominal anchor' concept as a tool for bringing 
open price inflation down is then questionable, at least in 
the short term. Before a 'nominal anchor' comes into effect 
Table 2 
Comparison of internal wholesale prices in the USSR and world 
market prices for selected products, 1991 
:Unit Internal World 
wholesale price market price 
(I OOOR) (I OOOUSD) 
Oil I OOO tonnes 70,0 127,0 
Natural gas 1 OOO m3 42,0 100,0 
Engine petrol 1 OOO tonnes 227,0 200,0 
Coal I OOO tonnes 21,0 44,3 
Rolled ferrous metals I OOO tonnes 328,0 372,1 
Pipes of steel I OOO tonnes 388,9 511,2 
Polyethylene 1 OOO tonnes 701,6 923,3 
Calcinated soda 1 OOO tonnes 119,7 133,4 
Metal-cutting lathe piece 29,1 36,5 
Truck piece 13,8 19,7 
Tractor piece 10,9 18,5 
Excavator piece 49,9 79,4 
Bulldozer piece 52,7 92,3 
Timber I OOO m3 46,9 50,0 
Saw-timber I OOO m3 194,9 144,5 
Cellulose I OOO tonnes 1 089,8 625,0 
Cardboard I OOO tonnes 888,1 519,2 
Paper I OOO tonnes 958,5 583,3 
Cement I OOO tonnes 60,0 65,6 
Cotton fibre 1 OOO tonnes 7 819,4 1 952,8 
Natural wool I OOO tonnes 37 940,6 2 116,7 
Fertilizers 1 OOO toones 205,9 124,4 
Meat and meat products 1 OOO tonnes 9 500,0 1 616,l 
Potatoes I OOO tonnes 382,4 254,8 
Tea I OOO tonnes 15 720,0 2 810,5 
Vegetable oil I OOO tonnes 3 252,0 495,0 
Sugar 1 OOO tonnes 2 070,4 481,5 
Grain I OOO tonnes 485,0 140,0 
Data from Ministry of Economics of RSFSR. 
Source: Ekonomika i zhizn (1991), No 44, p. 6. 
as a tool of stabilization, there might be a wave of four-
digit inflation (not just the Polish or Czechoslovak-style 
'corrective inflation'). This runaway inflation can obtain 
dynamics of its own, leading to a critical destabilization 
rather than anything else. Probably, prices for main inputs, 
foodstuffs and services should be controlled at the first stage 
of transition, and an outflow of such inputs to external 
markets must be controlled by quantitative restrictions. 
As for the exchange-rate regime, East European and world-
wide experiences prompt a 'crawling peg' with pre-an-
nounced regular adjustments as an optimal solution. An 
inflexible fixed rate for a long period and a floating rate 
from the start both have many negative effects. 
Rationale for rouble convertibility 
3.3. Demonopolization and competition 
The impact of current account convertibility on the domestic 
market includes a direct benefit offered by an inflow of 
imported consumer goods and production inputs, and an 
indirect effect embodied in the establishment of a more 
competitive environment. Both factors would serve to over-
come the extreme monopolism of the Soviet system of pro-
duction and distribution. 
Current account convertibility establishes a high degree of 
freedom of choice for consumers and producers, thus expos-
ing them to pressures of global competition. It implies a 
rapid increase of supply of imported goods to the domestic 
market, able to eliminate the chronic shortages. In the short 
term, a competitive environment can emerge in the Soviet 
economy through external factors mainly, because domestic 
agents will need time to adjust and to react to price signals. 
3.4. Radicalization of market-oriented reforms 
Currency convertibility appears as an inseparable element 
of a market-oriented economic reform, i.e. as an 'external' 
continuation of market principles. Establishment of current-
account convertibility of the rouble would change dramati-
cally the economic regime and undermine the present system 
of economic management. External factors would exert a 
hard destructive effect on domestic economic structures, 
by enforcing a mass-scale redeployment of factors, hitting 
inefficient producers, and destroying the administrative pri-
cing and resource allocation. 
By creating convertibility of the currency, a government 
leaves itself no chance to suspend reforms or to restrict their 
degree of radicalism. 
·..r,;, 
3.5. Risks involved by establishment 
of convertibility 
Western Europe was deterred from rapid establishment of 
convertibility by the fear that the foreign exchange constraint 
would preclude operation of the economy at full employ-
ment. While this potential cost is macroeconomic in nature, 
the benefits of convertibility are the classic microeconomic 
gains of more efficient resource allocation (Williamson, 
1990). 
The main risks involved in an early current-account converti-
bility of the Soviet currency include: 
current-account deficit; 
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exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves; 
negative effects of foreign competition on production and 
employment; 
crisis for importing companies and sectors, due to a drastic 
devaluation of the rouble and the resulting one-off price 
shock; 
rupture of domestic economic links between agents, due 
to a rapid trade diversion in favour of developed market 
economies; 
sharp increase in unemployment and the consequent ad-
ditional social spending, with inflationary effects; and 
social tensions and political instability. 
4. Preconditions for rouble convertibility 
4.1. Macroeconomic and financial stabilization 
Monetary overhang, shortages, budget deficits, price in-
flation, 'soft' credit, price controls and high inflationary 
expectations represent the major obstacles to a solid cur-
rency, be it convertible or not. 
Neutralization of the 'stock' of monetary overhang would 
affect hundreds of billions of roubles (see Table 2). Under 
the assumption that currency substitution of the 'stock' 
component of the overhang is to reach the dimensions as in 
Poland by the end of 1989 (roughly three-quarters of all 
assets), a liberalization of the foreign exchange regime would 
thereby require around USD 86,5 billion at an exchange rate 
of R 10/USD 1. A bigger problem consists, however, in the 
enterprise sector's insatiable demand for imports paid from 
current revenues ('flow'), which is still uncontrollable. 
Inflation rates are estimated at between 600 and 1 000% for 
1991, and they are increasing from one month to another, 
particularly since August 1991. On the one hand, inflation 
depreciates the money 'stock' and reduces the overhang in 
real terms. On the other hand, high inflationary expectations 
do fuel an increase of the overhang and encourage currency 
substitution in both sectors. 
Is macroeconomic stabilization a precondition for converti-
bility, or is there a case for introducing convertibility as part 
of a stabilization package? (Williamson, 1990). A strong 
feedback between the two does exist. Pegging the rouble 
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might constitute the basic tool of macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion, if linked to a sound macroeconomic policy. Fulfilment 
of the simultaneity requirement is crucially important here. 
Currency convertibility cannot be launched before macro-
economic and financial stabilization has begun, but one must 
not necessarily wait several years until a complete stabiliza-
tion before shifting to current-account convertibility. 
4.2. Market infrastructure and the 
banking system 
A minimal infrastructure for normal functioning of markets 
includes establishment of horizontal links between agents 
through commodity exchange markets, independent brokers, 
subcontracting, etc., to replace administrative of allocation 
inputs. Enterprises need a higher degree of autonomy and 
an environment in which explicit and stable legislation exists. 
In addition to commodity markets, there should also be 
markets for money and capital. Generally speaking, the 
Soviet economy should become more monetized than now. 
The banking system in the former Soviet Union is inadequate 
from the perspective of developing a foreign exchange mar-
ket. Several tens of commercial banks now hold licences 
for foreign exchange transactions, but they do not possess 
sufficient facilities, particularly away from the main centres. 
In order to become operational as the key institutional 
element of the foreign currency market, the banking sector 
must substantially expand its capacities. That implies ad-
ditional installations, communications, computing facilities, 
personnel, operative reserves of currency of several denomi-
nations, etc . 
4.3. Rate of exchange 
For the sake of stabilization, a fixed exchange-rate regime 
has various advantages over a floating rate regime. Inter-
national experts have come to a consensus with regard to 
this (Portes, 1991b; Marer, 1990; Greene and Isard, 1991). 
As for an anchor currency, the ecu appears to be a good 
solution for the former Soviet Union, given the weight of 
Western Europe in Soviet foreign trade and finance. 
The salient problem is to choose the 'right' rate of exchange 
at which to peg the rouble. A huge disequilibrium between 
supply and demand for hard currency at present is pushing 
towards a marginal rate. This trend will remain if a dual-
rate system is adopted. 
A strong devaluation of the rouble has its pros and cons. 
As for advantages, it would severely limit the demand for 
imports, thus improving the balance of payments and pro-
viding the necessary protection to domestic producers. His-
torically, countries with uncompetitive industries and foreign 
exchange shortages have generally sought to restrict the 
convertibility of their currencies, or to maintain other forms 
of import restrictions, rather than to rely on a heavily de-
preciated exchange rate for attaining a sustainable current-
account position (Greene and Isard, 1991). Transitional 
economies can reasonably adopt a different approach, in 
order to eliminate distortions and imbalances over a rela-
tively short period of time. 
Altogether, a serious undervaluation of the rouble would be 
damaging. 'Overshooting' for the sake of sustainability of the 
exchange rate can cause a very deep recession, as happened in 
Poland in 1990. A strong cost-push inflation will emerge. In 
the former Soviet Union, it would be a bad solution to peg 
at the marginal exchange rate of the parallel market, for 
both conceptual and practical reasons. That rate is excep-
tionally far removed from purchasing power parity (Marer, 
1990). It is distorted also because of unrepresentativeness: 
only small portions of all foreign exchange available in the 
country, namely 1,5% of hard currency export receipts, are 
traded on the parallel market. According to Williamson 
(1990), domestic currency should be devalued by enough to 
ensure a substantial competitive export sector, but by no 
more than can be relied on to achieve that purpose. 
Table 3 
Monetary overhang in the USSR and an estimate of currency substitution 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Cash money in circulation 
Call deposits 
of which: households 
companies 
Term deposits 
of which: households 
companies 
Money in settlements and other assets (balance) 
Monetary assets of households and companies, total 
(a) 
157,6 
537,1 
282,5 
254,6 
36,8 
289,5 
74,3 
267,1 
1 058,5 
(a) Monetary assets of the Soviet economic agents by I July 1991, in billions of roubles. 
Source: data from Gosbank (Gerashenko, 1991). 
Preconditions for rouble convertibility 
The I.eve! of exchange rate depends on supply of foreign 
currency, and more specifically on the volume of exports, 
debt servicing and inflow of direct foreign investment. 
Lushin and Vernikov (1991) compiled a static model of 
supply/demand on the Soviet foreign exchange market for 
1992, the variables being the volume of debt servicing (USO 
0, USO 10 billion or USO 20 to 22 billion), and the avail-
ability of a USO 10 billion stabilization fund, under the 
assumption that this fund can be used during one year. 
Minimal import demand for foreign currency was postulated 
at USO 35 to 40 billion, and exports at USO 30 billion. The 
resulting rate of exchange varies very broadly between R 6,6/ 
USO 1 (no debt servicing, a stabilization fund available) 
and R 46,0/USO 1 (full debt servicing, a stabilization fund 
unavailable). 
Calculations carried out by the Ministry of Economics of 
the USSR suggested the limit point of devaluation as R 7 / 
USO 1, taking into consideration the viability of various 
sectors. However, R 10/USO 1 might be regarded as a more 
realistic target. An attempt to peg at a much lower rate 
would condemn to death the absolute majority of importing 
industries, under monetary stringency. 
Independently of a far-reaching market liberalization and 
rouble devaluation towards a market-clearing level, a 
straightforward adjustment of the 'commercial' rate of ex-
change is advisable, from R 1,8/USO 1 in November 1991 
(b) (c) (d) (e) 
78,8 2,5 7,8 11,3 
388,8 12,2 38,9 55,5 
205,5 
183,3 
264,1 8,3 26,4 37,7 
210,6 
53,5 
. ''133,6 4,2 13,4 19,1 
865,3 27,0 86,5 123,6 
(b) Amount of money potentially subject to currency substitution, in billions of roubles (own estimate). The estimate is based on the assumption that currency substitution in the USSR can reach 
the same proportion as in Poland in December 1989. 
(c) Amount of foreign currency (in billions of USD) needed for currency substitution, at the exchange rate of R 32/USD I. 
(d) Amount of foreign currency (in billions of USD) needed for currency substitution, at the exchange rate of R 10/USD I. 
(e) Amount of foreign currency (in billions of USD) needed for currency substitution, at the exchange rate of R 7 /USD I. 
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down to at least R 3,5 or 4/USO 1. This alone, however, 
cannot improve the balance of payments under a lax monet-
ary policy, but it can start the way out of the impasse of the 
multiple rate system. 
4.4. Foreign currency reserves and settlement 
of debt-servicing obligations 
A move towards currency convertibility implies the avail-
ability of foreign exchange reserves. Soviet reserves of gold 
were recently estimated at a pessimistically low level of 240 
tonnes. The reserves of foreign exchange kept with Western 
banks have decreased to a critically low level too. The central 
banks of the former Soviet Union republics are not in a 
position to intervene on the market and to influence the rate 
of exchange. Accumulation of foreign exchange reserves 
from domestic sources is extremely problematic, in view of 
falling export receipts, current-account deficits and insignifi-
cant holdings of foreign currency in the household and 
company sectors. Therefore, current-account convertibility 
cannot be established without a stabilization fund contrib-
uted by foreign countries and financial institutions. Esti-
mates of desirable magnitudes of such a fund usually vary 
between USO 10 and 20 billion. At the G7 summit in July 
1991, no concrete understanding was reached regarding a 
stabilization fund, so the issue remains suspended. The West 
may feel reluctant to contribute to what might seem an 
overvalued rate of the rouble instead of the parallel market 
rate of exchange. However, saving resources at the cost of 
an excessive devaluation will certainly produce Polish-style 
depression problems in the economy. 
Disequilibrium between the former Soviet Union's export 
receipts and its import requirements is aggravated by foreign 
debt servicing, which may leave as little as USO 10 billion 
for the domestic market to cover a demand for imports at 
least four times bigger. Export aversion and import hunger 
can partly be solved by a drastic devaluation of the rouble, 
but even in that case an extreme scarcity of foreign exchange 
in the short term would bias the functioning of the market 
and the stability of the pegged rate. 
The only visible solution cop.sists in renegotiation and re-
scheduling of the external debt. There have been such pre-
cedents in Eastern Europe (Poland), though similar attitudes 
would be harder to justify for the former Soviet Union, 
given its traditionally high solvency (as distinguished from 
the present constraints on liquidity). 
In any event, Western financial support will become avail-
able only for a clearly cut and internationally approved 
package of market-oriented reforms. 
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4.5. Microeconomic precondition 
By basing their decisions on international relative prices, 
domestic investors will allocate resources in conformity with 
the country's comparative advantage. To accomplish this, 
there should exist, at least, domestic agents able and willing 
to react to price signals, which has not been the case in the 
former Soviet Union. The entry of a sufficient number of 
market-type agents is a crucial microeconomic precondition 
for exposing the economy to foreign competition ('opening') 
via current account convertibility. Otherwise, 'opening' will 
prove to be counterproductive, as was the partial decentraliz-
ation of foreign trade and exchange in the USSR in the 
second half of the 1980s. 
Coping with this microeconomic precondition implies a 
far-reaching institutional reform aimed at privatization 
and redefinition of property rights (for the transitional 
period 'commercialization' of State-owned companies); 
demonopolization; and creation of a competitive environ-
ment. Such a reform certainly requires a long period of 
time, but a stabilization package cannot be put off until 
its completion. 
4.6. Political precondition 
Commitment to early convertibility raises the stakes for the 
government in charge. It increases the cost - perceived and 
actual - of reneging and enhances policy-makers' credibility 
(Portes, 1991a). A government which undertakes to move 
towards currency convertibility must be popular, strong, 
professional, pragmatic and flexible. The hardships of tran-
sition in the former Soviet Union will be of a greater order 
of magnitude than elsewhere in Eastern Europe, due to a 
more heavily distorted economy, lower standards of living, 
and lesser manageability. Political instability and polariza-
tion are likely to increase within individual republics immedi-
ately after the start of stabilization programmes. 
4. 7. Single economic space 
Stabilization and convertibility of the rouble as the only CIS 
or Russian currency requires centralized policy-making in 
the area served by this currency. It is impossible to conceive 
that within the rouble area there will be several autonomous 
centres in charge of monetary and credit policy, foreign 
trade and exchange regulation, foreign reserves manage-
ment, external borrowing and debt repayment. 
5. Policy options with regard to 
rouble convertibility, 1991 
-,1 '. .,: ; 
5.1. The Union Government's plan 
,.;;-, 
·t,, .· ,, 
. \/ ' . >'. ~-,J ;. ;~'' 'J • i -..,; ' 
In May 1991, the Union-Republic Foreign Exchange Com-
mittee decided to shift to 'internal convertibility' of the 
rouble as of I January 1992. That was an unexpected and 
somewhat improvised decision, given the background of 
reform thinking and reform-making over the preceding per-
iod. A group of experts elaborated a draft concept, spelling 
out the essence of internal convertibility, its main precon-
ditions and probable effects. The general conclusion was 
that most preconditions did not exist in summer 1991, nor 
were they likely to emerge by I January 1992. Besides that, 
a transition towards rouble convertibility could not be 
started in the absence of a general stabilization programme. 
Both the initial draft concept of internal convertibility and 
the gradualist scenario prepared by the Ministry of Econ-
omics were rejected by representatives of the republic 
governments. It was done for reasons of conceptual disagree-
ment rather than technical problems of implementation. The 
ideas most unacceptable to the republics were: (a) liquidation 
of foreign exchange retention quotas; (b) accumulation of 
all foreign currency funds with the banks; (c) centralization 
of gold reserves with the central bank; (d) equal access to 
foreign exchange on the market for all agents regardless of 
their territorial location, sectoral subordination and export/ 
import profile; (e) unified rate of exchange for all trans-
actions on the current account. 
In rejecting the internal convertibility plan of the Union 
Government, the republics pursued an objective of 
maximum autonomy from the centre in spheres such as 
monetary and macroeconomic policies, international re-
serves management and exchange regulation. 
. ;, l,:. .I ,, . 
There was no interest in creating a unified domestic market 
for foreign exchange, since each republic's authorities would 
prefer to administer all export receipts obtained by com-
panies located on their territory. One may conclude that the 
internal convertibility plan was, for the first time perhaps, a 
case in which the centre proposed a more market-oriented 
plan than the individual republics. Still, administrative-
minded separatist scenarios were preferred. The Union 
Government did not have enough time to push forward its 
plan. After the August 1991 coup, Union-level authorities 
finally lost the initiative and power. 
Policy options with regard to rouble convertibility, 1991 
5.2. The Russian Government's plan 
The first stabilization programme, submitted by the Govern-
ment of Russia in April 1991, proclaimed the intention to 
achieve rouble convertibility (presumably in the first place 
external convertibility in order to attract foreign investors). 
The programme envisaged the right of all Russian citizens 
and enterprises to buy and sell foreign currency (Programma, 
J99J). ] .l,;L, ;,':,, ;:,;,):-;, '·.,,:.':, ,'., ,,,; .. ,;_. 
The Russian Government - more precisely, its Ministry of 
Foreign Economic Relations - opposed the Union Govern-
ment's plan of internal convertibility with its own blueprint 
in August 1991. The latter envisaged the taxation of export 
earnings (to be channelled towards debt servicing and cen-
tralized import programmes), entitling the exporter to retain 
the remainder - not less than 50%. The strategy of move-
ment towards convertibility of the rouble, as exposed in the 
plan, mainly consisted of vague statements and did not spell 
out the mechanism of implementation, nor did it provide 
quantitative estimates. 
In the autumn of 1991, ideas for rouble 'internal converti-
bility' were discussed at inter-republic meetings in Moscow. 
Still, in the economic reform programme for Russia, an-
nounced on 28 October 1991, nothing definite was said on 
currency convertibility. 
·.· : ., :. 
5.3. Yavlinsky's plan 
The 500-day plan (Perekhod, 1990) envisaged a two-phase 
scenario of shifting towards convertibility of the rouble: at 
the first stage (1991) - complete decentralization of ex-
change allocation among agents, except for a proportion 
destined for debt servicing; during the second stage (as of 
1992 and according to maturity of premises) - establish-
ment of internal convertibility and liberalization of exchange 
transactions for individuals. One might question, however, 
the consistency between these two phases. The ambiguity 
(export earnings left to exporters versus a single market) was 
later reproduced in other documents prepared by Yavlin-
sky's group. 
In September 1991, Yavlinsky presented a blueprint for an 
economic union (of former Soviet republics), where internal 
convertibility of the rouble was mentioned as one of the 
immediate tasks. The rouble would be kept as the single 
common currency. The scenario admitted introduction of 
local currencies to the extent that these would not undermine 
the rouble. 
Subsequently, Yavlinsky's blueprint acquired the form of 
'Convention on the Economic Community', signed by eight 
65 
Rouble convertibility in the context of Soviet economic reform 
ex-republics of the USSR by October 1991. The community 
member States that use a single currency would hereby 
envisage a transition to internal convertibility of the rouble 
in the near future and would prepare and implement an 
agreed schedule to this effect. 
6. Convertibility of currency (-ies) in the USSR: 
a speculative outlook 
6.1. How many currencies? 
Unlike other transition economies in Central and Eastern 
Europe, the former Soviet Union cannot concentrate its 
efforts on stabilization of a single domestic currency. There 
have been explicit declarations on the issuing of own curren-
cies in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine and Georgia. 
The list may have new entries at any moment, however. For 
technical reasons, monetary reforms in the ex-republics are 
unlikely to be accomplished before the second half of 1992. 
Ukraine plans to introduce its 'grivna' by the middle of 
1992, before which date coupons will serve as quasi-money 
in order to protect the market. 
6.2. Ration~le for convertibility with republic 
currencies 
In 1990, the authors of the report of the four institutions 
(IMF, IBRD, OECD and EBRD) on the Soviet economy 
noted that when the rouble became convertible, a unified 
policy of currency interventions would be needed, thus leav-
ing no justification for dispersion of foreign currency re-
serves among regions and republics (IMF et al., 1990). 
The drive towards introduction of separate currencies by the 
republics originates predominantly from political motiv-
ations and ambitions. Newly established authorities wish to 
acquire all the attributes of independent States as soon as 
possible and at any price. As for economic motivation, the 
foremost is the uncertainty of financial stabilization at the 
Union level and the magnitude of the rouble overhang. 
After August 1991, decomposition of the USSR and the 
forthcoming introduction of republic currencies was no 
longer just a theoretical assumption, but almost an ac-
complished fact. Will it be easier for the new currencies to 
become convertible than for the rouble? 
Opinions differ strongly in this respect. On the one hand, 
disintegration can be considered advantageous, in view of 
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the inability of the Soviet Union as a whole to achieve 
convertibility of the present single currency, the rouble. 
Many Soviet experts argue that financial stabilization under 
the aegis and dear responsibility of a single republic becomes 
more feasible, because this way financial discipline can pre-
sumably be controlled better. The main externalities that 
hindered Union-level stabilization can thus be avoided. An 
increment in output of consumer goods by local industries 
would improve the equilibrium and not be absorbed by 
the monetary overhang of non-residents. More developed 
republics in the western parts of the former Soviet Union 
have relatively good prospects with regard to output struc-
ture, labour efficiency and ethics, infrastructure and geo-
graphic position. 
The above argument must not altogether be taken for 
granted. Judging by the practical evidence of the past years, 
financial discipline at the republic level is not necessarily 
better than at the Union level. Quite the opposite: the deficits 
of the republics' budgets were growing faster than the Union 
budget deficit, and the budget of Russia is an illustration of 
that. Nothing indicates at present that republic governments 
can afford to suddenly abandon their irresponsible policies 
in public spending, taxation and wages, and to curb inflation 
efficiently. 
As for the balance of payments of individual republics, 
inevitable current-account deficits will not be offset by an 
inflow of foreign finance, because individual republics have 
insufficiently attractive markets and high risks of political 
instability. The bargaining potential of individual republics 
in settling issues of foreign credit and debt rescheduling 
cannot be compared with that of the entire USSR. 
The argument that there will be 'no negative effect of the 
transition from the rouble to a 16-currency system on econ-
omic efficiency' (Bofinger, 1991) appears to be very vulner-
able too. Despite the rouble's failure to provide the main 
monetary functions, its existence within the USSR did mark 
a certain degree of economic integration, not necessarily 
irrational. Replacement of the rouble by local currencies will 
in any event increase transaction costs and information costs. 
The trend towards delinkage, self-sufficiency and minimiza-
tion of inter-republic flows of factors becomes stronger. 
Autarchy cannot but affect economic efficiency. Besides 
that, the cost of transition and restructuring will be great, 
due to the rupture of interregional links and the crisis of 
industries most integrated into division of labour between 
ex-republics, and an aggravation of shortages. Losses from 
trade diversion may well exceed the gains (Mac Auley, 1991). 
In the short and medium term, no republic, not even Russia, 
will benefit from delinkage and the collapse of the rouble 
area. Therefore, the new currencies to emerge will face much 
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stronger inflationary pressures than those currently faced by 
the rouble. Republic currencies' convertibility requires very 
similar conditions to those for rouble convertibility, plus 
even greater efforts to offset the costs of delinkage and trade 
reorientation. 
In view of the disintegration of the USSR and the introduc-
tion of local currencies, it may appear to be politically wise 
to accept this trend as supposedly a factor for promoting 
economic reforms in each republic. However, the cost of this 
development should not be underestimated, nor should one 
be too optimistic about the prospects for convertibility of 
republic currencies. 
6.3. Russia: monetary reform and currency 
convertibility in the light of the latest 
developments 
The emergence of republic currencies does pose new chal-
lenges to the rouble. The currency substitution or parallel 
circulation of various currencies in the republics outside 
Russia forces the roubles out and thus worsens the monetary 
overhang in Russia. The prospect of keeping the rouble as 
the currency unit of inter-republic trade transactions does 
not seem to be viable, because introduction of local curren-
cies reflects exactly the attempt to escape from the rouble 
area. 
An eventual substitution of the rouble by republic currencies 
affects the credibility of the rouble for agents in the respective 
republics. Hence the trend of'flight from the rouble', already 
started in the Baltics and visibly depressing the rouble/dollar 
exchange rate on the entire Soviet territory. 
Under these conditions it becomes extremely hard to stabilize 
the rouble and to introduce its convertibility. As long as the 
rouble remains the single currency in the area, Moscow 
must coordinate its stabilization efforts with other republics' 
authorities, but the latter do not manifest much readiness 
to cooperate in this field. Russian financial authorities may 
find it meaningless to guarantee the internal convertibility 
of the rouble with Russia's reserves and stabilization funds, 
if there is a lack of similar policies and financial discipline 
in other republics. 
In the light of these new developments, the former scenarios 
of monetary stabilization and rouble convertibility lose rel-
evance. What was correct in July 1991 was no longer so in 
November 1991. In particular, the idea of a monetary reform 
and introduction of an alternative currency in Russia was 
gaining ground. At the end of October 1991, the Russian 
leadership threatened the republics unwilling to remain in-
side the rouble area, and those planning to introduce their 
own currencies, with a monetary reform. 
Gradualist approaches to currency convertibility, on the 
other hand, have much less justification now, because the 
risks of 'early' convertibility are becoming comparable to, if 
not smaller than, the cost of postponing it. The most specific 
feature of the USSR, namely its federative structure, has 
disappeared, so the imperatives for 'early' convertibility in 
Russia have become more similar to other Central and 
East European economies. Last but not least, the political 
situation in Russia at the end of 1991 had become more 
appropriate for launching a stabilization package, of which 
current-account convertibility for residents could constitute 
one of the main elements. 
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1. Introduction , 
State ownership of most capital assets is incompatible with 
a market economy: that has become the standard view 
amongst Soviet reformers over the past few years. The aim 
of razgosudarstvlenie (literally, destatification) was incorpor-
ated into the Soviet Government's plans for transition to a 
market economy. This article reviews the main recent 
measures of destatification now in place or (where the drafts 
are known) in draft form at the federal (USSR) level. It also 
reviews the programme of destatification incorporated in 
the so-called 'Shatalin plan' ( Perekhod k rynku. Chast' /, 
1990, and Transition to the market. Part II, 1990), and some 
RSFSR legislation, and compares these with the federal 
government's 1991 programme.I 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 makes 
the details of legislation passed before that time seem of 
doubtful interest. It is a safe bet that much of it will be 
revised. Different territorial jurisdictions are now responsible 
for the legal framework(s) of the economic space that until 
recently was occupied by the USSR. And how much of 
any of it will be implemented in practice? The lack of an 
appropriate general civil-law framework is another concern 
(EC Commission, 1990, p. 96). {Though it will be shown 
below that there have now been some signs of progress in 
relation to property as loan security.) 
Despite these doubts, the general direction of recent legis-
lation on ownership, and the thinking behind it, do matter. 
The various laws and decrees may not serve as reliable guides 
to the precise shape of things to come,- but it will be argued 
here that this legislation, with all its ambiguities and lacunae, 
and all the doubts about its life-chances, reflects a consider-
able degree of agreement within the economic policy elite in 
Russia and the former Union. 
James Noren has recently argued (Noren, 1990) that it is 
premature to write of some sort of muddling through in 
Soviet economic transformation. He observes, however, 
apropos of the Shatalin programme, that 5 OOO days might 
be more plausible than the 500 days. Suppose then that in 
five to 10 years' time observers could look back and say that 
there had after all been a successful transformation; if that 
were to be the case, the present thinking on ownership would 
have contributed to it. 
The text of Gorbachev's compromise plan was given in lzvestia. 
27.10.1990, pp. 2-5. It seems consistent with one conclusion of this 
paper: that differences between the programmes identified here as the 
Shatalin-Yavlinskiy and Ryzhkov-Abalkin plans with regard to intended 
ownership forms (though not on the transition to them) are numerous 
but mostly minor. Therefore, radically new ideas on ownership are 
unlikely to emerge. 
Introduction 
Sectiqn 2 of the paper contains a brief account of the mean-
ing of some of the key terms currently in use in Soviet 
legislation and public debate, followed by some remarks on 
the evolution of the Soviet ownership debate and the earlier 
legislation. These are topics the author has dealt with at 
greater length elsewhere (Hanson, 1989 and 1990). 
Section 3 is a summary of the major legislative developments 
at the USSR, or Union, level. Here the focus is on the 
legislation that is of a generally 'liberalizing' character, but 
it includes a section on the outbreak of restrictive measures 
between September 1990 and March 1991. Section 4 con-
siders the ownership ingredients of the Shatalin programme 
and some republic programmes in comparison with those 
found in the Union programme. Section 5 offers an assess-
ment, taking into account the presidential compromise pro-
gramme for transition to a market economy (Jzvestia, 1990) 
and the Pavlov anti-crisis programme of spring 1991 {TASS, 
1991 ). 
The treatment here is not comprehensive. Events - at any 
rate, legislative events - are moving so fast that one has to 
choose between trying to take stock of them in a rough and 
ready way and leaving them to the definitive assessment of 
some future economic historian. 
One more disclaimer: the legislation is considered only from 
the point of view of its economic rationale and economic 
implications. A lawyer would approach it somewhat differ-
ently. Most Soviet economic legislation is regarded by West-
ern lawyers as poorly drafted and therefore problematic on 
technical legal grounds. No doubt some of the gaps and 
ambiguities that are apparent to a lawyer are also apparent 
to an economist, but some will not be. 
2. Terminology and background 
In English-speaking countries, the term 'public sector' refers 
to that part of the economy in which the capital assets are 
owned and the labour is employed by the State, by agencies 
of the State, or by corporate bodies established and owned 
by it as entities with their own legal existence. The last of 
these may be public corporations in the British sense or 
commercial concerns in which the State is the sole or the 
majority shareholder. 
Whether the State is involved at national/federal level or at 
some other level, including local or municipal, makes no 
difference so far as our use of the term 'public sector' is 
concerned. 
Conversely, the private sector is everything else, including 
producer cooperatives. 
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In the present Soviet debate and legislation there has been 
a tendency to restrict the scope of the terms 'private' 
( chastniy) and 'privatization' ( privatizatsiya). This does not 
apply to some writers like Vasilii Selyunin (see Selyunin, 
1990, where he comments on this difference of terminology), 
but it is true of most. 
The attempt to limit the scope of these terms was most 
pronounced in the speeches and documents coming from 
Gorbachev, Ryzhkov (during his premiership) and others 
associated with the USSR authorities. They generally avoid 
referring to privatization in a favourable sense. (In this 
respect the Gorbachev compromise document of October 
1990 comes rather closer to the more 'radical' use of 
language.) The authors of the Shatalin programme were 
more relaxed about it, treating 'privatization' as an im-
portant part of their agenda. But they also use the terms 
'private' and 'privatization' more narrowly than is normally 
done in Britain or ~he United States. 
The mainstream Soviet public debate, and the USSR and 
Russian legislation, tend to use these terms only in relation 
to small firms owned and run by individuals, families or 
small partnerships. The notion that some large firms might 
also be 'private' in this sense is not addressed. It is usually 
assumed that large enterprises, if they leave State ownership, 
will pass into some form of what is referred to as 'collective' 
ownership. This may include workforce control under leas-
ing of assets that remain State-owned; it may include work-
force ownership (producer cooperatives); but it is expected 
that the quantitatively most important form of 'collective' 
ownership will in the medium-to-long term be the joint-stock 
company. Thus the corporation or, as in British terminology, 
the public limited company, is referred to as a form of 
collective ownership, though such firms are the core of what 
we routinely refer to as the private sector. 
Razgosudarstvlenie, or destatification, therefore, is not equiv-
alent in this Soviet usage to privatization. Rather, the latter 
is treated as a special case of the former. Destatification by 
transformation into 'collective' forms of ownership, mainly 
joint-stock companies, is treated as the main type of owner-
ship change that is planned for the medium term. From a 
Western point of view, all of this is rather confusing. By and 
large, what the Soviets call destatification is what we would 
call privatization. 1 It should also be noted, however, that 
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Admittedly, British usage is not always clear. 'Privatization' can mean 
both the sale of State assets and the device of offering for open, 
competitive tender contracts to carry out services previously provided 
in-house by (e.g.) city council employees. The latter procedure goes one 
step further than leasing a State-owned cafe or factory to its existing 
employees. Vickers and Yarrow (1988), in their study of UK privatiza-
tion, concentrate on asset sales. 
conversion of a State enterprise into a joint-stock company 
with shares owned by the State Property Agency (see below), 
as a stage on the way to public sale, would also, in Soviet 
usage, be destatification. This corresponds to what one study 
has called 'commercialization' (IMF et al., 1990). 
The Soviet public debate on economic reform has moved 
quite quickly to confront the issue of property rights. In 
1987, the dominant reform view was that 'market relations' 
could and should be combined with State ownership of all 
land and nearly all capital. Since late 1989, all major policy-
making groups have been advocating the sale of a large 
proportion of State assets and the introduction of small 
family firms and larger joint-stock companies, with such 
institutional concomitants as a stock exchange and a net-
work of commercial banks clearly separated from the cen-
tral, State bank. The differences now are over terminology 
and the pace and final extent of the transformation. 
A letter in the literary journal Novyi mir in May 1987 marked 
the most conspicuous shift in the debate (Popkova, 1987). 
It was written by a young radical economist, Larisa Piyash-
eva. She argued that the most prosperous economies in 
the world were market economies, that none of them was 
socialist, that experiments in combining planning and the 
market in the West had been written off as failures and that 
socialism was incompatible with the market. That view was 
outside the rules of the public debate at the time; it is 
now regarded as conventional by many of the economists, 
officials and elected deputies who are drafting programmes 
for the transition to a market economy. 
The route along which the Soviet debate has evolved has 
not led through an abstract analysis of the economics of 
property rights. One does not see references to the Western 
economic literature on principal-agent relations or the mar-
ket for corporate control. The emphasis has instead been on 
two closely linked phenomena widely observed in the Soviet 
economy. The first is the wasteful use of natural resources 
and capital assets in the absence of identifiable proprietors 
with a direct interest in their value. The second is the failure 
of attempts to. induce enterprises to behave independently, 
short of cutting all links between them and the central 
authorities. 
At the same time, favourable references both to Western 
and to Hungarian and Polish experience have proliferated. 
Writings about, and translations of, Hayek and Friedman 
have begun to appear (for example, Pinsker and Piyasheva, 
1989), but the discussions related most closely to policy tend 
to appeal to common sense rather than theory. Through 
1990, semantic differences such as those already described, 
over the meaning of 'private', loomed large in public dis-
r cussion. Thus the USSR President and Prime Minister and 
the USSR Deputy Prime Minister responsible in 1990 for 
reform, Leonid Abalkin, continued to describe their plans 
for the future as socialist while preparing for a stock ex-
change, foreign direct investment and the transformation 
of State enterprises into 'joint-stock companies' and 'small 
firms'. This linguistic conflict seems to have disappeared in 
1991, under the aegis of the otherwise-conservative Pavlov 
government. 1 
More radical policy-makers, including Boris Yeltsin, speak 
favourably of 'private ownership', without displaying an 
obviously different view of future economic institutions. 
These differences of terminology are considered by the rad-
ical reformers to signal real differences: above all, differences 
in willingness to create an economy composed largely of 
firms that are genuinely independent of the central authori-
ties.2 
Before 1990 the only pieces of legislation that could have 
facilitated a significant departure from the general rule of 
State ownership3 were the 1987 decrees on joint ventures on 
Soviet territory and the 1988 law on cooperatives. The 1986 
law on individual labour activity was extremely limited in 
scope and did little more than clarify the legal status of 
minor sideline activities already in existence - and make 
them liable to licensing fees and taxation. In the implemen-
tation of the April 1991 USSR law on entrepreneurship (see 
below), this 1986 law is to be annulled. 
The law on· cooperatives provided a framework in which 
firms that were de facto private could operate. It allowed 
cooperative members, who could be as few as three in num-
ber, to employ non-members, without any ceiling on the 
number of the latter. Whether these hired workers could 
legally be both full-time and long-term employees, remains 
obscure, even after some amendments to the law.4 The fact 
is that many (though probably not most) Soviet cooperatives 
are for all practical purposes private businesses. The present 
distribution of fixed capital assets by ownership, according 
to Goskomstat, is such that around 95% are either State or 
4 
See Ryzhkov speech to the Congress of People's Deputies, (Izvestia, 
14.12.1989, pp. 2-4); his report to the 20 July joint meeting of the 
Presidential and Federation councils (lzvestia, 22.7.1990, pp. 1-2). For 
Pavlov see TASS (1991), and speeches by Pavlov in April 1991 (lzvestia, 
22.4.1991 and 24.4.1991). 
See Selyunin, 1990. 
The author follows Soviet reformers' practice in disregarding the largely 
formal ownership differences between collective farms and State en-
terprises. 
Original law, lzvestia, 8.6.1988; revisions approved on 6.6.1990 (lzvestia, 
24.6.1990). 
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collective-farm property. Table l gives data from an October 
1990 source, described as illustrating the position 'now': 
mid-1990 is the most plausible interpretation of the time to 
which the table refers. 
Table 1 
Soviet fixed capital assets by ownership, mid-1990 
(billion R) 
Book value 
Gross of depreciation Net of deprCC'!ation 
and net of retirements and retirements 
State 2612 I 690 
cooperative ss, 44 
kolkhoz ·203. 156 
private 101 69 
Total 2 971 1959 
Productive assets 
State 1771 1 035 
cooperative 28 21 
kolkhoz 165 123 
private 22 ... 19 
Total 1 986 1 198 
Note: Values arc at historic cost and exclude land, mineral, etc. deposits, forests and purely 
personal possessions, but not livestock. Productive assets are those used directly in 
material production, so assets used in some commercial service activities are excluded 
from the lower half of the table but included along with housing and other infrastructure 
assets in the top half. ·Private' probably includes private-plot assets. 
Source: Ekonomika i zhizn', 1990, No 40, p. 15. 
In the UK in 1979, before the privatization programme of 
the Conservative government began, the share of public 
corporations (of which there were then 47) in the UK econ-
omy was as indicated in Table 2. (These figures do not of 
course include the other elements in the UK public sector.) 
Table 2 
Importance of public corporations in the UK, 1979 
GDP 
Employment 
Capital stock 
Investment 
Share 
of UK total 
10,5 
8,1 
17,2 
15,2 
Source: Vickers and Yarrow (1988), p. 140, citing Nalional income and expenditure, 1984. 
(%) 
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The disparity in the scale of UK and Soviet 'destatification' 
programmes would be hard to overstate. Yet even the com-
paratively tiny UK programme, conducted within an existing 
framework of market institutions, has been problematic and 
is not yet complete. 
The legislation discussed in the next section is part of the 
USSR Government programme of transition to a market 
economy. 1 Originally formulated in late 1989, that pro-
gramme was rejected by the Soviet parliament in spring 1990, 
and strongly criticized in the Soviet press. Later variants (the 
Gorbachev compromise programme of October 1990 and the 
Pavlov anti-crisis programme of April 1991) have, however, 
been adopted. 
Legislation associated with the rival team of transition-
planners operating under the Gorbachev-Yeltsin agreement 
of 27 July 1991, but closely linked to the Russian Republic 
leadership, is discussed in the section after this. Some of that 
latter legislation (in draft form, in the source available to 
me) was intended to be Russian Republic legislation, but 
some is would-be USSR legislation. All of it appears to 
emanate from the Shatalin group rather than the Ryzhkov-
Abalkin team. That is the reason for treating it separately.2 
Subsequent RSFSR legislation is also discussed - briefly 
and with incomplete coverage. 
3. The main USSR Government measures 
The following are the main laws and decrees bearing on 
property rights that have been approved, or of which drafts 
have been published or circulated, since late 1989.3 They go 
into effect from the date of publication unless otherwise 
specified. They are listed in approximate order of approval 
and publication, to provide a sense of the course oflegislative 
events. 
(i) Leasing. The foundations of USSR and Union-repub-
lic legislation on leasing ( arenda). Approved by the 
USSR Supreme Soviet, 23 November 1989.4 
(ii) 
4 
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Ownership in general. (Framework law.) The law 
on property in the USSR. Approved by the USSR 
See the list of planned legislation associated with an early version of the 
transition programme (Izvestia, 26.9.1989, p. I). 
See two articles by Mikhail Berger, "Sosny' i Sosenki,' and 'Sosenki bez 
'Sosen", Izvestia, 13.8.1990 and 27.8.1990, respectively (both on p. 2). 
Ownership aspects of the Shatalin plan are discussed in a later section 
of this paper. 
The degree of detail of the information available to me varies amongst 
these measures, so in some cases the account given here is less full than 
in others. 
lzvestia, 1.12.1989, p. 3. 
. Supreme Soviet on 6 March 1990, to go into effect in 
July 1990.5 
(iii) Land. The foundations of USSR and Union-republic 
legislation on land.6 
(iv) Intellectual property. The draft law on inventive ac-
tivity in the USSR.7 
(v) Business units in general. The law on enterprises. 
Approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet on 4 June 
1990, mostly to go into effect from the start of 1991.8 
(vi) Joint-stock companies. A USSR Council of Ministers 
statute (po/ozhenie), approved on 19 June 1990.9 
(vii) Securities. A USSR Council of Ministers statute, de-
tails as for the previous statute. JO 
(viii) Currency market. USSR Council of Ministers resol-
utions (postanovleniya) of 20 and 24 July 1990, on 
the establishment of an internal market in foreign 
currency and of shops selling consumer goods for 
hard currency .11 
(ix) Small businesses. USSR Council of Ministers resol-
ution of8 August on the creation of small businesses12 
and a draft Supreme Soviet resolution on their activi-
ties.13 
(x) State holding company for privatization. A presiden-
tial edict (ukaz) of 9 August 1990, creating a USSR 
State Property Fund.14 
(xi) Privatization procedures. Non-binding government 
recommendations to local councils on procedures for 
taking property out of State ownership. IS 
(xii) Investment. Bases oflegislation of 10 December 1990, 
with effect from 1 January 1991.16 
(xiii) Banking. Law of 11 December 1990 on the State Bank 
of the USSR and law of 11 December 1990 on banks 
and banking activity in the USSR.17 
(xiv) Land reform. Presidential edict (ukaz) of 5 January 
1991 on the implementation of land reform.IS 
lzvestia, I 0.3.1990, pp. I, 2. 
6 Ekonomika i zhizn', 1990, No 11, pp. 17-20. 
1 Izvestia, 7.4.1990, pp. 2-3. 
B Izvestia, 12.6.1990, pp. 2-3. 
9 Ekonomika i zhizn' (henceforth EZh), 1990, No 27, pp. 12-14. The 
author has also seen a typescript draft of a law on joint-stock companies. 
10 EZh, 1990, No 29, p. 14. 
II EZh, 1990, No 33 (supplement). 
12 Ibid. 
13 EZh, 1990, No 34, p. 18. 
14 Kommersant, 1990, No 31, p. 4. 
15 EZh, 1990, No 36 (supplement). 
16 Izvestia, 16.12.1990, p. 2. 
17 /zvestia, 18.12.1990, pp. 3-4. 
18 Izvestia, 7.1.1991, p. I. 
(xv) Employment. Bases of Union and republic legislation 
of 15 January 1991, with effect from l July 1991.1 
(xvi) Privatization. Draft bases of Union and republic legis-
lation on the destatification and privatization of en-
terprises. 2 
(xvii) Foreign currency markets/rouble convertibility. Law 
on currency regulation of I March 1991, with effect 
from I April 1991.3 
(xviii) Openness to import competition. The USSR Customs 
Code and the law on the customs tariff, both of 26 
March 1991, with effect from I July 1991.4 
(xix) Entrepreneurial activity. Law of 2 April 1991 on the 
general principles of entrepreneurship of citizens of 
the USSR.5 
(xx) Foreign investment. A draft law on foreign invest-
ment. 6 
In addition, there is legislation either already approved or 
in draft that is important to the future working of the new 
economic system but is not directly and exclusively to do 
with ownership: the new laws on individual and enterprise 
taxation; various decrees and draft laws dealing with the 
creation of a civil service and (within that) a tax inspectorate; 
the 16 August 1990 government decree on anti-monopoly 
measures,? and the law of I April 1991 giving the revised 
and slightly slimmed-down list of ministries (and therefore 
of economic-branch and economic-functional ministries).8 
The leasing legislation is a framework for republic laws that 
could (so far as the USSR legislators are concerned) contain 
some variations. It applies to producer durables, land and, 
apparently, mineral rights. The lessor is the owner of the 
asset in question, and the law envisages all possible categories 
of owner with respect to reproducible capital assets - in-
cluding foreign citizens or firms and Soviet individuals -
but only a State authority with respect to land and natural 
resources in general. 
Leasing may be from some person or juridical person author-
ized by the owner to act in the capacity of lessor, so a branch 
4 
5 
6 
lzvestia, 25.1.1991, pp. 3-4. 
EZh, 1991, No 7, pp. 18-19. 
EZh, 1991, No 12, pp.18-19. 
lzvestia, 18.4.1991, pp. 3-6; ibid. 19.4.1991, p. 2. 
lzvestia, 10.4.1991, p. 2. 
Mimeo, obtained August 1990. See also Stepovoi, A. and Chugaev, S., 
'Inostrannym investitsiyan - rezhimbl agopriyatstvovaniya' lzvestia, 
30.6.1991, pp. I, 3; Ershov, Yu. A., 'Usloviya dlya inoinvestitsii v SSSR', 
EZh, 1991, No 11, pp. 18-19; reports of the Geonomics Institute's review 
of a draft of the law, Robert Lyle, NCA from Washington, DC, 
10.5.1991. 
EZh, 1990, No 38 (supplement), pp. 2-3. 
lzvestia, 9.4.1991, p. 2. 
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ministry could, as in previous practice, act for practical 
purposes as the lessor. For a workforce to lease its enterprise 
from the State, there must be a two-thirds majority in favour 
of this action amongst the workers. A lessee may by nego-
tiation purchase the leased assets outright - though this 
probably does not apply to land. · 
The law on ownership in general has been criticized by 
radicals. In August Boris Yeltsin said he would ask the 
Russian parliament to abolish it (presumably with respect 
to Russian territory; Literaturnaya gazeta, 1990, No 34, 
p. 2). It certainly contains some fudges. Ownership is defined 
as rights of possession or control ( vladenie), use ( po/'zov-
anie) and disposal ( rasporyazhenie). Article 1.4 seems to 
open the way to private-sector employment by stipulating 
that an owner can conclude agreements with other citizens 
to use their labour to exploit the asset owned - subject to 
USSR and republic laws; yet Article 1.6 states that ownership 
must not be used for the alienation of the worker from the 
means of production and the exploitation of man by man 
- a provision that has been mocked as meaningless by the 
more secularly minded Soviet commentators, but could still 
be used to restrict the consequences of Article 1.4. 
Ownership (allowable in the USSR) is categorized in the 
law as citizens' ownership, collective ownership and State 
ownership. Citizens' ownership can include shares, but there 
is no clear statement of a right of individual citizens to 
own whole businesses employing other people. Joint-stock 
companies are classified as a collective form of ownership, 
though Article 15 states that shareholders in such companies 
do not have to be workers in those companies themselves 
- again with the ambiguous proviso that this must also be 
allowed by Union and republic legislation. 
Land, mineral deposits and other natural resources are said 
in Article 20 to be the 'inalienable property of the peoples 
living on the given territory' (Article 20.1) but the same 
article also provides for the USSR to have the control and 
use of natural resources needed for all-Union purposes, 
including defence, trunk pipeline networks, etc. (Article 
20.2). This was a fuzzy compromise between USSR and 
republic claims, leaving open the question of who is to decide 
what constitutes a necessary all-Union function. This has 
become a major issue between republics, especially Russia, 
and the USSR since the law was approved. Much of the 
subsequent USSR legislation in effect extends, or interprets 
liberally, this early law. Much subsequent republic legislation 
contradicts it, with respect above all to the Union/republic 
division of property rights -which of course has no direct 
bearing on the public sector/private sector division. 
The legislation on land elaborates what is implicit in the 
previous two pieces of legislation. The intention clearly is 
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that natural resources remain State property, though the 
'State' will usually be the Union or autonomous republic 
where the resources are located. Land can be leased, and 
leases can be heritable and of indefinite duration; the lessee 
has rights of control and use (usufruct) but not of disposal, 
i.e. sale. The possibility of a land market seems to be ex-
cluded, but that of a market in land-use rights may not be. 
The draft law on inventions has been controversial and its 
approval long-delayed. The key provision in published drafts 
is that inventors would have exclusive rights of use of regis-
tered inventions, as in most Western patent laws, and could 
therefore sell (license) the right to use the invention to others. 
This is a major departure from the old 'inventors' certificate' 
regime in which inventions were treated as public property, 
with no right on the part of the inventor to monopolize their 
use. Simplifying somewhat, one could say that the traditional 
system amounted to a giant company suggestions scheme, 
in which USSR Inc. exercised a monopsonist's power to set 
the terms of any reward to inventors. The draft would open 
the way to a Western-style market in industrial property. 
The law on the enterprise was originally scheduled to be the 
law on the socialist enterprise. The dropping of the adjective 
in the course of parliamentary review of the original draft 
is one sign of the rapid secularization of thinking among the 
policy-making elite. The law is general, covering all sorts of 
business entities: State enterprises, cooperatives, family 
firms, joint ventures and others. The general principle is 
enunciated that all new enterprises, of whatever type, must 
be registered with the local council and are then entered on 
a national register of businesses. 
Managers are said to be appointed by the owners. This 
represents a step back from the earlier moves towards work-
force election of management. Cooperatives and workforce-
leased enterprises will be the only types of business in which 
the workforce is the owner, and even in cooperatives, this 
will not be true where there are non-member employees. The 
workforce is to be represented on the enterprise council in 
numbers equal to the representation of the owners - but 
the enterprise's statute may provide otherwise. 
The law specifically states that enterprises can choose their 
own customers and suppliers, but adds that State enterprises 
will only acquire this right at the beginning of 1993. That, 
under the original Ryzhkov-Abalkin transition plan, would 
be when centralized supply allocation and placing of State 
orders would begin to be phased out to a more than marginal 
extent. The State, according to the law, can control some 
prices, especially those of monopolists, but no operational 
definition of monopoly is provided. That presumably will 
be done by specific anti-monopoly legislation, still to come. 
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The statute on joint-stock companies allows for the establish-
ment of Western-style corporations or public limited com-
panies. Individual Soviet citizens, Western citizens and West-
ern firms (as well as Soviet juridical persons) can be share-
holders. This statute - to be replaced by a law later -
should in principle allow the creation of, and the transform-
ation of existing State enterprises into, the kind of business 
organization that is the core of the Western private sector. 
For joint-stock companies, the law sets a minimum size of 
initial capital, of R 500 OOO, with shares required to have a 
minimum nominal value ofR 100 each. The so-called 'shares' 
issued by Soviet State enterprises hitherto have often not 
been real shares: they have paid a fixed return on nominal 
value, and carried no rights of control. 1 This statute and 
the associated statute on securities envisage the issuing of 
recognizable equity shares, and the development of a second-
ary market in shares. Individuals are restricted to holding 
named shares, i.e. they cannot hold bearer shares. This 
need not prevent a secondary market developing in which 
individuals could participate. 
The law on enterprise taxation2 covers several different 
forms of business taxation, and deals with USSR taxes 
plus some federal-level rules about republic and lower-level 
taxation. It envisages a federal profits tax of 22%, and a 
ceiling of 45% on the total of federal-plus-lower-level profits 
taxes. Soviet commentators have assumed that 45% would 
in fact be the overall rate of profits tax, and many have 
criticized it as 'too high'. 
What is more obviously objectionable is the inclusion of a 
'supertax' of 80% on the first 10% of enterprise profits 
over and above the profits that would represent twice the 
industry-average return on capital, and 90% tax on the next 
10%. That would be questionable on incentive grounds in 
an operating market economy. It is true that in an economy 
still emerging from massive distortions of product prices and 
asset values, such high rates of return may bear very little 
relation to enterprise behaviour at all; but controlling them 
early in the transition is hardly conducive to rapid liberaliza-
tion. 
The presidential decree of 4 October, 'On priority measures 
for the transition to market relations', (lzvestia, 5 October 
1990, p. I), only strengthens such doubts. It calls for a 
substantial shift to 'contract pricing' in 1991, but makes it 
clear that the new prices should be based on the central 
planners' revised wholesale prices worked out in 1988 and 
See I. Zhagel' in lzvestia, 21.6.1990, p. 2 and I. Kitaigorodskii in EZh, 
1990, No 27, p. 15. 
lzvestia, 29.6.1990, pp. 1-3, approved by the Supreme Soviet on 14 June, 
to take effect from the start of 1991. 
1989. Moreover, an absolute ceiling is to be put on profit 
rates. This decree was promptly criticized· from a liberal 
viewpoint in the Soviet press (e.g., I. Demchenko in Izvestia 
6 October 1990, p. 2). Price revisions so far in 1991 have 
confirmed these doubts about the liberalism of the measure. 
The detailed regulations on the foreign currency market were 
embodied in later legislation, early in 1991 (see below). The 
main ideas at mid-1990 were that private citizens should be 
able to open their own hard currency bank accounts more 
freely than at present, and that trading in currencies, includ-
ing the purchase and sale of freely convertible currencies 
against roubles, should be widely conducted by enterprises 
and organizations (but not private citizens), through 
interbank transactions and currency exchanges. This should 
allow a market rate to emerge - something that the small 
and highly controlled Vnesheconombank currency auctions 
have not achieved. As of early June 1991, however, the 
functioning of the new interbank currency market has been 
too restricted to constitute a major change in the situation. 
The resolution on small businesses covers small enterprises 
of all varieties of ownership, but is primarily intended as the 
framework for private enterprises on a scale smaller than 
the joint-stock companies covered in earlier legislation. 
There are size limits on the labour force: 200 in industry and 
construction, 100 in research and development, 15 in retail 
trade and 25 in the rest of the services sector. 
The small firm can have limited liability, though the exact 
relationship between the enterprise, as a juridical person, 
and its founders has not been clearly specified. There are no 
special tax concessions. 
Registration is with the local district council, and is meant 
to be quick and simple. The first small private firm was 
registered in the Oktyabr'sky district of Moscow on 21 
August 1990, to market a board game called 'Capital' and 
perhaps later to go into publishing on the occu!t. 1 Evidently 
those local authorities that are sympathetic will already 
register private firms without delaying to prepare detailed 
regulations. This squares with the description of the govern-
ment recommendations on privatization procedures as non-
binding. Several more such small private businesses have 
since been set up.2 
The small business legislation could be used by ex1stmg 
cooperatives or State enterprises. A co-op that was in reality 
a private business could register under this heading and 
avoid possible legal hassles over its employment of contract, 
Kommersant, 1990, No 33, p. I describes this firm gleefully as the first 
real capitalist business in Moscow. 
Conversation with a deputy director of one of them, Andrei A. Ponom-
rayov of Rost, 20 October 1990. 
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non-tpember labour - unless, of course, it was already 
employing more than the ceiling number of staff. A State 
enterprise could be privatized by splitting it up into a number 
of small firms (few State enterprises are small), as an alterna-
tive to conversion into a joint-stock company. 
The State holding company arrangements have caused 
controversy. The USSR State Property Fund, created by the 
presidential ukaz of 9 August 1990, was meant to arrange 
the privatization of State enterprises, ensuring also that 
monopoly positions are destroyed. It is apparently meant 
to cover enterprises subordinate to federal Tevel (USSR) 
ministries only, applying to about 40% of the book value 
of all non-infrastructure capital assets, concentrated in only 
about 8 500 enterprises. It was planned to convert a quarter 
of them to joint-stock companies by the end of 1990. To a 
considerable extent, this was already happening; but it has 
often not been a process of public and transparent marketing 
of the assets in question, but often a low-cost nomenk/atura 
pseudo-buy-out. 
The fund will itself be a State body, but not subordinate to 
the government. In principle, therefore, it will not be under 
the thumb of the branch ministries which have hitherto been 
the de facto owners of these enterpri·ses. Its powers are 
supposed to be defined by the President, its activities regu-
lated by parliament. Its tasks include the valuation of assets 
and the protection of 'State interests' during the process of 
valuation and sale. 
The main worry expressed by Soviet reformers is that the 
fund will try to keep a majority stake in the new companies, 
in the cause of 'protecting State interests'. For these critics, 
the provision that, while the fund and its staff are taking 
shape, its powers will be temporarily delegated to other State 
agencies - the Ministry of Finance and possibly the branch 
ministries - is ominous. 
Several drafts of the law on foreign investment are circulat-
ing in typescript. The draft seen by the author is probably a 
USSR Council of Ministers staff draft. It is relatively liberal. 
The key points in it are as follows. 
Foreign investment is defined broadly to include the placing 
of deposits in Soviet banks and the purchase of Soviet shares 
by foreign firms and individuals, as well as the acquisition 
of buildings and equipment, and of leases on land and 
natural resource deposits. Foreign direct investment is ex-
plicitly included, so it is made clear that foreign firms can 
purchase or establish subsidiaries in the USSR. Military 
enterprises and establishments owned by the KGB or the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs are not for foreign purchase; 
nor can foreigners set up wholly owned banks or insurance 
81 
Soviet market legislation: ownership rights in Soviet legislation 
companies outside special economic zones, or media or edu-
cational concerns anywhere: everything else can be done. 
Whether 'military enterprises' means those directly under 
the control of the Ministry of Defence or the much larger 
category that comes under the Military-Industrial Com-
mission ministries is not clear. 
As with the existing joint ventures, wholly or majority-
owned foreign subsidiaries are to be registered with the 
Ministry of Finance. Before that, government permission is 
needed for the creation of wholly owned new firms: republic 
government approval where the capital is R JOO million or 
less, USSR government approval for larger values. Tax 
treatment is to be not less favourable than for domestically 
owned enterprises, and normally as for joint ventures (30% 
on profits after a two-year grace period, plus 20% on repatri-
ated profits). A list of product groups for which there is 
preferential profits- tax treatment includes manufactured 
consumer goods, food processing, electronics and pharma-
ceuticals. Foreign-owned firms will not usually be allowed 
to spend more in convertible currency than can be covered 
from their own revenue, but repatriation of profits through 
a consortium of foreign-owned firms is not ruled out, and 
exceptionally the Soviet or a republic government may pro-
vide hard currency to cover the repatriation of rouble profits. 
In its operating activities in the USSR the foreign-owned 
firm must provide its Soviet staff with standard Soviet social 
insurance arrangements. There will not be restrictions on its 
pricing of its products or its choice of currency for settle-
ments. Nor ·does it require import or export licences from 
the Soviet authorities except for the export of any item to 
whose price its own value-added contribution is less than 
30%. 
The law on investment activity in the USSR is a framework 
for republic laws. The equality of all investors, including 
private and foreign, in the USSR is proclaimed. The rights 
of all investors are said to be guaranteed by the State: 
legislation reducing the rights of existing investors will have 
to be accompanied by compensation; no nationalization 
without compensation. 
The law on the State Bank of the USSR creates a two-tier 
banking system with a central bank with the traditional 
roles of lender of last resort to other banks, banker to the 
government, regulator of monetary growth, etc., with powers 
to set reserve ratios of commercial banks, license commercial 
banks, etc. Gosbank will be responsible to the USSR Su-
preme Soviet, not to the government. USSR Gosbank tog-
ether with the central banks of union and autonomous 
republics are to form a single central-bank system, managing 
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a single currency and single monetary policy. Gosbank Cen-
tral Council is to be composed of a chairman and first 
deputy (centrally appointed), plus 10 of the heads of the 
republic central banks (potentially 35 of them). USSR Gos-
bank is to hold (USSR total?) gold and foreign currency 
reserves. The degree of central control envisaged is not 
acceptable to several republics, including Russia. 
The law on banks and banking activity deals with the rest 
of the banking system. Its provisions include the following. 
No single shareholder is to own more than 35% of the equity 
of a bank (Article 10.1 ). Where a foreign legal person is 
amongst the owners, it must be a bank (Article 10.2). Foreign 
participants must show documentation of conformity with 
banking laws of their own country (Article 13a). USSR 
Gosbank is to keep a central register of all commercial banks 
(Article 17), though licensing of banks that are not all-Union 
is left to republic central banks. Banks can declare debtors 
insolvent, and inform their creditors and the local soviet 
with which the debtor organization is registered (Article 32). 
Licenses from Gosbank/republic central banks are needed 
for dealing in foreign currency (Article 34). Foreigners may 
be bank directors (Article 39). 
The anti-monopoly measures are a necessary ingredient in 
any successful privatization programme. The USSR Govern-
ment decree on them provides for the establishment of an 
anti-monopoly committee under the aegis of the USSR 
Council of Ministers. Its functions would include the fos-
tering of small businesses as well as the monitoring and 
possible breaking-up of monopolies. The exact scope of its 
powers is not clear from the decree, for many of the pro-
visions of the decree contain instructions apparently ad-
dressed to other government agencies. 
The main aim of the decree is the prevention of market 
domination by an individual producer. This is defined at two 
levels: a 70% market share during the process of transition to 
the market - apparently this degree of concentration is to 
be avoided or prevented - and a lower level of 35 to 70%, 
where enterprise behaviour is to be monitored, but which 
will presumably be treated as not necessarily constituting a 
prima facie case for action. 
The committee is to monitor large investment projects for 
their monopoly effects. It is also to monitor the working of 
the (increasingly numerous) 'associations' and 'concerns' 
(kontserny), which often cover whole sub-branches of in-
dustry. 
The committee is specifically charged with investigating 
market-sharing arrangements, activities that create barriers 
to market entry, price rings, and the like. It also has a remit 
to deal with 'unfair trading practices'. Enterprise actions that 
create or sustain market dominance in the above sense make 
executives liable to sanctions imposed through the courts. 
Amongst the provisions that are not addressed specifically 
to this committee there is a ruling (point 8) that the sale 
of State enterprises should incorporate separate sales of 
technologically independent production units within a given 
enterprise. This is presumably addressed to the State Prop-
erty Fund and investment funds created by it. 
There is also a provision that branch ministries should cease 
to be responsible for the fulfilment of contracts by enterprises 
attached to them (point 6). But this is not to come into effect 
until after the economy has been stabilized in a macro-
economic sense. The importance of the monopoly power 
built into the supply system is recognized by a provision 
(point 15) that Gossnab offices be turned into independent 
commercial wholesaling enterprises. They will have to com-
pete with the large number of local commodity exchanges 
already created 'from below' (Cohen, 1991). 
The other points worth noting here are provisions that the 
statutory monopoly of insurance be ended (point 20), that 
foreign trade organizations at present subordinate to the 
Ministry of External Economic Relations become indepen-
dent of it (point 22), and that competition via foreign direct 
investment be encouraged (point 23). 
The edict on land reform instructs republic and local govern-
ments to prepare by the end of June 1991 an inventory of 
all unused ot 'irrationally used' land, whether controlled by 
collective farms, State farms or ministries. This land is then 
to be incorporated in a local authorities' land fund, from 
which land can be provided on a lifetime (inheritable) lease-
hold basis to individual peasant farmers, other individuals 
or agricultural cooperatives, for use for farming or dacha 
construction. Between 3 and 5 million hectares (compare 
this with l 055 million hectares of land in agricultural use 
at l November 1989) are to be made available before com-
pletion of the inventory, in the spring. There is also a 
recommendation to the parliaments of all republics thl!-t they 
remove 'unfounded' restrictions on the development of the 
existing subsidiary household plots. (Probably this refers 
mainly to restrictions on numbers of livestock.) In addition, 
the Union and republic governments are told to work out 
ways in which 'ineffective' State and collective farms could 
be transformed into associations of peasant and small co-
operative farms. The enforced break-up of State and collec-
tive farms is expressly forbidden. 
The edict makes no reference to any non-agricultural uses of 
land, apart from dacha construction; urban land is implicitly 
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excluded. There is no reference to foreigners being allowed 
or not allowed to lease farm land, but an earlier decree on 
leasing did not rule out foreign lessees, and the foundations 
of USSR and republic legislation on land, approved by the 
USSR parliament in spring 1990 (Ekonomika i zhizn', 1990, 
No 11) specifically listed foreign legal persons - for exam-
ple, foreign companies - amongst those to whom local 
soviets could lease land. In general, this presidential edict 
does nothing significant to affect the general circumstances 
of land ownership and use. It is more in the nature of a 
campaign, and a campaign of limited scope, that leaves 
implementation to local soviets. 
The bases of legislation on employment provide guidelines 
for more detailed legislation at republic level. (NB: the title 
of the measure refers just to 'republics'; most earlier guideline 
legislation of this sort referred specifically to Union repub-
lics, but the distinction has become blurred as many auton-
omous republics have claimed Union republic status.) It 
defines the unemployed as people who for reasons not of 
their own making are without a job, who are registered with 
the State Employment Service as job-seekers, and who have 
not received offers of suitable employment through that 
service. Suitable employment is defined as employment ap-
propriate to the age, experience and qualifications of the 
person concernl!d, and whose location makes it accessible to 
them. 
The measure states the principles of the Soviet State's em-
ployment policy (Article 4) and defines the State 'guarantees 
of the right to work' (Article 5). These do not include a 
blanket assurance that jobs will be available to all job-
seekers. The principles include equal job opportunities, the 
voluntary nature of work, the coordination of Union and 
republic employment policies, and the participation of both 
trade unions and associations of employers (rabotodateli, a 
newish Soviet term) in the formulation of employment-
promoting measures. The guarantees include free education 
and training, free choice of occupation, free assistance in 
finding work, and protection against job discrimination. 
Article 15 provides for State assistance with the costs in-
curred by individuals in moving geographically to new jobs 
(by implication - when this is done through job placement 
via the State Employment Service). 
Article 18 provides for the creation of a State Employment 
Service (henceforth SES), financed by a special State Em-
ployment Fund (SEF), and with a network of offices across 
the country. Commercial employment agencies are to be 
subject to licensing (it is not clear by whom: the SES?) 
The SES can require all employers to provide information 
on planned changes in their employment levels; it can pro-
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pose lists of job slots to be reserved for people in need of 
social protection (the handicapped, etc.), subject to review 
and approval by local authorities. This applies potentially 
to all employers. The SES can also propose to republics and 
local soviets that they impose a six-month statutory delay 
on the implementation of substantial numbers of redun-
dancies by any employer in circumstances where there would 
be difficulty securing re-employment. This would be with 
full 'or partial' compensation to the employer(s) in question 
by the SES (Article 19). Union, republic and local authorities 
can offer tax concessions to employers in return for their 
taking on employees in the social-protection category 
(Article 20). The SEF is formed from obligatory employers' 
contributions (Article 22); 
Section IV (with effect from July 1991) outlines the benefits 
available and the conditions attached to them. It appears 
(Articles 25 and 36) that the various benefits either definitely 
will not, or at local discretion need not, be made available 
to those who are unemployed after voluntarily quitting a 
job, were sacked for breaches of Jabour discipline, or who, 
after being legitimately classed as unemployed, have refused 
two offers of suitable work. People returning to seek employ-
ment after being out of the labour force for a year or more, 
however, are eligible for benefits. 
There are four kinds of benefits: guarantees to those made 
redundant, stipends during retraining, unemployment ben-
efits proper, and further assistance on a selective basis to 
dependants. 
The guarantee to those made redundant is an assurance 
that their previous average earnings will continue for three 
months after redundancy, provided that they register as 
job-seekers with the SES within 10 days of being made 
redundant. This payment is to be disbursed at their former 
workplace but appears to be financed from the SEF. Their 
status changes to that of unemployed after three months 
without a suitable job offer through the SES or after two 
refusals of suitable offers, whichever comes first. 
The standard rate of unemployment benefit is 50% of pre-
vious earnings (Article 31 ). The duration of this benefit is 
26 weeks minimum plus a further two weeks for every year 
worked above the number needed to qualify for a retirement 
pension (Article 28). Labour market entrants who cannot 
find employment (and who register with the SES) are classed 
as unemployed, and receive a benefit rate of 75% of the 
statutory minimum wage (Article 33). Unemployment ben-
efit for demobilized servicemen or KGB employees is to be 
not Jess than the minimum wage (Article 32). 
The stipend during training/retraining is 50% of the unem-
ployed person's previous basic pay or, if they have depend-
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ants, 50% of previous earnings. It appears that the period 
of training is envisaged as coming after the period of guaran-
teed continuation of previous pay, but whether it is meant 
to precede or be continuous with the period of receipt of 
unemployment benefit, is not clear. If a redundant former 
employee needs retraining and did not have the opportunity 
to undertake training during his last two years in employ-
ment, his former employer is liable to pay the cost of his 
retraining (Article 26). 
(NB: this legislation apparently imposes additional costs on 
joint ventures and foreign-owned companies: contributions 
to the SEF; possible obligation to employ disadvantaged 
persons, with possible but not automatic tax concessions in 
return; possible injunction to delay redundancies for six 
months, with possibly Jess than full compensation; liability 
to pay for retraining of redundant ex-employees if they 
had not had training opportunities with their N/foreign 
employer.) 
The draft bases of legislation of the USSR and republics on 
the destatification and privatization of enterprises set out 
the Union authorities' proposed framework for all de-
nationalization in the USSR, whether conducted by Union, 
republic or lower levels of government. It defines destati-
fication as the changing of ownership from State to non-
State entities, and privatization as the transfer to private 
citizens of the ownership of some or all of the shares in joint-
stock companies or the ownership of complete enterprises 
(where the latter become partnerships or family firms). This 
draft legislation does not deal with land (Article 2.4). 
For all-Union enterprises, the USSR State Property Fund 
(created by the presidential edict of 9 August 1990) deter-
mines what can and cannot be sold (Article 3.2); can itself 
acquire State enterprises (Article 6); and is responsible for 
drawing up annual programmes listing enterprises to be 
denationalized (Article 7 .2). For other enterprises, analogous 
republic and local organizations are expected to perform 
this role, and to act within the guidelines set by the bases of 
legislation. For each enterprise included in the programme, 
the USSR State Property Fund or its republic/local equiva-
lent creates a commission to carry out the valuation and 
organize the transfer of ownership; there must be representa-
tives of the 'owner' (branch ministry?), labour collective and 
trade union on the commission (Articles 9 and 10). 
Anybody (Soviet citizens, whether or not working at the 
enterprises in question; foreign persons and legal persons, 
etc.) can become the new owners (Article 6). The principles 
set out for transfer of ownership are (i) that transfer should 
generally be for payment; (ii) that preference be given for 
ownership by the workforce; (iii) that the workforce's 
interests be taken into account, and (iv) that the process 
should be open (Article 4.1). However, republics may legis-
late to give away 'their' enterprises if they wish (Article 4.2) 
and a later article specifically states that an enterprise may 
be denationalized against the wishes of its workforce 
(Article 8). 
The intent behind the second principle of Article 4.1 is 
embodied in the right given to workforces by Article 18.2 to 
use the proceeds of sales of assets they already own (for 
example, through the ploughing-back of profits in en-
terprises already leased by the workforce) and their retained 
profits to finance purchase of the enterprise; also by Article 
20's provision that the workforce can be offered shares at 
preferential rates and other benefits up to a value of 30% 
of the value of the enterprise, and, additionally, have right 
of first refusal as buyers. The intent behind the third principle 
of Article 4.1 seems to be embodied in another provision of 
Article 20, to the effect that social infrastructure assets of 
the enterprise can be given free to the workforce. (This could 
perhaps include housing owned by the enterprise.) It is also 
reflected in Article 21, which requires that three months' 
redundancy benefit must be given to workers sacked within 
six months of denationalization and that there must be a 
collective labour agreement in place by that time. 
The articles of association of joint-stock companies can 
prescribe the process of privatization of their shares (Article 
2.2). (This provision appears to make it easy for a nomen-
klatura group that has already turned a State enterprise 
into a joint-stock company (as many have) to arrange to 
distribute the hitherto State-owned shares in ways that suit 
them.) Article 12 provides (presumably for State enterprises 
that have not already been turned into joint-stock com-
panies) that the founder must, in the case of all-Union 
enterprises, be the USSR State Property Fund or its rep-
resentative. (This may or may not hinder corrupt nomenklat-
ura privatization, depending on the degree of venality of 
State Property Fund officials.) 
Valuation must take into account the prospects of the en-
terprise (Article 17). (In other words, the gross error of 
requiring valuation to reflect historic or replacement cost of 
assets only, is not built into the legislation.) Sale can be by 
any method, including auction or tender; enterprises can be 
sold on credit, but there must be a 20% down payment and 
a maximum credit term of 10 years (Article 11). The proceeds 
of the sale belong to the State and priority as to their use 
l is given to financial stabilization (Article 19). The State 
(presumably through the State Property Fund(s)) can impose 
conditions on a sale, such as maintaining the size of the 
workforce for a prescribed period, or maintaining specific 
levels of product supply to designated customers for a pre-
scribed period. 
The main USSR Government measures 
The l~w on currency regulation defines currency (valuta) to 
include bank money, precious metals (some of them strat-
egic, such as palladium), precious stones and pearls, as well 
as cash (Article I). It distinguishes between resident and 
non-resident persons and legal persons. A foreign-owned or 
partly-owned firm is a resident legal person, if it is registered 
in the USSR. A foreign firm's representative office that does 
no business on Soviet territory is treated as non-resident 
(Article 1 ). 
The law restates the traditional position that roubles may 
not be taken across Soviet borders except in specific instances 
authorized by USSR Gosbank (Article 2). 
USSR Gosbank is the main executive agency with respect 
to currency regulation (Article 8). It determines the scope of 
use of foreign currency in the USSR and licenses commercial 
banks to operate in foreign currency (Article 8). It also sets 
the exchange rates (Article 4). In line with 1990's banking 
legislation, the republics' central banks have analogous 
powers within their own borders (though not with respect 
to exchange rates), but must act within USSR Gosbank 
guidelines (Article 8). USSR Vneshekonombank is licensed 
ex officio to deal in foreign currency (Article 8) (though the 
legislation is not drafted so as to give it a monopoly). 
Ultimate authority rests with the USSR Supreme Soviet, to 
which both USSR Gosbank and the Union-republic valuta 
fund (henceforth URVF) report (Article 6). 
The UR VF controls the foreign currency that is compul-
sorily sold to the central authorities by resident earners of 
foreign currency. It can buy more through the official cur-
rency market (auctions, interbank market amongst author-
ized banks, etc.), and it can also raise credits abroad. Its 
responsibilities include the funding of centrally determined 
imports, the service of (USSR) debt and the stabilization of 
the exchange rate (Article 11). Firms that are at least 30% 
foreign-owned are not obliged to sell foreign currency to the 
State (Article 15). Republic and local-authority URVFs have 
analogous roles and powers, including the right to raise 
credits abroad, but operate within rules set by the USSR 
authorities. (It appears that the proportion of foreign cur-
rency earnings that must be sold to republic, etc. authorities 
by foreign-currency earners is set by the central authorities) 
(Article 12). 
Resident legal persons can keep foreign currency in bank 
accounts abroad provided they make their compulsory sales 
of foreign currency to the State and notify the authorities 
(USSR Gosbank?) of their foreign accounts (Article 15). 
They can also borrow abroad (presumably at their own risk). 
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Resident citizens can send or take abroad foreign currency, 
and deposit it with authorized banks or foreign banks, 
provided it was earned abroad or received legally (for ex-
ample, by inheritance) from abroad or obtained legally (em-
phasis added) in the USSR. Deals among resident citizens 
or between resident and non-resident citizens in foreign 
currency are forbidden, but the purchase of foreign currency 
for roubles through authorized banks (at a market-deter-
mined rate) is allowed (Article 16). 
A USSR Supreme Soviet decree of the same date deals with 
the introduction of this law (same source). Amongst other 
things, it specifies that earlier legislation must be annulled 
and/or reconsidered. It refers specifically to the presidential 
edict of2 November 1990 (setting a special 40% compulsory 
sale of foreign currency earnings to the central authorities) 
as requiring reconsideration in the light of the new law. 
However, there is nothing in the present law that entails the 
cancellation or suspension of the key provision of that edict. 
The decree also requires the USSR Government to come up 
within three months with a draft law on State insurance of 
the commercial, investment and currency risks of (Soviet) 
enterprises. This might include a Soviet equivalent of West-
ern governments' official export credit support arrange-
ments. 
Implementation of the law on currency regulation has been 
limited. The first interbank currency trading under the law 
took place on I April 1991, and a market rate of R 27,6 = 
USO I emerged. This is close to the auction and black 
market rates. The tourist rate of around R 6 = USO I was 
abolished. At the time of writing, the rate has not changed 
since then, apparently because the volume of transactions 
has been less than the USO 10 million (in a day) required 
to trigger a change in the announced rate. This means that 
the central monetary authorities - perhaps the only agent 
in a position to offer larger quantities of convertible currency 
for sale at the existing rate - have chosen not to do so. 
Thus the 'market' can only begin to function at the discretion 
of USSR Gosbank. 
Soviet citizens travelling abroad on a personal (non-busi-
ness) basis can now purchase foreign currency from a bank 
licensed to trade in currency, at the market rate, under new 
USSR Gosbank rules for the purchase and sale of currency 
for foreign travel by Soviet citizens [travelling] on their own 
account (Jzvestia, I April 1991, p. 2). The rules allow such 
travellers to buy up to USO 200 or the equivalent in other 
foreign currencies once a calendar year, and people emigrat-
ing to take out only USO 100 per person. Thus a Soviet 
citizen making a personal visit abroad would need to pay 
about 50% more than an average year's salary in order to 
have at their disposal enough currency to pay for two nights' 
bed and breakfast at a mid-price hotel in Western Europe. 
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Regular interbank currency trading was to start on 9 April, 
and to take place every Tuesday and Thursday from then 
on, at the Centre for Interbank Currency Operations (103066 
Moscow, Neglinnaya ulitsa 12 - the address of several 
USSR banks) (/zvestia, 3 April 1991, p. 2). Only the members 
of the new Exchange can trade directly on it; other legal 
persons must do so through them, paying up to 1,3% com-
missions. Any bank licensed to deal in foreign currency in 
the USSR can become a member of the Exchange. There 
are at present 11 members. 
The Soviet Customs Code is part of the reorganization of 
Soviet foreign trade away from the old State monopoly 
system. The reorganization of customs arrangements arises 
from two circumstances. One is that policy since 1986 has 
been to diffuse the right to engage in foreign trade from 
100 or so foreign trade organizations tightly controlled by 
Gosplan and the Ministry of Foreign Trade/Ministry of 
Foreign Economic Relations to over 20 OOO different trading 
and production entities. This means that regulation and 
reporting of foreign trade flows have to be conducted under 
explicit, published regulations instead of as an internal, 
administrative matter. The other is that the USSR wishes to 
gain GA TT membership, and therefore seeks to present to 
the world a set of trade procedures that is relatively trans-
parent and that lends itself to the introduction of a tariff 
system appropriate to a market economy. 
The Code announces a single USSR customs policy, op-
erating within the borders of the USSR and administered by 
the USSR Customs Committee. Republics' input to customs 
policies is via representation to a Customs-Tariff Council 
attached to that Committee. The USSR Customs Committee 
is to have a number of regional offices at Soviet borders. 
The Customs Committee staff have the same rights of inves-
tigation, etc. as the (new) USSR Tax Inspectorate, with 
respect to the collection of export and import taxes. The 
Committee is responsible inter alia for chasing narcotics, for 
ensuring that customs duties are paid to the Union budget 
and for customs statistics. It will staff checkpoints at special 
duty-free zones. Tariff rates are to be published separately. 
The law on the customs tariff is complementary to the 
preceding law. The text covers general principles; it does not 
list specific rates. 
It covers duties on both imports and exports. Import tariffs 
will be at two rates: MFN or non-MFN; export duties are 
simply determined unilaterally by the USSR (Articles 6 to 
7). The rates may be ad valorem or fixed unit amounts or a 
mixture of the two. There can also be special duties (emer-
gency protection or as counter to unfair competition), anti-
dumping duties (where the criterion is that the 'dumped' 
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item is being sold at a price below that in its country of 
origin) and -compensatory (to offset subsidies to foreign 
exporters) (Articles 9 to 12). The standard international 
tariff classification will be used. Rates are to be set by a 
Customs-Tariff Council, in whose meetings representatives 
of producers can participate. There are arrangements for 
determining country of origin (basically country of pro-
duction for raw materials, etc., or country of further pro-
cessing if the result of the processing is to change the prod-
uct's classification or add more than a proportion to be 
specified to its value). There are provisions for duty-free 
zones (Article 19). (No reference is made to any special 
treatment for inputs to joint-venture/foreign-owned pro-
duction in the USSR (outside duty-free zones) or for their 
exports.) 
Regarding government structure for economic adminis-
tration, it is appropriate to include here the USSR law of I 
April 1991 'On the list of ministries and other central organs 
of government of the USSR', with effect from publication 
(/zvestia, 9 April 1991, p. 2) 
The new list of ministries sets out the structure of State 
administration at the Union (USSR) level. The list covers 
ministries, State committees, and commissions of the USSR 
Cabinet of Ministers for steering economic complexes (i.e. 
broad sectors). There has been some reduction from the 
numbers of a year or so ago (76 Union ministries at the start 
of last year, lzvestia, 28 January 1990, p. 2, as against 49 
now). The principle of economic branch ministries has not 
been abandoned, however. (Nor has it been abandoned at 
the republic level by most republics.) 
The following summary gives a broad idea of the new struc-
ture; it lumps State committees and ministries together where 
their responsibilities seem to be similar in character. 
Type of activity 
Non-economic (justice, health, internal, etc.) 
Number 
of agencies 
7 
Functional economic1 13 
Inter-republic organs of USSR State adminis-
tration2 2 
Total branch sectoral agencies 27 
comprising: 
Cabinet commissions for economic complexes3 2 
Industrial branch ministries, etc. 16 
Other economic branch ministries 9 
1 Includes the new Ministry of Economics and Forecasting (formerly USSR Gosplan), the 
new Ministry of Material Resources (formerly Gossnab), the Ministry of External Economic 
Relations. the Ministry of Labour and Social Problems, etc. 
2 The Union-Republic Valuta Committee (see the law on currency regulation above), and the 
State Council for Economic Reform. 
3 The Military-Industrial Commission (overseeing seven of the industrial branch ministries), 
and the Commission for the Fuel-Energy Complex. 
Regarding entrepreneurial activity, 'entrepreneurship' or 
'enterprise' is defined in the law as 'independently initiated 
action of citizens, aimed at profit or personal income, under-
taken at [their] own risk and on their own material responsi-
bility'. It is applied here to individual, unincorporated busi-
ness activity and to business conducted through a legal 
person (firm). The activities of a firm come under the law 
on enterprises in the USSR, while the activities of a firm 
created by foreign citizens come under that law and the law 
on foreign investment. (One draft of the latter has been 
offered to the Geonomics Institute in Vermont for com-
ments, and they have criticized it for some ambiguities and 
for a tendency to leave too much scope for ad hoe govern-
ment intervention. Robert Lyle, NCA report from Wash-
ington, DC, 10 May 1991.) 
The law specifically states that middleman activities are 
legitimate (a great many earlier Soviet laws and decrees 
penalized them). It also specifies that entrepreneurs may 
draw up labour contracts, hire and fire, and decide on the 
allocation of net profits (Article 5). They may not (Article 
6) operate without a labour contract, pay less than the State 
minimum wage or hinder the formation of a trade union. 
There is to be State registration of persons engaged in 
unincorporated business, and it is delegated to republics. 
The enabling decree calls for a review of existing legislation 
to remove anything in conflict with the new law. It also calls 
for people at present registered under the 1986 law on 
individual labour activity to be re-registered under this law, 
and for the 1986 law to be cancelled. (The 1986 individual 
labour activity legislation was highly restrictive: it ruled out 
full-time private business activity by fit persons of working 
age and it forbade the employment of non-family labour.) 
In general, it is obvious that much of this Union-level legis-
lation is declaratory in character, not necessarily user-
friendly, and simultaneously needlessly specific in some 
respects (long lists of things that are allowed) and insuf-
ficiently specific in others (often lacking operational defi-
nitions of key terms). Its generally liberalizing direction, with 
respect to property rights, is none the less clear. 
4. Ownership elements in the Shatalin 
programme and the Russian Republic 
legislation 
Privatization (in the broad, Western sense) was treated 
clearly and prominently as a central element of the Shatalin 
'500 days' programme. It is the clear and prominent presen-
tation of this fact that chiefly distinguishes the Shatalin 
programme from the various documents that constituted the 
Soviet Government programme, so far as property rights 
are concerned. 
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Section 3 has shown that the privatization envisaged in the 
latter programme is very extensive indeed; and therefore 
necessarily a central element in the government programme 
as well; but Soviet government officials have nowhere pre-
sented this fact in a clear and forceful way. 
This section is concerned, however, with differences of sub-
stance between the two programmes, including subsequent 
Russian Republic legislation, rather than differences in pres-
entation. It will be suggested that these lie chiefly in the 
clarity of the relevant draft legislation and the role of privati-
zation in the transformation strategy as a whole. Differences 
in the general character of the institutional changes that 
were planned are not fundamental. 
The short, programmatic statement about the Shatalin 
group's proposals, 'Man, freedom and the market', conveys 
the general approach of the group to property rights. I In 
that statement the Shatalin group say that their programme 
will achieve reform at the expense of the State, not of the 
people. The Soviet Union, they say, has 'a rich State and a 
poor people'. By returning resources to the people, the 
programme will end their poverty. (This claim can be given 
some meaning by reference to any or all of the gains in 
allocative efficiency, gains in X-efficiency or movement 
along the production-possibility curve in favour of consump-
tion; but its implication that restructuring can be painless is 
specious.) 
After the introduction, the statement (which is only about 
3 500 words long) has six sections, each dealing with some 
right. The first two are 'Man's right to property' and 'The 
citizen's right to economic activity'. The return of property 
to the people is described as 'an act of social justice'. The 
desirability of selling, rather than giving away, State assets, 
is asserted as a general principle, though some scope for free 
distribution of assets is accepted. The underlying theme is 
the interest of identifiable proprietors in maintaining and 
increasing the value of their assets, and therefore in using 
them effectively. 
No top Soviet policy-makers have ever made such a strong 
and prominent statement of this philosophy of ownership; 
this is true not only of Ryzhkov and his associates, or later 
of Pavlov, but also of Gorbachev. 
The documents that set out specific proposals of the Shatalin 
group deal with ownership primarily in the form of a section 
in the programme itself (Perekhod k rynku. Chast' I, pp. 55-
69) and in the supplementary volume of draft legislation 
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'Chelovek, svoboda, rynok', Izvestia, 4.9.1990, p. 3. Also supposedly 
contained in Transition to the market. Part II. 1990 (according to the 
contents list), but not in the author's copy. 
(Tran.sition to the market. Part JI, mainly pp. 69-157). The 
two sources will be discussed in that order. 
The programme puts its emphasis on republic legislation. It 
says that a presidential ukaz, 'On Freedom of and the defence 
of entrepreneurship', provides an all-Union guarantee of 
equal opportunities for all the various forms of ownership. 
(The April 1991 USSR law on entrepreneurial activity might 
be seen as performing this function.) Republic legislation, 
however, will provide the specific rules of the game. 
The general guideline for this Union-republic division is that 
the Union should continue to control (and not destatify) 
defence plants not subject to conversion, nuclear facilities, 
trunk pipelines, main railways, 'communications' (probably 
the phone system) and defence facilities; and it should super-
vise the sale of assets in aerospace, electronics, shipbuilding, 
the merchant marine and major ports. Enterprises in these 
latter branches should become joint-stock companies, in-
itially with shares held by the State property funds of the 
republics. Everything else should be handled at republic 
level. 
Union responsibilities are therefore restricted to the military-
industrial sector, in the sense of the enterprises that come 
under those ministries that report to the Military-Industrial 
Commission (VPK), plus a few other branches in the con-
tinued-Union-control category that are apparently thought 
of as either providing public goods or constituting natural 
monopolies. 
That telephone systems and rail networks can be privatized 
and have competition introduced into at least some of their 
activities is, in the Soviet context, a minor criticism. Provided 
that the other category of Union-responsibility industries is 
meant to be privatized in due course by its republic holding 
companies, the division of responsibility between Union and 
republics is a reasonable one. Problems are likely to arise, 
however, when it comes to deciding the precise republic 
shares, and how to do business with separatist republic 
leaderships. 
The Shatalin group was criticized for proposing an implaus-
ibly high pace of privatization. They did, but their aspir-
ations in this respect were not as far-fetched as was suggested 
by the semi-literate critics who read nothing in the pro-
gramme except the words '500 days'. An imaginative-looking 
diagram on p. 63 suggests that they in fact envisaged about 
20% of industry having been converted to joint-stock enter-
prises by (the end of?) 1992, while nearly 70% would still 
be in State hands. At several points in the programme they 
in fact acknowledge that State assets simply cannot be sold 
off quickly. They sensibly point out that it is very hard 
to sell large blocks of assets before basic capital-market 
institutions have been created. 
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The emphasis is on an early declaration of intent and a 
preliminary listing of enterprises for sale, plus an early and 
quick start on the privatization of assets in road haulage, 
building, the building materials industry (where workforce 
leasing of enterprises was first developed), retail trade, cater-
ing, other services, and the textiles, clothing and food-
processing industries. 
The early-privatization sectors are intended for sale to indi-
viduals, families, small cooperatives and partnerships. The 
Shatalin group's first target in this area is the sale of half of 
all retail food stores with a workforce of less than eight by 
the spring of 1991, and half of all retail non-food stores 
with less than .11 workers. Together these would apparently 
account for about 15% of present State retail sales, in outlets 
at present employing about 600 OOO people. Small-scale 
privatization would continue rapidly through 1991. 
One example of such a programme is the Leningrad City 
Council's sale of an initial tranche of leases on 100 food 
shops (Kommersant, 1990, No 34, p. 4; Yakovchuk, 1990). 
The aim is to continue for the time being to supply these 
shops as before through centralized supply channels, while 
encouraging the new, independent shopkeepers to sup-
plement the centralized supplies on their own initiative -
something the existing managers had little incentive to do 
under State ownership. The number of bidders for these 
shop premises comfortably exceeds the number of shops 
offered. 
The Shatalin group envisaged the State share of industrial-
sector assets falling below 50% in the fifth year of the 
transformation process - i.e. well after the period of 500 
days has elapsed. They envisaged it levelling off at about 
20% after eight years or so (Perekhod, p. 63). Presumably 
they expected small-scale privatization in other sectors to 
move somewhat faster. 
The legislative drafts in the Shatalin programme that will be 
discussed here are the following (page numbers refer to 
Transition to the market. Part JI): 
RSFSR law on joint-stock companies (pp. 69-87), 
RSFSR law on circulation of securities and concerning stock 
exchanges (pp. 87-96), 
(USSR) Regulations for the Committee on Management of 
State Property (pp. 96-100), 
(RSFSR) Regulations on the State Agency for Supervision 
of operations in securities (pp. I 00-105), 
USSR law on the property liability of enterprises (pp. 105-
112), 
USSR law on bankruptcies of juridical persons (pp. 112-
120), 
USSR law on the bankruptcy and reorganization of en-
terprises (pp. 120-138), 
RSFSR law on foreign investment in the RSFSR (pp. 138-
157). 
All of these were presented as drafts. The Russian Republic 
parliament approved the Shatalin programme in early Sep-
tember 1990, so it was, at least in principle and in outline, 
committed to the Shatalin drafts that were intended for 
RFSFR legislation. 
The discussion of the Shatalin legislative programme on 
ownership will not be comprehensive. There will first be 
comments on its general character, in comparison with that 
of the USSR legislative programme, and then selected points 
will be discussed on which specific differences appear to be 
important. 
The drafting of the Shatalin documents looks, at any rate 
to an economist, to be less ambiguous and rather more 
purposeful: it has fewer statements of general desiderata 
and more concentration on matters that might plausibly be 
regulated by law. 
It is at the same time less comprehensive in coverage. There 
is no general framework law on ownership, and no law on 
land, on intellectual property or on foreign currency mar-
kets. The reasons for this difference of coverage are presum-
ably some or all of the following: satisfaction with existing 
USSR legislation on the subject in question, belief that no 
legislation on it is needed at all, and the existence of RSFSR 
laws that were either already approved or still being drafted. 
The inclusion in the Shatalin programme of a law on the 
property liability of enterprises is a definite advantage. It 
tackles the fundamental question of loan securities and pen-
alties for breach of contract. How successfully it does so, in 
comparison with Western commercial law, is for lawyers to 
judge; but there was no comparably serious attempt at this 
in the contemporaneous batch of legislation associated with 
the Union government transition programme. There was, 
however, a reference to future legislation on loan security 
in the first draft of the Pavlov Government's anti-crisis 
programme (TASS, 1991 ). 
The drafts on bankruptcy and reorganization also appear 
fuller and more systematic than any comparable existing 
USSR legislation. 
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The draft RSFSR law on joint-stock companies makes it 
clear that foreign investors are, with some specified restric-
tions, to be treated on a par with locally based investors. It 
sets the minimum number of shareholders somewhat higher 
than the USSR statute: three for closed companies and 10 
for public limited companies. It also allows a smaller mini-
mum size of initial capital (R 10 OOO and R 50 OOO, respect-
ively) and of nominal values of shares (R 10). There are 
no restrictions on individual citizens' ownership of bearer 
shares, and the legal requirements for internal structure do 
not include the rather elaborate supervisory board set-up 
included in the USSR statute. 
Registration procedures are not much different, except that 
the RSFSR Ministry of Finance accepts and maintains lists 
of registrations. The Union statute, finally, has no counter-
part to the requirement that purchases (on the secondary 
market) of more than 10% of a company's shares have to 
be reported to and approved by the republic Ministry of 
Finance. 
The draft RSFSR law on securities markets is clearer on the 
matter of secondary markets, stating specifically that anyone 
can buy and sell on them. (Reliance on the principle that 
whatever is not specifically forbidden is allowed, is still 
problematic in the USSR, partly because a great deal of 
conflicting earlier laws and regulations are still on the 
books.) 
The Shatalin securities law is also specific in excluding from 
its ambit the so-called 'enterprise shares' and 'workforce 
shares' issued under USSR Council of Ministers decision 
No 1195 of 15 October 1988. (These are referred to in Section 
3.) And it addresses the question of capital gains tax on 
share dealings: it provides for such gains to be treated for 
tax purposes as income, pending any new legislation on the 
subject. 
In general, it seems fair to say that the Shatalin legislation 
on companies and securities was more businesslike. One 
obvious problem was simply that it conflicted on a number 
of points with the USSR legislation. 
The Shatalin draft USSR regulations for a committee to 
manage the sale of State assets make it clear that the invest-
ment trusts to be created as State holding companies under 
the committee are to do their best to sell off the assets they 
hold, retaining responsibility for control and management 
only as an interim arrangement. The presidential ukaz of 9 
August, setting up the USSR State Property Fund, leaves a 
good deal of detail to be worked out, and does not exclude 
the possibility of continued State control; nor do the sub-
sequent draft bases of legislation (see Section 3). 
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The draft RSFSR law on foreign investment seems on the 
whole to be simpler, clearer and more generous than the 
draft USSR law. 1 Registration with the republic Ministry of 
Finance is required only for firms with majority foreign 
ownership; others can be registered with local authorities 
(this is at odds, however, with the law on companies). A 
foreign firm can set up a branch in the Russian Republic by 
a fairly simple procedure; the republic Finance Ministry 
must respond within 90 days of the application and a 
negative response can be appealed. 
Hard-currency profits can be repatriated, including hard 
currency bought for roubles. No export or import licences 
are needed. The taxation exemptions appear to be more 
generous than in the USSR law. The awkward and unclear 
distinction between joint ventures and wholly or majority-
owned foreign firms that emerges from the USSR draft law 
is not present in this draft. The Shatalin group seem, sensibly, 
to be assuming that the term 'joint venture' will become 
redundant, as far as their legislation is concerned. Finally, 
the list of product groups on whose production there are tax 
concessions for foreign companies is rather more detailed 
than in the USSR draft. 
Differences between these two draft laws are probably not 
too serious, since the USSR legislation specifically allows 
for republic variations. 
To complete this outline comparison, it may be noted that 
the Shatalin programme also contains draft USSR and 
RSFSR bank laws (Transition to the market. Part II, pp. 1-
53). Here the key difference is that the Russian Republic 
reform team envisaged a USSR central bank modelled 
roughly on the US Federal Reserve Board (they call it 
the USSR Reserve System). The idea was to give greater 
authority to republic central banks without departing from 
monetary union and a single monetary policy. 
The Shatalin group's draft legislation on ownership looks 
on the whole stronger than that of the Union Government. 
It does however complicate the situation in several areas 
where either (a) conflicts of USSR and RSFSR legislation 
arise and it is still not clear whose jurisdiction prevails, and 
(b) the Shatalin group is backing draft USSR legislation that 
differs significantly from that of the rival team. 
The draft legislation in the Shatalin programme seems to 
have had some influence on completed RSFSR legislation 
and, since the spring of 1991, on some USSR legislation as 
well (see above). 
The English translation, the only text available to the author, however, 
is unclear in some places. 
Ownership elements in the Shatalin programme and the Russian Republic legislation 
It has not been possible in the time available to conduct 
anything like a comprehensive survey of recent Russian 
Republic legislation, let alone the legislation of other repub-
lics. Some notes on that of the Russian Republic follow; it 
will be seen that completed Russian legislation is not necess-
arily free of the kinds of loopholes and compromises associ-
ated with the USSR legislation. 
The pieces of legislation in question are the following: 
(i) the 3 December 1990 decree of the RSFSR Congress of 
People's Deputies on the 'Programme of revival of the 
Russian countryside', which contains changes in the 
legal framework of land ownership; 1 
(ii) the RSFSR law of 25 December 1990 on enterprises 
and entrepreneurial activity;2 
(iii) the RSFSR law of 22 March 1991 on competition 
and the limiting of monopoly behaviour on product 
markets.3 
(i) The main features reported in Kommersant are an an-
nual allocation of 15% of RSFSR national income (probably 
net material product) from 1991 to the development of 
infrastructure and other investment in the countryside; the 
writing-off of R 23 billion of short-term State and collective-
farm debt; the establishment of a single-rate tax on (farm) 
land ownership, including private; and the possibility for 
individuals to buy land from the local soviets, as the local 
representatives of the State (to which, in principle, the land 
used by State and collective farms, like all other land, has 
so far belonged). Land thus purchased cannot be resold for 
I O years, and if resold (in the meanwhile, at any time?) must 
be sold only to the local soviet. The 15% of national income 
is implausibly high; it would prima facie mean over half of 
all investment going to rural areas; and it is not clear how 
such an open-ended government pledge can be consistent 
with a programme of financial austerity and privatization. 
The compromise over resale of land impedes the develop-
ment of a market in land, though perhaps not a market in 
land-use rights. 
(ii) The law on entrepreneurial activity covers much of the 
same ground as the USSR law on the enterprise of 4 June 
1990. In other words, it is a framework law covering all 
forms of business activity. The associated, enabling RSFSR 
parliamentary decree (same date as the law) provides, how-
ever, that the USSR law on the enterprise ceases to be 
effective within the RSFSR from the date of operation of 
As outlined in Kommersant, 1990, No 47, p. 10; with effect from (appar-
ently) 1.1.1991. 
EZh, 1991, No 6, pp. 16-18. 
EZh, 1991, No 19, pp. 24-25. 
the new Russian Republic law. This is partly because there 
are some differences in provisions with respect to forms of 
enterprise, but mainly because of a dispute over control of 
enterprises on RSFSR territory that are of all-Union status 
and therefore traditionally subordinate to USSR ministries. 
The main differences from the USSR law are the following: 
Rights of management, usufruct and disposal of all State 
enterprises reside with the RSFSR. 
More emphasis is placed on 'entrepreneurship' as an im-
portant category; provisions relating to municipally owned 
enterprises are rather more substantial; the terms 'collective' 
and 'cooperative' ownership are not used; the right of the 
work collective to take part (with the 'owner') in appointing 
the director is reasserted with respect to State and municipal 
enterprises (Article 31; it was dropped in the USSR law). 
The listed forms of ownership are: State, municipal, 
individual/family (with no hired labour), unlimited liability 
partnerships (polnoe tovarishchestvo; Article 9), limited liab-
ility partnerships/closed companies (Article 11), 
partnerships/companies combining limited-liability and un-
limited-liability owners (Article 10), public companies (joint-
stock with freely tradable shares, Article 12); workforce 
leasing or purchase is also referred to (Article 15), but is 
presumably envisaged as combined with one or other of the 
above forms of company. 
Article 24, dealing with foreign trade, makes no reference to 
import licensing. It simply asserts the right of all enterprises 
to engage in foreign trade; it also refers to RSFSR export 
controls over selected items, and to profits in hard currency 
being subject to RSFSR (only) tax. 
(iii) The Russian law dealing with monopoly and unfair 
competition. It does not appear radically different from the 
USSR law on the same subject, of 16 August 1990 (Ekono-
mika i zhizn ', 1990, No 38 (supplement), pp. 2-3). 
The law sets up an RSFSR State Committee for anti-
monopoly policy, under the republic's Council of Ministers. 
Its coverage extends to restrictive agreements made outside 
the RSFSR if they affect markets in the republic. It specifi-
cally excludes anti-monopoly policies with respect to finan-
cial markets, which are to be provided for in other legis-
lation. 
Like the USSR law, this republic law defines anti-monopoly 
policies as directed against 'dominant market positions' from 
which an enterprise can determine the terms of transactions 
within a particular market. It resembles the Union-level 
legislation, again, in being also directed at unfair trading, in 
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the sense of deception of customers; in providing for powers 
to break up enterprises/other entities; and in being aimed 
in part at State administrative structures such as branch 
ministries. 
It differs from the USSR law in several ways. It sets a 35% 
market share as one criterion for a presumption of market 
dominance, while allowing for a firm with a share of more 
than 35% to defend itself by showing that it did not deter-
mine terms of transactions, whereas the USSR law treats a 
70% market share as providing a presumption of dominance, 
and treats shares between 35 and 70% as providing grounds 
for a watching brief. It refers to restrictions on market entry 
as a form of market dominance, while the Union law does · 
not. It does not, unlike the USSR law, deal explicitly with 
interlocking shares, though that may be because financial-
sector legislation is meant to do this. It gives far less attention 
than the Union law to prescribing moves away from adminis-
trative price-setting_ from above and to dealing with related ' 
issues like the traditional differentiation of pay-scales ac-
cording to enterprise size. 
Both laws enjoin their anti-monopoly agencies to assist in 
creating market infrastructures and otherwise positively to 
encourage competition. The Union law refers to the facilitat-
ing of imports as a means to this end, while the Russian 
Republic law does not. 
5. Preliminary assessment 
The first point to be made is that there is extensive agreement 
on major issues of principle in the various established and 
draft pieces of legislation on ownership. The general aim 
implicit throughout is the creation of a mixed economy. The 
thinking behind it is also reasonably clear. 
The various teams of establishment reformers all appear to 
endorse the following proposition: the attempt at trans-
forming Soviet economic performance would begin t!) suc-
ceed if the managers of production units found they had 
to worry more about customers and actual or potential 
competitors than about the higher authorities; if this was 
true for investment and market entry and exit decisions as 
well as for current output decisions; if all such decisions 
were taken in an environment where prices tended to reflect 
relative scarcities; and if there were more or less predictable 
rewards for success and penalties for failure. 
Similarly, there seems to be agreement that only an economy 
with identifiable proprietors of capital assets can provide 
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such an environment. 1 The arguments for this second prop-
osition are often implicit rather than explicit. They include 
the following: 
(a) if there is no market in which capital assets are valued, 
there is no reliable basis for product prices that reflect 
opportunity costs in production (the existence of a prod-
uct market is also necessary for the appropriate valu-
ation of capital assets, so the link runs both ways); 
(b) the existence of a capital market with competition for 
asset ownership provides both the possibility of free 
product-market entry and exit and of a market for 
corporate control, through which the managers of assets 
are under pressure to respond to asset-owners' interests 
in maintaining and increasing the value of assets;2 
(c) arrangements of this sort are more conducive to static 
allocative efficiency, X-efficiency and technological pro-
gress than the existing system of State ownership. 
The Soviet and Russian legislation and draft legislation 
reviewed in the previous two sections are widely criticized 
by Soviet radical reformers as inadequate. 3 The outside 
observer, however, is bound to say that these measures are 
at any rate clearly aimed at the creation of the legal frame-
work for a mixed economy. The Union government 
measures contain their share of bureaucratic traps and half-
measures; but those weaknesses seem to be less with the 
more recent measures than with the earlier measures within 
the package. 
For example, the ambiguities in the framework law on 
ownership in general (see above) are greater than those in 
the joint-stock company statute or the draft law on foreign 
investment. And in successive drafts of the law on the central 
bank, subordination of USSR Gosbank to the USSR 
Government gave way to subordination to parliament - in 
the Soviet context, this is probably an improvement. 
There are also some missing elements and loose ends in one 
or both programmes that are quite important. First, the 
question of the future ownership of land is still contentious 
and far from any apparent solution. The development of a 
market in land-use rights may be sufficient to support the 
general development of the market, but there is so far no 
clear provision for such a market. 
Earlier papers (Hanson, 1989 and 1990) cite a range of recent Soviet 
sources to this effect. Interviews by the author in Moscow and Leningrad 
in August 1990 with more than a dozen reform thinkers have reinforced 
this interpretation. 
2 For a review of Western literature on the relationships between owner-
ship and control see Vickers and Yarrow, 1988. 
This includes some severe criticism of the Shatalin programem, e.g., 
Larisa Piyasheva in Hayekian vein in "Sotsial'noi spravedlivosti v ekon-
omike ne sushchestvuet...", Komsomo/'skaya Pravda, 6.10.1990, p. 2. 
Second, the half-measures, bureaucratic traps and disabling 
lower-level counter-measures have not disappeared from the 
Union-level legislation. It is not clear, for example, why 
there should be Jabour-force ceilings on 'small enterprises' 
when some of the dynamism of mixed economies comes 
from those small firms that succeed in getting big. 
And there is a real risk that the conversion of State en-
terprises into companies will be managed in such a way 
that the State keeps a majority stake or ex-nomenklatura 
managers become the new owners, with undiminished mon-
opoly power. I Nor are such problems absent from the 
Russian legislation - notably on land. 
Third, the instability of the political situation in 1990/91 has 
been such as to generate a sudden rush of re-centralizing, 
illiberal measures from the Union authorities, between aut-
umn 1990 and spring 1991. Unlike the lower-level counter-
measures referred t0 in the previous paragraph - which are 
a chronic problem - this little outburst of anti-reform 
measures came from the top: from the President of the 
USSR, in the form of presidential edicts, and from the USSR 
parliament. 
They included a law of 31 October 1990 increasing penalties 
for speculation and middleman activity; a presidential edict 
of 30 November 1990 strengthening workers' control over 
retail trade, to maintain order; another presidential edict of 
26 January 1991 on measures to combat economic sabotage, 
which appeared to open the way to arbitrary searches of the 
premises and documents of foreign firms; various clumsy 
measures designed to combat inflation by, for example, a 
centrally directed raising of (nominally still controlled) retail 
prices; and the imposition of a special regime in the energy 
and transport sectors. 2 - · --
Some of these measures made some sense in the context of 
the USSR anti-crisis programme, which was simultaneously 
liberal on price decontrol and ownership (TASS, 1991; Bush, 
1991). Most of it, however, was simply in conflict with the 
liberalizing measures discussed above. This little outburst of 
illiberal measures appeared to reflect a strengthened Gorba-
chev alliance with conservatives. So far as a programme of 
liberal reform is concerned, however, it simply underlined 
the fragility of the political base for the legislation reviewed 
here. 
This has been a serious problem in Poland and Hungary. See the 
contributions by Paul Marer, David Stark, Marton Tardos and others 
to the April 1990 Trento Conference on Self-Employment and Entrep-
reneurship in the Socialist Countries, (proceedings forthcoming). 
Respectively, lzvestia, 3.11.1990; lzvestia, 1.12.1990; !zvestia, 28.1.1991; 
lzvestia, 27.3.1991; lzvestia, 29.4.1991. 
Preliminary assessment 
Fourth the implementation of the legislation calls for an 
infrast;ucture of skills and institutions that is still only rudi-
mentary: commercial law and accountancy skills, sto~k ex-
change institutions and so on. These cannot be bmlt up 
overnight. 
Finally, experience in China, Hungary and Polan? already 
makes it clear that privatization of a large proport10n of the 
economy - in part for the reasons just given - simply 
cannot be rapid. 
The ownership measures must also be considered, not m~~ely 
as a framework to be arrived at, but as part of the transition 
process towards a new system. In other w~rds, the ti~ing 
and pace of their adoption and implementat10n are crucial. 
How should the timing and pace of the Soviet privatization 
programme be determined if the economic transfoTI?ation 
is to succeed? This is not the place to embark on the difficult 
question of desirable sequencing of the transformation pro-
cess. The following remarks, however, address the narrow~r 
question of how the timing ~f t~e initiation_ of ownership 
legislation and the speed of its 1mplementat1on can affect 
other elements in that process. 
The main groups of policy measures in a transformation ~f 
the Soviet economy to a market system are: macroeconomic 
stabilization; decontrol of prices and quantities; privatiza-
tion; and opening up to the international economy. The 
process of structural change is also part of the transform-
ation, but is a consequence of these measures rather than a 
set of measures in itself. "-'·- ,_. 
All of these groups of measures take extended periods of 
time to design, introduce and implement. They are more or 
less certain to overlap one another in time, so that sequencing 
cannot be reduced to saying: do A before B. Moreover, 
policy-makers have to get the sequence right in a cardinal, 
and not merely an ordinal sense. 
In general, the linkages between the various groups . of 
measures run in all directions. There are at least four maJor 
linkages between a privatization programme and the other 
components of the transformation process. 
First, privatization can contribute to stabilization because _it 
promises to change the prevailing patterns ofmic~oeco_nom1c 
behaviour of enterprises that help to generate mflatlonary 
pressure. In Kornai's terminology, the introduction of hard 
budget constraints (presumably on some critical mass ~f 
enterprises) may be a necessary condition of macroeconomic 
stabilization. This consideration is strengthened by the sim-
ple observation that the sale of State assets provides revenue 
that helps to bring the State budget deficit under control. 
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In other words, it may be futile to wait for purely budgetary 
and monetary reforms to create a stable monetary environ-
ment before embarking on privatization. Some analyses sug-
gest that this has been the case so far as banking reforms in 
China are concerned (Herrmann-Pillath, 1990). 
Second, there is a chicken and egg relationship between 
privatization and decontrol. Assets cannot be sensibly valued 
while product prices are controlled; decontrolled product 
prices, however, will not reliably reflect opportunity costs 
until there is a market in which capital assets are valued 
according_ to their yields in alternative uses. 
Third, there is a tricky relationship between privatization 
and opening up the product market to import competition. 
If assets are sold while the product market is still heavily 
protected, and if this protection is not expected to be re-
moved soon, the values of the assets will be greatly different 
from what they would be if the assets had to be operated in 
conditions of strong import competition. 
German unification illustrates one extreme solution, in 
which the value of former GDR assets, at least those used 
in the production of tradables, was sharply reduced by 
the abrupt and complete opening of the product market. 
Conversely, in less open product-market conditions (say, 
Skoda rather than Trabant conditions), any initial privatiza-
tion without the opening of product markets is subject to a 
threat of substantial losses of asset values later. Therefore if 
you privatize first, you strengthen domestic political press-
ures to maintain protection. Both early opening of product 
markets (perhaps step-by-step in a pre-announced pro-
gramme) and early opening to foreign direct investment 
seem desirable. 
Finally, the sequence of privatization itself must be affected 
by the speed and sequence of other measures. Thus it makes 
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sense to start first and move fastest with small-scale privatiz-
ation, for several reasons. The estimation of expected returns 
on assets is likely to be easier, in part because retailing, 
consumer services and building are less vulnerable to import 
competition than manufacturing, and in part because they 
are already selling to hard-budget-constraint buyers -
namely, households. The monopoly problem is also generally 
smaller in these sectors. 
One conclusion, then, would be that the various privatization 
programmes are generally sensible with respect to the branch 
sequence of assets to be privatized. 
Finally, with respect to sequencing, the hope of achieving 
rapid stabilization before significant ownership changes are 
in place could turn out to be doomed, for the Kornai-type 
reasons suggested above. 
All of this illustrates the difficulty of the transformation 
process. The Shatalin programme sought to handle such 
difficulties by early announcement of a complete package of 
measures and an announced timetable of rapid implemen-
tation. Over-precise and over-ambitious as parts of the Shat-
alin programme appear, the serious attempt to influence 
expectations in this way was a strength when the programme 
first appeared. The Pavlov anti-crisis programme, with dates 
for price decontrol and for stages of privatization, has ben-
efited from the Shatalin programme's example. 
For all their deficiencies, the various pieces of ownership 
legislation may be capable of contributing to an eventual 
muddling-through solution, however hard that may be to 
imagine at present. The transformation of establishment 
thinking that they represent is the most encouraging aspect, 
and it is an important one: not a sufficient, but at any rate 
a necessary condition for progress. 
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1. Introduction 
Evidence from Eastern Europe, particularly from Poland 
and former East Germany, shows that the transition of 
a Soviet-type economy to a market-oriented economy is 
associated with a sharp rise in unemployment. In the Soviet 
Union the transition of the economy has not come very far 
yet. Nevertheless, the economic reform process initiated in 
1987 and the crisis situation which evolved in the Soviet 
economy have produced noticeable changes on the labour 
market. Previously, people could only be employed in the 
State sector or the collective farm sector, the risk of being 
laid off was minimal, wages were centrally fixed and stable, 
and labour relations were under strict control. Now, people 
have the opportunity to be self-employed and to work for 
cooperatives, unemployment is rising, nominal wage 
increases have been dramatic, and strikes have become a 
common phenomenon. 
This study attempts to give a tentative picture of some 
aspects of developments on the Soviet labour market in 
recent years. We start by describing the basic characteristics 
of the labour market before the transition. Then we discuss 
labour supply trends in the 1980s and 1990s using recently 
published data from the last population censuses. We find 
that labour force participation rates have been declining 
among the active population, and that there are sharp differ-
ences between the different parts of the USSR. This suggests 
that regionally differentiated approaches should be adopted 
in labour policy during the transition. The fourth section 
describes employment trends in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, and their causes. State-sector employment has de-
creased markedly since the start of economic reforms in 
1987. It is widely believed that these reforms have had some 
dampening impact on labour demand in the State sector and 
that the decline in employment is basically a result of labour 
shedding. This study argues that factors influencing labour 
supply might have been as important, if not more important, 
for this development. The major portion of the growth of 
the labour force can be found in Central Asia and Transcau-
casia, 1 where labour force participation is lower than the 
USSR average. In addition, the economic reforms have 
brought about a wide range of changes in economic variables 
which may have caused some decline in State-sector employ-
ment. In particular, the introduction of a legal private sector 
has affected the labour market. The fifth section analyses 
the various estimates of unemployment which have been 
forwarded by Soviet and Western observers; and the sixth 
considers options for labour market policies. Finally, the 
conclusions that can be drawn from the foregoing discussion 
are presented. 
Central Asia includes the republics of Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan, Turk-
menistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Transcaucasia includes Georgia, Armenia, 
and Azerbaijan. 
The labour market before the start of the transition 
2. The labour market before the start 
of the transition 
Since the 1960s, the allocation of labour in the Soviet econ-
omy has been accomplished by a mixture of planning and 
market elements. The demand for labour was an integrated 
part of production planning. Centrally set priorities and 
investment allocations formed the basis for the level and 
structure of employment. The number of workers of different 
categories to be employed in each plan period by a particular 
enterprise was regulated by plan indicators dictated from 
above. 
The regulation of labour supply was more indirect. In April 
1956, Khrushchev abolished the harsh restrictions on work-
ers' mobility which had been imposed in 1940.2 Since 1956, 
workers have been able to change jobs at their own initiative, 
an opportunity which has been used by over 20 million 
persons in the non-agricultural work-force per year.3 Mo-
bility was governed by economic incentives such as wages, 
fringe benefits and working conditions, and relative living 
standards, in particular by the varying availability of housing 
and consumer goods and services among regions. The diffi-
culty of acquiring a (city) residence permit (propiska) limited 
migration to big urban centres. 
First-time job-seekers with higher education or specialized 
secondary education were subject to administrative compul-
sory placement. Usually the assignment in the first job was 
three years (Oxenstierna, 1990, pp. 108-10). Also, graduates 
from vocational training establishments were placed in jobs, 
usually at a large enterprise associated with the vocational 
training establishment (Oxenstierna, 1990). Apart from these 
administrative instruments, the institution of 'organized re-
cruitment' (orgnabor) served as a special channel for mobiliz-
ing labour, particularly for construction projects in Siberia 
and the Far East. There were also the particular recruitment 
channels for mobilizing young people to particular projects 
(Komsomol appeals, obshchestvennye prizyvy), and the local 
recruitment of labour for priority tasks (patronage, shef-
skaya pomoshch ), such as bringing in the harvest (Oxenstier-
na, 1990, pp. 111-13). However, in the beginning of the 
1980s, administrative forms of placement accounted for only 
15 % of all hirings (Oxenstierna, 1990, p. 98). Thus, although 
administrative instruments have been important for allocat-
These entailed that an employee could not leave his job without the 
permission of the employer, and that employers had the right to order 
compulsory transfer of workers between factories and regions (see 
further Hauslohner, 1984, pp. 98-101 ). 
Several sources quoted this figure in the 1980s (see, for example, Mane-
vich, 1983, p. 4; Kotlyar and Talalai, 1981, p. 34). 
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ing certain segments of the labour force, it is relevant to talk 
about a labour market even before the start of Gorbachev's 
economic reforms. 
The main Soviet employment problem in the past was inef-
ficiency in labour allocation and utilization. 1 On the macro-
level there was no mechanism to guarantee that labour was 
allocated where it would be used most productively; and on 
the micro-level economic incentives encouraged employers 
to hoard rather than economize on labour resources. Up to 
the 1980s, the manpower requirements of the extensively 
growing economy (at least of priority activities) had never-
theless been ensured either by mobilizing new groups into 
the labour force (as in the 1960s, when labour force growth 
was high because of a great influx of women to the labour 
market) or by high growth in the working-age population 
(as in the 1970s). In the 1980s, however, when labour force 
participation was already high and the rate of growth of 
the working-age population fell markedly, it was no longer 
possible to solve the problem using an extensive approach. 
Pensioners were encouraged to continue working after reach-
ing retirement age and people were encouraged to take a 
second job, but it soon became clear that the only remedy 
for the labour 'shortage' was to raise efficiency and labour 
productivity. 
The measures undertaken in the early 1980s were primarily 
geared to the 'X-inefficiency' in labour utilization at the 
enterprise level and the 'poor work ethic' of Soviet workers. 
Andropov launched his discipline campaign (1982-83) to get 
people to be at work during working hours, not to be drunk 
during working hours, and actually work at their jobs. 
Legislation relating to labour discipline was significantly 
reinforced in August 1983, and measures were introduced 
to reduce the leaving-rate (turnover, tekuchest'). Andropov 
also launched new plan indicators and new rules for man-
agers' bonuses to spur the growth of labour productivity. 
An experiment in alternative management methods was 
launched in 1984. The measures had a temporary effect on 
labour productivity and worker turnover declined, but soon 
economic indicators resumed their earlier tendencies (see 
further Teague, 1988). 
3. Labour supply trends 
Up to the 1980s, labour force participation rates (LFPRs) 
increased in the Soviet Union. In the 1960s, the growth was 
primarily accounted for by a sharp rise in women's LFPRs. 
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Various explanations for these inefficiencies have been forwarded in the 
Western literature (see Oxenstiema, 1990, Chapter 2, for a review). 
In 19.59, 69 % of women in the working-age age-groups2 
participated. In 1970, this was 82 %. In the 1970s, LFPRs 
remained high (the LFPR of working-age men declined from 
88 % in 1970 to 87 % in 1979, and women's LFPR rose 
from 82 % to 84 % ) and labour force growth was primarily 
due to growth in the working-age age-groups. 
Labour force participation rates are derived from the tables 
giving data on people's major source of income in the popu-
lation censuses. Since the war, four censuses have been 
conducted, in 1959, 1970, 1979, and 1989. Unfortunately, 
the detailed tables for 1979 and 1989 with a breakdown of 
age-groups and sex have not been published yet, which 
inhibits the study of the changes in LFPRs among different 
groups. Nevertheless, from the information available we can 
calculate the LFPRs of the working-age population (16-59 
years for men; 16-54 years for women) and of the population 
beyond the statutory working ages. This reveals two interest-
ing trends. First, we find that the LFPR of the working-age 
population fell during the 1980s, second that the LFPR of 
the older population r'?se (Table !). 
Table 1 
Labour force participation! in the USSR, 1959-89 
(%) 
1959 1970 1979 1989 
Population 16-54/59 years2 78,2 84,9 85,5 83,9 
Population > 55/603 21,3 12,9 12,3 17,8 
Standardized LFPR4 73,9 75,5 78,4 76,2 
1 Excludes those employed in private subsidiary agriculture. 
2 Refers to the population of normal working ages, which according to Soviet standards are 
16-54 years of age for women. and 16-59 years for men. 
3 Refers to population over normal retirement age, which in the Soviet Union is 55 years of 
age for women. and 60 years of age for men. 
4 Total labour fon:e divided by population aged 15-64 years. 
Sources: Oxenstierna. 1990, p. 185; Statisticheskii press byulleten·. No 13. 1990, pp. 76 and 78; 
Vestnilc statistilci. No 6. 1990, p. 62; Nase/enie, pp. 48-9. 
The standardized labour force participation rate also fell by 
2,2 percentage points in the 1980s. This is a break from the 
previous trend of a rising labour force participation rate in 
the 1960s and 1970s. These developments entail that there 
were 3,6 million more non-employed persons among the 
working-age population in 1989 than in 1979. At the same 
time the number employed in the population over 55/60 
years has increased by the same magnitude. In 1989, the 
population in the working-age age-groups made up 94 % of 
According to Soviet standards the working-age age-groups are 16-54 
years for women and 16-59 for men. Normal pensionable age is 55 years 
for women and 60 years for men. 
the total labour force of 142 million, compared to 96 % in 
the 1970s (Table 2). 
The falling labour force participation of the working-age 
population appears primarily to be accounted for by the 
uneven geographical distribution of the growth in these age-
groups. During the 1980s, the growth of the working-age 
population was around 7 million persons and nearly all of 
the growth took place in the Central Asian republics. As 
shown in Table 3, labour force participation rates in the 
working-age population in the Central Asian and Transcau-
casian republics are significantly lower than the USSR aver-
age. In 1989, over 6 million people (24,4 %) in the working-
age population were non-employed. This means that while 
16 % of the Soviet working-age population were in Central 
Asia and Transcaucasia in 1989, almost a fourth of all the 
non-employed in these age-groups could be found in this 
region. 
Is this a problem or not? In 1986-87, resolutions were passed 
by the secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU 
expressing concern about these numbers; 3 million of the 6 
million non-employed were considered a 'labour reserve' 
which could be drawn into social production (Jzvestiya TsK 
KPSS, No 5, 1989; c/Marnie, 1991, pp. 10-11). Later these 
figures have been used to argue that there are considerable 
numbers of unemployed in this area. For instance, one 
observer claims that the 3 million are active job-seekers who 
cannot find work (Semenov, 1990, p. 49). Marnie (1991, 
p. 12) arrives at an estimate of 2 million unemployed, of 
which half are living in Uzbekistan. 
However, much of this concern is a result of past approaches 
and practices concerning the active population. Soviet 
authorities have estimated how many could possibly be 
mobilized into social production, or the 'labour resources' 
of the country. These calculations do not take account of 
people's actual labour market behaviour. In fact, many 
cultural factors might explain considerably lower partici-
pation rates in the southern republics compared to the Euro-
pean parts of the USSR. 
For example, the number of children per thousand of popu-
lation is much higher here than in other parts of the USSR. 
The USSR average was 17,6 in 1989. In Uzbekistan the 
corresponding figure was 33,3, in Tadjikistan, 38,7, in Turk-
menistan, 35,0, and in Kyrgyzstan, 30,4. In the Transcauca-
sian republics, this indicator is lowest for Georgia, 16,7, 
while for Armenia and Azerbaijan the indicator is above 20 
(Ekonomicheskoe i sotsial'noe ... , p. 37). The growth of the 
population in Central Asia is around 30 per thousand of 
population, while the USSR average is around 7 to 8 (ibid., 
p. 38). Average family size is 5 to 6 in the Central Asian 
republics, and 4 to 5 in the Transcaucasian republics, as 
Labour supply trends 
Table 2 
The Soviet labour force, 1959-89 
Total labour force 
Labour force aged 
16-54/59 years 1 
Labour force > 55/602 
/I OOO) 
1959 1970 1979 1989 
99 130 115 204 134 860 142 014 
93 692 110 511 129 864 133 326 
5 438 4 693 4 996 8 688 
1 Refers to the Jabour force in the normal working ages, which according to Soviet standards 
are 16-54 years for women, and 16-59 years for men. 
2 Refers to labour force over normal retirement age. Employees have been eligible for an old 
age pension upon reaching the age of 55 (women) and 60 (men) if they have spent at least 
25 years (men) or 20 years (women) in employment (see further Oxenstierna, 1990, 
pp. 194-8). 
Sources: Oxenstierna, 1990, p. 185; Statisticheskii press byulleten', No 13, 1990, pp. 76 and 78; 
Vestnik statistiki, No 6, 1990, p. 62. 
·'I 
Table 3 
Number of non-employed in the working-age1 population in the USSR 
and selected republics, 1989 
Working-age Non-employed 
population working-age population 
(I OOO) (I OOO) (%) 
USSR 158 911 25 585,0 16,1 
Central Asia 16 024 3 600,2 22,5 
Uzbekistan 9 720 2 148,I 22,1 
Tadjikistan 2410 641,1 26,6 
Turkmenistan I 751 369,5 21,l 
Kyrgyzstan 2 143 441,5 20,6 
Transcaucasia 8 785 2 443,7 27,8 
Georgia 3 039 699,0 23,0 
Armenia 1 858 652,2 35,I 
Azerbaijan 3 888 1 092,5 28,1 
Central Asia and 
Transcaucasia 24 809 6 043,9 24,4 
1 Population aged 16-59 years (men) and 16-54 (women). 
Sources: Ve.unik stati.stiki, No 6, 1990, pp. 62-77. Statisticheskii press byulleten', No 13, 1990, 
pp. 78-9. 
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compared to the USSR average of 3,5 in 1989 (Vestnik 
statistiki, No 6, 1990, pp. 78-9). In the rural population, 
family size is larger, and a larger part of the population lives 
in rural areas in the southern republics than in the rest 
of the USSR. Thus, the way of life, particularly in the 
predominantly Muslim republics of Central Asia, differs 
considerably from that in industrialized parts of the country 
and lower participation in the labour market is probably 
largely explained by a lower proportion of the active popu-
lation, especially women, wanting to participate. 
Moreover, the proportion of the population engaged in 
private subsidiary agriculture (which was not regarded as 
productive work in the past) is larger in these republics than 
the USSR average. In 1989, 2,6 % (4,3 million, including 
private farmers) of the total estimated 'labour resources' 
(164 million) in the USSR were reported as working in 
private subsidiary agriculture (Ekonomicheskoe i sotsial'noe 
... , p. 43). In the Central Asian republics over 10 % of the 
estimated labour resources (the absolute figures are not 
given) were engaged in this sector, and in the Transcaucasian 
republics around 6 % (ibid.). These figures probably under-
estimate the amount of people doing productive work on 
the private plots, and it can be assumed that if the correct 
figure of these people could be obtained and if people en-
gaged in the subsidiary economy were included in the labour 
force, the difference in labour force participation between 
republics would diminish. Data from Goskomstat (the State 
Committee on Statistics) on the percentage proportion of 
the estimated labour resources in employment including 
private plots support this hypothesis (ibid.). 
Thus, the numbers of non-employed, or the proportion of 
the active population which is non-employed, does not in 
itself indicate a serious unemployment problem in the Cen-
tral Asian and Transcaucasian republics. A large part of 
those who do not participate on the labour market do so by 
their own choice (or for social and cultural reasons). Data 
that would seem to indicate a serious unemployment prob-
lem in this region probably reflect unemployment concen-
trated in big urban centres and amongst young age-groups. 
Thus, it is crucial to obtain disaggregated information on the 
non-employed population and preferably straightforward 
information on the numbers actively searching for a job, 
that is, the unemployed. This way much confusion regarding 
the aggregate unemployment estimates (see Section 5) could 
be eliminated and, what is more important, relevant policies 
on how to cope with unemployment in this region could be 
worked out. 
Between I 990 and 1995, as well, the large part of the increase 
in the working-age population will occur in the less-de-
veloped republics. According to a forecast made by Goskom-
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stat, of the increase of 3,6 million persons in 1990-95, 80 % 
are located in the Central Asian and Transcaucasian repub-
lics. Thus, in the European parts of the country the growth 
in the working-age population will be only about 600 OOO 
over the five-year period. Between 1995 and the year 2000, 
the increment is forecast at 8,3 million, of which about 50 % 
will come from Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and Transcauca-
sia. About the same proportions will prevail in the period 
2000-2005. However, in the following two five-year periods, 
when the net increment is forecast at 4,4 million and 3,2 
million, respectively, the whole increase will take place in 
the southern parts of the USSR, while the Slavic republics 
will experience an absolute decrease in the working-age 
population (Vestnik statistiki, No 10, 1991). 
Thus, there are and will be great regional differences on the 
supply side of the labour market in the USSR. This implies 
that a disaggregated approach must be applied both in 
analyses of the situation as well as in recommendations of 
appropriate labour policies. 
4. Employment 
The two major changes in the Soviet pattern of employment 
after the start of the transition have been the decline in 
State-sector employment and the rise in legal private employ-
ment. As shown in Table 4, State-sector employment has 
declined by about one and a half to two and a half million 
persons a year since I 988, or by almost over 5 million 
persons between 1985 and 1990. Including employment in 
the kolkhoz (collective farm) sector, the decrease over five 
years was 6 million. As a result, the number employed in 
the State sector is now below the 1980 level. Meanwhile, 
employment in cooperatives and other legal private activities 
(excluding private subsidiary agriculture) has risen from nil 
in the mid-1980s to over 4 million at the beginning of the 
1990s. The Soviet authorities have started to publish figures 
also for total employment including private subsidiary agri-
culture. From these we can see that altogether, employment 
in the State, the collective farms, and the cooperative and 
individual sectors rose to 139,3 million persons in 1989. 
Thereafter total employment declined to 138,4 million in 
1990 (Ekonomika i zhizn', No 5, 1991). Further decline 
occurred in the first six months of 1991, when total employ-
ment fell to 135 million (Ekonomika i zhizn', No 17, 1991). 
The greater part of this decrease took place in the State and 
collective farm sector where ~mployment fell by about 3,5 
million. 
Developments in recent years represent a sharp break with 
the previous trend in employment. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
State-sector employment rose by around 10 million persons 
Employment 
Table 4 
Trends in Soviet employment, 1986-91 (Jao.-Juoe) 
(I()()()) 
Jan.-June 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
State sector1 118 503 118 572 117 236 115 433 112 936 109 976 
Annual change 705 69 -1 336 -I 803 -2497 -2960 
Kolkhoz sector 12 560 12 236 11 700 11600 11 500 10 700 
Annual change -127 -324 -536 -100 -100 -800 
State and kolkhoz sector 131 063 130 808 128 936 127 033 124 436 120 676 
Annual change 578 -255 -I 872 -1 903 -2 597 -3 760 
Consumer cooperatives n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3 500 3 400 
Cooperatives2 (excl. part-time) n.a. n.a. 743 3143 4 208 4 500 
Annual change 2400 I 065 300 
Self-employed2 n.a. 427 734 673 200 200 
Private subsidiary agriculture n.a. n.a. n.a. 4000 4200 3 700 
Private farmers n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 100 
Reported total employment n.a. n.a. n.a. 139 300 138 400 135 OOO 
1 The figures regarding State-sector employment in 1990 and 1991 should be regarded with some scepticism. Since 1989 Goskomstat has changed the breakdown in their reports on employment 
each year. Heleniak (1991) explains the inconsistency of the figures, which have appeared in different publications, by Ministry of Defence employment being included in some figures and 
excluded in others. The initial figures for State-sector employment given in the plan reports for 1990 and Jan.-June 1991 were 114 600 and 111 900 respectively, which, according to Heleniak's 
interpretation, includes Ministry of Defence employment. The figures given in this table are from Narkhoz (1990) and an unpublished table provided to me by Goskomstat, and should exclude 
Ministry of Defence data. If Heleniak's interpretation of the different figures is right, this implies that part of the decline in State-sector employment is explained by an increase in Ministry of 
Defence employment. From Heleniak's analysis of the available data this rise would particularly be due to increases in Ministry of Defence employment in construction, transport and 
communications. 
2 The reported numbers of self-employed and those employed in cooperatives vary between different sources. Here the numbers for cooperative employment in 1988 and 1989 arc calculated from 
the figures on total cooperative employment and the number of holders of several jobs in Narkhoz, 1988 and 1989, and that for 1990 from the corresponding figures in Ekonomika i zhizn', 
No 20, 1991. The numbers of self-employed in 1987 is the number reported in Trud v SSSR, and those for 1988 and 1989 arc the numbers reported in Narkhoz, 1988 (p. 329), and Narkhoz, 
1989 (p. 275). The remaining figures for these two items arc from the plan fulfilment reports in Pravda, 28 January 1990, and Ekonomika i zhizn', Nos Sand 30, 1991. 
n.a.: not available. 
Sources: Trud v SSSR, pp. 30-1, 76 and 276; Narkhoz, 1988, pp. 322 and 329; Narkhoz, 1989, pp. 48-9 and 268; Narkhoz, 1990, p. 108; Ekonomika i zhizn', Nos S, 20 and 30, 1991; Pravda, 
28 January 1990; unpublished data from Goskomstat. 
in each five-year period. In the first half of the 1980s, the 
growth in employment slowed down, but nevertheless the 
increment was about 5 million persons (Table 5). 
As shown in Table 5, it is employment in the productive 
sector1 which has lost ground in absolute terms. Agricultural 
employment decreased by over 2 million (including ko/-
khozy) in 1985-89. The transportation sector employed 
2 million, or 20 %, fewer workers in 1989 than in 1985. 
Employment in railway transportation has decreased by 
10 %, and in road transportation by 24 %. The only pro-
ductive sectors which have experienced an increase in em-
ployment during the period are the construction sector and 
the unspecified activities included in the productive sector. 
Employment in the non-productive sector1 increased by al-
most l million in 1985-89. All sectors except State and local 
administration and sciences have increased their employ-
ment. The rise in employment in the two largest non-pro-
ductive sectors, education and health care, was around 10 %. 
The State bureaucracy has declined by a third compared to 
1985, and the number employed by scientific institutions by 
10%. 
Soviet economic science distinguishes between two sectors : the 'pro-
ductive sector' (also called the material sphere of production) which has 
encompassed industry, construction, transportation, agriculture, trade 
and communications; and the 'non-productive sector' (or the non-
material sphere of production) consisting of education, health care, 
housing and other public services, science, State and local adminis-
tration, finance and banking, art and culture. 
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Table 5 
Change in employment stocks, 1965-89 
1965-70 
(I 000) 
State and kolkhoz sector, total 11 342 
State sector1 13 271 
Productive sector1 7 597 
Industry 4 146 
Agriculture -1 214 
State 715 
Kolkhoz -1 929 
Construction 1 751 
Transportation 733 
Rail 12 
Road 699 
Water 22 
Trade 1 528 
Communications 323 
Forestry 31 
Others 299 
Non-productive sector1 3 745 
Education 1 202 
Health 803 
Housing 666 
Science 374 
State administration 302 
Culture 268 
Finance 88 
Art 42 
I Includes sectors listed below this heading. 
Source: Oxcnsticrna, 1990, p. 233; Narkhoz 1989, pp. 48-9; Trud v SSSR, p. 76. 
By disaggregating these figures over the republics, we see 
that in absolute terms the major part of the decrease took 
place in the RSFSR. However, in relative terms the decline 
in employment in this republic is rather small. State employ-
ment declined by around 3 % between 1985 and 1989 
(Table 6). Yet, this is a significant change compared to 
previous periods, for instance between 1980 and 1985, when 
employment rose by 3 % in the RSFSR. In the three Slavic 
republics together, employment declined by 2,4 million 
(2,6 %). Other republics had more significant decreases in 
relative terms, for instance, Moldova (8 %), Estonia (6 %), 
and Latvia (5 %). The Transcaucasian republics experienced 
a decline in employment of only 1 %. However, in the first 
half of the 1980s, employment grew by 12 % in this area. In 
the Central Asian republics employment increased by about 
300 OOO (4,3 %), but the increase is only a third of the 
increase in 1980-85. 
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1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-89 1985-89 
(I 000) (I 000) (I 000) (I 000) (%) 
10 432 8 509 4 643 -3 452 -2,6 
11 974 10 338 5 300 -2 365 -2,0 
6 682 5 113 2 521 -4441 -4,5 
2 461 2 837 1 212 -1 689 -4,4 
-440 -700 -67 -2161 -8,7 
1 102 I 129 590 -1 074 -8,8 
-1 542 -1 829 -657 -1 087 -8,6 
1 522 666 252 1 692 14,7 
1 230 1 109 554 -2 194 -20,2 
128 157 23 -276 -10,5 
1 068 923 513 -1 886 -24,2 
34 29 18 -32 -7,1 
1 320 837 337 -154 -1,5 
198 106 37 -132 -7,9 
20 5 -2 -63 -13,8 
371 253 198 260 13,7 
3 750 3 396 2 122 989 3,2 
889 1 031 721 1 137 11,5 
689 454 561 713 10,5 
753 707 382 155 3,2 
791 589 175 -449 -9,9 
231 240 156 -792 -33,2 
232 234 96 198 14,3 
131 130 30 10 1,5 
34 11 I 17 3,7 
Further, we note that parallel to the decline over 1985-89, 
the number of women employed in the State sector decreased 
by 1,3 million. This corresponds to 54 % of the total decline 
(Table 7). Since women make up over 50 % of the State 
labour force, this decline in female employment cannot be 
taken as an indication that women are being displaced to a 
greater extent than men. 
4.1. Why is State-sector employment declining? 
The decline in State-sector employment raises several ques-
tions. Has the contraction of employment come about be-
cause labour demand has declined in this sector? That is, 
have hardened budget constraints led State employers to 
dismiss workers? Or is the decline primarily due to compe-
Table 6 
Number of employed in the State sector in the republics, 1980-89 
Average annual employment (I OOO) 
1980 
USSR 112 498 
Slavic Republics 89 700 
RSFSR 65 612 
Ukraine 20 042 
Belarus 4046 
Moldova 1 511 
Baltic Republics 3 363 
Estonia 700 
Latvia 1202 
Lithuania 1461 
Transcaucasian Republics 4972 
Georgia 1 978 
Armenia 1 192 
Azerbaijan 1 802 
Central Asian Republics 6 909 
Uzbekistan 4169 
Tadjikistan 927 
Turkmenistan 711 
Kyrgyzstan 1102 
Kazakhstan 6043 
Source: Narkhoz, 1989, p. 52. 
Table 7 
Number of women employed in the State sector, 1980-89 
Total 
Change 
Source: Narkhoz, 1989, p. 53. 
1985 
60 011 
1986 
60 171 
160 
1985 
117 798 
92 591 
67 641 
20 679 
4 271 
1 619 
3 512 
718 
1 231 
1 563 
5 591 
2 178 
1 355 
2 058 
7 985 
4 834 
1 101 
811 
1 239 
6 500 
1987 
60 054 
-117 
1989 
115 433 
90 194 
65 634 
20 249 
4 311 
1 491 
3 399 
675 
1 171 
1 553 
5 523 
2 161 
1 304 
2 058 
8 325 
5 061 
1 161 
854 
1 249 
6 501 
1988 
59 273 
-781 
1980-85 
(I 000) 
5 300 
2 891 
2 029 
637 
225 
108 
149 
18 
29 
102 
619 
200 
163 
256 
1 076 
665 
174 
100 
137 
457 
1989 
58 729 
-544 
Employment 
Change in employment 
1985-89 
(%) (I 000) (%) 
4,7 -2 365 -2,0 
3,2 -2 397 -2,6 
3,1 -2007 -3,0 
3,2 -430 -2,1 
5,6 40 0,9 
7,1 -128 -7,9 
4,4 -113 -3,2 
2,6 -43 -6,0 
2,4 -60 -4,9 
7,0 -10 -0,6 
12,4 -68 -1,2 
10,l -17 -0,8 
13,7 -51 -3,8 
14,2 0 0,0 
15,6 340 4,3 
16,0 227 4,7 
18,8 60 5,4 
14,1 43 5,3 
12,4 10 0,8 
7,6 0,0 
(I()()()) 
1980-85 1985-89 
2 442 -1 282 
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tition for labour from the private sector? Or is it due to 
factors related to labour supply? 
Part of the decline may be attributed to the regional mis-
match between jobs and job-seekers. Growth in the active 
population is taking place mainly among the peoples of 
the southern republics where employment opportunities are 
scarce, and these people are reluctant to migrate to places 
where there is employment. Furthermore, wage rises, price 
increases, and changes in taxation rules may have had both 
positive and negative effects on labour supply. Labour sup-
ply may increase or decrease when real wages increase de-
pending on whether the substitution or income effect domi-
nates. A problem in studying the Soviet situation is that it 
is difficult to determine whether real wages have increased 
or decreased and what the impact of income taxes on the 
take-home wage is. Moreover, the shortages on consumer 
markets complicate matters, since money incomes do not 
guarantee access to goods and services. Labour supply may 
have declined because of supply multiplier effects, that is, 
people choosing to be non-employed (or reduce their work-
ing time) because shortages on consumer goods markets 
have intensified. 
Since we do not have data on the number leaving employ-
ment and lay-offs (which would tell us whether people have 
left their jobs on their own initiative or whether they have 
in fact been laid ofl) or detailed information on the develop-
ment of non-employment and unemployment in recent years, 
it is not possible to give clear-cut answers to these questions. 
We can only name a few factors which have probably con-
tributed to this development. 
The wage reform launched in 1986 appears to have had 
some impact on the employment level. This reform was 
aimed at raising basic wages in the productive sector by 20-
25 % and increasing wage differentiation. Enterprises were 
supposed to cover the resulting rise in labour costs by their 
own means, through rationalization of production and lab-
our shedding (see Oxenstierna, 1990, pp. 242-4; Chapman, 
1988). The reform was estimated to raise the wage bill 
in industry alone by about. R 20 billion (Maevskii and 
Maevskaya, 1986, p. 9). According to the latest reports, 
5,5 % (3,3 million) of the work-force affected by the reform 
has been displaced (Statisticheskii press byulleten', No 13, 
1990, p. 38). Many of those losing their jobs have been re-
employed in the State sector (often in the same enterprise). 
The figures for 1988 reveal that about 3 % of the workers 
who were transferred to the new wage scales were actually 
laid off, of which about a third entered retirement (Oxensti-
erna, 1990, p. 251). Ifwe assume that lay-offs are still around 
3 %, then the wage reform would thus account for about 
1,8 million or 30 % of the total decline in State-sector em-
ployment during the period 1985-90. 
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Because of the drastic changes in many variables at the 
same time, one should not read too much into this kind of 
mechanical calculation. In fact some Soviet employment 
specialists tend to attribute very little importance to the wage 
reform and other reform measures in explaining the decline 
in State-sector employment. I 
In any case, the effects on labour productivity have been 
much weaker than those observed when the reform was tried 
out on an experimental basis,2 and the effects on the nominal 
average wage level have been much more dramatic than 
expected. In 1988, the average nominal wages in the State 
sector rose by 8,3 %, in 1989 by 9,4 %, and in 1990 by 
12,5 %,3 compared to about 2,5 % per year in the early 
1980s. 
This is largely due to the fact that the wage reform was 
implemented in an environment set by the 1987 law on State 
enterprises4 introduced in 1988. Among other provisions, 
this law gave enterprises some freedom in setting their output 
prices and adjusting their product mix towards more expens-
ive output. Combined with the absence of competition in 
the product market, this opened the opportunity to raise 
wages by increasing prices instead of shedding labour. 5 
In addition, the wage determination mechanism in the new 
enterprise law which was chosen by most enterprises made 
it possible to raise wages without improving labour pro-
ductivity. The law offered the enterprise a choice between 
4 
In a discussion in Stockholm on 14 June 1991, Professor I. Maslova 
(Institute of Economics, Moscow) stressed the importance of people 
changing their labour market behaviour (e.g. women becoming less 
inclined to work) and Professor A. Kotlyar (Central Labour Institute 
at the RSFSR Ministry of Labour, Moscow) pointed at regional imbal-
ances, claiming that labour shortage is still a problem in many areas. 
The wage reform was tested on the Belarus railways during 1985-86. 
Labour productivity rose by 32 % compared to 1983, and around 13 % 
of the work-force was displaced. Wages rose by over 22 %. In 1987 the 
reform was adopted in the whole railway sector, and employment 
decreased by about 10 % (Oxenstiema, 1990, pp. 243-4). 
These are the percentage growth rates for State-sector wages which may 
be deducted from Narkhoz (1989, p. 78) and Ekonomika i zhizn', No 5 
(1991, p. 9). Aslund (1991, pp. 8 and 30) presents higher growth rates 
based on the total remuneration paid out to the population for the given 
years. Of course, if the earnings of kolkhozniki (which rose more than 
average State wages in 1989 and 1990) and the wages in cooperatives 
are included, wage and salary rises are higher. 
Zakon SSSR 'O gosudarstvennom predpriyatii (ob edinenie)', 30 June 
1987. Ekonomicheskaya gaze/a, No 28, July 1987. 
In 1988, over 50 % of the increase in the wage funds was generated this 
way (Deripasov and Semenov, 1989, p. 90). Total remuneration rose by 
R 30 million in 1988. Previously, the yearly increase had been around 
R 10 billion (Aslund, 1991, p. 6). 
two alternatives with respect to wage determination. With 
the first, the major part of the wage budget was dependent 
only on revenues and only a small part was profit-related. 
In principle, this model copied already-existing practices. In 
the second alternative, the total wage budget was dependent 
on net revenues (total revenues minus all costs except labour 
costs). I Most enterprises adopted the first alternative, which 
implies that wages would be paid out, no matter how bad 
overall results were. That is, budget constraints have con-
tinued to be particularly soft with regard to wages. 
Despite the intensified decline in 1990 the trade-off between 
wages and employment level appears very weak. State wages 
rose by 12,5 %, while State-sector employment declined by 
2,2%. 
The development during the first six months of 1991, when 
State-sector employment was reported to have fallen by 
almost 3 million, might of course be a lagged effect. A new 
enterprise law (a law applicable to all types of enterprises) 
has been introduced together with a new tax legislation.2 
Enterprises might have been expecting continuing soft 
budget constraints and therefore were postponing dismissals 
until it had been made clear whether loss-making enterprises 
would have to cut down employment or close down. If 
constraints have in fact hardened, the wholesale price reform 
in January 1991, and the postponement of retail price rises 
until April, would have put many enterprises in trouble and 
led to dismissals. 
The general disintegration of the material supply system is 
another factor which has distorted production, and maybe 
this is the major cause for the decline in employment at the 
beginning of 1991. 3 Lack of inputs means that output levels 
will fall with a consequent loss of revenues. If enterprises 
are operating under hard budget constraints this should lead 
to labour shedding. Only a thorough empirical investigation 
can reveal whether this is the story behind the decline in the 
first half of 1991. 
Oxenstierna, 1990, Ch. 10, contains a detailed presentation and analysis 
of these models. 
Zakon SSSR 'O predpriyatiyakh v SSSR', Ekonomika i zhizn', No 25, 
June 1990. Zakon SSSR 'O nalogakh s predpriyatii, ob edinenii i 
organizatsii', Ekonomika i zhizn', No 30, July, 1990. 
During my visit to the Baltic Republics in February 1991, this was the 
most common cause cited both by government officials and enterprise 
management. See further Oxenstierna (1991 ). 
Employment 
4.2. The private sector 
The legalization of employment outside the State and 
kolkhoz sector is certainly one of the factors explaining the 
decline in State-sector employment. The development of this 
sector is in itself a central element in the transformation of 
the economy. 
The process of legalizing private employment started with 
the law on individual labour activity of 19 November 1986,4 
which permitted people not required to work in the State 
sector to engage in a variety of activities such as private 
taxi businesses, car repair, and housing construction. The 
number of people in these activities has not been very high 
(see Table 4), but the psychological impact of legalizing 
self-employment certainly prepared the way for successive 
reforms (see further Plokker, 1990). 
Permitting cooperatives has had a more substantial impact 
on private opportunities. When the law on cooperatives5 
was adopted in May 1988, employment in this sector rose 
dramatically (see Tables 4 and 8). The growth slowed down 
slightly between 1989 and 1990, and during the first months 
in 1991, employment was reported to have fallen by a few 
thousand persons (see Table 4). 
In 1988, cooperatives in consumer goods production and 
consumer services grew rapidly. By January 1989, there was 
a total of 77 500 cooperatives, of which over 50 % were 
in consumer-oriented production (Tedstrom, 1989). Public 
opinion became rather critical of cooperatives, and since 
then the growth in the number of cooperatives has been 
concentrated in activities which are not so visible to the 
public. 
At the end of 1990, the cooperatives employed about 
6, 1 million persons of which 31 % were reported as persons 
holding several jobs (sovmestiteh). This means that they did 
not work full-time in the cooperatives; many probably have 
a job in the State sector as their primary job. This suggests 
that about 4,2 million can be regarded as employed full-time 
in the cooperatives (Ekonomika i zhizn', No 20, 1991). Total 
sales turnover was R 67 billion, and net revenues were 
R 44,2 billion, of which 74 % (R 32,5 billion) was at the 
disposal of the cooperatives (ibid.). The wage fund of this 
sector rose by about R 10 billion, compared to 1989, to 
R 26,8 billion. This implies that those employed in cooperat-
4 Zakon SSSR 'Ob individual'noi trudovoi deyatel'nosti', Pravda, 21 
November 1986. 
Zakon SSSR 'O kooperatsii v SSSR', Ekonomicheskaya gaze/a, No 24, 
June 1988. 
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ives (about 4 % of total employment) received 20 % of the 
total increase (R 53 billion) in the economy-wide wage fund. 
The average wage paid in the cooperative sector was R 417 
per month (ibid.). This is l.5 times the average wage in the 
State sector. 1 
As Table 8 indicates, construction cooperatives accounted 
for almost 40 % of total sales turnover, over 40 % of cooper-
ative employment and almost 50 % of the total wage budget 
of the cooperative sector. The amount in the wage fund per 
worker was over R 5 OOO per year (R 426 per month), and 
sales turnover was R lO 385 per worker. Consumer goods 
production, consumer services and public catering account 
for 40 % of sales turnover, one-fourth of employment, and 
20 % of the total wage sum in the cooperative sector. The 
amount in the wage fund per worker was lower than in 
construction, R 3 700 per year (R 306 per month), but 
sales turnover per worker was within the same magnitude, 
R 10 220. 
A majority of all cooperatives are linked in some way to a 
State enterprise. In 1990, this proportion was as high as 
80 % (Ekonomika i zhizn', No 20, 1991). This means that in 
many cases part of an enterprise's activities have simply been 
taken over by a cooperative formed by workers employed 
at the enterprise. Large Soviet enterprises have always hand-
led a vast spectrum of activities, for instance, they have had 
their own construction department, their own recreation 
facilities, and social services. This kind of auxiliary activities 
as well as parts of the main production have now been 
reorganized into cooperatives. For the cooperatives the link 
to a State enterprise is essential because it allows them to 
lease equipment and buildings and means they do not have 
to raise their own capital. The underdeveloped level of the 
market for production capacities and material inputs and 
shortages are other factors which make it crucial to be linked 
to an enterprise well established in the old network for the 
distribution of capital goods and inputs. 
The close link to the State sector, together with the fact 
that cooperatives to a large extent provide services to State 
producers, is part of the reason for the increased amount of 
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In the construction industry the cooperative average wage was R 463, 
and in the State sector it was R 339 (1,34 :1). In agriculture the average 
cooperative wage was lower (R 230) than in State agriculture (R 270). 
In retail trade the cooperative wage was R 574 while that in the State 
sector was R 227 (2,5 : I), in health care the corresponding wages were 
R 398 and R 184 (2,16 :I), in scientific work, R 484 and R 333 (1,45 :1), 
and in construction design, R 495 and R 392 (1,26 :I) (Ekonomika i 
zhizn', No 20, 1991). Because the proportion of part-time workers is 
greater in the cooperative sector than in the State sector, the actual 
average cooperative take-home wage for full-time workers is higher than 
these figures reveal. On the other hand, work intensity is probably much 
higher in the cooperative sector than in the_State sector. 
money in circulation. Through the selling of services to State 
enterprises, the passive money in the State-enterprise sector 
enters circulation via purchases of cooperatives and wages 
and salaries paid to their staff. The growth in the cooperat-
ives' wage funds has been greater than the average for the 
State sector. Thus, although minor in size, the cooperative 
sector has contributed to the current wage-price spiral. The 
proportion of wages in total costs is much higher in the 
cooperative sector (40 %) than in the State sector.2 
Throughout their existence, a large share of those working 
in cooperatives has been those holding several jobs (or part-
time workers), which in most cases implies that they have a 
State-sector job beside their work in the cooperative. The 
distribution of cooperatives among republics reveals regional 
differences in this respect (Table 9). The proportion of part-
time workers is lowest in the Central Asian republics. This 
might be an indication that cooperative jobs are representing 
new job opportunities to a larger extent there than elsewhere 
in the USSR (see further Malle, 1990). 
The sheer numbers of cooperatives which are established in 
direct connection to State enterprises imply that new work-
places are not being created to any large extent. In 1989-
90, only 12,5 % of the growth in cooperative employment 
represented a growth in work-places. That is, of the total 
rise in employment of 3,5 million, only around 400 OOO were 
new jobs (Malle, 1990). The most important obstacle to 
further development of the cooperative sector is probably 
the lack of equipment and inputs. Changes in tax laws have 
not been advantageous for the cooperatives, and both the 
physical impediments and the less favourable financial situ-
ation have contributed to the slowing growth of the sector. 
5. Unemployment 
Some unemployment has always existed in the Soviet Union. 
Primarily this has been in the form of frictional unemploy-
ment because of people changing jobs or being dismissed for 
disciplinary reasons. In Soviet parlance this phenomenon 
has been called 'unplanned turnover' (tekuchest'). In the 
Western literature, estimated frictional unemployment rates 
for the USSR have been calculated from data on tekuchest' 
and estimated average duration of unemployment between 
jobs. For the 1980s, this methodology renders an unemploy-
According to Narkhoz, 1989 (p. 343), the average labour share in Soviet 
industry's total costs was 14 % in 1989. 
Unemployment 
Table 8 
The cooperative sector, 1990 (end of year) 
Number of Number of Wage Sales 
cooperatives workers fund turnover 
(I OOO) (I OOO) (millionR) (million R) 
Total 245,4 6 098,2 26 836,0 67 313,0 
Selected branches: 
Construction 75,5 2 548,2 13 015,4 25 961,5 
Consumer goods, production ,41,8, 1 010,0 4 069,7 11 994,4 
Consumer service 'l1,6 .. 420,8 1 291,1 2 888,3 
Producer goods, distribution 8,~ 380,l l 730,5 5 941,4 
Data processing, information services 4,0 77,2 287,0 I 736,0 
Source: Ekonomika i zhizn', No 20, 1991. 
Table 9 
Development of employment in cooperatives in the USSR and its republics, 1989-90 
January 1989 January 1990 July 1990 
2 2 3 3a 
USSR I 395,9 46,8 4 855,4 35,3 3 459,5 5 219,5 364,1 
RSFSR 707,9 47,0 2 688,4 34,1 I 980,5 2 958,8 270,4 
Ukraine 249,0 50,2 779,4 39,2 530,4 784,2 4,8 
Belarus 43,6 53,8 123,9 44,6 80,3 137,1 13,2 
Moldova 38,5 61,0 83,0 36,7 44,5 111,4 28,4 
Estonia 21,5 68,4 42,l 54,9 20,6 47,1 5 
Latvia 28,7 67,6 134,8 48,1 106,l 158,6 23,8 
Lithuania· 25,4 61,2 81,4 50,1 56,0 77,9 -3.5 
Georgia 32,4 40,2 135,9 31,7 103,5 127,8 -8,1 
Armenia 56,4 25,9 138,l 40,3 81,7 171,3 33,2 
Azerbaijan 15,8 32,3 62,8 32,3 47,0 63,7 0,9 
Uzbekistan 71,6 35,7 250,5 28,l 178,9 243,2 -7,3 
Tadjikistan 12,5 36,0 40,7 22,1 28,2 44,2 3,5 
Turkmenistan 4,8 18,7 30,5 24,3 25,7 33,5 3 
Kyrgyzstan 15,8 37,3 38,7 28,7 22,9 34,4 -4,3 
Kazakhstan 72,7 35,7 225,2 25,3 152,5 226,3 1,1 
Number of employed (I OOO) 
J 
Proponion ofpart•timc workers (sovmeslileli) (%) 
Change in number of employed 
. Change during the first six months of 1990 . 
Sources: Nalle, 1990, p. 210; Narkhoz, 1989, p. 269; Statisticheskii byulleten', No 20. 1990, p. 44. 
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ment rate in the range of 1-3 %,1 depending on the average 
duration of unemployment spells. For instance in 1985, if 
the average duration of unemployment was one month, 
the frictional unemployment rate was 0,9 %. If the average 
duration was two months or three months, the unemploy-
ment rate was 1,8 or 2,7 %, respectively (Oxenstierna, 1990, 
p. 224). In the l 980s, reported job-changing involved about 
13-14 % of the State-sector labour force (some 15 million 
persons) and the resulting simulated unemployment rates 
correspond to 1,2-3,5 million unemployed on a yearly basis. 
In addition to frictional unemployment, the most important 
types of unemployment have probably been unemployment 
due to migration from rural areas, and unemployment of 
first-time job-seekers. Unemployment in connection with 
migration has not been documented, and little is known 
about first-time job-seekers. In the l 980s, 4-5 million persons 
in the age-group 15-24 years finished school or graduated 
from higher educational establishments each year. It appears 
that typically the time required to find employment has 
been longer (3-6 months) for these categories than for job-
changers. It is uncertain to what extent the school-leavers 
and graduates have been actively searching for jobs during 
this period, but a very rough estimate indicates that first-
time job-seekers would add about 1-2 % to the simulated 
unemployment rates for the mid-1980s (Oxenstierna, 1989, 
p. 865). This suggests that it is not unreasonable to assume 
a 'natural' or lower-bound unemployment rate for the Soviet 
economy of 2-5 % (2,4-6 million)2 even before the onset of 
perestroika. 
5.1. How many are unemployed? 
In the light of these figures, the claim made by Goskomtrud 
(the State Committee on Labour and Social Questions) that 
there were around 2-2,5 million unemployed in 1990 appears 
a bit low (Ekonomika i zhizn', No 15, 1990). The number 
of people changing jobs has not decreased. The frictional 
unemployment rate due to tekuchest' was in the range of 
1,1-3,4 %,3 and there are several indications of increased 
difficulties of first-time job-seekers in finding jobs. The fig-
ures for the number of school-leavers neither working nor 
studying have increased, and there are reports of graduates 
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These figures relate only to the State-sector labour force (that is, 
kolkhozy are not included) and to obtain the ratio, the number of 
unemployed has been divided by State-sector employment. 
This interval is, of course, too large to be satisfactory. 
Calculation based on the tekuchest' figures in Narkhoz, 1989 (p. 69) 
and an average duration of unemployment spells of 1-3 months. If 
anything, duration of unemployment should have increased. 
from higher education having increasing difficulties finding 
jobs. According to the population census in 1989, 422 OOO 
persons aged 16-29 years did not work. The number of 
school-leavers neither working nor studying has risen from 
23 600 in 1985 and 36 200 in 1987, to 90 600 in 1989 (Kirillov, 
1990, p. 59). This represents 4 % of the total group of school-
leavers (2,25 million) in 1989 (Kirillov, 1990, p. 58). Of those 
neither working nor studying in 1989, 32 800 were engaged 
in private subsidiary agriculture. Yet, even if these are sub-
tracted from the total number, there were more than twice 
as many non-employed school-leavers in 1989 (57 800) than 
in 1985. 
In addition, some of the decline in State-sector employment 
may be attributed to people who have been laid off and who 
are searching for jobs, and who therefore should be regarded 
as unemployed. Further, there are reports of increasing 
numbers of migrants, and of refugee-migrants. Goskomstat 
reports around 600 OOO refugees on the territory of the USSR 
in 1990 (Ekonomika i zhizn', No 5, 1991; Volokh, 1991, 
p. 50). These are people who had to leave their permanent 
place of residence because of natural catastrophes or ethnic 
conflicts. One might also suspect that food shortages in some 
regions have put people on the move. Many of the refugees 
come from Azerbaijan and Armenia. (In 1988-89, 422 OOO 
persons left these areas, in the first quarter of l 990, 100 OOO 
left.) There are also refugees from Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan. (In 1989, 100 OOO left these areas.) Among the 
refugees are also military personnel and their families (about 
50 OOO) (Volokh, 1991, p. 50). (How much unemployment 
was caused by the demobilization has not been reported 
yet.) The refugees face many problems, not the least of which 
is finding work. In big cities such as Moscow and Leningrad, 
refugees are now considered a special category among the 
unemployed. Apart from these indications that unemploy-
ment is rising, there is the latent problem of non-employment 
and unemployment in the labour surplus regions of Central 
Asia and Transcaucasia. 
The Goskomstat report on the state of the economy in 1990 
reveals that the number of non-employed and non-studying 
persons in the working-age population exceeded 8 million 
persons; and of the temporarily non-working population, 
2 million could be regarded as unemployed. Meanwhile, 
there were about 3 million vacancies in the State sector 
(Ekonomika i zhizn', No 5, 1991). 
The figure of 8 million appears to be an estimate of the 
proportion of non-employed persons out of the estimated 
total labour resources (estimated at 164 million in 1989). Of 
the total, about 25 million were non-employed (those in 
private subsidiary agriculture and private farming have been 
included among the employed), 12 million wele reported to 
be in education. The remaining 13 million were in the armed 
forces, staying at home, or temporarily out of work (Ekono-
micheskoe i sotsia/'noe razvitie, p. 43). The armed forces 
appear to include around 4-4,5 million persons, 1 so the 
number potentially available for work is 8,5-9 million. Of 
these, about 4 million may be assumed to be women not in 
the labour force. 2 Thus, there are about 4,5-5 million persons 
who are potentially unemployed. Of these, at least between 
one-half to I million may be considered people who do not 
wish to work,3 so the potential stock of unemployed appears 
to be around 3,5-4,5 million rather than the 2 million Gos-
komstat reports. Unemployment due to changing employ-
ment in the State sector has probably not been included in 
Goskomstat's 8 million, so I, 1-3,8 million should be added. 
The unemployment rate is thus in the range of 3,2-5,8 %.4 
However, since it is not known how long people go without 
a job, and one might be suspicious about the number of 
'labour resources' which does not take account of people's 
labour market behaviour, this estimate is still very shaky. It 
lies near the estimate of unemployment made by the Shatalin 
group at the beginning of 1990. The figure they suggested 
was 6 million (Perekhod k rynku, p. 111). 
5.2. Unemployment scenarios 
In connection with the various reform programmes pre-
sented during the autumn of 1990 and the writing of the 
new employment law5 different unemployment scenarios 
were drawn up. In these, the primary cause for the rise in 
unemployment would be a reduction of overmanning due 
to privatization and structural change. In addition, the dur-
ation of unemployment might be expected to increase which 
4 
So bell ( 1988) reported military personnel per I OOO population in the 
USSR at 16, I. Calculated on the 1987 population this implies that the 
Soviet armed forces consisted of 4,5 million persons. According to 
Pravda of 28 January 1990, the number in the armed forces was 4 
million in 1989. Gorbachev announced an overall reduction of 500 OOO 
men in the Soviet military establishment by 1990 in his speech to the 
UN General assembly on 7 December 1988 (Clarke, 1988). 
This is the estimate reported for 1989 in Pravda of 28 January 1990. 
Various figures for this group are given. See, for example, Shcherbakov 
(1991, pp. 14-15) and Chizhova (1990, p. 64). 
Here the rate has been calculated as the total number of full-year 
equivalent unemployed, 4,6 million and 8,3 million respectively, divided 
by total employment in 1990, 138,4 million, plus the respective stock of 
unemployed. That is, 4,6/142 and 8,3/143. 
'Osnovy zakonodatel'stva soyuza SSR i respublik o zanyatosti nase-
leniya', lzvestiya, No 22, 26 January 1991. 
Unemployment 
would increase the unemployment rate even if the number 
of people in unemployment were constant. 
Goskomtrud came forward with two projections of labour 
market implications of a move towards a market economy. 
The Shatalin group presented their unemployment scenario 
related to the 500-day programme. Furthermore, the joint 
agency study of the Soviet economy presents two hypotheti-
cal scenarios for 1991 and 1992 (A Study of the Soviet 
Economy, Vol. 2, pp. 148-9). 
The first scenario described by Goskomtrud involved a tran-
sition period of 8-10 years and the second a transition period 
of two years. In the first gradual scenario employment in 
the State sector was projected to fall by 40 million over the 
8-10 years, and by 9,5 million in 1991. Only about one-third 
of the contraction in 1991 was expected to come about 
because of workers being made redundant: 500 OOO was 
to be because of ownership changes and thereby reduced 
overmanning, 1,5 million because of loss-making enterprises 
closing down, and 1,5 million as a result of structural change 
in industry. The remaining persons were supposed to leave 
the State sector on their own accord (ibid., p. 147). In this 
scenario, the total employment level in the economy would 
remain at its 1990 level. This implies that the gradual increase 
of the number of unemployed persons from about 2 million 
up to 4,5 million (3,25 % of the labour force) in 1994 would 
be in line with the projected increase in the labour force of 
about 700 OOO persons per year (ibid.). In the second, more 
radical scenario, the lay-offs in 1991 were projected at 
6 million in 1991, because of more rapid structural change 
and faster privatization (ibid.). Goskomtrud did not ex-
plicitly state the unemployment consequences of this alter-
native. 
Goskomtrud also projected the regional distribution of the 
unemployed who would be in need of help, primarily in the 
form of income support, in 1991. This forecast indicates 
that 46 % of these persons would be located in the Slavic 
Republics, 30 % would be located in the Central Asian 
Republics (almost 40 % if Kazakhstan is included), and 
about 12 % in the Transcaucasian Republics (ibid., p. 212). 
Even if we assume that the number of unemployed in need 
of help is only 3 million persons, it is evident that in relation 
to the numbers in the population, the proportion of those 
unemployed would be high in the southern republics. 
The Shatalin group put the figure for the number of unem-
ployed at 6 million at the beginning of 1990, of which 
4,5 million would represent long-term unemployment and 
1,5 million frictional unemployment (Perekhod k rynku, p. 
111). According to their prognosis, the number of unem-
ployed would reach 6,3 million by January 1991 (Perekhod 
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k rynku, p. 111). The rise in unemployment during 1990 
(10 OOO) was due to a rise in frictional unemployment be-
cause of an increasing number of displaced workers and a 
slight increase in the duration of unemployment between 
jobs (from one to one and a half months), and a rise in the 
number of long-term unemployed (plus 20 OOO). During 
1991, the number of unemployed would rise to almost 12 
million because of three factors : a rise in long-term unem-
ployed (to 6,1 million), a rise in frictional unemployment 
due to a rise in the numbers of job-changers and job-losers 
(from 17 million in 1990 to 25 million in 1991 ), and an 
increase in the duration of unemployment between jobs 
(from one month in 1990 to two months at the end of 1992). 
The two hypothetical unemployment scenarios for 1991 and 
1992 presented by the agency (IMF, World Bank, OECD, 
EBRD) study are based on Goskomtrud's forecasts but have 
less modest assumptions regarding the degree of overman-
ning and the average duration of unemployment spells (A 
Study of the Soviet economy, Vol. 2, pp. 148-9). In both 
scenarios, enterprises are assumed to eliminate overmanning 
in two years and the initial stock of unemployment is set at 
2,5 million at the end of 1990. In the first gradual scenario 
it is assumed that initial overmanning is 12,5 % and that 
average duration of unemployment is to rise to 7,5 months 
in 1992. In this scenario the unemployment stock rises to 
8,3 million (which corresponds to an unemployment rate of 
6 %) at the end of 1991 and to 13 million (9,4 %) at the end 
of 1992 (ibid., p. 200). In the second scenario, overmanning 
is assumed to be 25 % initially, and the average duration of 
unemployment is to rise to 10 months. In this case, the stock 
of unemployed is to rise to 17 million at the end of 1991 
(about 12 %) and then to settle at around 15 million (about 
I O % ). The first scenario suggests a rise in the unemployment 
rate from 1,8 % (2,5 million) at the end of 1990, to 6 % (8,3 
million) at the end of 1991, and to 9,4 % (13,2 million) at 
the end of 1992 (ibid., p. 200). The second scenario indicates 
a rise of unemployment to 9,3 % (13 million) in 1991, and 
10,8 % (15 million) in 1992 (ibid.). 
Since none of the economic programmes presented in 1990 
was ever put into action, none of these scenarios is likely to 
materialize, and as shown above, there are indications that 
unemployment at the end of 1990 already exceeded these 
prognoses. Yet, the scenarios give some indication of poss-
ible developments even if the timing might not be correct. 
The hypothetical scenarios of the agency study highlight 
the importance of taking into account how the prolonged 
duration of spells contributes to the unemployment rate. 
The present crisis of the Soviet economy indicates that unem-
ployment could rise even more than in these forecasts. Re-
cently, Prime Minister Pavlov has presented three new scen-
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arios (Ekonomika i zhizn', No 18, 1991). In the first, no 
measures are taken against the crisis. In this case, the na-
tional income is supposed to fall by 20 %. According to 
Pavlov, this would result in 18 million unemployed (12-13 % 
of the labour force) by the end of 1991. Pavlov does not 
explain how he arrived at this figure, but one might suspect 
that he means that 18 million persons would be displaced 
during the year. The second alternative is a laissez-faire 
scenario where State intervention would cease completely. 
The Prime Minister assumes that setting the market forces 
free would cause the national income to fall by 30 % and 
unemployment to rise to 30 million persons (21 % of the 
labour force). Again, it might be assumed that Pavlov had 
the number of displaced in mind, and does not take into 
account that this shock treatment might lead to new oppor-
tunities and create new jobs. The third alternative, which is 
the government alternative, envisages measures which would 
stop the national income from falling by more than 10 %. 
Pavlov does not give an estimate for the number of unem-
ployed in this alternative, but says the figure for possible 
unemployment would fall to a manageable level, and people 
could find work in small-scale enterprises, the developing 
service sector, road construction, and as a last resort, they 
could be given unemployment benefit. The other two esti-
mates indicate that for each percentage point decrease in the 
national income, the number of job-losers rises by 0,7 % of 
the labour force. This would mean that the number of job-
losers in the last scenario would be around 9 million persons, 
or6%. 
Thus, this is near the first Goskomtrud scenario, which 
assumed that 9,5 million persons would leave the State sector 
in 1991, and that around 3 million of these would become 
unemployed. Perhaps one reason that Pavlov finds this a 
more manageable figure is that the government's policy for 
taking care of the displaced and the unemployed and its 
financing would provide coverage for about this number of 
persons. 
A common deficiency in these forecasts is that very little is 
said about which categories of workers will primarily be 
displaced and about the regional location of the unemployed. 
This is of extreme importance in order to work out appropri-
ate labour policies. Early reports on displacement indicated, 
for example, that white-collar workers, and particularly 
young professionals, were laid off to a greater extent than 
blue-collar workers and had difficulty finding new jobs (Zas-
lavskii, 1988, p. 30). It might be difficult to persuade these 
people to take manual jobs, and it follows that unemploy-
ment may rise more dramatically due to a structural mis-
match between jobs and job-seekers. Another special cate-
gory is made up of workers in the defence industry, who 
have enjoyed special privileges. According to the draft State 
Programme on Conversion, in 1990 alone half a million 
workers were to leave employment involving military pro-
duction and were to transfer to civilian manufacturing 
(Cooper, 1991, p. 134). It is recognized that those displaced 
by the conversion in the defence industry will require retrain-
ing and compensation for reduced earnings. However, how 
this is to be handled has not been made clear. Similarly, 
virtually no attention has been devoted to how displaced 
armed forces personnel are to be assimilated into the new 
labour market. The potential distribution of i;nemployment 
over the country is of interest, since mobility between differ-
ent parts is impeded by cultural, ethnic, social, and economic 
factors. Thus, regional mismatch between jobs and job-
seekers might become a more pronounced problem than 
these prognoses indicate. Finally, the question of how a 
restructuring of the USSR's federal structure might possibly 
affect the labour market remains to be answered. 
6. Easing the transition with labour 
market policy 
A sharp rise in unemployment would cause concern and 
most likely lead to increased social tensions. Therefore, it is 
of importance that there is a policy which can mitigate the 
unemployment problem. 
After long discussion, all-union legislation on employment 
was finally adopted in January 1991. 1 This is a basic legis-
lation for the entire country which provides definitions for 
'employed', 'unemployed', and 'suitable work'; gives general 
directions for labour market policy and employment pro-
grams; and lays down minimal levels of income support for 
the unemployed. The republics, however, are supposed to 
work out their own employment laws which may differ in 
accordance with regional conditions.2 
Before the adoption of this law, the rights of laid-off workers 
were regulated by a decree adopted by the CPSU Central 
Committee, the Council of Ministers, and the VTsSPS3 in 
December 1987.4 In March 1988, this decree was confirmed 
'Osnovy zakonodatel'stva soyuza SSR i respublik o zanyatosti nase-
leniya', Izvestiya, No 22, 26 January 1991. 
For instance, Lithuania adopted its employment law as early as Nov-
ember 1990 (Oxenstierna, 1991). Russia adopted its law in May/June 
1991. 
All-Union Central Trade Union Council. 
Joint decree on efficient employment,job placement for laid-off workers, 
and the rights oflaid-ofTworkers to compensation (Po/nyi khozyaistven-
nyi ... , pp. 117-33). 
Easing the transition with labour market policy 
by Goskomtrud and VTsSPS by a decree spelling out the 
conditions in more detail. 
According to these regulations, laid-off workers were for-
merly entitled to severance payment from their former em-
ployer at the level of their former average wage two to three 
months after the lay-off. To be eligible for pay in the third 
month, the worker had to be registered at the employment 
service. Workers who chose to leave on their own initiative 
(i.e. whose lay-off was classified as 'separation on their own 
initiative') were not formally entitled to severance pay or 
wage. The decrees also stated that workers should be offered 
retraining. The retraining of a worker was supposed to be 
organized by the enterprise hiring the displaced worker. 
Training was to be offered either at the enterprise itself, 
or at some organization that could provide the necessary 
training. The employment services were supposed to provide 
the employers with information on the availability of train-
ing at various training institutions. The worker was entitled 
to his or her former average wage ifhe or she was undergoing 
retraining on a full-time basis. Also, when working part-
time and training part-time, he or she was entitled to at least 
the former average wage. The costs were to be borne by the 
new employer. 
6.1. The employment law 
The new 1991 Law on employment clearly states that em-
ployment is voluntary and that voluntary non-employment 
cannot be used for legal prosecution of a person. Citizens 
are regarded as employed if they work for pay according to 
a contract, are self-employed, if they have been elected to a 
paid position, if they are in the military service, or work 
temporarily abroad (Article I : 1-2). 
A citizen is counted as unemployed ifhe or she is ofworking-
age and capable of working, but for reasons beyond his or 
her control, does not have a job and income from work, is 
registered with the State employment service, is searching 
for a job, is capable and available for work, and has not 
been offered a suitable job by the employment service. If 
the employment service cannot offer a suitable job to an 
unemployed person, he or she can be offered retraining 
(Article I :2). A suitable job is judged in terms of the pro-
fessional training of the job-seeker, his or her age and work 
experience, as well as the geographical location of the job. 
A job is not suitable if the job-seeker would have to move 
to less favourable living conditions, if it is based too far 
from the present residence, if the wage and other working 
conditions are worse than those of his or her previous job, 
or if there are 'valid' reasons, in particular personal or family 
reasons, for him or her to refuse it (I :3). 
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The definition of unemployed in the new law means that a 
person leaving a job on his or her own initiative will not be 
counted as unemployed. The argument for this is of course 
that the status of 'unemployed' gives the right to claim 
income support and if voluntary job-changers were made 
eligible for benefits, they could prolong their spells of unem-
ployment. Another category excluded from the status of 
unemployed is old-age pensioners. As I have shown above, 
people beyond retirement age make up a significant portion 
of the labour force. This is largely due to low pensions. 1 The 
idea is apparently that pensioners should be provided for in 
other ways. 
The definition of a 'suitable' job appears generous, in view 
of the possible changes in labour demand. It is already 
difficult to find suitable jobs for displaced professionals with 
specialized secondary or higher education, particularly in 
big urban centres. These people must either accept jobs 
below their professional status or move in order to be rede-
ployed. In a longer perspective the problem of people having 
the wrong professional profile will certainly grow and 
involve blue-collar workers as well. 
Rules for income support given to the unemployed are 
differentiated for different categories. Laid-off workers are 
to receive a severance payment from their former employer 
corresponding to their average wage for a maximum of 
three months. The laid-off worker must register with the 
employment service 10 days at the latest after being dismis-
sed. If no suitable job has been found for the displaced 
worker during the three-month period, he is regarded as 
unemployed (IV :26). If the person worked for at least 
12 weeks during the 12 months preceding the unemployment 
spell, he will be entitled to receive unemployment benefits 
for at least 26 weeks over a 12-month period. During the 
period of receiving benefits, the unemployed must actively 
search for work (IV :28). 
Re-entrants (persons who have been absent from the labour 
market for at least one year) will receive unemployment 
benefits from the 11 th day after registration at the employ-
ment service for at least 26 weeks during any 12-month 
period (Oxenstierna, 1990, pp. 194-201 ). First-time job-seek-
ers have the right to unemployment benefit from the 
11 th day after registration for 13 weeks (ibid.). Job-seekers 
who have fulfilled the required years of service for receiving 
old-age pension (normally 30 years of employment for men 
and 25 years for women) have the right to an extended 
period of income support. Two weeks are added for every 
year the person has worked in excess of the required years 
in employment. Those who are unemployed and who would 
See further Oxenstiema, 1990, pp. 194-201. 
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thereby have the right to 52 weeks of unemployment benefit 
(i.e. they have worked 13 years more than is required for 
receiving a pension) are eligible for old-age pension one year 
before they reach the stipulated pension age (IV :29). 
The sizes of unemployment benefit to laid-off workers are 
to be based on the basic (tariff) wage of their previous job 
(IV :30). This means that bonuses and extra payments, which 
may be a substantial part of earnings, are not taken into 
account. If the unemployed person has children below the 
age of 14 and other dependants, the size of the benefit is 
adjusted according to republic-level legislation. The mini-
mum size of the benefit should not be less than 50 % of the 
former basic wage or the minimum wage (IV :31). For those 
displaced from military service and those completing pro-
fessional training or retraining, the minimum size of the 
benefit must not be less than the minimum wage (IV :32, 
35). For first-time job-seekers and re-entrants after long 
spells of non-employment, the minimum level is 75 % of the 
minimum wage (IV :33-34). 
The right to unemployment benefit is not granted, or is 
withdrawn for a period or diminished, if the unemployed 
person turns down two job offers made by the employment 
service. The same applies if the unemployed person receives 
income compensation from his former employer, if he has 
been dismissed for infringements of work discipline or left 
on his own initiative without 'valid reasons', if he takes a 
temporary job, does not fulfil the terms for 'active job 
search', is absent from his permanent place of residence, 
or if the benefits have been granted on deceptive grounds 
(IV :36). 
Apart from income support, the unemployed person should 
be offered retraining if necessary. If an enterprise hires a 
displaced worker and organizes training for him, the worker 
has the right to receive his former average wage during the 
training period (from the new employer), but the enterprise 
will be able to deduct the costs of the training from its 
taxable profit (IV :26). Persons who are difficult to place in 
a job should be offered retraining opportunities by the 
employment service. The training could be organized either 
in centres under employment service management or in 
existing establishments for vocational training. In this case, 
costs are to be borne by the special State fund for employ-
ment assistance (III :24). A person undergoing retraining 
should receive income support corresponding at least to 
unemployment benefit. For displaced workers with depend-
ants, the stipend should be at least 50 % of the former 
average wage or the minimum wage, but not more than the 
average wage in the republic (IV :27). 
Besides income support and retraining, the employment law 
gives outlines for how employment programmes should be 
organized, how public relief works, and how labour policy 
should be administered. A network of public employment 
services is of vital importance for the administration of these 
policies. At present there are only 3 OOO employment offices, 
of which 570 are called centres for 'employment service, 
retraining, and professional guidance'. The number of em-
ployees is around 15 OOO (Ekonomika i zhizn', No 19, 1991). 
The resources for labour policies are to be raised by a I % 
levy on the pay-roll. At least 10 % of this revenue is to be 
transferred to a central all-union fund, and the rest will be 
retained in republic employment funds for republic-level 
needs. The central fund is needed for redistributional pur-
poses, since the tax base and estimated number of persons 
who will be in need of help are unevenly distributed over 
the country. 
7. Conclusions 
The decline in State-sector employment since 1988 is due to 
changes on both the demand and supply side of the labour 
market. The wage reform launched in 1986 has induced State 
employers to shed some labour. However, the trade-off 
between nominal wage increases and the employment level 
is still very weak, which indicates that State employers have 
been operating under soft budget constraints at least up 
to 1990. The 1987 Enterprise law has contributed to the 
development of high wage rises without improvements in 
labour productivity by granting monopolistic enterprises 
more discretion over price formation and the enterprise 
remuneration funds, and by a wage-determination mechan-
ism which does not link wage payments directly to profit. 
In addition, the legalization of private employment has drai-
ned the State sector of labour and the increased competition 
on the labour market has also pushed nominal wages up-
wards. 
With the data available it is not possible to say whether 
these measures are the primary causes of the decline. To a 
greater or smaller extent, decreased labour supply may have 
interacted. The demographic situation, with large increases 
in the labour force in Central Asia and Transcaucasia where 
job opportunities are scarce, might have affected the employ-
ment level. Jobless people in these regions have a low propen-
sity to migrate, and the proportion of non-employed persons 
is considerably higher in these regions than the USSR aver-
age. The fact that labour force participation has tended to 
fall among the working-age population in the 1980s might 
be a consequence of a greater proportion of the population 
choosing not to work. It follows that the decline in State-
sector employment may be a result of a supply constraint. 
Conclusions 
Apart from the fact that the growth of the active population 
has been concentrated in regions where labour market par-
ticipation has traditionally been lower than the USSR aver-
age, decline in labour supply (to the legal economy) may 
have resulted from responses to changes in wages, prices, 
and tax laws. Intensified shortages on consumer goods mar-
kets may have produced supply multiplier effects, that means 
people choose not to work since wages and salaries do not 
guarantee command over goods and services. 
Moreover, ethnic conflicts, demobilization, natural catas-
trophes, and the economic crisis have induced people to 
move, which also means they have left their jobs. These 
developments may also be reflected in the declining employ-
ment. 
In order to analyse the trends in employment properly, better 
statistics are needed. For instance, ifwe had time-series of the 
number leaving employment and lay-offs, we could be more 
precise on whether the decline in State-sector employment is 
primarily due to factors affecting demand or supply. 
The study of the development in unemployment is also 
impeded by lack of relevant labour statistics. Since there are 
no data which can clearly distinguish the unemployed from 
the non-employed, all estimates of unemployment are tenta-
tive. From the available data, we can estimate the stock of 
unemployed at 3,5-4,5 million at the end of 1990, to which 
1-4 million unemployed due to job changing should be 
added. This means that the unemployment rate would be in 
the range of 3-6 %. In order to obtain a better picture of 
developments in unemployment, it would be helpful if labour 
force surveys were conducted at least in some regions of the 
country. To shape labour market policies it is important to 
know how many people are actually unemployed, how this 
number is growing, and who are unemployed. In addition, 
better data are crucial in order to forecast the consequences 
in terms of unemployment of any reform programme. 
Several tentative scenarios of the unemployment conse-
quences of further transition have been presented. These 
indicate that unemployment may increase sharply when the 
economy is undergoing privatization and structural change. 
Some of the scenarios presented in the USSR seem to be of 
more political importance than economic. For instance, the 
government is seeking support for their particular pro-
gramme by claiming that a high unemployment rate would 
result if their policy is not pursued. Nevertheless, an unem-
ployment rate of around 10 % is not implausible during 
the transition, and it will rise more sharply if economic 
deterioration continues. 
It is difficult to foresee what capacity the economy will have 
to create jobs during the transition period, especially because 
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it is hard to tell now what kind of transition the economy 
will have to go through. So far, the economic reforms have 
not succeeded in creating the prerequisites for economic 
growth. Instead, elements of the old system prevail side by 
side with elements of a new system, and as a result, economic 
activity is heavily distorted. The development of the private 
sector is impeded by the lack of equipment and inputs and 
uncertainty regarding future prospects. As long as these 
obstacles persist, the job-creation capacity in this sector is 
limited. The future of the big State enterprises is far from 
clear; they are to be subject to 'de-nationalization' (razgosud-
arstvlenie) and privatization (privatizatsiya), but it is not 
resolved how this process will be realized, and with the 
impediments inherited from the past, any revitalizing effect 
of this process could take a long time to materialize. 
Furthermore, it must be recognized that the transition of 
the Soviet economy is not only a question of transforming 
a command economy into a market economy. In addition, 
the transition involves the reorientation of military pro-
duction towards civilian activities. The conversion of the 
Soviet defence industry has already been shown to be slow 
and difficult, and is fraught with compound political and 
social implications. Another prominent complication is the 
restructuring of the Soviet federal structure. This process 
has added to the economic disruption, and will continue to 
offer a complex environment for economic reform. Thus, 
apart from the non-trivial difficulties in assessing the pros-
pects of turning the Soviet economy into a market economy, 
privatization, and structural change of the economy in gen-
eral, the particular problems of the conversion towards civ-
ilian production and of the reshaping of the federation 
have to be taken into account in any evaluation of Soviet 
economic prospects. 
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Even if the Soviet Union can find a way out of its present 
crisis, open unemployment will rise and it is important that 
there is a willingness to mitigate this problem in order to 
avoid increased social tension and a backlash on the whole 
transition process. It is also vital that labour policies should 
be designed in a way which does not impede the transform-
ation of the economy. In particular, labour policies should 
not be geared to saving jobs without a future, but instead 
to easing the reallocation of workers from shrinking sectors 
of the economy to expanding sectors. In addition, some kind 
of income support programme must be put into effect to 
provide short-term help to the unemployed in order to avoid 
destitution. 
The all-union employment legislation passed in January 1991 
copies many elements oflabour policies in market economies 
and is a reasonable start for working out relevant labour 
policies in different republics. What may be questioned is 
whether it is possible to live up to this costly legislation 
during the transition period. For instance, the provisions for 
the kind of job an unemployed person can refuse while 
still being eligible for income support are very generous. A 
network of public employment services is required for effec-
tive administration of these labour policies. The number of 
offices and their resources are at present far below what 
would be required to fulfil this task. The commitment to 
providing relevant retraining will be difficult to realize be-
cause no one knows which kinds of professional skills will 
be in demand in the future. The State's ability to finance 
any employment programmes, if only income support for 
the unemployed, may be questioned as well, in the light 
of the general financial situation, the reluctance of many 
republics to contribute to the all-union funds, and the possi-
bility that a great number of people will be unemployed. 
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Officially the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA) ceased to exist on 26 September 1991. However, 
the basic decision to abandon the old system of trading 
arrangements and to organize trade on a commercial basis 
was taken more than a year and a half earlier, in January 
1990. From I January 1991 CMEA trade was to be conduc-
ted on the basis of world market prices, with settlement in 
convertible currencies. The new rules were considered more 
advantageous both by the USSR and by its European trade 
partners, although for different reasons, and were expected 
to promote market-oriented reforms. It did not take long to 
prepare the appropriate bilateral agreements, and by the end 
of 1990 everything was ready. 
-:;, ,··· 
The former CMEA partners were surely aware of some 
inevitable losses which would result from breaking estab-
lished trade and industrial links, but these were thought to 
be eventually outweighed by gains. The European member 
countries of the CMEA (ECMEA - Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia) expected their short-
term losses would be offset by political gains as well as by 
an expansion of trade with the West. The USSR was gravely 
preoccupied by the rapid worsening of its payments situation 
and expected to improve its current-account deficit and 
reduce outstanding debt to ECMEA by a sharp improvement 
in its terms of trade vis-a-vis ECMEA. 1 But the outcome 
proved to be more complicated, and the hopes were not 
fulfilled. The poor trade performance with the former 
ECMEA in the beginning of 1991 caused major domestic 
problems and aggravated the economic situation. 
1. New trade and payment arrangements 
The new basis of trade with the former ECMEA is formed 
by the bilateral treaties on 'transition' to the new mechanism 
of mutual economic relations and according agreements 
on trade and economic cooperation in 1991.2 These were 
concluded between the USSR and each of the former 
ECMEA countries at the very end of 1990.3 The treaties 
and the agreements declare the transition to payments and 
The potential gains of the Soviet Union from the new mode of pricing 
and terms of trade improvement were discussed widely. Even the pessi-
mistic scenario provided in European Economy. No 45, 1990 (sharp 
decline in oil exports and pre-Kuwait price level) projected the trade 
surplus with the CMEA at USO 1,6 billion after a USO 1,2 billion 
deficit in 1989 and a USO 3,8 billion deficit in 1990. 
The agreement with Poland is without fixed term. 
With Poland, on 13 November; with Hungary, on 11 December; with 
Czechoslovakia, on 17 December; with Romania and Bulgaria, on 20 
December. 
New trade and payment arrangements 
settlements in convertible currencies on the basis of world 
market prices, but in order to limit immediate trade disrup-
tions they provide measures for 'preserving in the tran-
sitional period the procurements which are established and 
indispensable for the national economies'. 
The settlements with Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia are to be 
performed on a clearing basis in convertible currencies with 
the US dollar as the agreed accounting unit. One part of 
trade is to be centrally regulated and the other is to be free. 
The regulated trade will be conducted in 1991 within the 
framework of so-called 'indicative lists' of commodities and 
manufactured goods offered for trade. For this purpose 
special accounts with fixed limits of technical credit were 
established in the corresponding banks for foreign trade. 
The agreements with Poland, Hungary and Romania do 
not mention clearing arrangements, so the trade is to be 
conducted on a cash basis. But in fact there are 'hidden' 
clearing arrangements, for a part of the turnover is to be 
regulated according to similar 'indicative lists' for the year 
1991, and any trade surplus should be used for extra pur-
chases of goods, for balancing bilateral payments and for 
paying off credits. 
Another major feature of the agreements is that governments 
do not undertake obligations to procure the items and vol-
umes mentioned in the indicative lists, but only that they 
'should provide conditions necessary for the fulfilment of 
the mutual deliveries of goods and services included'. For 
the Soviet Union it means including the indicated goods in 
the State export plan and providing export licences automati-
cally. 
On the Soviet export side, the goods included in the indica-
tive lists are energy products and some other raw materials, 
equipment for nuclear power stations, vehicles and parts. 
On the import side, they are deliveries of parts, components 
and accessories in the framework of cooperation agreements, 
spare parts for vehicles, medicines, food products and equip-
ment for the oil and gas industries. All in all the goods 
in the indicative lists account for approximately one-third 
(Bulgaria and Romania) and one-half (Hungary, Czechoslo-
vakia) of total trade with these countries in 1990. The sharp-
est reduction is in Soviet imports of capital goods and 
intermediate materials for food and light industries (one-
third of former volume) and consumer goods (one-tenth of 
former volume). Machinery and equipment account for 40 
to 50% of their 1990 volume. The example of an 'indicative 
list' - for trade with Hungary - is presented in Annex A. 
It is worth noting that most Soviet export items (being raw 
materials) are indicated in volume terms, whereas imports 
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from ECMEA are indicated in value terms (in US dollars). 
Still, there were hidden assumptions concerning future com-
modity prices. It was understood that the regulated trade 
would not be balanced bilaterally and that Soviet exports 
would have to exceed imports in order to pay back accumu-
lated ECMEA surpluses from the past. The latter were 
denominated in transferable roubles (TR) which are con-
verted to US dollars. For example, the regulated exports 
to Hungary account for USO 2, 1 billion, whereas imports 
account for only USO 1,7 billion. [l] The total value of 
Soviet exports to Czechoslovakia according to the indicative 
lists is estimated at USO 1,9 billion and imports at USO 
1,4 billion. [2] In addition, the Soviet Union 'will grant 
Czechoslovakia a possibility' to buy, in 1991, an additional 
7,5 million tonnes of crude oil, two of which will be on 
barter terms with enterprises of the Ministry for the Oil and 
Gas Industries, and the rest on a cash basis in hard currency 
without matching Soviet purchases in Czechoslovakia. I 
Similar agreements were concluded with Romania (raw ma-
terials and some machinery against equipment for the oil 
and gas industries) and Bulgaria. The centrally regulated 
volume of trade in the latter case is particularly small because 
of the overwhelming share of 'soft commodities' in Soviet 
purchases from Bulgaria, which is reported to be about 90% 
(50 to 60% with other countries). [3] 
As for the indicative lists, there was no real change in trade 
regulation (except for settlements in convertible currencies 
on the basis of world market prices), for they strongly 
resembled the annual protocols prepared previously with 
each trading partner, although they were less detailed and 
covered only half the 1990 volume. But the other part of 
trade, besides and beyond the negotiated lists, was to be 
conducted on the basis of commercial agreements with the 
republics, regions and individual enterprises, and on their 
own responsibility. As the republics, regions and most en-
terprises are deprived of convertible currencies and the 
Vneshtorgbank no longer guarantees non-centralized loans, 
their trade with the former ECMEA can be conducted vir-
tually exclusively in the form of barter. 
Consequently according to the new regulation during the 
transitional period there will be four levels of decision-
making in export-import operations with former ECMEA 
partners: 
(i) the centre (all-Union), 
(ii) republics, 
122 
In August 1991 the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia came to an agree-
ment about future cooperation in development of gas fields and related 
matters. The Soviet liability in the framework of this common project 
was stated to amount to one billion transferable roubles. The sum is to 
be covered by delivery of 16,35 billion cubic metres of natural gas. [2] 
(iii) regions, 
(iv) enterprises, 
and three different types of settlements: 
(i) clearing (or 'hidden' clearing) arrangements, 
(ii) barter, 
(iii) cash payments in hard currencies. 
2. Recent trade performance 
and underlying factors 
The Soviet Union's trade with ECMEA stagnated from the 
mid-1980s onwards and contracted sharply in 1990 due to a 
sharp fall in oil exports that caused a similar decline in the 
volume ofECMEA exports to the USSR. The latter declined 
by 12% in value terms (denominated in 'valutny' roubles). 
The value of Soviet exports fell by one-quarter partly because 
of a 15% drop in oil prices, which, according to the 'Moscow 
formula', reflected almost entirely the decline in the oil price 
on world markets since 1985. 
In the first half of 1991 Soviet trade with the CMEA was 
reported to have dropped dramatically: exports declined as 
much as 45% and imports 50% (in value terms). But official 
data on changes in values of exports and imports are mean-
ingless without knowing the underlying price movements 
which took place because of the new system of pricing in 
CMEA trade, and surely these data are incomparable with 
those concerning trade with other countries where there had 
been no severe price changes. Furthermore, the official data 
on value changes do not appear to be very reliable: Goskom-
stat is engaged in a total revision of trade statistics.2 For 
example, Goskomstat relates 1991 data on CMEA trade 
without the GOR to 1990 data with the GOR, and this 
accounts for an additional 11 % drop in export value and a 
10% decline in import value. 
So we will use our own calculations based on the following 
main assumptions: trade values in 'valutny' roubles for 
1990-91 were converted to US dollars at the rate of 
USO 1 = R 1,69 (assuming TR 1 = R 2,8 and applying 
then an official rate of USO 1 = R 0,605), and trade values 
in roubles for the first quarter of 1991 were converted by 
The revision includes a transition to a new trade classification as well as 
co_n~ersion factors f~r ex~ernal trade, not to mention the complications 
ansmg from the umficauon of Germany. The technique to deal with 
these matters seems to be in transition too, as it changes from quarter 
to quarter. 
a common commercial rate of USD 1 = R 1,672. These 
techniques seem to be as close as possible to the last known 
variant of Goskomstat's procedure. I 
With these assumptions, total Soviet exports to ECMEA 
declined in the first quarter of 1991 by 11,3% while imports 
dropped by 45,5%, both in dollar value terms. Total energy 
export value rose 42,5% and non-energy exports declined 
by 45,5%. As a result, the energy exports' share rose steeply 
- from 45% in the first quarter of 1990 to 68% of total 
exports in the first quarter of 1991 (see Table 1). 
Table 1 
Soviet trade with ECMEA countries 
1990 1991 Change (First quarter) (First quaner) 
(million USD) (million USD) ('lo) 
Bulgaria 
Exports 802 532 -33,7 
Energy 333 292 -12,3 
Oil 180 113 -37,2 
Other 470 240 -48,9 
Energy share (%) 41,5 54,9 
Imports 986 438 -55,6 
Surplus ( +) or 
deficit (-) -184 +94 +278* 
Hungary 
Exports 519 336 -35,2 
Energy 233 224 -3,5 
Oil 70 77 9,0 
Other 286 112 -60,9 
Energy share (%) 44,8 66,7 
Imports 555 346 -37,7 
Surplus ( +) or 
deficit (-) -36,0 -10 +26* 
Poland 
Exports 636 757 19,0 
Energy 285 537 88,9 
Oil 146 356 143,0 
Other 352 220 -37,5 
Energy share(%) 44,8 71,0 
Imports l 115 599,6 -46,2 
Surplus ( +) or 
deficit (-) -479 + 157 +636* 
In fact it does not really matter what conversion rate between the 
transferable rouble and the US dollar is chosen for 1990, for the purpose 
here is to estimate relative price and volume changes which do not 
depend on it: the answer would be the same even if all trade prices and 
values were measured in barrels of oil. The estimation of the 'true' value 
of CMEA exports and imports is quite a different problem. 
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Romania 
Exports 401 244 -39,2 
Energy 165 100 -39,4 
Oil 36 30 -17,8 
Other 237 144 -39,l 
Energy share (%) 41,0 40,9 
Imports 268 190 -29,l 
Surplus ( + ) or 
deficit (-) + 133 +54,0 -79,5* 
Czechoslovakia 
Exports 735 875 19,l 
Energy 381 692 81,6 
Oil 187 408 118,9 
Other 354 183 -48,2 
Energy share(%) 51,8 79,l 
Imports 902 512 -43,2 
Surplus ( +) or 
deficit (-) -167 +363 +530* 
Total ECMEA 
Exports 3 094,8 2 744 -11,3 
Energy l 396 l 871 34,0 
Oil 619 993 58,8 
Other l 698 873,5 -46,6 
Energy share(%) 45,l 68,2 
Imports 3 826 2 085 -45,5 
Surplus ( +) or 
deficit (-) -732 +659 + l 391* 
• Million USD. 
NB: The 'totals' include estimates of oil products' expons not included in country data. 1990 
impons are fob and 1991 impons are cif. No adjustment was made because of lack of 
data, but the cif/fob factor seems to be rather small for trade with ECMEA. With proper 
adjustment import performance would be even poorer. 
The changes were caused by significant moves both in trade 
prices and in trade volumes, which were of different sign in 
most cases. To estimate volume and price changes uniformly: 
(i) the change of the energy export price was calculated 
(from price index with 1990 weights); 
(ii) the similar price index for non-energy goods was calcu-
lated with estimated price changes for these goods. 
The latter turned out to be rather a tricky problem since 
exports and imports of 'Other' (mostly manufactures) are 
reported usually only in value terms.2 The analysis of avail-
able data permitted the following price changes (these are 
both for exports and imports of other goods and commodi-
ties) to be assumed: 
other primary commodities and chemicals: an increase of 
roughly 60%; 
To complicate matters, because of the transition to a new trade classifi-
cation and absence of revised data for 1990, the range of comparable 
goods was still smaller. 
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machinery and equipment: 50%; 
food: 70%; 
manufactured consumer goods: 15%. 
Because of differences in the structure of non-energy exports 
and imports (imports from ECMEA are assumed to be 
exclusively non-energy) this procedure yields an increase in 
export prices of other goods of 52% and a rise in import 
prices of 47%. The data on price and volume changes are 
summarized in Table 2.1 
Table 2 
Soviet trade with ECMEA countries: volume and price changes 
1990 1991 
First ·quarter Volume Price Value First quarter level (%) (%) (%) level (million (million 
USD) USD) 
Exports 3 094 -53 89 -11 2 774 
Energy 1 396 -36 110 34 1 871 
Oil 619 -40 163 59 983 
Other 1 698 -66 52 -49 873 
Imports 3 826 -63 47 -46 2 085 
Oil export volume dropped by more than 40% in the first 
quarter, and total energy exports by 36%. The steepest 
decline was in other - mostly manufactured - products, 
more than 60% both for Soviet exports to ECMEA and for 
imports from these countries.2 There were differences in 
country performance, of course, as shown in Table I, but 
these will not be discussed here. 
The total terms-of-trade improvement may be estimated at 
about 29% only. This is much less than was envisaged in 
most projections (see for example [4] and [5]) mostly due to 
underestimation of the change in relative prices of manufac-
tures. It was generally assumed that these prices would drop 
sharply because manufactured goods were overpriced in 
CMEA trade relative to their poor quality. But although all 
prices declined relative to oil, the decline was less than 
projected and they still rose considerably in nominal terms. 
The volume change estimates are biased, of course. Thus, the energy 
export volume change estimated by 1990 weights of the volume index 
is -33,7% and not -36,3% as is stated in Table 2. 
Part of these were deliveries under 1990 contracts, so that for 1991 as a 
whole the drop might be even greater. 
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This was partly because of the nature of the trade agreements 
between the USSR and CMEA countries (the major part of 
this trade is still bilaterally regulated) and the fact that there 
cannot be overnight substitution of CMEA products for 
those from other countries, especially for semi-finished in-
dustrial products. The interesting thing is that prices for 
industrial consumer goods (television and radio sets, re-
frigerators, footwear, etc.) rose much less than average: it 
may mean that the market for consumer goods is more 
competitive and that price increases were moderated in order 
to prevent a shift in demand. 3 So it might tum out that future 
manufactured goods' price adjustments would contribute to 
some recovery in Soviet trade with the former ECMEA 
countries, with, of course, further ECMEA losses in terms 
of trade. 
The improvement in the Soviet terms of trade was less than 
expected not only because of a significant rise in non-energy 
prices, but also because the rise in oil prices, due to the 
Kuwait war, was short-lived: the Soviet oil export price for 
ECMEA in the first quarter of 1991 was about USO 142 
per metric tonne or USO 19,6 per barrel, while at the end 
of 1990, when the indicative lists were compiled, it was 
believed that the price would be no less than USO 25 per 
barrel. If the 'Moscow formula' had still been in force and 
if pricing had still been in TR, the 1991 CMEA oil price 
would have dropped another 14% to USO 46,5 per tonne 
(about USO 6,4 per barrel). 
In fact the trade balance for the first quarter improved not 
only because of the terms of trade improvement, but also 
because import volume contracted even more strongly than 
export volume. In the second quarter exports apparently 
declined sharply; however, over the first half-year as a whole 
the surplus with ECMEA evaporated - trade was barely 
balanced.4 
The most obvious explanation of the poor trade performance 
is the collapse of the CMEA. The effect of the changes in 
payment arrangements and new terms of trade surely was 
to cause trade diversion and changes in the commodity 
structure of exports and imports within the CMEA. Still, 
the contraction seems to have overshot somewhat. Most 
authors blame this on the haste with which the transition to 
the new rules was accomplished - virtually overnight and 
without the necessary preparations and provisions. [6] This 
is true to some extent, but it is not the complete explanation. 
Another factor is that trade data for the first quarter of 1991 include 
some deliveries according to the previous year's contracts, at 'old' prices. 
These data are obtained from trade statistics, which are on a transaction 
basis. 
Reasonings of the kind post ergo propter are irrelevant 
mainly because of the poor performance of Soviet external 
trade as a whole in 1991 - Soviet exports to the industrial 
and developing countries declined by about 26%, and im-
ports as much as 54% in dollar terms, according to estimates. 
Exports to industrialized countries declined by some 4%, 
and to developing countries by as much as 64%. Import 
values dropped 51 and 68% respectively. Considering the 
rise in prices, it makes the decline in volume terms similar 
to those registered in trade with ECMEA countries. It shows 
that the reason for the Soviet-ECMEA trade collapse is of 
a less particular nature and that some of the explanation lies 
with the generally poor trade and economic performance of 
the Soviet Union in 1991. 
2.1. Domestic supply - physical constraints 
Raw materials account for more than a half of the total 
Soviet exports to ECMEA. They are even more important 
in centrally regulated trade - these items account for 80 to 
90% of the total value of goods and commodities included 
in the indicative lists of Soviet exports. For delivery of energy 
products, in particular, a special transportation system was 
constructed with the participation of ECMEA countries: 
pipelines for oil and gas as well as a common electricity 
transmission net. 
The pessimistic projection in European Economy, No 45 
of December 1990 ('oil exports drop sharply') based on a 
forecast provided by the Soviet authorities turned out to 
be too optimistic. It was supposed that exports of energy 
products to ECMEA would drop some 10 to 15% from their 
1990 level: in particular oil exports (a half of total energy 
Table 3 
Exports of some primary commodities as a share of production 
Production 
1990: First half 1991: First half 
Oil (million tonnes) 
Gas (billion m3) 
Coal (million tonnes) 
Electricity (billion kWh) 
Wood and lumber (million m3) 
Saw-timber (million m3) 
Source: Goskomstat surveys. 
289 
409 
360 
872 
-144.· 
34 
263 
400 
320 
864 
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exports) would decline by 30% with export volume of other 
energy products unchanged. But the output decline in the 
Soviet oil and gas industries, in coal and in electricity pro-
duction turned out to be more pronounced than predicted, 
and consequently there was a more than proportional re-
duction in exports (see Table 3). · 
As a result, the volume of total energy exports dropped by 
28% during the first quarter of 1991, for crude oil the fall 
was 42%, for oil products 27%, for natural gas 6,5%, for 
coal 34% and for electricity 23,5%. This was exclusively at 
the expense of ECMEA countries; energy exports to them 
declined by 33, 7%, with oil and coal roughly in line with 
the total, and gas down 20%. Energy exports to the rest of 
the world did not decline at all. 1 
The sharpest fall - almost to zero - was reported for oil 
products. But this is mainly because of a decrease in ECMEA 
demand. Oil products (only 4,7% of the total Soviet energy 
exports to ECMEA in 1990-91) do not seem to have been 
included in the new indicative lists. Vast oil refinery capacit-
ies in ECMEA countries are to be idle because of the contrac-
tion of oil imports from the Soviet Union and from Iraq, 
and there is no need to purchase them centrally. Moreover, 
exports of oil products are much more profitable for hard 
currency, so surely the Soviet trade authorities were reluctant 
to include them in the indicative lists. As a result, although 
total Soviet exports of oil products declined in 1991, exports 
to some countries in the convertible-currency area (notably 
to Belgium, France, Italy and Japan) rose. 
In the first half-year total oil exports declined by 50%, oil products by 
43%, coal by 27%, and electricity by 13%. There are no data on 
geographical distribution, so it is impossible to estimate the decline of 
energy exports to ECMEA, but probably the situation was the same as 
in the first quarter. 
Exports Share(%) 
1990: First half 1991: First half 1990: First half 1991: First half 
62,0 31,0 21,5 11,8 
54,0 52,0 13,2 13,0 
2~.o 13,0 6,7 4,1 
18,0 16,0 2,1 1,9 
11,0 9,0 7,6 7,2 
2,8 1,8 8,2 6,2 
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A similar situation was observed for other commodities: 
while total Soviet exports declined, exports to CMEA 
countries declined either as much as or more than to the rest 
of the world. 
The fall in manufactured goods exports was more profound, 
but this was largely due to a decline in ECMEA demand. 
There were physical constraints on the supply side too: 
the output of manufactured goods fell, partly because of 
insufficient purchases of parts and components from 
ECMEA countries. This particularly affected those export 
sectors where the import content was highest. 
2.2. Domestic supply - misguided regulation 
Thus the decline in output is an important, but certainly not 
the only, reason for the sharp decline in Soviet exports to 
ECMEA. In the same way that the fall in total output was 
a result of the loosening of State control without any market 
mechanisms to take its place, a number of inept and partial 
reforms in the external trade sector caused additional ob-
stacles for export-import operations, especially with 
ECMEA countries. The enterprises which consider them-
selves independent now, and free from State control, some-
times choose to ignore central export plans (orders) when 
they consider them unprofitable. So there is sometimes a 
profound contradiction between State and enterprise inter-
ests, and there are no means as yet to cope with this problem. 
The existing system of distribution of foreign currency rev-
enues - the so-called retention scheme - makes exports 
to ECMEA unprofitable for enterprises. Hence the 'non-
fulfilment' of the plan of centralized deliveries to the 
ECMEA, and the extremely low level of activity in the 'free' 
sector of trade, especially in exports of manufactured goods. 
The reform of the external trade system in the Soviet Union 
started in 1986. The main aspects of the reform were to 
decentralize trading rights and to introduce incentives for 
exports. As these measures failed and recent trade perform-
ance was poor, the authorities tried to reverse the reforms, 
which only increased the confusion. The constantly changing 
system of external trade regulations provided contradictory 
signals for enterprises and increased the transaction costs of 
their export-import operations. 
The decentralization of trading rights, permitting any firm 
or enterprise to engage in foreign trade, was accompanied 
by a tougher licensing policy and by the introduction of 
quotas. At present more than 70% of exports are subject to 
licences; this covers almost all raw materials and energy 
products, most semi-manufactured goods, foodstuffs and 
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consumer durables. About 6% of imports require licences: 
this covers some medicines, herbicides, printed materials, 
tape and video recorders, etc. What is more, licences and 
quotas are used for all imports from Hungary, the former 
East Germany and Czechoslovakia (except for medicines 
and food). The mechanism of licensing and quotas does not 
work smoothly yet and sometimes there are delays with the 
allocation of quotas; therefore the producers do not know 
them in advance or for the current period. 
The sophisticated system of differentiated foreign currency 
coefficients (DVKs) providing a linkage between world 
prices and domestic prices was abolished and a common 
commercial exchange rate for the rouble - more depreciated 
- was established at the end of 1990. 
Another export incentive was the introduction of a foreign 
exchange retention scheme, so that a part (a quota) of foreign 
currency earnings could be used by the enterprises to self-
finance their imports of intermediate and investment goods, 
as well as of consumer goods for their employees. The rules 
regulating the retention rates were changed too and the rates 
for 1991 are given in Table 4. 
But the stimulating effect of the depreciation of the rouble, 
and of retained foreign exchange, was undermined by the 
introduction of new rules and regulations. 
From the beginning of 1991 export and import taxes (other 
than duties) were introduced. The export taxes cover mainly 
raw materials, pulp and paper, metal and chemical products. 
They are paid by exporters in roubles and the rates are fixed 
as a percentage of the (contract) value of the commodity, 
converted into roubles at the commercial rate. The basic 
rates are: for iron and steel products, 50%; for oil, 40%; for 
non-ferrous metals and oil products, 35%; for ores, 30%; 
etc. The lowest rates were introduced for timber (10%) and 
for coal (5%).1 
Furthermore, the stimulative effect of the depreciation of 
the rouble was almost eliminated by rising domestic prices. 
The index of wholesale prices of industrial output rose 122% 
in June 1991 (year-on-year basis); of fertilizers, 82%; oil 
products, 117%; vehicles, 149%; and timber, 122%. The 
partially liberalized contract prices and especially the prices 
at the new commodity exchanges (in fact auctions) are even 
higher. 
Besides, retentions of foreign currency decreased because of 
the special measures introduced to raise funds to cope with 
It was declared that the rates were needed for levelling external and 
domestic prices, but certainly there were budget considerations as well. 
the sharply increased foreign debt service obligations: the 
mandatory sale to the State of as much as 40% of total 
export proceeds in foreign currency at the commercial ex-
change rate (a kind of a tax, in fact), so that retention quotas 
were reduced by 40% (see Table 4). For enterprises which 
export to ECMEA countries the incentive effect of foreign 
currency retention was still lower because their retentions in 
'accounting dollars' from trade with ECMEA could be used 
only in the country of destination of their exports. As a 
result some enterprises refused to send their goods and 
commodities to ECMEA unless they were paid in convertible 
currencies. 
Table 4 
Principal retention quotas effective in 1991 
(%) 
Retention Retention Commodity quota quota after •40 % tax' 
Oil 60 36 
Gas 20 12 
Chemicals and plastics 25 15 
Iron, steel and non-ferrous metals 30 18 
Oil products 35 21 
Stone, plaster, etc. products, glass 40 24 
Hides and skins 45 27 
Manufactured goods, divers 50 30 
Footwear, textiles, etc. 55 33 
Machinery and transport equip-
ment, instruments, etc. 70 42 
In sum, the export taxes, the transportation and insurance 
costs paid from now on by the enterprises themselves and 
the lower rate of foreign currency retention caused a con-
siderable drop in the profitability of exports. 
External debt service considerations also Jed the authorities 
to prohibit barter trade at the end of 1990. Although barter 
transactions with ECMEA countries accounted for Jess than 
2% of Soviet exports, it did provide a small-scale, but still 
important, basis for trade with ECMEA outside the sphere 
of governmental regulation. I 
The extremely poor performance of external trade, especially 
with the ECMEA countries, made the central USSR authori-
ties change the regulations. In April 1991 State export con-
Barter trade, which doubled in 1991, is mostly conducted with the 
permission of republic or regional authorities, often to the detriment of 
centralized deliveries. 
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tracts were declared to be of top priority, taking precedence 
over other contracts. Enterprises refusing export contracts 
were to pay fines. Incentives for trade with ECMEA were 
also created: the 40% of foreign currency received for export 
to the CMEA, sold previously to the State for external debt 
service, could now be used to buy goods there. There were 
also some tax incentives for those enterprises which delivered 
commodities and goods to the CMEA under State orders 
(to repay the debts, for centralized State loans, etc.). 
In the summer of 1991 barter trade with ECMEA countries 
in finished manufactured products was permitted to State 
enterprises. With Bulgaria and Poland this also applied to 
raw materials, but only from inventories exceeding a certain 
norm. In September State enterprises were freed from export 
taxes on barter transactions, as well as from import taxes 
on foodstuffs and garments. Barter trade in primary com-
modities remained officially banned. 
2.3. Domestic demand - changing pattern 
There was also a decline in Soviet demand for ECMEA 
goods because of the contraction of output, and especially 
investment. In 1991 total investment was projected to drop 
by 60 to 70% in real terms, and industrial output by 7 ,2%. [5] 
Traditionally the Soviet Union bought mostly manufactured 
products - capital goods, intermediate materials and parts, 
processed food and consumer durables. The share of imports 
in total domestic consumption in the late 1980s was very 
high, and well above 'safety levels' in rolling mills and 
equipment for the textile industry (about 40%), food-pro-
cessing equipment, machinery for the chemical industry 
(about 25%), trams (30%) etc., although it was already 
decreasing because of a reorientation towards Western 
goods. Imports of parts and components for the car industry 
are very substantial too; they account for as much as a third 
to a half of total demand for these goods. 
But the main reasons for the decline in imports are the 
Jack of hard currency and the accumulated trade surplus in 
ECMEA countries, which are to be repaid by exports of 
'hard' commodities. There is a very narrow basis for imports 
in the framework of governmental agreements, and a still 
narrower one for independent purchases. Finished goods 
were almost excluded from indicative lists - capital goods 
were to be imported mainly for the oil and gas industries 
(to support exports) while consumer goods were reduced to 
10% of their volume in 1990. However, even these bare 
necessities might not be provided because of a higher-than-
expected decline in exports and miscalculated oil-price move-
ments. 
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This resulted in extremely limited room for mana:uvre for 
central trade authorities, and to arrears in payments. More-
over, sometimes the trade organizations of Bulgaria, Hun-
gary, Czechoslovakia and Poland refused to grant commer-
cial credit and insisted on cash payment. Even the govern-
ment contracts within the framework of the indicative lists 
were not fulfilled, the most striking example being non-
payment for agreed deliveries of medicines from Hungary: 
although a minimum ofUSD 450 million worth of medicines 
was included in the indicative list, less than 2% of this was 
imported during the first quarter of 1991. 
The non-fulfilment of the centralized payment plan was 
caused not only by lack of liquid resources but also by 
constant changes in priorities. The rapid deterioration of 
the domestic economic performance constantly created new 
'emergencies' calling for new imports. The agreed lists of 
industrial materials and components proved to be insuf-
ficient, but imports from ECMEA countries could be in-
creased only on a cash basis for they would not provide 
credits. So the purchases were made in the rest of the world, 
to the extent that new loans were obtained. 
The hope that enterprises would acquire the necessary indus-
trial inputs and capital goods themselves by self-financing 
in foreign currency proved to be vain. With the retention 
system there was constant confusion as to who must pay for 
what between central authorities, republics and enterprises. 
The retention scheme was not very efficient as an export 
incentive; as a method of fostering imports of industrial 
supplies in 1991 it proved to be disastrous. 
Firstly, in spite of strict regulations regarding the expendi-
ture of foreign currency (mainly for production needs), those 
enterprises which had it managed to spend a large part 
on consumer goods for their employees, and on attracting 
domestic suppliers. 1 At the same time, there were constant 
requests by enterprises and ministries to central authorities 
to provide centralized resources to buy industrial supplies 
from ECMEA countries - they regarded this not as their 
own task but rather as a government concern. 
Secondly, the amount of retained currency is often insuf-
ficient to provide for the desired quantities of industrial 
inputs and capital goods, and the enterprises' ability to use 
credits is restricted by the reluctance of ECMEA firms and 
by the Vneshtorgbank, which no longer guarantees non-
centralized loans. 
The current ratio of domestic to foreign prices makes consumer goods 
imports more profitable; and they are tradable for industrial supplies 
in the domestic market. 
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But the most dangerous thing is that with less and less hard 
currency available centrally a lot of enterprises, mostly in 
light industry and in the food industry, as well as in transport 
(especially public) and in other public utilities, are increas-
ingly deprived of supplies from ECMEA countries. They do 
not have their own foreign currency resources, since they do 
not export, and their needs were usually regarded as minor 
when the indicative lists were completed. 2 But exactly these 
industries were the main customers for ECMEA capital 
goods. The commodity composition of Soviet imports from 
ECMEA in 1988 (the year is chosen because it is rather 
'normal') is presented in Table 5. 
The opportunities for direct barter trade are evidently limited 
in this case, even with barter partially permitted now. So 
'independent' trade is hindered by the lack of hard currency 
or of 'hard commodities' for barter transactions of those 
who would like to import from ECMEA countries, and 
by the discrepancy between the commodities demanded by 
enterprises which have hard currency and those goods on 
offer within ECMEA. 3 
The abolition of non-market retention schemes would per-
haps help to increase imports of some goods from ECMEA 
countries by reallocating currency resources to those sectors 
which used to buy ECMEA goods. But this would require 
either a new (and successful) coup d'etat, or internal converti-
bility and price liberalization, both of which are highly 
improbable in the short term. But both of them seem to be 
more effective than the present system, especially after the 
abandoning of the '40%' rule in trade with ECMEA 
countries. 
2.4. External demand and supply factors 
The main reasons for the decline in Soviet exports of primary 
commodities are on the supply side. But for manufactured 
goods exports and imports, the main cause of the decline in 
trade volumes is demand. In indicative lists for Soviet exports 
their share is small in comparison with 1990. Machinery and 
transport equipment normally account for more than a half 
of total exports of manufactured goods (see Table 6), and 
The lack of industrial supplies from abroad caused a half of the 10% 
output decline in the light and food industries. But as there is yet no 
unemployment problem (even with a 10% output drop, employment 
has not contracted) for government to solve, their poor performance is 
still compensated by increasing imports of finished consumer goods. 
Sometimes enterprises and regions, while proposing hard commodities 
for barter trade with ECMEA, ask for Western goods (or cash in 
convertible currency) as a part of the repayment. 
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Table 5 
Commodity composition of Soviet imports from ECMEA countries in 1988 
( in million roubles) 
Bulgaria Hungary Poland Romania C=hoslovakia Total 
Total imports 6 873,10 4 943,20 7 109,30 2 431,20 6 817,30 28 174,10 
Industrial supplies 24,80 39,32 940,40 197,70 697,40 I 899,62 
Machinery and equipment, total 3 784,03 2 486,65 3 358,10 l 186,00 3 931,80 14 746,58 
Heavy machinery l 197,77 195,22 963,50 572,70 801,70 3 730,88 
Equipment for extractive and fuel in-
dustries 0,65 211,60 428,80 76,20 717,25 
Machinery for light and food indus-
tries, etc. 118,62 148,00 136,10 11,00 563,00 976,72 
Machinery for chemical and timber 
industries 15,17 20,48 113,10 39,00 139,30 327,50 
Laboratory and medical equipment 56,20 191,50 186,10 97,10 530,90 
Data-processing machinery and parts I 137,74 166,45 I 304,19 
Agricultural machinery 178,04 116,00 96,90 77,60 181,50 650,04 
Transport equipment 139,35 I 009,09 647,80 291,90 1 170,30 3 258,44 
Chemical products 62,61 115,00 101,18 62,30 173,00 514,09 
Food etc. I 012,99 708,74 42,50 135,70 24,10 I 924,03 
Manufactured consumer goods 530,60 389,90 487,60 492,30 I 035,90 2 936,30 
Medicines 227,63 275,60 482,90 5,10 71,20 I 062,43 
Figures do not add to the totals because some goods in the totals have not bcco classified. 
(%) 
Bulgaria Hungary Poland Romania Czechoslovakia Total 
Total imports 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Industrial supplies 0,4 0,8 13,2 8,1 10,2 6,7 
Machinery and equipment, total 55,1 50,3 47,2 48,8 57,7 52,3 
Heavy machinery 17,4 3,9 13,6 23,6 11,8 13,2 
Equipment for extractive and fuel in-
dustries 0,0 3,0 17,6 1,1 2,5 
Machinery for light and food indus-
tries, etc. 1,7 3,0 1,9 0,5 8,3 3,5 
Machinery for chemical and timber 
industries 0,2 0,4 1,6 1,6 2,0 1,2 
Laboratory and medical equipment 0,8 3,9 2,6 1,4 1,9 
Data-processing machinery and parts 16,6 2,3 4,6 
Agricultural machinery 2,6 2,3 1,4 3,2 2,7 2,3 
Transport equipment 2,0 20,4 9,1 12,0 17,2 11,6 
Chemical products 0,9 2,3 1,4 2,6 2,5 1,8 
Food etc. 14,7 14,3 0,6 5,6 0,4 6,8 
Manufactured consumer goods 7,7 7,9 6,9 20,2 15,2 10,4 
Medicines 3,3 5,6 6,8 0,2 1,0 3,8 
Souru: Vnelnie ekonomi eskiL svdzi SSSR " 1988g 
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Table 6 
Commodity composition of Soviet non-energy exports to ECMEA countries in 1988 
( in million roubles) 
Bulgaria Hungary Poland Romania Cz.cchoslovakia Total 
Total exports 3 511,90 1 868,50 3 200,40 1 188,10 2 837,50 12 606,40 
Industrial supplies 376,20 294,00 748,40 409,60 501,20 2 329,40 
Machinery and equipment, total 1 512,20 657,90 913,30 376,70 844,20 4 304,30 
Heavy machinery 738,90 164,90 133,30 103,60 361,70 1 502,40 
Equipment for extractive and fuel in-
dustries 73,60 14,30 32,50 35,60 25,50 181,50 
Machinery for light and food indus-
tries, etc. 48,60 8,30 41,50 37,20 18,00 153,60 
Machinery for chemical and timber 
industries 61,90 10,40 13,90 39,40 10,00 135,60 
Laboratory and medical equipment 34,10 10,50 23,00 8,50 17,80 93,90 
Data-processing machinery and parts 1,54 7,50 8,30 45,80 63,14 
Agricultural machinery 248,90 73,70 111,70 7,30 59,40 501,00 
Transport equipment 333,90 290,70 232,60 64,70 214,70 1 136,60 
Chemical products 63,50 522,50 157,90 61,80 168,70 974,40 
Food etc. 29,40 66,60 19,60 44,80 160,40 
Manufactured consumer goods 107,40 95,70 281,50 32,70 121,90 639,20 
Medicines 14,00 10,50 19,20 3,90 6,60 54,20 
Figures do not add to the totals because some goods in the totals have not been classified. 
(%) 
Bulgaria Hungary Poland Romania Czechoslovakia Total 
Total exports 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Industrial supplies 10,7 15,7 23,4 34,5 17,7 18,5 
Machinery and equipment, total 43,1 35,2 28,5 31,7 29,8 34,1 
Heavy machinery 21,0 8,8 4,2 8,7 12,7 11,9 
Equipment for extractive and fuel in-
dustries 2,1 0,8 1,0 3,0 0,9 1,4 
Machinery for light and food indus-
tries, etc. 1,4 0,4 1,3 3,1 0,6 1,2 
Machinery for chemical and timber 
industries 1,8 0,6 0,4 3,3 0,4 l, 1 
Laboratory and medical equipment 1,0 0,6 0,7 0,7 0,6 0,7 
Data-processing machinery and parts 0,0 0,4 0,3 1,6 0,5 
Agricultural machinery 7,1 3,9 3,5 0,6 2,1 4,0 
Transport equipment 9,5 15,6 7,3 5,4 7,6 9,0 
Chemical products 1,8 28,0 4,9 5,2 5,9 7,7 
Food etc. 1,6 2,1 1,6 1,6 1,3 
Manufactured consumer goods 3,1 5,1 8,8 2,8 4,3 5,1 
Medicines 0,4 0,6 0,6 0,3 0,2 0,4 
Source: Vneinie ekonomi eskie svtizi SSSR v 1988g 
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this category is extremely sensitive to the declines in final 
consumption which took place in all ECMEA countries. 
Moreover, about one-sixth of total capital goods exports 
are based on technical assistance agreements, primarily for 
heavy industry. The ECMEA countries turned down these 
and other similar contracts, not only because of Jack of hard 
currency, but also because of their aspiration to restructure 
their domestic economies. The liquidity problems of 
ECMEA led them to prefer credit-based purchase in Western 
countries, if available; the high quality of Western goods is 
not the only reason for reorientation of import demand. As 
regards exports of Soviet consumer durables1 previously 
bought by ECMEA countries, the decline is due to their 
poor quality. 
Lastly, trade in military goods and components traditionally 
accounted for some 15% of total Soviet exports to ECMEA. 
The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the conversion of the 
defence industry (in Czechoslovakia, for example) surely led 
to a fall in demand in this sector. 
The supply-side constraints for exported goods in ECMEA 
countries seem to have been less important than in the 
USSR. The main problem was that of contradiction of 
interests of the central authorities, so that there was a necess-
ity sometimes to establish special incentives. 
In addition, prospective exporters are reluctant to conclude 
contracts with Soviet customers without the guarantees of 
the Vneshtorgbank, as not all of the 1990 deliveries have yet 
been paid for. 
2.5. Prospects 
In addition to the measures mentioned above to promote 
trade with the ECMEA area, some bilateral measures were 
taken as well. These are proposals to include a clause in the 
agreements on trade and economic relations concerning the 
possibility of payment in national currencies outside the 
indicative lists (June 1991), the establishment of bilateral 
institutions of different kinds (bilateral trade boards, joint 
banks and firms for trade intermediation, etc.). The im-
portant feature in mending things are direct agreements with 
republics concerning large-scale barter contracts.2 
But there are still restrictions on the Soviet supply side. For 
example, total oil production is projected to reach only 
520 million tonnes, with only 56 million available for export 
(I 09 in 1990). If trade is to be balanced, ECMEA export 
Television and radio sets, refrigerators, sewing-machines, etc. 
In August an agreement was concluded between Russia and Hungary 
concerning exports of about USD 600 million worth of energy and 
wood products, fertilizers and tractors in exchange for Hungarian buses, 
meat, butter, medicines, etc. 
Recent trade performance and underlying factors 
volume has to rise without further price changes by about a 
third, to roughly a half of the 1990 volume (1991-92 was 
used as a benchmark here). With restrictions on Soviet 
supplies of energy and other primary commodities, the only 
way to further trade promotion would be to increase Soviet 
exports of manufactured goods - which in tum would 
permit Soviet importers to buy more ECMEA manufactured 
goods. 
With the currently low share of manufactured goods in 
Soviet exports (about one-fifth) another rise of 20% in 
imports from ECMEA would require a doubling in the 
volume of Soviet manufactured exports. To increase Soviet 
exports more than that (and accordingly, to increase 
ECMEA exports by more than another 20%) seems highly 
improbable in view of not only the present poor state of 
the Soviet economy, but also of the reduced propensity of 
ECMEA countries to buy Soviet manufactured goods. 
To make things worse, total Soviet exports to ECMEA need 
to exceed total imports to repay the existing debt. It reduces 
the prospects for large increases in ECMEA exports to the 
USSR even further, regardless of financing issues. 
So with luck it might increase to 60 to 70% of its previous 
volume when the first shock of transition is overcome, and 
provided the financing problems can be partially solved.3 
It will be more and more difficult to find exportable goods, 
since Soviet hard commodities are much more likely to be 
traded for consumer goods, especially since the republics are 
gaining power over external trade issues. 
Further price adjustments are likely to provide incentives 
for importers, but they may prove to be out of the question 
for exporters. To increase the present ECMEA manufac-
tured exports to the Soviet Union by making their prices 
more competitive they have to be heavily subsidized, but it 
would be a temporary relief only. Modernizing export sec-
tors of ECMEA appears to be a better use of scarce re-
sources. Inter-industry trade, especially in semi-manufac-
tured goods, parts and accessories, would require more pro-
found measures, such as direct investments. 
All in all, it would be wiser to seek not just short-term but 
at least medium-term solutions - Western aid included -
to improve the situation in USSR-ECMEA trade. But it is 
extremely difficult now to make any further projections 
because of the uncertain and rapidly changing political situ-
ation in the Soviet Union. 
By use of payments in national currencies or more likely by establishing 
a common currency in the ECMEA area [7) and/or by introducing 
domestic convertibility in the USSR. 
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Plywo~ (I OOO m3) 5 
Annex A Cellulose (I OOO tonnes) 39 Cardboard (I OOO tonnes) 20 
Indicative list for trade with Hungary Staple fibre (1 OOO tonnes) 10 Sodium chloride (1 OOO tonnes) 150 
Quantum Value Soviet imports 
(in million 
USD) Nuclear power station equipment 4,20 
Control panels for cranes 10,30 
Soviet exports Parts for looms 13 
Parts for construction machinery 26,80 
Wires (tonnes) 500 Condensers 3,30 
Oil refinery equipment 0,80 Telecommunications apparatus 47,40 
Equipment for the chemical industry and Equipment for medicines manufacture 6,70 
spare parts 8,30 Accessories for painting equipment 21,50 
Tractors, trucks and spare parts 53 Measuring instruments 8,30 
'RAF' buses, units 150 Medical instruments and parts 106 
Parts for autobuses 10 Data-processing machines and parts 47,30 
Passenger cars, units 23 OOO 'Icarus' buses and parts 477 
Coal ( 1 OOO tonnes) 150 Parts and accessories for vehicles 145 
Oil (1 OOO tonnes) 1 OOO Ship equipment and spare parts 2,20 
Gas (million m3) 5 190 Special equipment and spare parts 50 
Electricity (billion kWh) 10,40 Alumina (I OOO tonnes) 600 
Iron ore etc. in iron equivalent Polymer resin (1 OOO tonnes) 1,50 
(1 OOO tonnes) 1 OOO Paints, varnish, etc. (I OOO tonnes) 2 
Asbestos (I OOO tonnes) 30 Photographic paper and chemicals 3,20 
Iron and steel (1 OOO tonnes) 640 Hoses 25 
Tin-plate (I OOO tonnes) 7 Linoleum (I OOO m2) 1 600 
Special flat cold-rolled steel (1 OOO tonnes) 1 Non-woven fabric (million m) 2,20 
Non-ferrous metals (I OOO tonnes) 128,3 Tinned baby food (I OOO tonnes) 10 
Methanol (I OOO tonnes) 70 Medicines 450 
Potash fertilizer (Kp equivalent) Goods by orders of oil industry enterprises 63 
(1 OOO tonnes) 100 
Synthetic rubber (1 OOO tonnes) 32,80 Source: 'Vncsnaa torgovlti', No 1-2, pp. 64-65. 
Timber and saw-timber (1 OOO tonnes) 700 
132 
References 
[I] 'J13BeCTm1', 16.1.1991. 
[2] 'BHeI.UHHH rnproBJIH', No 3, 1991, p. II. 
[3] fp1rn6epr, P., Jlwraii, K. OT '6paTCTBa' K napT-
HepCTBy. "3KOHOMH'leCKHe HayKw", No 4, 1991, p. 86. 
[4] European Economy, No 45, December 1990, pp. 156-160. 
References 
[5] Kenen, Peter B. 'Transitional arrangements for trade and 
payments among the CMEA countries', IMF staff papers, 
Vol. 38, No 2, June, pp. 235-267. 
[6] Ma3aHoB, r. EhIBI.Uwe naprneph1 no C3B: w 6e3 
BaJIIOTbl, H 6e3 TOBapoB. '<l>wHaHCOBbIH BeCTHHK', 
No 7, September 1991. faBpHJIOB, B. Ha nepenyThe 
.IJ.BYX cwcTeM, '<l>l1HBECT', No 4, August 1991. 
[7] '3KOHOMHKa w )KH3Hb', No 31, July 1991, p. 2. 
133 

Foreign trade liberalization and redeployment in the former USSR 
The Soviet economy at world prices1 
Gerard Duchene 
Claudia Senik-Leygonie 
Contents 
1. Introduction 
2. The model 
2.1. Models with a unique pricing rule 
2.2. A two-channel pricing model 
2.3. The issue of the exchange rate 
3. The database 
3.1. Input-output data 
3.2. Conversion of prices 
4. Results 
4.1. The competitiveness of Soviet industries 
4.2. Size and structure of the Soviet economy 
5. Consequences for the transition policy 
6. Conclusion 
7. Annex: The complete model formulation (in US dollars) 
Bibliography 
137 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
141 
142 
143 
143 
144 
146 
148 
151 
152 
1 We thank J. Benard and D. Cohen for helpful comments on a first version of this paper. We remain responsible for all 
possible errors. 
135 
136 
Tables 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Some examples of conversion coefficients from internal (roubles) 
into world prices (US dollars) 
Sectoral profit margins and value-added 
Structure of final demand 
Shares of the various sectors in GDP, at current and world prices 
Employment and viability of industries 
Protection and foreign trade 
The competitiveness of the Soviet traded industries 
Graph 
I. World to Soviet prices gap (1990) 
142 
143 
145 
145 
147 
148 
149 
138 
1. Introduction • ! :, 
Like most East European countries on the brink of transition 
toward a market economy, the former Soviet Union has 
been characterized both by a high degree of isolation and 
by a distorted price structure. These two features were closely 
related and stemmed from the attempt to escape the influence 
of market laws and price signals. On the one hand, soft 
budget constraints, a complex system of subsidies often 
channelled through prices and direct resource allocation by 
State agencies have deprived prices of their functions. On 
the other hand, the inconvertibility of the national currency 
has precluded any external pressure on domestic relative 
prices and transactions. 
The opening of the economy to foreign markets and the 
freeing of prices are widely perceived as necessary reform 
measures They should give the possibility of exploiting 
national comparative advantage, and of reducing the mon-
opoly power of Ministries and large corporations. At the 
same time the sudden removal of the protection granted so 
far through fixed prices (implicit tariffs) may have very costly 
consequences in terms of bankruptcies and redundancies, 
since many industries might prove to be loss-making at 
world prices. Since October 1991, the freeing of prices in 
a closed-economy framework and without any restrictive 
monetary policy has resulted in the development of hyper-
inflation. Whatever the period considered, any economic 
assessment of the former Soviet Union is quite difficult, 
since rouble values and prices convey little information. 
Adopting the US dollar as a standard of measure is thus a 
useful device in the assessment of the economy of the former 
USSR. 
The first purpose of this contribution is to shed some light 
on the issue of the potential competitiveness of Soviet indus-
tries on the world market. It aims at indicating the directions 
of industrial restructuring that would spontaneously follow 
the liberalization of prices, transactions and foreign trade. 
The ranking of industries according to their potential 'to 
extract' value-added or profit under world market conditions 
constitutes basic information for public authorities and pri-
vate investors. The results of the study can indeed be used 
to design economic policies aimed at reducing transition 
costs such as unemployment and output falls, to elaborate 
a sectoral approach to the privatization process, and to give 
some preliminary information about the value of the assets 
which will be subject to privatization in the near future. To 
achieve these various aims, it is necessary to eliminate the 
biases introduced by arbitrary domestic pricing. 
Starting from the hypothesis of a liberalization of prices and 
of foreign trade, Mac Kinnon (1991) has suggested that 
during their transition to the market, some industries of the 
Introduction 
relatively closed Eastern economies might generate negative 
value-added under conditions of international competition. 
Empirical studies have so far yielded ambiguous results 
concerning the Mac Kinnon conjecture. A first study by 
Duchene and Senik-Leygonie (1991a) on the case of the 
USSR (relying on a 20-industries input-output table) did 
not show negative value-added, although several industries 
showed unprofitability at world prices. Another study by 
Hughes and Hare (1991), using more disaggregated data 
(100-industries level) on Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Po-
land, revealed several negative value-added industries. In the 
present contribution, the availability of more detailed data 
on the Soviet economy does lead to confirming the negative 
value-added phenomenon for this country. 
The second purpose of this study is to present a macro-
economic assessment of the Soviet economy: what would be 
the size and the structure of GDP at world prices? What 
would be the average wage rate in US dollars? This in tum 
raises the problem of the exchange rate of the rouble. 
The issue of the dollar value of Soviet GDP and of the 
implicit exchange rate of the rouble has been treated so far 
mainly in terms of purchasing power parity by Schroeder 
and Edwards (1985) and Soviet specialists (Vestnik Statistiki, 
1990), following the well-known scheme initiated by the 
United Nations International Comparison Project (see Hes-
ton and Summers, 1988) for purposes of standards of living 
comparisons. Subsequent discussions and the experience of 
economies in transition (Nordhaus, 1991), however, showed 
that these studies did not allow for the treatment of pervasive 
shortages of goods combined with a monetary overhang, 
which are typical features of pre-transition socialist econ-
omies. 
In Section 2, we discuss price formation in economies in 
transition, allowing for the distinction between tractable and 
non-tractable industries. We then set out the basic method-
ology for assessing the competitiveness of industries as well 
as some macroeconomic indicators (GDP, wage rate). We 
then show that the determination of the exchange rate is a 
separate issue from the assessment of real variables. 
Section 3 comments on the data collected in order to apply 
the model to the Soviet case. Section 4 presents the results. 
Section 5 analyses these results in order to shed some light 
on the possible strategies of transition to a market system. 
2. The model 
We provide a simple representation of a Communist econ-
omy comprising k industries, each of which produces a 
homogeneous good. The production functions are assumed 
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to be of the Leontieff type, and are represented by input-
output technical coefficients, which are supposed to remain 
stable in the short run, including the periods immediately 
preceding and following a hypothetical overnight liberaliz-
ation of prices and transactions. 
To assess the competitiveness of the industries in the post-
transition period, i.e. the vector of profits per unit of output 
in an open economy, shadow prices essentially based on 
world prices are substituted for the distorted domestic prices. 
The problem which immediately arises, however, is the ab-
sence of international prices for some goods or factors. At 
what level should, for instance, labour inputs be priced? 
The first subsection presents two polar cases of price forma-
tion. One describes the pre-transition 'socialist' monopolistic 
pricing method; the other corresponds to a determination of 
all prices by international competition. We propose, in a 
second subsection, to combine these two approaches by a 
partition of the economy into tradable and non-tradable 
goods, assuming that these categories correspond to the two 
aforementioned pricing rules. In a third subsection, we show 
different possibilities for the determination of the exchange 
rate. 
Graph I: World to Soviet prices gap (1990) 
2.1. Models with a unique pricing rule 
The traditional socialist pricing practice followed the so-
called Cost-Plus method. Domestic prices were fixed in a 
monopolistic way, by applying differentiated mark-ups m to 
the total production costs of the various industries. Fixing 
the set of mark-ups m (which could be positive or negative) 
and the wage rate w (in domestic currency, say roubles) 
determines the prices which thus differ from world relative 
prices. The domestic pricing equation thus becomes: 
[p] = {[p].[a]+w. [L]}.[I+m] (I) 
where the row vector [p] stands for domestic prices, [a] is 
the square matrix of technical coefficients of order k, the 
row vector [L], also of k dimension, represents the unit 
labour costs, [I+ m] is a diagonal matrix containing the 
mark-up rates m, and w is the unit wage rate in domestic 
currency. This practice, which is not very different from the 
monopolistic pricing used in many cases by Western firms , 
has been extended by the socialist planners to all products, 
including raw materials and standardized goods. Such exten-
sive centralized pricing has created a wide gap between 
domestic and world relative prices (see Graph 1). It is clear 
in these conditions that the domestic currency could not be 
made convertible. 
petrol steel polyethylene cement wool wheat 
coal gas copper wood cotton meat 
- 1-Pi*/Pi -+- Pi/ Pi* - I -a- Pi/ Pi* 
p;• stands world prices 
Pi stands for internal prices 
Source: Goskomstat. unpublished statistics. 
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Graph I illustrates the divergence between the relative Soviet 
and foreign prices. Internal prices are represented by the 
variable Pi, world prices by Pi*. When the domestic price 
of a good Pi is higher than its world equivalent Pi*, the 
ratio appears above the horizontal axis with an ordinate of 
(Pi- Pi*)/Pi*. When it is lower, it appears beneath the 
horizontal axis with an ordinate of (Pi* - Pz)/ Pi. We have 
chosen to use different expressions of the ordinates of the 
points so as to have symmetrical representations of the price 
gap whatever its sign. The gap in the price structures shown 
by the graph is of course independent of the level of the 
exchange rate. Graph I shows that the internal price of meat, 
for instance, is 88% higher than the world price of meat (at 
the official exchange rate (Pi- Pi*)/ Pi*= 0,88), whereas the 
world price of oil, is higher by 140% than the domestic price 
for this commodity (at the official exchange rate (Pi* - Pz)/ 
Pi= 1,4). 
Let us now turn to the opposite, post-transition case of 
completely free foreign trade, which implies a radical change 
in pricing behaviour. If the currency were made convertible, 
domestic goods would be put in competition with foreign 
goods. If all goods were traded and did not enjoy sufficient 
quality differentiation to escape price competition, their 
prices would adjust to international relative prices and would 
thus be exogenously given (in foreign currency), determining 
the value-added and profit rates of the various domestic 
activities. The economy would then be depicted, in inter-
national prices, by the simplified equation: 
[p*] = [p*]. [a]+ w*. [L] + [M] (2) 
which immediately solves in: 
[M] = [p*]. [I -a]-w*. [L] (3) 
where [M] is the row vector of profit per unit of output in 
each industry, [p*] is the row vector of international prices, 
and w* is the international value of the wage rate. It is now 
equally possible to express the prices [p*] in foreign currency 
or in roubles. Two possibilities then arise to determine the 
value of w*: one can either consider that labour is a tradable 
factor and that its price is determined on the world market, 1 
or alternatively assume that labour is a fixed non-traded 
factor. In this last case, its international value can be ap-
proximated by the world value of the basket of consumption 
goods bought by wage-earners, 
At the time of German unification, it was indeed considered that East 
German labour had to be priced at about 60% of the Western standard, 
a level which was assumed sufficient to restrain labour mobility from 
the East to the West, but which did not reflect the comparative pro-
ductivity of Eastern and Western labour. 
The model 
w* = [p*]. [c] (4) 
where [c] is the column vector representing the consumption 
goods bought by one unit of labour. 
Equation (3) then becomes: 
[M] = [p*]. {I -[a]- [c]. [L]} 
2.2. A two-channel pricing model 
(5) 
Actually not all goods are tradable. Although services cannot 
be considered a monopolistic activity, they are generally not 
subjected to foreign competition even in an open economy. 
We assume that the prices of non-tradable goods stem from 
monopolistic behaviour such as described in equation (I) 
whereas the prices of traded goods are fixed by the inter-
national market. We then obtain a combination of the two 
previous models. 
In the following model, the exogenous variables are the 
international prices oftradable goods and the mark-up rates 
on non-tradable goods which are here discretionary vari-
ables. The endogenous variables are the prices of non-traded 
products and the value-added of tradable sectors at world 
prices, which break down into profits and wages. The econ-
omy is then described by a system of equations, expressed 
in international prices: 
[pn] ={[pt*]· [atnl + [pn] • [antl + w* • [Ln]} ·[I+ mn] 
w* =[pt*]· [et]+ [pn] · [en] 
(7) 
(8) 
where the subscripts t and n stand respectively for traded 
and non-traded goods. 
The system made up of equations (6- 8) solves the following 
way: equation (9) gives the prices of non-tradable goods, 
equation (10) shows the margins of tradable sectors, equa-
tion (11) gives the wage rate. All these results are expressed 
in foreign currency, say in dollars, and they depend only on 
the technical coefficients of production, on the international 
prices of tradable goods and on the mark-up rates of non-
tradable industries. 
w* =[Pt*]. {[et]+ [atn + ctLn] [H] [en]} 
where [H] is:{[l + mn]-1-[ann + c0 L0]}- I 
(9) 
(11) 
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The set of [m0 ], which appears as a control variable, deter-
mines all other variables, which are also directly linked to 
the set of international prices. One possibility - a;nong 
others - is to consider the mark-up rates of non-tractable 
sectors as equal to the average rate of profit in the economy. 
This is the solution adopted in the detailed model used for 
calculation and presented in the Annex. In fact, these mark-
up rates should result from the demand behaviour of house-
holds and enterprises, and the adopted solution is a mere 
approximation. 
Let us stress that the model is based on three main assump-
tions: that prices react instantaneously to trade liberaliza-
tion, that the USSR is a price taker on the world market, 
and that production techniques are rigid in the short term. 
It is likely that, in reality, prices react with various lags to 
the freeing of transactions: in particular, prices of imported 
and exportable goods should react more quickly than prices 
of domestic substitutes for imports, and prices of non-
tradable services - particularly public utilities - might 
adjust still more slowly. In the present study, all these 
changes - which could last some months - are assumed 
to occur instantaneously. During the adjustment period, 
there could be some changes in the level of activity of the 
industries, which is also taken as given in the model, even if 
it is doubtful that the technologies would evolve much. 
2.3. The issue of the exchange rate 
Equations (9)-(11) are expressed entirely in a foreign cur-
rency (for instance in US dollars). Converting them into 
roubles using any exchange rate e (such that USO I = e 
roubles) neither modifies the value-added and profit rates 
per unit of output, nor changes the relative prices of the 
various goods and factors. Fixing the exchange rate simply 
determines the level of domestic prices. 
In a previous study, Duchene and Senik-Leygonie (1991b) 
determined a possible exchange rate through a (modified) 
purchasing power parity restricted to consumption goods. 
The exchange rate was defined as the ratio of the flow of 
consumption expressed in current roubles to the equivalent 
aggregate expressed in dollars, a device which allowed the 
nominal wage rate and the price index of consumer goods 
to be kept constant, before and after the transition. This led 
to an expression of the exchange rate e1 as: 
(12) 
where [p] is the initial pre-transition price vector expressed 
in domestic currency, as defined in equation (!), [Ct 0 ], [Ct] 
and [C0 ] are the consumption vectors of respectively all 
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tractable and non-tractable goods. Notice that this exchange 
rate differs from the PPP value because it accounts for the 
factor cost of non-tractable goods instead of pricing them at 
their supposed international value: the service of a school 
teacher, for instance - although approximately the same in 
the Soviet Union and in the United States - will be priced 
at a rnlatively lower value in the first country, reflecting the 
fact that the Soviet school teacher consumes much less 
than his American colleague. In principle, we should have 
e1 > ePPP' a feature analysed by Balassa (see Asselain, 1986). 
However, this correction for the 'Balassa effect' in exchange 
rates does not take into account the purchasing power lying 
in the monetary or financial assets already accumulated by 
the economic agents. If a part of these assets is not volun-
tarily held before transition (which is a consequence of fixed 
prices, rationing, and insufficient extent of parallel markets), 
the freeing of prices and international trade would transform 
them into an active demand, pushing prices upward. The 
exchange rate which would result under such conditions 
would be higher than e1. 
Define the money demand before the transition as Ad, such 
that: 
Ad= ([p] · [Ct,nD/v (13) 
where v is the velocity of money desired by the households. 
The matching of the money supply As with the demand Ad 
would require an adjustment of the price level [p]. But in 
conditions of fixed prices and rationing, [p] cannot move, 
so that all adjustments takes place through v: the velocity 
of money typically will be at a level v' lower than v, such 
that v' = ([p]. [Ct,nD/As. If the money supply grows faster 
than real transactions, v' will fall and the households will 
accumulate an overhang As -Aiv). 
In post-transition conditions, the domestic currency which 
is willingly held by the residents of the country is: 
(14) 
where [Pt] and [P 0 ] are the vectors of domestic prices in 
roubles (respectively of tractable and non-tractable goods) 
after the transition, such that [Pt]= e2 • [pt*] and [P 0 ] = 
e2 • [Pnl· 
The desired money balances can be written as: 
(l 5) 
and the equilibrium condition Ad= As then leads to: 
(16) 
The ratio v/v' is greater than one, so that e2 > e1• In con-
ditions when money supply rises permanently faster than 
real transactions, although e1 is constant (fixed prices), e2 
rises. 
This ratio can be interpreted as an indicator of the excess 
liquidity in the economy and e2 appears as the exchange 
rate which wipes out all the excess balances. Setting the 
convertibility of the rouble at a fixed exchange rate implies 
making a choice concerning the relative value of the real 
money balances and the flow of real income. Either nominal 
money balances are granted a high purchasing power by the 
setting of the exchange rate at a low level, or these balances 
are wiped out by the one time price rise deriving from the 
adoption of a high exchange rate. 
In the first case, maintaining the average price level could 
have been accomplished only with an adequate policy of 
high real interest rates or sale of State property, in order to 
transform the (revalued) money balances into longer term 
savings. This policy proved unfeasible in 1991. 
In the second case, expectations of higher prices influence 
the desired velocity of money: the cost of keeping roubles 
rises with the prospect of the freeing of prices. Before tran-
sition to completely free prices takes place, and if dollars 
(or foreign currencies) are considered a store of value, the 
exchange rate could be pushed to levels higher than implied 
by the ratio between existing free prices and corresponding 
international prices (Meyendorff, 1991). After the total free-
ing of prices, the expectation of greater budget deficits and 
of an accelerating money supply might raise anew the desired 
velocity of money. In these hyperinflationary conditions, the 
link between (free) domestic prices and international prices 
through the exchange rate also disappears, even if there is 
free international trade, for all goods which are not con-
sidered to be a store of value. 
All this shows that the nominal exchange rate need not 
provide a meaningful measure of the ratio between domestic 
and international prices, as long as monetary stabilization 
has not been achieved. For this reason it is more reliable to 
assess the Soviet economy directly in dollars. 
3. The database 
The model has been applied to the Soviet economy using 
two kinds of data: input-output tables and coefficients of 
conversion of domestic into international prices for each 
product. 
The database 
3.1. Input-output data 
The cost structure, or the pattern of inter-industrial links of 
the Soviet economy, is studied through an input-output table 
with 22 branches, as well as through a 110-branches table 
(90 of which are tradable). They refer to the year 1987 and 
are expressed in producer prices (wholesale prices). They 
have been corrected to suppress the multiple biases caused by 
taxes and subsidies which discriminate between the different 
users of the same products. As a result all the rows of the 
tables are homogeneous in terms of prices. 
A series of transformations has been carried out to make the 
small table comparable to Western practice. Soviet statistics 
traditionally consider the greatest part of services (services 
to the population and government services) as non-pro-
ductive. In the original data, these are therefore excluded 
from the central matrix of intermediate consumption. They 
appear only as 'consumption by non-material branches' or 
'other expenditure' in final demand. We re-introduced seven 
('non-productive') service sectors in the central matrix, two 
of which were re-aggregated with the already existing ones 
(passenger transport and communications between house-
holds). Thus, five lines have been added. In order to correct 
the Soviet practice which consists in not considering as costs 
the use of'non-productive' services by 'productive branches', 
although in certain cases there is clearly a consumption of 
such inputs, we have filled up some of the five additional 
lines in the central quadrant: this is of particular importance 
in the case of 'science' (R&D) services, which weighs heavily 
in the costs of the machine-building industry in the recon-
structed table. 
The military services sector, which in the reconstructed table 
appears as a part of the first quadrant, has been built 
essentially on the basis of the column 'other expenditure' (in 
the second quadrant of the Soviet format). To match West-
ern practice, a column of government expenditure has been 
created and included in the final demand quadrant. Govern-
ment consumes only administrative and military services: 
the production of the education-health-culture branch is 
entirely allocated to household consumption (except the part 
used, for instance, by the military service sector). 
As a result of these transformations, in the 20-industries 
input-output table, there are 11 traded sectors: agriculture 
and forestry, oil and gas, coal and other fuels, ferrous metals, 
non-ferrous metals, chemical industry, machine building and 
metal working, timber and wood and paper, light industry, 
food industry, other industries, 1 and 11 non-traded ones: 
'Other industries' include: handicrafts, precious stones, musical instru-
ments, jewellery, dry-cleaning, toys, animal feeds, water-supply and 
others. 
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construction, electrical power, building materials and glass, 
transport and communication, trade and distribution, other 
branches, 1 housing and usual services, research and develop-
ment, education and health and culture, administration, 
military services. 
The 110 branches input-output table could not be modified 
the same way, due to lack of information. Some of the 
results obtained with the reduced size model have then been 
transferred directly to the detailed table, in order to assess 
the competitiveness at the level of smaller industries. But the 
measure of costs and value-added is not the same in both 
tables: namely, costs of 'non-productive' services are con-
sidered part of the value-added (and profits) in the 100-
industries level table, and these indicators are thus over-
valued. 
3.2. Conversion of prices 
In order to convert the interindustry flows of the input-
output table to world prices, we have used the so-called 
coefficients of efficiency of foreign trade which represent the 
ratio of the price at which a Soviet good was actually bought 
or sold on the world market to its internal official price. The 
coefficients convert rouble values directly in valuta roubles. 
The valuta rouble being an accounting unit anchored to the 
dollar by a fixed exchange rate, the coefficients could be 
transformed so as to convert rouble values directly into 
dollars, simply by being multiplied by the official exchange 
rate of the valuta rouble against the dollar (USO 1,580 per 
valuta rouble in 1987). Using these conversion coefficients 
based on foreign trade rather than relying on the average 
prices of the goods on the world market allows us to reflect 
as much as possible the specific features of Soviet products, 
such as quality and reliability. 
In most cases, we have chosen to compare the internal and 
foreign prices of goods that are produced inside the Soviet 
Union and sold abroad so that the coefficients most often 
relate to exports (they are the 'coefficients of efficiency of 
exports' which used to be calculated by the Soviet Ministry 
for Foreign Trade). Imported goods rarely have domestic 
substitutes (except cereals and other foodstuffs in short 
supply). For certain products from the agriculture sector, 
food industry and light industry import coefficients have 
been used. 
To allow for the fact that a given industry delivers different 
inputs to each of the other branches, we have used a complete 
matrix of conversion coefficients of the same size as the 
disaggregated input-output table appearing in the detailed 
model in Annex I. 
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It was also necessary to take into account the difference 
between the product mix of the trade flows of an industry 
and the commodity composition of its output. The coef-
ficients corresponding to each flow of the matrix have thus 
first been computed using a very detailed nomenclature of 
products (six-digit disaggregation of foreign trade statistics). 
These product coefficients have then been aggregated ac-
cording to the input-output table nomenclature, following 
the composition of the deliveries of each industry to the 
others. 
The issue of price distortions inside the former CMEA has 
been addressed by applying Western conversion coefficients 
to these trade flows. Some of the coefficients are shown in 
Table I: they convert the Soviet data directly from (internal) 
roubles into dollars. 
One can question the comparability of Soviet and Western 
goods: quality, reliability, technical specifications, com-
pliance with official standards, after-sales service, etc. are 
certainly not in favour of Soviet manufactured goods, and 
these characteristics, although taken into account in the re-
pricing, cannot always be compensated by a low price. One 
can, however, assume that, at least during a transitional 
period, the internal market will be large enough to absorb 
the domestic products; the price competitiveness will be a 
sufficiently convincing argument for residents if not for 
foreign consumers. Existing and potential markets for stan-
dard Soviet manufactured goods in less developed countries 
should not be forgotten either. 
Table 1 
Some examples of conversion coefficients from internal (roubles) into 
world prices (US dollars) 
Tradable sectors Exports Private Total 
consumption output 
Agriculture 0,729 0,857 1,229 
Oil and gas 2,890 1,826 2,813 
Coal and other fuels 1,153 1,246 1,271 
Ferrous metals 1,742 1,557 1,992 
Non-ferrous metals 2,620 N.A. 2,381 
Chemical industry 0,971 1,012 0,962 
Machine building and 2,605 0,723 1,822 
metal working 
Timber wood and paper 0,968 0,576 0,799 
Light industry 0,604 0,749 0,599 
Food industry 0,707 0,790 0,782 
Other industries 1,424 0,936 0,936 
N.A. = not applicable. 
1 
'Other branches' include: printing, film studios, metal scrapping, fishing, 
hunting, etc. 
4. Results 
Some indicators of performance of the various industries in 
conditions of an open economy will be presented first: these 
results depend only on the cost structure of each industry. A 
second series of results concerns macroeconomic indicators 
reflecting the structure and degree of development of the 
pre-transition Soviet Union: these depend on the level of 
activity of each industry; they are entirely expressed in US 
dollars. 
4.1. The competitiveness of Soviet industries 
The liberalization of prices would modify the value-added 
and profit margins of the various Soviet industries. These 
indicators, calculated at world prices, reflect the static corn-
Table 2 
Sectoral profit margins and value-added 
Results 
parative advantage of Soviet industries, and are also the 
closest approximation of their potential viability on a dom-
estic market with free prices. Table 2 shows the profit mar-
gins and value-added of the various sectors. The mark-up 
rates for non-tradable industries (defined here as the ratio 
of profits - including amortization - to the total pro-
duction of the branch) has been chosen so as to be equal to 
the average profit rate of the tractable industries, and there-
fore to the average margin rate in the whole economy (0,28). 
Value-added at world prices 
The model has been applied first to the 20-industries input-
output table, including the reconstituted non-productive ser-
vice sectors, in order to determine the vector of prices for 
non-tradable activities, the equilibrium wage rate, and other 
macroeconomic indicators. The conversion factor for wages 
Branches Margin rates 
in current 
rouble priccsl 
Margins rates 
at world pricesl 
Value-added 
at world prices 
(USD billion) 
Value-added 
at world prices 
per unit of output 
Value-added 
at current 
rouble prices 
per unit of output 
Tradable 
Agriculture -5,2 17,4 108,6 49,8 48,2 
Oil and gas 46,3 51,1 64,3 51,8 48,9 
Coal and other fuel 5,7 23,3 9,1 42,9 39,1 
Ferrous metals 26,6 49,6 52,6 52,7 35,0 
Non-ferrous metals 27,9 48,0 38,2 50,5 36,0 
Chemical industry 23,3 16,0 12,6 22,9 32,2 
Machine building and metal working 21,4 37,1 208,0 44,7 39,9 
Timber wood and paper 24,5 13,5 10,3 31,9 44,2 
Light industry 18,5 23,8 25,1 35,0 27,5 
Food industry 13,3 -34,4 -31,7 -28,9 19,l 
Other industries 17,9 16,3 7,3 26,7 30,8 
Non-tradable 
Electricity 39,9 27,81 12,5 32,2 46,9 
Construction 20,6 27,8 1 83,3 50,7 54,3 
Construction material and glass 25,2 27,8 1 15,9 40,9 44,7 
Transport and communication 53,2 27,81 37,6 63,5 83,1 
Trade and distribution 46,6 27,81 22,1 76,9 83,3 
Housing and services -63,4 27,81 11,8 67,9 41,4 
Health and education 14,6 0,02 27,8 65,8 74,0 
Science 14,6 27,8 1 20,8 55,7 59,6 
Civilian administration 42,8 0,02 4,4 55,2 72,1 
Military services 5,7 0,02 9,7 6,9 21,9 
Other branches 33,8 27,81 3,6 67,3 74,5 
Total 20,1 25,0 755,0 40,1 44,9 
By construction. 
By assumption. 
J Profits in % of output. 
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and the average profit rate have then been used when dealing 
with the 110 industries table in order to obtain more detailed 
results. Among the 90 tractable industries, 20 generate 
negative value-added at world prices (see Table 7). They 
represent 10% of the total output and 3,7% of the labour 
force (12% of the output and 8% of employment oftradable 
branches). In absolute figures negative value-added indus-
tries represent 5 million people. Those industries, although 
scattered among nearly all sectors, are mostly present in the 
food, light, chemical and machine-building industries. They 
are shown in Table 7. 
Profits at world prices 
The model shows that 29 of the 90 tractable branches are 
loss-making. They represent 13% of total output and 6,4% 
of total employment, i.e. 9 million people (17% of the 
output and 15% of employment oftradable branches). Their 
complete list is shown in Table 7. 
Out of the 32 branches of the machine-building and metal 
working sector one is non-tractable (repair of 'machinery 
and equipment') and only nine are really profitable: the 
extremely well-performing aeronautics and weaponry, cable 
products, tractors and agricultural machinery, communal 
services 'machinery and equipment', mining 'machinery and 
equipment', hoisting and transporting 'machinery and equip-
ment', railway machinery, automobile, shipbuilding. These 
nine branches make the machine-building and metal working 
industry appear as profitable once aggregated. 
Within light industry most branches are loss-making, es-
pecially cotton, flax, wool, leather, fur and footwear, and 
other light industries. The profits of two branches, hosiery-
knitwear and sewn goods, overcompensate, however, the 
losses of the rest of the industry which thus seems profitable. 
Concerning the food industry, sugar, fats, fruits and veg-
etables, other food products, meat products, dairy products 
and flour milling products make the branch loss-making 
as a whole, despite the fact that confectionery, perfumes, 
alcoholic beverages, wines, tobacco and fish appear rather 
profitable. 
The industries with the highest value-added and profits at 
world prices are oil extraction, gas, coke products, optical 
materials, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, mineral chemistry 
products, tyre industry products, cable products, tractors 
and agricultural machinery, communal services 'machinery 
and equipment', other 'machinery and equipment' products, 
alcohol liquors and vodka. 
An interesting result of the model is that competitiveness at 
the industry level appears quite robust to variations in real 
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wages. Reducing real wages by 30% for instance (as hap-
pened in Poland in 1990) has no noticeable effect on the 
profitability of the various industries (most non-profitable 
industries remain non-profitable). This result is self-evident 
for negative value-added industries. For other non-profitable 
industries, it seems to be due to the fact that only a few of 
them are on the edge of profitability. 
Comparative advantages 
The results are in conformity with the Hecksher-Ohlin prin-
ciple of specialization: the most profitable branches exploit 
the comparative advantage of the Soviet Union in natural 
resources. Their share of GDP is high in comparison with 
Western standards. This conclusion must be qualified, how-
ever. The contrast between the oil-extracting and oil-refining 
activities is striking: in spite of the exceptional endowment in 
this resource, the primary processing of oil shows a negative 
value-added as well as the basic chemical and organic syn-
thetic products industries. 
There also tends to be an opposition between labour inten-
sity, or the share of wages in value-added, and the perform-
ance of the industries at world prices as shown by corre-
lations calculated on the basis of the figures in Table 7. 
Similar results, revealing an inverse Leontieff paradox, were 
already established in Duchene and Senik-Leygonie (1991b) 
on a more aggregate scale. 
The competitiveness of some of the branches of the machine-
building sector is certainly due partly to a technological 
advantage, and partly to the high priority enjoyed by the 
military-industrial sector where the best technology, the most 
qualified employees and the highest wages are concentrated. 
But the electronic sector, which is mainly military, is highly 
loss-making. In conclusion, the immediate welfare gain that 
the Soviet Union could receive from increased participation 
in international trade would not derive from a radical 
reorientation of the industrial structure, but essentially from 
the concentration of resources in those industries which are 
already the most developed today. 
4.2. Size and structure of the Soviet economy 
In international prices, in 1987, Soviet GDP amounted to 
USO 754 billion, 1 which is inferior to the GDP of France, 
FF 5 336 billion or USO 887,8 billion. GDP per head is 
around USO 2 700 and indicates a level of development 
about equal to that of Portugal or of Venezuela which can 
US dollars of 1987. 
be classified as countries of average level of development. 
This judgment must be qualified, however. Because the spec-
ific structure of the economy leads to different conclusions 
depending on the indicator chosen, it is indeed not straight-
forward how to assess the level of development of the former 
USSR relative to other countries. As shown by the following 
figures, results depend on whether one uses GDP per head, 
consumption per head or the share of different activities in 
GDP. 
The structure of demand, shown in Table 3, reveals an 
important and unusual feature of the Soviet economy: the 
weakness of the share of private consumption and of labour 
income by comparison with investment and public consump-
tion. Total household consumption represents 37,7% of 
GDP (including 5,3% of non-market education and health). 
In OECD countries, it usually ranges between 65 and 75% 
of GDP. 1 Gross investment (including inventory changes) 
represents 42,3% of GDP, one of the highest percentages in 
the world as shown by Heston and Summers (1988). In 
OECD countries, the order of magnitude of this aggregate 
is of about 20% of GDP (including inventory change). 
Lastly, total defence expenditures amount to USO 
141 billion, 18,7% of GDP. 
Table 3 
Structure of final demand 
Shares in GDP(%) in producer prices 
Private consumption 
Government consumption I 
of which defence 
Gross investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Total 
Structure of revenue 
(Shares in GDP, in %) 
Wages 
State revenue2 
Total 
,·,, 
At current prices 
55,4 
14,6 
11,6 
37,4 
6,4 
-13,8 
100,0 
At current prices 
55,3 
44,7 
100,0 
,. 
At world prices 
37,7 
19 8 
11s:1--; · 
42,3'.C 
11,5 
-11,3 
100,0 
At world prices 
37,6 
.·,,_ ,; '·6t;4; 
100,0 
1 Education and health (5,3°1. of GDP at world prices) have been included in private 
consumption so that the government consumption aggregate contains only defence and 
administration. In Table 4 wages should thus be understood as including a tax financing 
non•markct expenditure benefiting households. 
2 Including amortization. 
Source: OECD, 'Purchasing power parity and real expenditures', 1985. 
Results 
Total household consumption (market and non-market) am-
ounts to USO 284 billion i.e. about USO I OOO per capita. 
It represents 10,4% of the consumption per capita in France. 
The average wage rate is equal to USO 169, which is about 
15% of the West European standards. The hourly wage rate 
(about USO I) is in line with the norm prevailing in certain 
developing and East European countries in transition 
(USO I in Poland and USO 0,73 in Morocco in the middle 
ofl991). :,:'.:::,,·'·•"' i.. ,::., ... :,-,. 
Table 4 reveals the output structure of the Soviet economy. 
Agriculture represents 14,4% of GDP at world prices instead 
of 12% at internal prices. Oil and gas account for 8,5% 
instead of 3% of GDP, machine-building and metal working 
for 27,6% instead of 14,8%. Light and food industries are 
even smaller than they seemed to be at rouble prices: 3,3 
and - 4% of GDP instead of 4,8 and 3,9%. This structure 
is specific of the socialist model of development. The share 
Table 4 
Shares of the various sectors in GDP, at current and world prices 
(value-added of the branch divided by the total value-added of the 
economy) · · · , 
Branches 
Tradable 
Agriculture 
Oil and gas 
Coal and other fuel 
Ferrous metallurgy 
Non-ferrous metallurgy 
Chemical industry 
;:. 1 
Machine building and metal 
working 
Timber, wood and paper 
Light industry 
Food industry 
Other industries ·,·,: 
Non-tradable 
Electricity , J • i i 
Construction 
Construction material and glass 
Transport and communication 
Trade and distribution 
Housing and services 
Health and education·'.: :,;-n.: ,· i , : 
Science ' ; . ·; ! . 
Civilian administration .,.•r: 
Military services 
Other branches 
Total 
Shares in GDP 
at initial prices 
12,4 
3,1 
0,9 
2,5 
1,7 
2,7 
14,8 
2,6 
4,8 
3,9 
1,3 
2,2 
11,8 
2,3 
11,5 
6,0 
0,5 
6,8 
2,7 
2,1 
2,5 
0,8 
100,0 
Shares in GDP 
at new prices 
14,4 
8,5 
1,2 
7,0 
5,1 
1,7 
27,6 
1,4 
3,3 
-4,2 
1,0 
\:·. :'" ,u{.-": 
1,7 
11,l 
2,1 
5,0 
2,9 
1,6 
3,7 
2,8 
0,6 
1,3 
0,5 
100,0 
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of agriculture is about the same as in countries at an inter-
mediate level of development such as Argentina (13%) 
whereas the machinery sector is relatively developed, which 
is usually a feature of more advanced economies. 
Our results differ in magnitude from the PPP, CIA and 
official estimates. The direct implementation of the PPP 
method leads to an estimate of GDP per capita of USO 
7 OOO, a level equivalent to that of Portugal also recalculated 
using PPP (Nordhaus, 1991). Our ranking of the USSR in 
comparison with other countries, in terms of GDP per head, 
is thus close to that provided by the PPP approach, in spite 
of the wide gap in the absolute figures calculated by the two 
methods. Applying the official exchange rate to the official 
value of GDP (R 825 billion) leads to a GDP per head of 
USO 4 600. Using for the same computation the black 
market rate of 1987 would have shown a GDP per capita 
of USO 216. Using the CIA estimate of GDP, GDP per 
head would be of USO 4 800 at the official rouble to dollar 
rate, and USO 225 using the black market rate1 (Nordhaus, 
1991). 
5. Consequences for the transition policy 
The results shown in Section 4 reveal the short-term viability 
of the Soviet industries, and their chances to adapt to inter-
national competition. To this extent, they shed light on the 
potential consequences of a sudden opening of the economy. 
Some industries, like the food industry and many branches 
of light industry are clearly threatened by the perspective of 
a brutal liberalization of trade and prices. Other branches 
like the extractive, metal and machine-building industries, 
on the other hand, are potential 'value extractors' at world 
prices. 
There is clearly a trade-off between economic efficiency and 
political considerations. Closing the loss-making industries 
and allocating new investment to the most efficient ones 
would amount to an immediate gain in welfare since it would 
suppress the negative value-added of some industries and 
increase the value generated by the most profitable ones. On 
the other hand, such a restructuring would imply large, at 
least temporary, labour lay-offs and output falls, the cost of 
which would risk destabilizing an already fragile political 
situation. It is not clear whether the gains from a strategy 
of one-off liberalization and opening of the economy would 
more than offset the costs implied by such a 'shock' therapy. 
In particular, the most labour-intensive industries are often 
R 13,5 per dollar in 1989. 
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the least competitive ones, as shown in Tables 5 and 6, which 
suggest that restructuring without a safety net would result 
in substantial unemployment. 
There is also an economic policy ambiguity in the fact 
that a rapid transformation is necessary to create adequate 
expectations and strengthen the credibility of the new market 
laws and rules, but that a strong recession due to the disrup-
tion of all traditional economic links could preclude the 
continuation of the reform programme. Even though there 
is a need for the reforms to reach a 'critical mass', the brutal 
contraction of a large share of national economic activity 
would risk slowing the development of new productive units, 
and undermining the credibility of the government in charge 
of the shock therapy programme. It thus seems that after 
macroeconomic measures such as stabilization, price and 
trade reforms are undertaken and once fundamental market 
legislation is adopted, it is very important to adopt a sectoral 
approach to the transition. The results of the present study 
can be used to design economic policy measures in order to 
soften the aforementioned costs of transition. They can 
serve as an instrument for a sector-by-sector approach to 
liberalization and privatization. 
Privatization 
As concerns privatization, for instance, it is clear that the 
protected sector, i.e. trade, distribution and other services, 
can be privatized rapidly, since it should be profitable even 
at world prices, and is technically relatively easy to transfer 
to private hands. In economies in transition this sector is 
typically included in so-called small privatization, which was 
indeed envisaged as one of the earlier measures of the reform 
programmes in the USSR. Small privatization could be 
beneficial in many ways. It could trigger the process of take-
over of the public property by private entrepreneurs by 
strengthening their confidence in the prospect of profits. It 
could also partly absorb, by stimulating the development of 
the still extremely small service sector, a part of the human 
resources laid off by the sectors in recession. Agriculture 
also seems to be profitable at world prices, which suggests 
that it could usefully be included in the first steps of a 
privatization programme. 
The 'large' privatization of State industrial enterprises 
should obviously be more differentiated. The most competi-
tive branches like the extractive and metal industries can be 
transferred to private hands through a distribution mechan-
ism such as the one adopted in Poland or in Czechoslovakia. 
There could, however, be many drawbacks in including the 
loss-making branches such as the light and food industries 
Table 5 
Employment and viability of industries 
Branches Employment by branch 
(thousands) 
Tradab/e sectors 
Agriculture 26 344,8 
Oil and gas 327,1 
Coal and other fuel 13 212,8 
Ferrous metallurgy 1 337,5 
Non-ferrous metallurgy 687,5 
Chemical industry ~' ... I 943,3 
Machine building and metal working 17 722,3 
Timber, wood and paper 2 829,9 
Light industry 4 957,9 
Food industry 3 127,0 
Other industries I 682,5 
Non-tradab/e sectors 
Electricity power 853,0 
Construction 14 482,9 
Building material and glass 2 532,8 
Transport and communication 10 104,8 
Trade and distribution 10 853,9 
Housing and services 5 048,6 
Health and education 20 247,1 
Science 5 369,5 
Civilian administration 2 594,9 
Military services 4 924,2 
Other branches 788,3 
I By construction. 
l By assumption. 
in the privatization programme without special attention. 
This could indeed have a discouraging effect on private 
investors who would lose confidence in the value of the 
assets transferred and in the privatization process in general. 
It would seem wiser to put a State or a private agency in 
charge of the transfer of the loss-making firms. This agency 
could adopt a case-by-case approach and set conditions for 
the transfer of the firms to private investors, as is done by 
the 'Treuhandanstalt' in Germany, in order to avoid asset 
stripping. 
The present study makes a contribution to the privatization 
process by giving indications on the value of the capital of 
the firms. There are indeed no financial assets the price of 
which could be used to value firms. Total capital consists of 
buildings, equipment and land, the value of which is biased 
by price distortions, and does not correspond to the concept 
Consequences for the transition policy 
Employment in % Margins Value-added 
of total employment (profit in % of output) (in % of output) 
at world prices at world prices 
18,8 17,4 49,8 
, 0,2 51,1 51,8 
0,9 23,3 42,9 
1,0 49,6 52,7 
0,5 48,0 50,5 
1,4 16,0 22,9 
12,7 37,1 44,7 
2,0 13,5 31,9 
3,5 23,8 35,0 
2,2 -34,4 -28,9 
1,2 16,3 26,7 
0,6 27,8 1 32,2 
10,3 27,8 1 50,7 
1,8 27,81 40,9 
7,2 27,81 63,5 
7,7 27,8 1 76,9 
3,6 27,8 1 67,9 
14,5 0,02 65,8 
_. 3,8>,;· 27,8 1 55,7 
1,91 ·1·: 0,02 55,2 
· 3,s, 0,02 6,9 
0,6 27,8 1 67,3 
of capital used in the West. A better approximation of this 
value would be the discounted flow of expected future pro-
fits. The sectoral yearly profits at world prices can constitute 
a substitute to such an indicator. They are shown in Table 7. 
External protection 
The gap between rouble prices and international prices could 
be considered as an implicit tariff protecting the domestic 
goods. We call 'protected' those industries in which prices 
are higher within the country than on external markets. In 
this view, it is possible to calculate the effective rate of 
protection (ERP) of these industries, which is defined as the 
surplus of value-added that derives from an existing tariff 
structure and equal, under certain assumptions, to the dom-
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Table 6 
Protection and foreign trade 
Branches 
Agriculture and forestry 
Oil and gas 
Coal and other fuels 
Ferrous metals 
Non-ferrous metals 
Chemical industry 
Machine building and 
metal working 
Timber, wood and paper 
Light industry 
Food industry 
Other industries 
Effective rate of 
protection in % 
-13,7 
-63,3 
-21,5 
-63,5 
-67,2 
+59,7 
-46,3 
+90,1 
+43,6 
192,51 
+35,3 
Trade balance 
++ 
+ 
0 
+ 
+ 
0 
I The value-added of this branch is negative. In the table, we have shown the absolute value 
of the ERP indicator which is more relevant. 
ERP = (va-va•)/va• = value-added at domestic prices including distortions, minus value-
added at world prices (without distortion), divided by value-added at world prices. For the 
construction of the table, in order to obtain comparable data, we have used value-added in 
percentage of GDP. 
estic resource cost (DRC, or value-added at domestic prices 
divided by value-added at world prices) minus one. The 
sectors with the highest ERP thus also have the highest DRC 
and can be considered as the least profitable from the point 
of view of the entire economy's utility, after those with 
negative value-added at world prices, and thus DRC. 
At new prices the margins of formerly protected branches 
of light industry, such as the food and processing industries, 
deteriorate. This result is also valid for light industry as a 
whole but this does not appear at the aggregate level because 
of the two greatest branches, hosiery and sewn goods, which 
are profitable and were not protected. As a rule, the final 
output of the protected industries is far more protected than 
their inputs, so that their rate of effective protection is high. 
Symmetrically, branches with low levels of protection like 
extractive and heavy industries become more profitable. The 
effective protection granted to the various aggregate sectors 
is shown in Table 6. 
Why did the Soviet authorities protect branches that they 
did not intend to develop? There are two possible answers 
to this question. First, it is common knowledge that the 
traditional Soviet foreign trade policy was 'minimalist'. It 
consisted of importing only goods that the USSR needed 
but could not produce itself (including equipment), and in 
exporting only the quantities necessary to cover the import 
cost. The autarkic choice made by the Soviet Union implied 
the need to keep as many industries as possible in operation 
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domestically. The authorities chose to assign high prices to 
the output of potentially Joss-making industries so as to 
cover their high production costs (instead of granting them 
direct transfers of funds). This was the case, for instance, 
for the manufacturing, processing and light industries. The 
protection structure was the price the authorities chose to 
pay for the incomplete specialization of the economy. 
Foreign trade activities may also have been used by the 
Soviet authorities as part of their policy of internal redistri-
bution. In this view, trade tariffs were not meant to protect 
the sectors that are affected by distortion (import tax or 
export subsidy) or to penalize the sectors which pay the 
equivalent of export taxes. Their purpose would have been 
to create some revenue for the State to be allocated to 
priority sectors and agents. The State could buy the exported 
good at a low domestic price, export it, use the currency 
earned to import goods, and resell those at higher domestic 
prices, obtaining, as a final result, a gain in roubles which it 
could allocate to the priority sector. In other words, external 
trade flows have counterparts in roubles which entered and 
modified the total budget constraint of the State, in roubles, 
allowing for the subsidization of the priority sectors, like 
heavy industry, defence industry, or bureaucracy. The price 
distortions ensuing from implicit tariffs constitute an element 
of this process of 'draining' the resources of one sector in 
order to allocate them to another one. Foreign trade, in 
this hypothesis, would be a 'detour' used to intensify the 
reallocation of resources from the productive sectors (energy, 
raw materials) to the privileged ones. 
Price and trade liberalization will put an end to these redistri-
bution flows, penalizing the protected and the priority sec-
tors, to the benefit of the 'value-extracting' ones. Here again 
transition costs have to be considered. To avoid massive 
bankruptcies in the weakest sectors, for instance, a set of 
explicit and progressively decreasing trade tariffs could be 
established replacing the implicit protection constituted by 
the former price gaps. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper suggests that an important part of the economy 
is inefficient and uncompetitive at world prices. Most 
branches of the light and food industries, for instance, should 
either receive Jess investment and be replaced by imports, or 
undergo a heavy modernization investment programme. The 
immediate static comparative advantage of the USSR lies in 
the natural resource-intensive industries such as extractive 
branches, metallurgy and a few machine-building activities. 
It is thus mostly related to factor endowments, except for 
the military branches where the Soviet economy seems to 
have developed a technological comparative advantage. The 
lack of openness of the economy and past policy to develop 
all sectors domestically have prevented the full exploitation 
of such factor endowment advantages, although the most 
profitable industries are already the most developed. 
Changes in the attitude toward foreign trade could generate 
welfare gains, deriving from specialization and concentration 
of domestic output in competitive industries. The risk of 
creating unemployment implies that the government has to 
make a trade-off between the speed of restructuring and the 
Table 7 
The competitiveness of the Soviet traded industries 
Conclusion 
social costs of this process. Labour lay-offs and output falls 
could be partly offset by the development of the service 
sector, which at present is very small. 
Natural resources are unevenly distributed on the former 
Soviet Union's territory. In the current context of dissolution 
of the Union, it is interesting to measure the comparative 
advantages of each particular former republic and the costs 
and benefits of trade liberalization from its point of view. 
This will also allow the assessment of the relative interdepen-
dence of the republics. This project constitutes the next stage 
of our study. 
.:-,' 
Value-added 
at world prices 
in million USD 
Profit 
at world prices 
in million USD 
Value-added 
at world prices 
per employee 
Profit 
per employee 
in thousand USD 
Number 
of employees 
in thousands 
Value-added 
per unit 
of output 
Value-added 
per unit 
of output at 
domestic prices in thousand USD at world prices 
Electric and thermal power 15 692 14 138 18,4 16,6 853,0 38,9 ,, . 47,7 .. 
Oil extraction 59 970 59 548 440,3 437,2 136,2 94,6 . 86,0,., 
Oil refining -4 305 -4 528 -28,l -29,5 153,4 -9,2 16,~ 
Gas 10 801 10 702 288,0 285,4 37,5 77,3 
·::, /!., 75,9. 
Coal 8 619 4 845 7,0 3,9 I 233,6 42,6 69,90 . 
Ferrous ores 2040 I 520 9,5 7,0 215,9 46,4 .. "62,5 
Ferrous metals 47 345 45 478 56,6 54,3 837,1 57,0 31,~,. 
Coke products 3 788 3 693 60,7 59,2 62,4 50,9 ,19,?, ·. 
Optical materials I 111 I 001 17,3 15,6 64,3 70,6 ·;.,. 48,5: 
Industrial metal products -1 573 -1 846 -10,0 -11,7 157,8 -47,l ' . 40,( 
Non-ferrous ores 4 593 3 905 21,9 18,6 210,0 61,7 ,. 63,4:.? 
Non-ferrous metals 34 535 33 288 72,3 69,7 477,5 50,6 , 33~0,: 
Mineral chemistry products I 749 I 577 25,6 23,1 68,3 73,3 ·., -~.6. 
Basic chemistry products -106 -1 062 -0,2 -2,2 490,7 -0,8 .47,3 .. ,, 
Synthetic fibres 785 482 4,6 2,9 168,8 26,4 .44,l,: 
Synthetic resins and plastics 564 379 5,8 3,9 97,0 18,2 4Q,7, .. 
Plastic, fibre glass items -272 -716 -1,0 -2,7 269,1 -12,2 }4,3 
Paints and lacquers 1879 I 767 27,9 26,2 67,3 38,4 , 24,0,, 
Synthetic dye products 147 · 92 4,7 3,0 31,2 21,1 .42,5., 
Synthetic rubber 342 264 7,5 5,8 45,4 16,7 ... 3(>,2 ' 
Basic organic synthetic products 34 -168 0,3 -1,3 127,8 0,9 . 35,7. , 
Tyre industry products 4 396 4 168 38,0 36,0 115,8 59,4 .2.7,5. 
Rubber and asbestos products 2 937 2 552 12,9 11,2 227,3 52,8 )5,6.· 
Other chemical and petrochemical 
' 
I 
products 782 595 6,9 5,3 112,5 25,8 . 40,5, 
Energy and power M&E I 845 390 3,1 , 1,4 274,9 18,6 ...... 48,Z. 
Metallurgical M&EI 110 -7 1,7 -0,l 63,4 11,2 ,•; •/. ;4~,7 · 
MiningM&EI 1 636 I 339 9,9 8,1 165,8 40,6. 43,7 . . 
Railway M&EI 2 242 I 858 11,5 9,5 195,0 35,4 }6,9° ... 
Hoisting and transporting M&El I 081 823 7,7 5,8 141,2 27,6 i/:.•;l· . . 37,7 
Electro-technical industry 4 257 2 585 4,6 2,8 929,l 26,8 ·-.. ~~1·· 
Cable products 755 602 8,1· 6,4 93,5 14,6 
.,,,:\· . 24,p. ·,' 
Pumps and chemical M&EI 659 -163 1,4 -0,4 461,2 7,8 
. :'\5,t. 
Machine tools -99 -597 -0,4 -2,2 269,6 -3,2 .. 5cp :. •. ·, r • , • ~ ,,,. 
Forging and pressing M&El -338 -458 -4,9 -6,7 68,4 -49,9 48,8 
Casting M&EI 47 7 2,3 0,3 20,8 20,2 56,2 
Tools and dies -132 -421 -0,0 -2,8 153,0 -8,2 '•', 530 
Industrial artificial abrasives 81 16 2,3 0,5 34,4 11,6 
·.:.•, 
· ·· 4h:s 
149 
Foreign trade liberalization and redeployment in the former USSR 
Table 7 ( continued) 
Value-added Profit Value-added Profit Number Value-added Value-added 
at world prices at world prices at world prices per employee of employees per unit per unit 
in million USO in million USO per employee in thousand USO in thousands of output of output at 
in thousand USO at world prices domestic prices 
Precision instruments 3 341 I 105 2,7 0,9 I 251,1 32,9 51,3 
Automobile 13 465 11 311 12,4 10,4 I 087,6 33,4 38,1 
Bearings -736 -1024 -4,7 -6,6 155,5 -105,4 55,2 
Tractors, agricultural machinery 15 361 13 465 14,4 12,6 1 068,9 38,4 42,0 
Construction M&EI 816 328 3,1 1,2 263,5 11,5 36,6 
Communal services M&EI 643 566 15,0 13,2 42,8 43,5 35,1 
Light industry M&EI 365 163 3,2 1,4 112,9 26,0 51,5 
Food industry M&EI 120 -72 1,1 -0,7 104,7 7,7 45,2 
Trade and restoration equipment 295 184 4,9 3,0 60,6 29,4 41,5 
Printing M&EI 54 24 3,3 1,5 16,3 40,0 60,6 
Consumer durables -1172 -1484 -6,7 -8,5 173,7 -83,6 38,4 
Sanitary engineering products -1 247 -1 527 -8,4 -10,2 149,1 -114,4 40,4 
Shipbuilding 2 961 2 084 6,9 4,8 430,0 36,5 43,5 
Radio and electronics 455 -42 286 0,2 -1,9 2 200,0 2,9 47,6 
Other M&E products 155 712 148 617 45,4 43,3 3 427,7 72,2 44,5 
Metal structures 634 217 2,8 1,0 223,5 12,2 39,0 
Metal wares -3 263 -4456 -4,8 -6,5 685,1 -54,8 42,1 
Logging 3 986 2 153 4,8 2,6 824,2 51,5 59,2 
Sawmills and lumber products 2473 489 2,2 0,4 I 112,4 23,2 37,1 
Plywood and panelling 225 147 5,4 3,5 42,0 37,8 39,9 
Furniture 521 -486 0,9 -0,8 574,4 12,1 42,3 
Paper and pulp 4075 3 564 15,6 13,6 261,6 46,6 41,4 
Wood chemistry products -190 -215 -12,4 -14,0 15,3 -105,9 34,8 
Cement 700 521 7,3 5,5 95,3 27,3 45,8 
Polymer construction materials 263 234 16,1 14,3 16,3 42,9 32,6 
Glass and porcelain I 443 960 4,9 3,2 296,2 51,5 56,0 
Cotton materials I 007 -127 1,5 -0,2 677,4 7,0 18,8 
Flax materials 120 -99 0,9 -0,7 134,1 6,1 20,1 
Wool materials -897 -1447 -2,7 -4,3 337,2 -13,5 10,9 
Silk materials 889 529 4,4 2,6 201,9 20,4 20,2 
Hosiery and knitwear 4 513 3 702 8,2 6,7 549,5 63,6 33,3 
Other textile industry 440 128 2,1 0,6 208,0 20,4 29,8 
Sewn goods 19 080 16 350 9,5 8,2 2 000,0 72,9 28,0 
Leather, fur, shoe and other light 949 -395 1,1 -0,5 849,8 9,6 29,8 
Sugar -4202 -4476 -22,9 -24,4 183,2 -76,9 17,5 
Confections I 992 I 680 10,4 8,8 191,6 33,5 21,7 
Fats and industrial soaps -653 -761 -9,0 -10,5 72,5 -28,3 13,6 
Perfumes and cosmetics 553 517 23,5 22,0 23,5 34,2 20,3 
Alcohols liquors and vodka 782 711 13,3 12,1 58,7 37,0 23,6 
Wines and cognac 715 584 7,2 5,9 99,2 11,9 10,3 
Fruits and vegetables -1 956 -2 352 -6,9 -8,3 284,5 -151,1 29,8 
Tobacco products 148 86 3,6 2,1 40,9 8,7 10,4 
Other food products -1 859 -2 235 -7,4 -8,8 252,6 -63,4 24,0 
Meat products -22 770 -23 557 -51,4 -53,2 442,6 -72,8 11,0 
Dairy products -9 732 -10431 -24,6 -26,3 396,2 -50,8 18,4 
Fishing and fish products 2 153 879 5,4 2,2 400,1 27,4 54,8 
Microbiology industry products 629 515 9,8 8,0 64,3 34,1 46,7 
Flour-milling products -I 661 -I 866 -11,4 -12,8 145,5 -14,5 8,7 
Pharmaceutical industry I 321 I 125 10,8 9,2 122,1 37,6 33,6 
Medical technical equipment 498 416 9,8 8,2 50,8 59,3 56,5 
Other industry products 5 480 3 422 4,0 2,5 I 367,4 40,7 47,5 
Agriculture 108 246 45 367 4,2 1,8 25 894,8 49,6 53,0 
Other branches (food industry) 5 514 3 939 10,2 7,3 540,0 77,2 16,4 
Source: Authors· calculation. 
I M&E: machinery and equipment. 
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Annex 
The complete model formulation (in US dollars) 
Full cost equations (l) and (2): 
Traded sectors: 
I. [dttl. [A11] + ld0 ). [Antl +[di]. [It]+ [s*. Wt] 
+ [1ttl = [dtl • [Xtl 
Non-traded sectors: 
I. [dtnl · [Atnl + ld.J · [Annl +[di]· [In]+ [s* · W nl = 
,·.,:,;. 
(I) 
[dn]. [Xnl. [l - M] (2) 
Definition of the conversion rate of rouble wages in US 
dollars s*: 
s* = ([dt]. [et]+ ld0l • [enJ + [dj]. [q)/ 
(I. et+ I. en+ I. ej) 
Definition of the profit margin of non-tradable sectors: 
m 
:Ent 
t= l 
M= 
m 
l:d1 xt 
t= I 
(3) 
(4) 
where [Aijl represents the matrix of input-output flows and 
is partitioned into traded and non-traded sectors, index t 
standing for the traded sector and index n for the non-traded 
one. These data are expressed in roubles. 
Identically, the matrix of intermediate imports is partitioned 
into traded and non-traded sectors, Ii, In. These data are 
expressed in roubles. 
Annex 
[WiJ and [W nl are the row vectors of total wages in roubles 
in the traded and non-traded industries. 
[1ttl is the profit vector of the tradable branches, expressed 
in dollars. 
, ::: . ,,:, 
[Xtl and [Xnl are the diagonal matrices of output, expressed 
in roubles. 
lJ !. i: 
[CJ is the column vector of private consumption, and [e1J 
[enJ [ei] are respectively the column vectors of private con-
sumption of traded, non-traded and imported goods, all of 
them expressed in roubles. 
[I - M] is the diagonal matrix containing the profit rates M 
for non-tradable industries; all M identical for the non-
tradable industries, except non-market ones for which M is 
zero. 
[d11] and [dtnl are the matrices of conversion coefficients into 
dollar prices for traded goods, 
[dnl is the row vector of conversion coefficients for non-
traded goods, 
[dtl is the row vector of conversion coefficients for traded 
goods, 
[di] is the row vector of conversion coefficients for imported 
goods, 
all these conversion coefficients are expressed in dollars per 
rouble. 
l is the unit vector. 
All unknown variables are in bold characters. They are 
expressed in dollars. 
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1. Introduction 
In the autumn of 1990, the hope of preserving the Soviet 
Union had not been abandoned. In spite of the 'parade of 
sovereignties' of the republics some chance remained for the 
conclusion of an economic union agreement, which could 
have had a considerable impact upon the preparatory pro-
cess for the new Union Treaty. 
A concept for the economic union was initially suggested 
in the '500 days' programme of September 1990. In the 
preparation of this programme, a compromise had eventu-
ally been reached with the representatives of all the Union 
republics (excluding Estonia), and it paved the way for an 
effective renovation of the USSR at the expense of a certain 
diminution of the power of the central authorities. This was 
used as a pretext to accuse the authors of the programme 
of seeking to disrupt the USSR. The critics did not notice 
(or rather did not want to notice) that for the sake of 
preservation of territorial integrity of the State (both in 
economic and in political terms) it was impossible not to 
assume a certain degree of decentralization, which necess-
arily means a certain weakening of the central power. 
Measures which could have been taken in a painless way 
and by mutual consent just two or three years before were 
never implemented because of obstinacy on the part of the 
Union authorities. 
A 'strong centre' was unwilling to share its power with 
'strong republics' while cherishing the hope of keeping them 
in a renovated federation. As a result, the idea was turned 
down as well as the programme itself. This gave impetus to 
the process of self-determination. The wars of legislation, 
banks and budgets broke out. 
A second qualitative shift occurred after the tragic events in 
Vilnius in January 1991. Having resorted to force, the centre 
completely discredited itself and the split became inevitable. 
A shift in republic attitudes was apparent in the refusal of 
six of them to conduct the Union referendum of March 1991 
on their territories, the publication of a draft of the Treaty 
of Union without the signatures of the leaders of those 
republics, and unequivocal pro-independence results of opin-
ion polls and referendums held in the republics. A long 
divorce procedure could not be avoided. 
Convinced of the strength of purpose of republics bent on 
self-determination (up to secession), the centre changed its 
strategy. It attempted to sacrifice a part of the territory in 
exchange for the preservation of its own power in a reno-
vated federation, and demonstrated this power in the streets 
of Moscow on 28 March. Afterwards a hard time began for 
the centre when it had to conduct a struggle on two fronts. 
National (ethnic) factors 
On the external front it had to retain its control in the 
republics intending to secede from the Union. Internally the 
fight was on for power in a renovated, somewhat smaller, 
federation.The compromises agreed on in Novo-Ogarevo 1 
did not suit the conservatives. As a result, instead of signing 
the Union Treaty on 20 August, they made up their minds 
to try to change the course of events by staging a coup 
d'etat. The days of the putsch of 19 to 21 August became a 
watershed, and the situation in the country changed rad-
ically. The old centre completely discredited itself and practi-
cally ceased to exist. The republic authorities consistently 
blocked attempts at its rebirth. The compromises achieved 
in Novo-Ogarevo had become senseless. A new process had 
been initiated based on the multilateral settlement of inter-
republic relations. The discrepancy between their inherent 
common interests and the contradictions accumulated over 
a long period add a dramatic tension to this process. 
A dear price has now to be paid for the delay in resolving 
urgent problems. The blood of innocent people has been 
shed, and regrettably the number of victims has increased. 
All those events occur against the background of a sharp 
deterioration in the state of the economy, which aggravates 
the situation. This aggravation is not the only reason for 
intensified ethnic conflicts, although such an explanation is 
quite popular. The reality is much more complicated. In the 
remainder of this paper, we discuss the relative roles of 
national or ethnic factors, political factors, and economic 
factors. The last section briefly addresses inter-republic co-
operation in the framework of an economic treaty. 
2. National (ethnic) factors 
An economy plays a significant role in the life of people, 
but they cannot be reduced to pure economic motives. This 
is apparent in a situation where the economy functions 
properly. National values, cultural and labour traditions, 
religion and mother tongue are so important for an individ-
ual, feeling his identity with a certain Eden, that for the 
sake of its preservation or rebirth he is prepared to ignore 
economic rationality and sacrifice the evident benefits of 
cooperation. 
Thus, a stormy upsurge of national movements has been 
quite natural, as well as the victory they gained in free 
democratic elections. It is also understandable that national-
In the spring and the summer of 1991, republic leaders had several 
meetings with President Gorbachev in a dacha in Novo-Ogarevo with 
the aim of preparing a new Union Treaty. A draft had been finalized 
and was supposed to be signed on 20 August 1991. 
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ism and its ideology lie in the foundation of their policies. 
Without going into the discussion of the positive and 
negative aspects of this process, we shall examine its impli-
cations. 
As a rule, nationalism comes into existence when, as in the 
Soviet case, the territorial boundaries of the nation (in its 
ethnic sense) and the State do not coincide. The political 
objective of nationalism is to obtain such a coincidence, an 
identity of the political and the ethnic 'unit', its sovereign 
statehood. Nationalism is a political reality which we cannot 
ignore, whether we like it or not. 
'National feeling' remains dormant only in two situations: 
it is either satisfied, or driven inside. In the Soviet Union, 
there was no satisfaction, for a multitude of reasons, and 
seemingly it never existed. It was not a pure matter of chance 
that after the Revolution, not only the RSFSR appeared on 
the map of the former Russian Empire, but also a number 
of national units which were not destined to become full-
scale national States. The Empire had been restored. Since 
that time, life continued within the framework of a unitary 
State which did not reckon with ethnic values - not only 
with abstract values but with the destinies of whole nations. 
Their national feelings were repressed. 
As perestroika awakened people, national feelings demanded 
instant satisfaction. The feelings which had been frozen for 
70 years melted and poured down into the space of a country 
in a stormy stream. Almost immediately, this stream came 
across certain important Soviet realities which, on the one 
hand, contributed to the growth of nationalism, but, on the 
other, constituted very significant obstacles to the formation 
of fully-fledged nation-States: 
(i) As a result of continued migration (voluntary as well 
as obligatory), a significant part of the population lives 
out of the limits of its 'national homeland'. Whole 
nations have been completely deprived of it. 
(ii) The internal boundaries within the USSR are of an 
administrative rather than State origin. They are largely 
arbitrary. 
(iii) An imperial hierarchy of nations has been created, 
which assigns 'ranks' to respective national and terri-
torial units. 
These realities impede solving the 'national problem' 
through struggles for achieving the integrity of the 'national 
homeland' and the implied territorial conflicts, as suggested 
by 'separatists'. 
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Nationalism cannot be impartial. On the one hand, it is over-
sensitive to the impediments on its way to self-determination, 
which are imposed by the centre, or to the interference of 
the centre in its internal affairs. This causes an unequivocally 
negative reaction in cases when pressure is applied, and 
blood is shed through the fault of the centre whenever this 
occurs - in Tbilisi, Baku or Vilnius. On the other hand, 
nationalism makes its claim on the whole territory, treated 
as 'national' or 'historical' homeland, simultaneously pre-
venting the self-determination of other nations living off the 
limits of their 'proper' (according to nationalistic viewpoint) 
territory. Any attempt by these smaller nations to preserve 
or establish their own statehood (or to 'reunify' with their 
own people in an administrative fashion) is considered by 
nationalists as an infringement upon the integrity of their 
'national homeland'. In that respect nationalism is inconsist-
ent. It gravitates towards imperial philosophy. 
The basic contradiction of nationalism can be described in 
the following way. On the one hand, it is ready for heroic 
feats for the sake of its own self-determination; but simul-
taneously it easily commits crimes against others contending 
for self-determination on the territory which it considers to 
be its own. For the one group self-determination is being 
treated as possible and even necessary, but for the other as 
unacceptable. In satisfying its own interests, nationalism 
cannot but encroach upon the interests of other, neighbour-
ing nationalisms. The latter is unwilling to reconcile with it 
as well. As a result, 'a diamond tries to cut a diamond', and 
an ethnic conflict breaks out. While national movements 
developed, the number of conflicts with the centre, as well 
as inter- and intra-republic conflicts increased. 
Almost all national movements in the USSR fell into this 
trap and apparently they will be entrapped in the same way 
again and again. Having started the struggle with the centre 
for its own self-determination, not one republic has managed 
not to hurt its neighbours or to refrain from engendering 
internal separatists. Separatists are also armed with national-
ism if they have grounds for claiming that the same territory, 
or part of it, is their own 'national homeland'. If those 
'separatists' belong to the neighbouring ethnos, they demand 
that it should grant them protection and in this case an 
ethnic intra-republic conflict grows into an inter-republic 
one. 'Mono-nationality' can therefore not be attained within 
the boundaries desirable for nationalism. But national feel-
ings still demand satisfaction. It is very hard to reach an 
agreement, for in this case both sides should make the 
necessary concessions. National problems will strongly influ-
ence the political and economic transformation in the coun-
try, both in the short and the long term. 
3. Political factors 
The attempted coup radically changed the political situation 
in the country. Conservative forces experienced a crushing 
defeat. The activity of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU) was suspended or banned in the majority 
of republics, and its ideology lost its attractiveness to the 
population. A serious reform of the KGB was undertaken. 
Almost all Union republics declared their independence. 
The three Baltic republics became independent, and were 
recognized by the world community. This meant that the 
existence of the Soviet Union as a federal State was no 
longer on the agenda. The objective of transforming the 
State organization of the USSR into a renovated federation 
ceased to suit the republics. Prospects for a confederation 
are more realistic, though also under question. 
A situation where the USSR still exists de Jure, although de 
facto one may talk of its complete disintegration, should be 
resolved as soon as possible. In the mean time, the republics 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania on the way to political 
independence 
Transformation in the Baltic republics started in Estonia. The 
National Front and the concept of republic khozraschyot (econ-
omic independence) initially appeared there. Within a few 
months, these same political movements and documents ap-
peared in Latvia and Lithuania. Thanks to the homogeneity of 
its population, Lithuania became the most radical of the three; 
Estonians were preoccupied with economic problems and Latvi-
ans were catching up with the leaders. 
1987 
First public discussions in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania of the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, whose secret protocols organized the 
takeover of the Baltic republics by Stalin. 
26 September 
First newspaper article by C. Kallaste, T. Made, A. Saviaar and 
M. Titma on the subject of republic khozraschyot. It receives a 
sharp rebuke by the chaivnan of the State Planning Committee. 
1988 
April 
Setting-up of the first initiative group of the National Front in 
Estonia. 
Political factors 
do not seem to be especially eager to speed up the process. 
The new Union Parliament will not assemble for quite some 
time, if at all. The only functioning body is the State Council 
of the USSR. The republics seek to sort out the problems 
of legal succession concerning the obligations and property 
of the old Union, and once those issues are resolved they 
are prepared to discuss the political treaty. But they are 
much more interested in their internal problems - in other 
words, republics are involved in the re-establishment of their 
own statehood. 
A change in the role of Russia has also resulted from the 
putsch. The victory gained by democratic forces gives them 
a unique chance . to speed up the process of social and 
political transformation. 
This opportunity should be fully exploited. On the other 
hand, in an objective sense Russia is now opposed to other 
republics because of its dominating position in all spheres 
of social life. 
June 
Public preparation of the Estonia delegation to the XIXth Con-
ference of the CPSU. Discussion of the joint platform: Union 
Treaty confederation instead of federation, imminence of alter-
ations and amendments in the USSR constitution. In his speech, 
the First Secretary of the Estonian Communist Party mentions 
the idea of economic independence for the Baltic republics for 
the first time ever. 
July 
Setting-up of the Interfront in Estonia. Appeals to take away 
from Estonia the towns of Kohtla-Yarve and Sillamyae with a 
predominantly Russian population. 
September 
Publication of theses of the conc:<:pt of republican khozraschyot. 
1990 
January 
Declaration by the Supreme Soviet of Estonia on the territorial 
integrity of Estonia. 
February 
Estonia and Lithuania pass their declarations of independence. 
11 March 
An independent Lithuanian State is proclaimed. 
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25 March 
Tanks are brought into Lithuania. The economic blockade 
begins. 
29 March 
Transitional period proclaimed in Estonia. 
April 
Threats to impose direct presidential rule on Latvia and Estonia. 
5May 
Latvia passes its Declaration of Independence. 
12May 
Setting-up of the Council of Baltic States. Conclusion of Treaties 
on Economic Cooperation between the three Baltic republics. 
August 
A treaty on cooperation between Estonia and Russia is con-
cluded. 
23 October 
Promulgation of Law on the economic frontier of Estonia. 
4. Economic factors 
If we leave apart the military aspect, the most important 
factor uniting the republics is economic. All the parties 
recognize that republics' economic interdependence is sub-
stantial and stand ready to discuss economic issues. On the 
other hand, the economic interests of the republics vary 
significantly. This makes it difficult to reach agreement on 
some specific points. 
Almost all aspects of economic life should be a matter for 
agreed settlement and a great deal of variation is envisaged 
for each individual field. Besides - and this is most un-
pleasant - the seriousness of treaties and agreements which 
would be concluded raises doubts whether and to what 
extent the parties are going to observe them. Eventually, 
things might turn out the same as in the case of the inter-
republic economic agreement for 1991, whose reality im-
mediately became obvious. 
To grasp possible future developments, 1t 1s necessary to 
realize that by the autumn of 1991 the 'joint economic area' 
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1991 
January 
Additional troop detachments are brought into Baltic republics. 
Casualties in Lithuania and Latvia. 
Boris Yeltsin signs a statement on the illegal and anti-consti-
tutional character of the application of military force against 
legally elected bodies. 
JO February 
Nation-wide opinion poll in Lithuania - 90,5% (out of the 
88% of the population who participated in the poll) support the 
idea of independence for Lithuania. 
3 March 
Referendum in Latvia: with 87% participation, 73, 7% support 
Latvian independence. 
August 
Independence of the Baltic States: recognized by Russia (B. 
Yeltsin) and the USSR (M. Gorbachev and the new State 
Council). 
already no longer existed. The 'unitary' rouble had been 
reinforced everywhere with various coupons, ration cards 
and other money surrogates, and customs houses had begun 
to appear at the frontiers between the republics. The Union 
budget had collapsed, and inter-republic bilateral agree-
ments on exchanging supplies were flourishing. This might 
be an indication that in 1991 a new model of inter-republic 
relations appeared spontaneously. This model was fairly 
close to that of the former CMEA. 
In that respect, the issue of economic compatibility between 
the republics should be raised. Even if agreements are eventu-
ally reached, it is obvious that the speed of reform will be 
different in individual republics. 
This would give rise to a number of new problems, resem-
bling those that existed in relations between the USSR and 
India (though multiplied by 15). 
In practice, republics have to make a difficult choice now 
- whether they should move to a model close to that of the 
European Community, or to a model resembling the former 
CMEA. For the majority of them, the CMEA model is 
more natural (which can be explained by socio-psychological 
motives). Anyhow a choice should be made, otherwise we 
are bound to repeat the sad experience of Yugoslavia. 
The analogies referred to here are necessarily simplified, 
because the problem oflegal succession exists for the external 
obligations of the USSR as well as for the obligations of 
other countries to the USSR. Furthermore, it is necessary 
to settle the issues of property rights and the internal debt 
problem. The disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Em-
pire might offer a better analogy in that case. 
Whichever model is eventually agreed on, the republics have 
to determine today their way out of the crisis. What would 
they prefer - a joint programme or separate ways? 
In such a situation different positions have been expressed. 
Draft economic treaties have been prepared which differ in 
the terms of their implementation and in the 'flexibility' of 
the terms. Several documents were prepared in September 
1991: 
1. Treaty on Economic Union (G. Yavlinsky group) 
2. Concept for the organization of economic collaboration 
among sovereign States (E. Saburov, A. Granberg). 
3. Convention on establishment of an economic community 
(S. Shatalin group) 
4. Treaty on setting up an inter-republic economic com-
munity (V. Vakhaniya group). 1 
At its meeting at the beginning of September, the State 
Council of the USSR decided to adopt as a basis the draft 
proposed by the Yavlinsky group. After hard work on con-
sideration of this document with representatives of republics, 
an agreement in principle was reached in Alma-Ata on I 
October 1991. Its title was changed to Treaty on Economic 
Community. On 18 October 1991, it was signed in Moscow 
by the leaders of eight republics (with the exception of 
the Baltic States, which preferred to solve their economic 
problems by means of bilateral agreements while aiming to 
join the European Community, and that of four republics, 
which earlier had planned to sign the Treaty - Ukraine, 
Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan). 
All these drafts were published in the economic weekly Economika i 
zhizn', 1991, September, No 39, pp. 4-11 (in Russian). 
The Economic Treaty 
5. The Economic Treaty 
The underlying idea of the Treaty, according to its authors, 
was to set up a framework for the conclusion of a number 
of more detailed agreements indicating the way out of crisis 
for all participating republics. This explains its short-term 
validity - the Treaty runs only for three years (in the draft 
a term of five years was envisaged). 
But it contains solutions, which can in principle provide a 
basis for a new model of inter-republic economic relations. 
Voluntary participation and equality of rights, assumption 
of obligations and mutual responsibility as basic principles 
inspire some hopes for realism in the formation of a common 
market and in the cooperation of policies as a prerequisite 
to overcoming the crisis. 
(i) The Treaty provides a vector for economic reform. 
Private property, freedom for entrepreneurial activities 
and competition are considered the bases for economic 
growth. Legal limitations on State interference in the 
economic activity of enterprises are recognized as 
necessary. Although it is quite obvious that the pace 
of privatization will differ in individual republics, the 
eventual aim of economic transformation is thus formu-
lated in an unequivocal way. 
(ii) Inter-republic negotiations on trade in goods and ser-
vices will be delicate. Some republics envisage that the 
role of regulation would be especially active in this field. 
(iii) Solving the problem of reforming the monetary and 
banking systems will also be complicated. An irresistible 
desire to introduce national currencies exists in practi-
cally all republics (one of the underlying reasons might 
be to reinforce their young statehood). Gosbank monet-
ary policy does not suit the republics and, although a 
common rouble is still a reality, attitudes towards the 
possibility of stabilizing it can be characterized as scep-
tical. 
The details of the Banking Union are not quite clear. If 
the republics try to introduce their national currencies, 
this Union would be reduced to a Bank for inter-republic 
settlements or a clearing house. However if the 'rouble 
zone' is maintained for a more or less lengthy period, 
the Banking Union will be necessary, since otherwise 
hyperinflation would be guaranteed. For the period of 
preservation of the rouble zone a common monetary 
system necessarily implies common monetary policy (for 
example, as regards interest rates, reserve requirements, 
and the exchange rate). 
161 
Unions and republics 
(iv) In the financial sphere, it is vital to reach some basic 
agreements. Community budget, tax unification, div-
ision and servicing of the internal debt, customs duties 
and the deficits of consolidated republic budgets should 
be agreed on. 
(v) Finally, the problem of servicing the external debt of 
the USSR should be considered. In the Treaty, the idea 
of republics having consolidated responsibility for the 
economic obligations of the USSR was suggested. This 
would mean that an economic community became a 
legal successor of the USSR in this field and took upon 
itself the settlement of relations concerning the external 
debt with all the elements of the USSR not participating 
162 
in the Economic Community. It is deemed necessary to 
conclude a special agreement which would determine 
the share of each element of the USSR in the total 
amount of debt repayment and in the total indebtedness 
of other countries to the USSR at a given date. 
Economic transformation in the USSR is predetermined 
by the outcome of the negotiations on these specific 
issues. It is not yet clear whether an agreement will be 
reached on all the issues, but delay in the process of 
seeking compromise is fraught with danger. An aggrava-
tion in inter-republic economic relations would lead 
only to a further intensification of the crisis and, as a 
result, to possible disintegration of the Soviet Union. 
The regional implications of the monetary crisis1 
J. Sapir 
Contents 
1. Regional differences 165 
1.1. The dichotomy between north-west and south-east 165 
1.2. Complementarity and interdependence 166 
l.3. Geography of monetary disequilibria 167 
2. Systemic deconcentration and monetary crisis 171 
2.1. The realities of Soviet federalism 171 
2.2. Disintegration and monetary crisis 172 
3. Costs and implications of disintegration 173 
3.1. Commercial interdependence 173 
3.2. The money question 173 
3.3. The nth + I currency 175 
4. Cooperation, integration, transition 176 
Bibliography 178 
This text is the result of work undertaken in the framework of the CEMI-EHESS and of fruitful discussions with M. 
Aglietta, A. Brender and all the members of the Franco-Soviet seminar on monetary matters. Any errors and omissions 
are the sole responsibility of the author. 
163 
164 
Tables 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Relative structure of each republic's exports 
Surpluses or deficits between republics 
Indicator of monetary tension, 1989 
Index of tension on the consumer goods market, 1990 
Indicators of the monetary situation by republic, 1989 
Monetary indicators for the north-west and the south-east, 1989 
Apportionment by area of productive fixed capital and savings of 
households, 1989 
166 
167 
168 
169 
170 
170 
171 
The economic area covering the territory of the former 
Soviet Union is now going through a twofold crisis of 
unprecedented gravity. At the very time when the inflation-
ary process seems to be taking off into hyperinflation, the 
Union itself is disintegrating. This is a process whose reper-
cussions may not stop with the 15 federal republics that 
made up the USSR. That is why the approach to the problem 
should be based on the rationale of regional dynamics. The 
demands for sovereignty emerging within the Russian SFSR 
itself show that the disintegration process may not stop at 
the boundaries of the republics. 
The two crises are closely linked. Both are rooted in radical 
regional differences and in trends inherent in the Soviet 
system. It would be pointless to try to deal with them 
separately. 
1. Regional differences 
I. I. The dichotomy between north-west and 
south-east 
The economic development of the USSR has led to profound 
regional disparities that affect both the real economy and 
monetary and financial factors. The salient feature is the 
distinction between the developed north-west on the one 
hand, and a south-east that could be tipped into the Third 
World on the other. 1 This dichotomy has deepened since the 
1960s. 
The definition of the north-west is not self-evident. Clearly, 
it includes the Baltic countries and Belarus; but there is some 
doubt about the inclusion of the Ukraine and the western 
part of the Russian SFSR. The vast economic and human 
units considered here are not internally homogeneous; more 
detailed regional studies are required. It is hoped that the 
necessary data will be available within the coming months, 
especially for Russia, but meanwhile, we must work with a 
fairly imprecise definition of the north-west. 
(i) Growth centres certainly exist in Belarus and around 
Leningrad-St Petersburg. The share of Belarus in the 
industrial output of the Union rose from 2,5% in 1967 
to 4,5% in 1987.2 Over the same period, the shares of 
the Ukraine and the Russian SFSR declined slightly. In 
terms of industrial output per capita, Belarus, Estonia 
and Latvia do considerably better than the Ukraine and 
See J. Sapir (1990a, p. 66) and J. Sapir (1991a, pp. 63-77). 
See J. Sapir (1990a, pp. 7-9) and F. I. Kushnirsky (1983). 
Regional differences 
Lithuania. 3 From the point of view of quality of output, 
Belarus and the Baltic countries occupy a dominant 
position. Among the products identified by the Soviet 
nomenclature as subject to certification, the share of 
'high-quality' products was 71,3% in Belarus, 58,7% in 
the Ukraine and 59% in the USSR in 1987.4 
(ii) A detailed study of the Ukraine shows wide disparities. 
The proportion of industrial goods classified as 'high-
quality' is very large - comparable to that for Belarus 
- in certain regions, such as the Carpathian part of the 
western Ukraine, with the regions of Ivano-Frankovsk, 
Ternopol, Chernovcy and Rovno, part of the coast 
(Odessa and Nikolajev, probably because of the defence 
industry) and a band that runs along the Dnieper and 
extends towards eastern Ukraine from Kiev to Kharkov 
through Cerkassy and Kirovograd. Other regions, how-
ever, are characterized by a very low proportion ofhigh-
quality goods, comparable to that of Central Asia. They 
are the regions of the east of the republic, the Donbass 
and the region of Zaporozje along with the Crimea, and 
the west, along a corridor from Lvov to the coast 
through Vinnica. In the Ukraine the dichotomy between 
regions producing high-quality and low-quality goods 
corresponds to that between regions producing equip-
ment goods and consumer goods. 
(iii) Social indicators accentuate the image of development 
of the north-west. 5 
The south-east corresponds to Central Asia, and part of 
Kazakhstan (the south) as far as Azerbaijan. The share of 
the four republics of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan 
and Turkmenistan in industrial output was steady, from 
1965 to 1987, at 4% of the total for the Union. If the 
whole of Kazakhstan is included, the figure rises to 7%; the 
inclusion of Azerbaijan brings it up to 8,4 to 8,8%. With 
the exception of Azerbaijan, all these republics are at the 
bottom of the table for quality of production indicators. The 
share of the south-east in agricultural output is, of course, 
large; but it is closely linked to the weight of Kazakhstan. 
Without the latter, the other four republics mentioned ac-
count for 8% of the Union's total output in 1987; with 
Kazakhstan, they account for 15%, a figure that rises to 
16,9% if Azerbaijan is also included. Social indicators pro-
ject a very clear image of underdevelopment. 
The dominant polarity in the USSR did not involve a distinc-
tion between the centre and the periphery; the past 70 years 
of development have not eliminated the opposition that 
See J. Sapir (1990a, p. 10). 
See NH 1987 (Statistika 1988, p. 91). 
See J. Sapir (1990a) and V. M. Dobrovol'skaja (1990, pp. 150-166). 
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existed in 1914. The north-west/south-east axis presentP.d 
above corresponds more closely to economic, social and 
demographic reality. 
1.2. Complementarity and interdependence 
As Tables I and 2 show, complementarity between the north-
west and the south-east is apparent in trade cross-flows. 
However, the situation is much more complex than these 
statistics imply. For example, metallurgy is concentrated in 
the Russian SFSR, the Ukraine and Belarus; but within the 
Ukraine the industry specializes in preliminary processing 
and certain mechanical engineering branches (shipyards, rail 
transport equipment). Belarus on the other hand is a major 
producer of high-tech machinery and equipment. The in-
crease in the output of machine-tools around Minsk is partly 
responsible for the growth of Belarus' share in the total 
from 1965 to 1987. Similarly, in the energy and chemicals 
branches, Azerbaijan's surpluses consist mainly of processed 
products. Oil extraction at Baku is now very low, and the 
chemicals industry centred around Baku and Sumgait is 
dependent on supplies of raw materials from the Russian 
SFSR. 
Table 1 
Relative structure of each republic's exports I 
Energy 
and chemicals 
Russia l,33 
Ukraine 0,62 
Belarus ' 0,94 
Moldova 0,27 
Lithuania 0,78 
Latvia 0,70 
Estonia 0,74 
Armenia 0,51 
Georgia 0,34 
Azerbaijan 1,19 
Kazakhstan 1,22 
Tadjikistan 0,35 
Turkmenistan 1,67 
Uzbekistan 0,74 
Kyrgyzstan 0,24 
The figures are not totally reliable. From the statistical point 
of view, it is clear that the structure of Soviet relative prices, 
which, of course, differs in several ways from the structure 
of world market prices, can substantially change the weight 
of each republic in the Union. Basically, it can be said 
that the relative weight of the raw materials producers is 
underestimated. 
But that is certainly a feature of secondary importance in 
terms of the question of economic complementarity. The 
approach here should take account of dynamics. It should 
be borne in mind that the formation of demand at the level 
of firms depends on the expected degree of shortage, the 
priority enjoyed by the firm, and the complexity of the 
product considered. Shortages incite firms to hold large 
stocks, thus boosting demand beyond the level technically 
necessary; repeated shortages (which are an inverse function 
of the degree of priority) incite firms to change the combi-
nation of factor inputs (e.g. by substituting labour for capi-
tal), which considerably affects microeconomic manage-
ment; and the existence of specific technical standards, pro-
duced by a technological culture that is itself a result of the 
adaptation of the economy to shortages, often gives rise 
to serious problems when attempts are made to substitute 
Western equipment for equipment of Soviet origin. 
Metals and Light Agriculture 
electrical engineering industry and others2 
l, 11 0,68 0,47 
l,32 0,79 l,25 
l,04 l,05 0,53 
0,50 2,17 1,59 
0,78 1,55 0,47 
0,75 l,50 1,57 
0,48 2,03 0,32 
0,63 2,01 0,13 
0,51 2,16 1,21 
0,45 1,65 1,08 
0,71 0,82 4,20 
0,66 1,96 1,02 
0,07 1,78 1,63 
0,43 1,73 3,06 
0,99 1,55 1,17 
1 Each branch's share in the republic's exports as a proportion of the corresponding share for the whole of the Union, i.e. taking this branch's share of Union exports as equal to 1,00. 
2 Agriculture and services linked to production. 
Source: Le/Ire du CEP/l (Paris). No 98. October 1991. 
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Table 2 
Surpluses or deficits between republics 
Energy Metals and 
and chemicals electrical engineering 
Surpluses Deficits Surpluses Deficits 
Russia + 86,1 + 49,5 
Ukraine - 38,9 + 40,2 
Belarus - 4,7 + 10,3 
Moldova - 9,0 - 8,4 
Lithuania - 9,5 - 6,9 
Latvia - 4,7 - 5,5 
Estonia - 2,4 - 5,1 
Armenia - 3,3 - 3,1 
Georgia - 5,5 - 6,9 
Azerbaijan + 7,2 - 3,0 
Kazakhstan - 8,1 - 29,1 
Tadjikistan - 4,4 - 4,6 
Turkmenistan + 6,8 - 7,6 
Uzbekistan - 4,7 - 18,5 
Kyrgyzstan - 5,0 -1,5 
Total 100 - 100 100 - 100 
I Agriculture and services Inked to production. 
Source: Lettre du CEPl/(Paris), No 98, October 1991. 
Various conclusions may be drawn from these observations. 
The demand for raw materials, the archetypal 'hard goods', 
will be affected mainly by changes in the global economic 
environment. Relaxation of the constraint produced by risks 
of shortage should lead in the short term, all other things 
being equal, to a reduction in this demand. Moreover, it is 
easier to change suppliers of raw materials, the currency of 
settlement clearly being a key factor from this point of 
view. For equipment goods, on the other hand, a change in 
suppliers is difficult in the short term. 
To the extent that a flow of equipment from the north-west 
to the east, and a flow of raw materials in the opposite 
direction could be identified, the complementarity between 
the two areas is based on different sets of reasons for each 
one. Consumers of equipment goods are dependent on their 
suppliers because of standards. This situation can be modi-
fied in the medium term, but should be considered rigid in 
the short term. Consumers of raw materials, however, are 
sensitive to price. Substituting a Western producer for a 
Soviet producer means being prepared to pay a different 
relative price, and also making available adequate export 
Regional differences 
(%) 
Light Agriculture Total 
industry and others1 
Surpluses Deficits Surpluses Deficits Surpluses Deficits 
- 86,2 - 95,5 + 2,5 
+ 5,0 + 35,9 + 35,l 
+ 23,l - 0,8 + 39,2 
+ 13,2 + 4,4 - 1,8 
+ 8,8 + 0,6 - 7,8 
+ 7,4 + 3,4 - 1,1 
+ 4,9 - 0,9 - 3,2 
+ 4,0 - 2,5 - 3,2 
+ 13,3 + 0,9 + 2,8 
+ 12,0 + 4,0 + 20,3 
- 13,8 + 29,0 - 51,8 
+ 1,0 - 0,4 -9,7 
+ 1,2 + 2,5 - 0,9 
+ 3,8 + 18,4 - 16,1 
+ 2,2 + 0,9 - 4,2 
100 - 100 100 - 100 100 - 100 
resources to cover settlement in foreign currency. Although 
the short-term constraint is less rigid than in the former case, 
it is more likely to last into the medium term. 
Account must also be taken of critical flows. The more highly 
developed the production system, the more catastrophic the 
possible consequences of failures of supply. Among such 
failures may be those affecting certain specific machines or 
parts. The degree of dependence of one republic on another 
may well be determined by critical flows that cannot be 
identified from aggregated data. The use of the ratio of 
imports to GDP may give misleading results and lead to 
erroneous conclusions in the case of an economy where 
technical integration is as close as in the former 
Soviet Union. 
1.3. Geography of monetary disequilibria 
As could be expected, the dichotomy between the north-
west and the south-east is reflected in indicators of incomes 
and financial variables. Earned income (that of wage-earners 
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and kolkhoz workers) varies widely between the two areas. 
In 1985, per capita annual incomes ranged from R I 350 in 
Estonia, about R I 200 in the Russian SFSR and Latvia, 
and almost R I OOO in Belarus and the Ukraine, to only 
R 700 in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan, R 600 in 
Turkmenistan and R 516 in Tadjikistan. 1 
There may be very wide variations in conditions of supply 
because of priority given to certain regions and certain 
towns. Proximity to sources of production is another very 
important factor: once local authorities have been granted 
autonomy, they are in a position to hold back resources. 
Estimates of disequilibria between regions (and of the monet-
ary overhang) must take account of the various determinants 
not only of demand but also of supply. The use of the ratio 
of retail turnover (index of supply) to savings (index of 
demand) can give a first approximation of monetary press-
ures, although it does imply the assumption that savings are 
homogeneous in the different regions. Clearly if all savings 
are forced in one area, while they are spontaneous in another, 
See J. Sapir (1990a, p. 51). 
Table 3 
Indicator of monetary tension, 1989 
Republic A 
Turnover of State 
and cooperative 
retail trade 
per inhabitant 
(Roubles) 
(ranking) 
USSR I 406 
RSFSR I 548 (5) 
Ukraine I 326 (6) 
Belarus I 559 (4) 
Uzbekistan 825 (13) 
Kazakhstan I 168 (10) 
Georgia 1 218 (9) 
Azerbaijan 814 (14) 
Lithuania 1 803 (3) 
Moldova I 273 (7) 
Latvia 2 055 (2) 
Kyrgyzstan 963 (11) 
Tadjikistan 730 (15) 
Armenia I 269 (7) 
Turkmenistan 956 (12) 
Estonia 2 164 (I) 
Source: Narodnoe Khozjajstvo, 1989, pp. 92 and 103. 
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the comparison between ratios is meaningless. Thus the ratio 
must be backed up by other indicators (Tables 3 and 4). 
Black market prices can be used to check on the estimate of 
the degree of disequilibrium. Bearing in mind that certain 
towns (especially Moscow) are given priority of supply, it is 
clear that monetary tensions were stronger in 1990 in the 
north-west than in the south-east. 
It is difficult to monitor the changes that occurred in 1991. 
Almost R 83 billion were put into circulation during the first 
10 months of the year. The Ukraine was the first republic 
to attempt to stabilize the monetary situation. The introduc-
tion of a system of ration coupons made it possible to 
contain the growth of liquidity. In Belarus, on the other 
hand, reactions to April's price rises were much stronger 
than elsewhere (strikes and demonstrations in Minsk). The 
government had to grant wage rises far in excess of those 
provided for in the system linking pay to prices. The refusal 
of Belarus to lend banknotes to Lithuania reflects the 
pressing needs of both republics. The stock ofliquidity seems 
to have increased in the north-west, especially along the 
arc from Minsk to Murmansk. In the Russian SFSR, the 
expansion of cash in circulation seems to have been concen-
trated in the northern part of the country. 
B A/B 
Amount of savings Index of 
bank deposit per monetary 
inhabitant tension 
(Roubles) 
(ranking) (ranking) 
I 170 120,2 
I 296 (7) 119,4 (6) 
I 431 (5) 92,7 (2) 
I 481 (3) 105,3 (5) 
349 (14) 236,4 (15) 
737 (10) 158,5 (10) 
I 265 (8) 96,3 (3) 
421 (12) 193,3 (11) 
1 855 (I) 97,2 (4) 
917 (9) 138,8 (7) 
I 340 (6) 153,3 (9) 
458 (11) 210,3 (12) 
324 (15) 225,3 (13) 
I 580 (2) 80,3 (1) 
414 (13) 230,9 (14) 
1453 (4) 148,9 (8) 
Regional differences 
Table 4 
Index of tension on the consumer goods market, 1990 (ratio of local black market price to average price for the USSR) 
A B C D E F G Ranking 
Moscow 0,95 1,02 1,15 0,76 1,04 0,98 12 
Ashkhabad 0,92 0,71 0,78 I, 18 0,90 13 
Baku 0,79 0,77 0,77 0,90 1,21 0,89 14 
Vilnius 0,93 1,32 1,34 1,24 1,87 1,34 3 
Yerevan 1,22 2,06 0,90 0,71 0,61 0,96 1,08 9 
Dushanbe 0,88 0,88 0,84 0,50 0,92 0,80 15 
Kiev 1,06 1,23 0,96 1,43 0,87 1,59 1,19 8 
Kishinev 1,35 0,83 1,54 1,05 1,77 1,31 4 
Lvov 0,97 1,40 1,19 1,32 1,22 6 
Minsk 1,27 0,51 1,27 1,02 10 
Odessa 0,87 1,05 1,57 1,25 1,59 1,06 1,23 5 
Riga 0,82 1,74 2,67 1,40 0,93 1,82 1,56 2 
Tbilisi 0,42 4,05 1,80 1,01 0,68 1,59 1 
Bishkek 0,74 1,11 0,93 1,23 1,00 11 
Kharkov 1,09 0,98 1,43 1,31 1,20 7 
The columns represent the following categories: 
A : foodstuffs: 
B: furniture: 
C: domestic electrical equipment: 
D: men's clothing: 
E: women's clothing: 
F: building materials: 
G: average index. 
In each category eight products were selected. The ratios represent the average for the category. Where the prices of fewer than three products were observed, no ratio is given. 
Source: Ekonomika i zhizn', No 12, March 1991. 
It is a reasonable contention that at the end of 1991 the 
north-west, and in particular Belarus, the Baltic countries 
and the northern regions of the western part of the Russian 
Federation, as well as part of Siberia, were experiencing 
considerable inflationary pressures. In the south-east, the 
pressure seems to have been less strong. This is understand-
able in the light of the labour market situation and the 
conditions of the formation of wages (Table 5). 
Participation rates in the north-west, and especially in the 
RSFSR, are high, which reflects the development of industry 
and depressed demography. Labour shortages are frequent 
(and seem particularly acute in Belarus and the Baltic 
countries). In the south-east, on the other hand, it is probable 
that the high rate of agricultural employment is symptomatic 
of disguised unemployment. Such situations tend to affect 
the formation of wages: firms have always had a certain 
autonomy in this area, which has increased considerably 
since 1987-88. Other factors also need to be borne in mind, 
however: the calculation of the basic wage incorporates 
weighting coefficients for the different regions (1,5 to 2 for 
Siberia, 1,3 for Central Asia), and for the availability of 
work. These coefficients result in automatic offsetting to the 
benefit of the RSFSR and certain parts of the south-east. 
The labour shortage has certainly been a stronger factor in 
the dynamics of wages since 1989 (i.e. the moment when the 
system of monitoring firms collapsed) than previously. Not 
that it was without effect before; but competition between 
firms for labour resources could not be given free rein. 
It is also worth noting that the development of cooperatives 
has led to the emergence of a sector where remuneration is 
very high, thus increasing the pressure on State-owned firms. 
Moreover, the present crisis is reflected in supply failures, 
which may incite firms to substitute labour for capital in an 
attempt to reduce their vulnerability; at the microeconomic 
level, this may mean an increased demand for labour in the 
face of limited supply. Without labour mobility (from the 
south-east to the north-west) and reform of the financial 
system, it is easy to understand why the most developed 
regions of the former USSR, which are also those where 
demography is weakest, are experiencing inflationary press-
ures stronger than those of the rest of the country. 
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Table 5 
Indicators of the monetary situation by republic, 1989 
(%) 
Republic A B C D E' 
Share of Share Share of Share of Share of 
population of GNP saving profits credits 
RSFSR 51,3 57,5 56,8 52,9 54,7 
Ukraine 17,9 18,6 22,0 19,5 12,4 
Belarus 3,6 4,5 4,5 5,7 2,8 
Uzbekistan 7,0 4,5 2,1 3,6 4,2 
Kazakhstan 5,8 3,5 3,6 5,3 7,1 
Georgia 1,9 1,7 2,0 1,4 2,1 
Azerbaijan 2,5 1,55 0,9 1,4 1,8 
Lithuania 1,3 1,4 2,0 1,9 1,2 
Moldova 1,5 1,4 1,2 2,15 1,0 
Latvia 0,9 1,3 1,1 1,7 0,8 
Kyrgyzstan 1,5 0,9 0,6 0,9 1,0 
Tadjikistan 1,8 0,9 0,5 0,8 0,7 
Armenia 1,1 0,8 1,5 0,75 1,0 
Turkmenistan 1,2 0,8 0,4 0,9 0,8 
Estonia 0,5 0,7 0,7 1,0 0,4 
I 7,8% of total credits are not broken down by republic. If these credits are linked to the activities of the military-industrial complex, they could primarily be apportioned to the RSFSR and 
Kazakhstan. 
Sources: for A, C, D, E: Narodnoe Khozjajstvo. 1989, pp. 17, 89,619,628; for B: Voprosy Ekonomiki. No 4/1990, pp. 46-58, Table 7. 
The distribution of monetary resources and uses highlights 
further differences and complementarities (Tables 6 and 7). 
The concentration of resources in the north-west and of uses 
in the south-east is striking, but hardly surprising, in view 
of the economic differences between these areas. In the 
framework of the former USSR, the financing of investment 
in the east and the south-east was based on creaming off 
investment resources from the north-west. Within the north-
west, the Ukraine showed a positive balance of inter-republi-
can trade. However, this was probably due in part to the low 
relative price of energy and hydrocarbons; the adjustment of 
prices to bring them closer to those of the world market 
should radically alter the situation, to the benefit of hydro-
carbon producers, i.e. principally the Russian SFSR. The 
constraint on the north-west would then be to the advantage, 
not of the south-east (with the possible exception of Turk-
menistan), but of Russia, whose situation in the former 
system was neutral. 
It is thus fair to say that factors of regional differentiation 
existed and had a considerable impact before the acceleration 
of the crisis process in 1990. Some control could be kept 
over them as long as the unitary framework held together; 
170 
but they were the symptoms of wide differences in the 
dynamics of economic and financial processes between the 
north-west and the south-east. 
Table 6 
Monetary indicators for the north-west and the south-east, 1989 
North-west (Ukraine, 
Belarus, Baltic States) 
South-east excluding 
Kazakhstan 
South-east including 
Kazakhstan 
RSFSR 
Source: Table 5. 
Arca 's share 
Saving of 
households 
30,3 
3,6 
7,2 
56,8 
Profits of 
enterprises 
29,8 
6,2 
11,5 
52,9 
(%) 
Credits to 
the economy 
17,6 
6,7 
13,8 
54,7 
Table 7 
i 
Apportionment by area of productive · fixed capital and savings of 
households, 1989 
/% of total) 
Savings Fixed capital 
North-west 30,3 21,8 
South-east excluding 
Kazakhstan 3,6 5,7 
South-east including 
Kazakhstan . 7,2 11,6 
RSFSR 56,8 61,8 
Source: Table 5 and Narodnoe Khozjajstvo, 1989, p. 278. 
2. Systemic deconcentration and monetary crisis 
2.1. The realities of Soviet federalism 
The historical choice of federalism by the Soviet Union was 
not without consequences. For authors like V. Aspaturain 
(1950), M. Fainsod (1965), F. C. Barghoorn and 
T. F. Remington (1986), federalism was merely a far;ade, 
while the system's approach in reality was unitary and cen-
tralizing. However, this traditional analysis raises more 
problems than it solves for the understanding of the real 
working of the system. The significance of the federal insti-
tutions as a potential focus for nationalistic attitudes, or the 
existence of powerful local interests with influence on the 
decision-making process, has been identified (T. Rakowska-
Harmstone (1974), H. L. Biddulph (1983)). Even Remington 
has admitted ( 1986) that the federal structure could play an 
important part in organizing the flow of information, and 
that it thus contributed to the definition of the rules of the 
game. G. W. Breslauer (1982) showed that deconcentration, 
i.e. the delegation of authority to lower levels, was an alterna-
tive to decentralization, or recourse to market mechanisms, 
in the operation of the Soviet system. This deconcentration 
occurred around two axes: the reinforcement of the power 
of the major production ministries and the acquisition by 
the local authorities (at the level of the republic or the oblast) 
of de facto, if not de Jure, powers. This had already been 
analysed by J. Hough (1968), who compared those in power 
locally to 'prefects'. 
The 'prefect' model was an initial departure from the ideal 
bureaucratic model. 1 But as the local official's responsibility 
See A. Avtorkhanov (1966). 
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for economic matters developed during the I 960s and I 970s, 
he gradually changed into a lobbyist.2 This happened be-
cause economic objectives became increasingly important in 
legitimizing the position of local officials in the eyes of both 
Moscow and their constituents. Their aim was to provide 
firms in their areas with the resources they needed, and to 
create a favourable climate of opinion so as to achieve the 
economic results that would consolidate their position in 
relation to the central authorities. This position enabled 
them to bring more pressure to bear in the resource allo-
cation process, to the benefit of the constituency. The lobby-
ist model then gave way to the nationalist leader modei.3 
This shift was largely due to the effects of the economic 
crisis that began to be apparent towards the end of the 
1970s. Faced with increasing resource allocation problems, 
the regional authorities were trying to salvage some factors 
of legitimacy to keep control of their areas. 
In fact, deconcentration is firmly rooted in the foundations 
of the Soviet-type economy. Far from being a deviation 
from the model, it is an essential product of the economic 
institutions. 
In the Soviet economy as it functioned from the end of the 
I 920s, the conditions for the distribution of goods could not 
serve as objective indicators of the degree to which resource 
allocation was correct. Guaranteed sales, and the corollary 
of fixed prices, the loose budget constraint, the monobank 
system, mean that allocation must be managed by applying 
rules.4 The issuing of such rules implies deconcentration, 
since they cannot be efficient unless they take at least partial 
account of local situations. Indeed, the increased complexity 
of the productive system that accompanied the industrializa-
tion and development process made deconcentration ever 
more necessary as the society and the economy were trans-
formed. Another factor to consider is the existence of chronic 
shortages. 5 Shortage is not just a feature of consumer goods 
markets: it is a basic situation that introduces a new factor 
of uncertainty throughout the economy. The management 
of this uncertainty tends to concentrate on the flexibility of 
local organizations, and thus the role and responsibilities of 
local officials. 
The Soviet economic system therefore involves powerful 
tendencies towards the transfer of powers either towards 
vertical bodies (the ministries) or towards regional bodies. 
The combination of these tendencies with the choice of a 
See M. R. Beissinger (1986) and J.C. Moses (1974, 1985). 
See G. Hodnett (1978) and G. Gleason (1989). 
See G. Roland (1989) and J. Sapir (1990b, 1991b). 
See G. Roland (1989, Chapter 4). 
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federal structure, which as we have seen could not be re-
garded as merely a fa~ade, created a situation where the 
power of the central authorities was often questioned, even 
under Stalin. 1 The reaffirmation of the Party's authority was 
used as a factor of unification, and recourse to arbitrary 
decision-making tipped the balance of the implicit bar-
gaining in favour of the central authorities.2 The Party's 
authority, however, had been going through a crisis since 
the 1960s. Destalinization destroyed the legitimacy of char-
isma as a basis for authority, and despite numerous attempts, 
the regime did not succeed in replacing it with another. 
Arbitrary decisions were less in evidence, although still more 
frequent than any Western society would have tolerated. 
Total despotism would have been thoroughly destructive in 
an economy as complex as that of the USSR from the 1950s; 
but its disappearance none the less unbalanced the system. 
The process was widened and deepened by glasnost and the 
introduction of free elections. In particular the fact that 
electoral systems were more democratic at local level in 1990 
than at the level of the Supreme Soviet affected the pace of 
change. The transfer of democratic legitimacy to republics 
and local structures confirmed the systemic tendency to 
deconcentration. It gave a decisive impulse to the process of 
fragmentation. 
2.2. Disintegration and monetary crisis 
The fragmentation process was also affected by the specific 
dynamism of the monetary crisis. The example of Germany 
in 1923 shows that a major hyperinflationary crisis can 
endanger the unity of a country. Local authorities seek to 
join with foreign monetary authorities to protect themselves 
from the effects of the disappearance of money. 3 
In the Soviet case, the fact that the first sign of the monetary 
crisis was an accentuation of shortages was reflected in the 
increased importance of local authorities. They attempted 
to solve the problem in the first instance by approaching the 
central authorities. As their efforts were in vain, and as 
confidence in the currency faded, they gradually introduced 
systems to control flows. Whenever these systems involved 
prohibitions on non-residents, local autarkies arose that 
eventually accentuated economic disorder. This led to the 
emergence of a cellular economy on the following pattern: 
accentuation of 
shortages 
t 
restriction of 
-+ flows 
See T. Dunmore (1980). 
See J. Sapir (1990b, pp. 68-74). 
disorganization of 
-+ production 
I 
See discussions with Professor G. Feldman (1992). 
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From many points of view the monetary crisis is endogenous 
to the fragmentation process it contributes to accelerating. 
The problem of the budget deficit leading to the injection of 
liquidity is due to a large extent to overshooting of expendi-
ture, fuelled by welfare programmes and subsidies to 
firms, both items clearly susceptible to pressure from local 
authorities.4 Similarly, the Chairman of the Gosbank, 
V. Gerashchenko complained in April 1990 that the Central 
Bank was not in a position to refuse immediate compliance 
with requests for liquidity from Finance Ministers in the 
republics. 5 Alas, this was not the only contribution of the 
local authorities to the monetary crisis. After gaining politi-
cal legitimacy in the 1990 elections, many authorities decided 
that the republics should hold on to their own tax revenue. 
Thus when the entire economy was in crisis, the republics' 
budget revenue from profit taxes doubled, and much of the 
revenue accruing from turnover tax was also put to local 
use.6 Despite the agreement reached early in 1991, the repub-
lics handed over only a fraction of the contribution provided 
for in the federal budget.7 These behaviour patterns should 
be placed in the systemic and political context analysed 
above. Although the new local authorities enjoy much 
stronger democratic legitimacy than the centre, they are 
nevertheless very fragile politically. Most of the newly elected 
officials are old hands from the Soviet political system. Their 
own political legitimacy is incomparably weaker than that 
of politicians from the clandestine or marginally legal oppo-
sition parties of Central Europe (e.g. Walesa or Havel). They 
have no political party or movement organized to support 
them in a specific policy programme. Their popularity and 
their authority rest basically on the extent to which they are 
in conflict with the centre. In the circumstances, it is not 
surprising that they concentrate their policy on taking con-
trol of resources, and that they automatically accede to 
demands for increases in nominal incomes. 
This shows how closely monetary matters are bound up with 
sovereignty. The collapse of the system of control over local 
authorities led to a monetary crisis that has itself gradually 
accentuated the fragmentation process. Clearly, the monet-
ary crisis and the fragmentation of the Soviet Union are 
closely linked. It would be pointless to try to deal separately 
with the problems of monetary and financial stabilization 
on the one hand, and those of the emergence of new State 
authorities on the other. 
See V. K. Senchagov (1989, p. 64). 
See V. Gerashchenko (1990, pp. 10-11). 
See V. Panskov (1990, p. 5) and S. Alexashenko (1992). 
See J. Rytov (1991, p. 6). 
3. Costs and implications of disintegration 
The question of the costs and implications of the disinte-
gration of the former USSR must therefore be approached 
simultaneously from the commercial and monetary points 
of view, on the basis of a static and of a dynamic assessment. 1 
It is important to bear in mind the differences between this 
process and the integration process now under way in 
the EC. 
3.1. Commercial interdependence 
The classic theoretical approach to the costs and benefits of 
integration/disintegration is based on the comparison (and 
trade-off) between trade creation and trade diversion.2 But 
this approach assumes that between the country or countries 
concerned, on the one hand, and the other partners, on the 
other, there is perfect substitution of products and markets. 
There is no reason not to accept this assumption here in the 
long term; but in the short term (some three to five years) 
the assumption of perfect substitution raises numerous prob-
lems. The USSR and the other East European countries 
have developed productive systems characterized by special 
technical and quality standards. This has several impli-
cations. 
(a) A Soviet purchaser of Soviet machinery and equipment 
cannot substitute a non-Soviet supplier for an unsatis-
factory Soviet supplier without paying the price of con-
verting existing equipment to the new standard. 
(b) A seller of Soviet machinery and equipment cannot 
easily substitute a non-Soviet market for a Soviet market 
without: 
(i) paying the price for converting output to a new 
standard; 
(ii) accepting a major cut in prices received; 
(iii) investing considerable resources in setting up a dis-
tribution and after-sales service network on the new 
market. 
(c) Raw materials and products are less affected by this 
situation than high value-added products. 
The conditions are quite different from those prevailing (in 
the past and at present) in the European countries of the 
EC.3 Integration by the former USSR is a short-term necess-
The failure to deal with monetary matters is the main criticism to be 
made of the article by A. Mac Auley (1991, pp. 51-65). 
See El-Agraa (1985). 
See E. Nevin (1990). 
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ity, not the result of a long-term process of cooperation. For 
there is no doubt that the countries of the former USSR and 
the former members of Comecon have everything to gain 
from harmonizing their standards on world standards; but 
in the short term, they cannot pay the price of harmoniza-
tion. Two remarks should be made. 
Firstly, it is clear that in the short term it is advantageous 
to maintain links between suppliers and customers as they 
existed before 1991, the more so the smaller the share of 
exports of raw materials or products in the trade of the 
country concerned. The risk of breaking these links is two-
fold: 
(i) the disorganization of a productive system either because 
of the shortage of vital parts or because of a sudden 
failure to sell output; this disorganization may be re-
flected, depending on the progress made with reform, in 
an increase in the subsidies that must be paid to firms, 
or in massive unemployment; 
(ii) the breaking of traditional links may oblige these econ-
omies to specialize in the products that are immediately 
exportable, i.e. raw materials and products; opening up 
to the world market may then lead, not to positive 
effects of multilateralization of trade, but to regressive 
specialization in terms of division of labour and a loss 
of technological know-how. 
But secondly, the preservation of links in the short term 
should not involve preserving the status quo. While these 
countries should not be faced with intolerable costs of adjust-
ment, they must be encouraged to achieve gradual alignment 
on international standards. The mix of short-term and 
medium-term considerations will be the key to the success 
or failure of the transition. This naturally leads us to refer 
to the monetary aspects of disintegration. 
3.2. The money question 
Here again we should recall the classical analysis of the 
respective advantages and disadvantages of a national cur-
rency versus a common currency.4 
The following arguments are usually mentioned in favour 
of a national currency: 
(a) the possibility for the government to control the transfer 
of wealth through inflation and deflation; 
(b) the absence of a nominal solvency constraint; 
See D. Cohen (1986, Chapter 6). 
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(c) the possibility of applying a flexible monetary policy to 
absorb external shocks. 
The following points are usually made in favour of a joint 
currency: 
(d) the existence of an automatic system of foreign exchange 
at fixed rates and without cost; 
(e) the constitution of a grouping with a better international 
negotiating position. 
In their present situation, point (e) is hardly relevant to the 
republics of the former USSR. Point (d), on the other hand, 
is vastly more important than it would be in other circum-
stances, specifically because of the interdependence of the 
economies. At the same time, the arguments in favour of 
national currencies, especially points (a) and (c), are particu-
larly convincing in view of the differences between republics 
referred to above. In the end, an accurate assessment of the 
cost-benefit balance should be based on possible dynamics. 
If each republic were to have its own currency very soon, 
the need for monetary cooperation would quickly be felt 
because of the necessity to maintain trade. Of all the repub-
lics, only Russia has the export capacity to enable it to 
stabilize its currency. If monetary cooperation was set up, it 
would take the form of a monetary system polarized on the 
Russian currency. 1 The relations between Russia and its 
main partners (Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan) can then best 
be described in terms of the 'prisoner's dilemma'. The market 
shares of each of the three republics are too small for there 
to be a strong temptation to opt out; however, they are large 
enough to make retaliation feasible against Russia. This 
could produce an equilibrium situation akin to that of 
nuclear deterrence, guaranteeing the survival of monetary 
cooperation. If the comparison with deterrence is useful, its 
features should be considered. Basically, deterrence depends 
on the dynamics of strategic instability. The more vulnerable 
a system of strategic weapons, the more destabilizing it is; 
for in a crisis vulnerability is an incentive to strike first. In 
the case considered here, the 'weapon' of the three republics 
against Russia would be Russia's need to purchase their 
manufactures. 
The crux of the matter is then how Russia is expected 
to react. For example, if the Ukrainian and Belarussian 
authorities think that the modernization of Russian industry 
will be a long process (taking at least JO years), they will 
expect their negotiating power to remain strong in the me-
dium term; by a process of the 'common knowledge' type 
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On the problem of the polarized monetary regime see M. Aglietta (1991, 
pp. 311-334). 
('they know that I know that they know .. .'), which can 
lead to a stable equilibrium. However, if those authorities 
think, rightly or wrongly, that Russia will do all in its 
power to reduce its technical dependence over a much 
shorter period, they will conclude that their negotiating 
clout is soon to be eroded. The logical reaction will be to 
seek to maximize their advantage in the short term by 
revaluing their currencies. 
This behaviour would inevitably encourage the Russian 
authorities to speed up measures to reduce dependence, thus 
confirming a posteriori the expectations of the Ukrainian or 
Belarussian authorities. The expectation of defection be-
comes, in this framework, a self-fulfilling prophecy. The 
same 'common knowledge' process that would stabilize 
negotiating relations in the case of certainty of prolonged 
dependence would destabilize it in the opposite situation. As 
it may be assumed that Russia and her neighbours view each 
other with the utmost circumspection, a stable compromise 
could probably only be achieved under the pressure of a 
strong exogenous constraint. But, to return to the deterrence 
metaphor, the prospect of a trade war, disastrous though it 
might be, cannot by any means be compared to the threat 
of nuclear war. 
Suspicion of Russia combined with a falsely optimistic idea 
of how easily the Ukrainian and Belarussian economies 
can be integrated would most probably lead to unilateral 
defections. On the other hand, reliable assurances concerning 
trade relations between Russia and the two partners, and a 
more realistic assessment in Minsk and Kiev of the risks of 
a 'Lone Ranger' type strategy would contribute to stabiliza-
tion. So it might still be thought that an even better solution 
would be to keep a single currency. 
This, however, is not so, for political as well as for economic 
reasons. It would be hopeless to rely on economic arguments 
to talk republics out of their aspirations to sovereignty. They 
are on quite a different wavelength. Only an awareness of 
how economic constraints can limit sovereignty will change 
behaviour patterns in the end, The only possible subject for 
discussion is how to organize cooperation between sovereign 
States; but the principle of their sovereignty is certainly not 
a matter for debate. 
There are also economic arguments at present against a 
single currency. It was seen above that having its own cur-
rency gave a country considerable scope for action. In view 
of the differences between situations in the various republics, 
there is no reason to do without such a tool for flexibility, 
provided of course that it is not used immoderately. 
Moreover, in the unlikely case of a single currency surviving, 
the negotiation of internal relative prices could rapidly lead 
to fragmentation. If the result was too favourable to Russia, 
the costs of transition would be passed on to the other 
republics, who would be forced into adjustments they could 
ill afford without a national currency. If, on the other hand, 
it was too favourable to the republics, the pressure on Russia 
to opt out would of course be very strong. 
In fact, despite the static advantages of each option, neither 
cooperation between national currencies (in the framework 
of a regional monetary system) nor the solution of a joint 
currency would be likely to lead to dynamic stability. The 
importance of political factors, the fear of 'paying for the 
others', the probable fragility of the political authorities over 
a fairly long period, all complicate the attempt to devise a 
solution satisfactory from both the static and the dynamic 
point of view. 
3.3. The nth + 1 currency 
One possibility might be found in what we could call the 
nth + 1 currency. 
The problem is both economic and political. The aim is to 
maintain trade relations between republics (which implies 
minimizing transaction costs) while at the same time permit-
ting some openness towards the world economy as an incen-
tive to modernization. There is thus a problem of converti-
bility to be approached in the knowledge that, firstly, some 
republics, but not all, can probably export enough products 
(especially hydrocarbons) to enable them to obtain foreign 
currency, and secondly, the trade balance of the area as a 
whole (former USSR) could well be in deficit. 
The political problem resulting from the nature of relations 
between Russia and her neighbours must also be solved. It 
is based as much on the effects of memory, prejudice and 
suspicion as on objective factors (the Russian SFSR is in-
comparably larger and richer in natural resources than the 
neighbouring countries). 
Rejecting the single currency solution as unrealistic, and 
recognizing that the instability of the authorities of the 
republics (with its risk of spiralling nationalism) would pre-
vent the achievement of a stable compromise based on the 
rationale of deterrence, we conclude that only a more inte-
grated system (and thus by definition a more complex one) 
is possible. The idea is based on avoiding a confrontation 
between Russia and her neighbours. The economic problems 
described above make a payments union appear an attractive 
proposition, but the problem of mediation arises. To make 
things easier, we suggest the creation of a 'supra-republican' 
currency: the nth + 1 currency. This currency would be first 
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and foremost a unit of account. It would be based on the 
establishment of a central bank open to all the republics and 
to Western partners. It would play a role in relation to the 
Western currencies identical to that of the dollar in relation 
to gold under the Bretton Woods system. The arrangements 
would thus incorporate flexibility at two levels: the par 
values of the currencies of the republics could be adjusted, in 
the framework of negotiated agreements, against the nth + 1 
currency; and the par value of the nth + 1 currency against 
a basket of Western currencies could itself be adjusted. 
This would provide scope for autonomy of decision by 
the republics, enabling them to cope with widely different 
situations, while allowing for the possibility of a common 
policy for the entire area.' 
Ifit is agreed that the main problem is to stabilize negotiating 
relations, then to the extent that this currency would not 
belong to any republic in particular, there is nothing to stop 
the introduction of a third party into the interplay between 
Russia and her partners. 2 Its task would be to balance the 
forces, e.g. by lending foreign exchange reserves to the least 
privileged republics to enable them to contribute their quota 
to the system. The presence of this third party would also 
be a political guarantee. As its withdrawal would lead to the 
collapse of the system, it could be used as an implicit threat 
if any of the parties tried to change the rules in its own 
favour. In view of present wariness of anything like a revival 
of the hated central powers, the presence of the third party 
would constitute assurance that there would be no return, 
by devious routes, to the former system. 
The combination of the nth + 1 currency and a payments 
union on the scale of the former USSR could provide all 
the theoretical advantages of a payments union without the 
drawbacks,3 which include the size of the market on which 
the payments union is based (the main argument against 
this solution for Eastern Europe) and the problems arising 
because of the existence of a large, dominant country. 
The advantages of the system are clear. Trade between 
republics would be sure to remain brisk, while the republics 
would have limited convertibility that would not lead them 
into an excessive demand for strong currencies. It is well 
known that the problem of reserves is crucial in the change-
This is a very important point, as D. Cohen ( 1986) shows; the counter-
part of the currency unit in a given country consists of internal transfers 
of labour and capital. 
The importance of external intervention to stabilize a cooperative game 
is demonstrated in C. A. Powell (1988, pp. 84-87) and T. Mitchell (1987). 
See P. Bofinger (1991, p. 13). 
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over to convertibility. 1 Outside the regions producing hydro-
carbons and other raw materials, the short-term potential for 
foreign currency earnings is extremely limited. The proposed 
combination would make it possible to achieve the best 
possible compromise between protection and openness, by 
minimizing the shocks of the transition to convertibility, 
while introducing some of the advantages of openness. A 
payments union over the whole territory of the former USSR 
would overcome the limitations linked to the size problem 
referred to in connection with a payments union covering 
all the East European countries.2 The efficiency of the system 
would even be enhanced if some of the former members of 
Comecon, especially those whose industry was most depen-
dent on the Soviet 'market', could join the combination. 
Experience towards the end of 1991 seems to show that even 
a sharp cut in prices of manufactures will not be enough to 
enable substitute markets to be found in the face of effects 
related to standards and sales networks. 
It should be clear that the suggested combination cannot 
be permanent. It would be justified during the period of 
modernization and re-equipment of the productive system, 
which might be very long. But it could also become an 
adaptable basis for development (through the adjustment of 
customs duties and par values, and a gradual change in the 
trade-off between protection and openness). It would thus 
enable monetary variables and trade to follow the economic 
transformation of the area. It could also be a special frame-
work for global aid packages (of the Marshall Plan type), 
and would become an ideal instrument for achieving a cus-
tom-built link-up between Western Europe and the former 
area of Soviet domination, eventually leading to integration. 
4. Cooperation, integration, transition 
It has been explicitly or implicitly assumed in several parts 
of this paper that the reform of the economies and their 
transition to market economies would continue during the 
stage of close integration that has been described. However, 
if this process is the main objective, the question of inte-
gration or disintegration still needs to be considered. 
At first sight, disintegration may be seen as favourable to 
the process of reform. By restoring institutional autonomy 
of decision to the local level, it may be imagined that it will 
lead to faster dismantling of the former system. Similarly, 
it might seem that it would be easier to apply monetary 
stabilization policies at the level of each republic separately. 
See R. Portes (1991). 
See P. Bofinger (1991, p.13). 
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Such policies are clearly conditions sine qua non of transition. 
Consequently, attempts to maintain a high level of concerta-
tion and cooperation could appear to be counterproductive 
from the point of view of the transformation of the econom-
ies. Nevertheless it is far from clear that this superficial 
conclusion will be confirmed by a more detailed analysis. 
The problem is not so much that of making decisions as that 
of maintaining them. The important thing is to ensure an 
irreversible process, despite foreseeable problems over the 
next few years. 3 Several remarks are called for here. 
(i) Monetary stabilization will be achieved, in the final 
analysis, only if the need for Western currencies can 
be kept within reasonable limits,4 and if the internal 
economic and social situation can also be stabilized. It 
would be vain to expect that in a situation of massive 
unemployment or paralysis of the productive system, the 
governments of the republics could limit the expansion 
of the money supply. Similarly, if there were a strong 
external trade constraint (a need to import energy and 
raw materials, and an inability to export), the capacity of 
governments durably to stabilize the monetary situation 
would be doubtful. 
(ii) The dynamic process concerned here is the opposite one 
to that described above to analyse monetary slippage, 
but it may lead to the same result. As long as we were 
discussing the features of the Soviet-type economy before 
reform, the problem of labour shortages was clearly 
central. These shortages result from a systematic tend-
ency to over-invest, low structural productivity (related 
to the inefficiency of the system of incentives because 
of obstacles to the fungibility of money, and to the 
disorganization generated by supply failures), and a de-
pressed demographic situation in the north-west. There 
was ample evidence of inability to contain nominal 
wages in the north-western republics.5 This was one of 
the mechanisms of monetary destabilization that helped 
to show why the situation was much more serious in the 
north-west than in the south-east. From a viewpoint 
taken after reform, it cannot be denied that governments 
must face the problem of closing down unprofitable 
firms. If they decide to do so, they will have to make a 
major contribution to compensating those whose jobs 
have disappeared (for only with adequate compensation 
will the USSR accept unemployment). If they decide not 
to close down such firms, out of fear of the social 
4 
See the distinction between static and dynamic irreversibility in M. 
Aglietta (1991, pp. 311-334). 
See R. Portes (1991). 
See V. K. Senchagov (1989, pp. 11-13). 
consequences, they will have to subsidize them. In either 
case, any sharp contraction in economic activity will 
lead to strong budgetary tensions that are potentially 
inflationary. In this situation, as before reform, the scene 
is set for monetary slippage. Moreover, the concen-
tration of resources in the north-west and of jobs in the 
east and south-east of the former Soviet Union removes 
any logical basis for the argument in favour of separate 
stabilization. 
It would therefore appear that while disintegration 
makes it easier to take important decisions, it makes it 
more difficult to maintain them. There is no doubt 
that the republic authorities have greater legitimacy for 
taking measures. Nor is there any doubt that they would 
find it almost impossible to maintain their position if 
they did not keep up the trade and monetary links 
referred to above. If reform from the centre failed, it is 
to be feared that localized reform will also fail. The most 
serious mistake that could be made would be to forget 
that the inhabitants of the former Soviet Union support 
the idea of a transition to a market economy only in so 
far as it improves their material well-being. 
The multiplication of decision-making centres ( 15 if each 
republic represents a centre, even more if the disintegration 
process goes further) also raises two technical problems that 
should not be ignored: the first concerns the number of 
qualified managers for government departments. It seems 
unlikely that the Soviet Union could provide the human 
resources to staff 15 genuinely independent central banks, 
even disregarding the question of their reputation in contacts 
with the international financial market. 1 The second is the 
problem of the need to coordinate rules and regulations to 
avoid compartmentalization into n segmented and inefficient 
markets. The problem of rules is the more critical as these 
are countries where the market has been described and 
perceived as the antithesis of rules. Even the idea of pruden-
tial rules is far from having been accepted. The serious 
shortage of economic and legal specialists is a very strong 
argument in favour of keeping the number of decision-
This problem has been dealt with primarily in the context of domestic 
monetary policy, but it would also arise for relations with foreign 
investors. See D. Kreps and R. Wilson (1982, pp. 253-279). 
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making centres small. Here again, there is a risk that the 
principle of transition will be endangered by the conditions 
for its application. 
The options of close cooperation, or even integration, that 
we have mentioned are certainly those most likely to ensure 
irreversible transition, even if they are reflected in relatively 
slow decision-making in some cases. 
The regional implications of the present monetary crisis thus 
highlight several contradictions. 
(i) The need to maintain close integration, at least in the 
short term, is accompanied (and reinforced) by a tend-
ency to ongoing disintegration that may not stop at the 
frontiers of the republics. In a sense, the outcome of a 
process of decomposition and recomposition that will 
certainly take years is really needed straight away. This 
means that any comparison with the process of the 
constitution of the EC is misleading. 
(ii) Monetary stabilization appears to be the only means of 
preventing paralysis of the productive system; but the 
conditions of operation of the productive system are 
the only means of ensuring monetary stabilization. 
(iii) The present divergence between the pace of progress on 
the political front (with the risk of extremist views 
gaining support) and the pace of economic change 
means that the optimal political conditions for ensuring 
transition are not optimal from the economic point of 
view. 
These three contradictions illustrate perfectly the great dif-
ference between the European integration process and the 
Soviet situation. While they do not bode well for the adop-
tion of optimal solutions, it is still to be hoped that the 
outlook for the less favourable options will appear grim 
enough to encourage the authorities in the different republics 
to avoid the worst by choosing cooperation. From this point 
of view, the extreme fluidity of the situation could even be 
an advantage. For lessons can be learned from dealing with 
a crisis; and if the learning process can l,P, supported and 
strengthened from outside, it could help to develop view-
points that would encourage cooperative solutions. 
Drafting completed in December 1991. 
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1. The options 
After the splitting up of the Soviet Union into independent 
republics a completely new monetary order for the rouble 
currency area is required. The paper discusses the two polar 
options of a Soviet economic and monetary union (SEMU) 
with a single currency and a central bank system with a 
federative structure, and ofa system with independent repub-
lic currencies with devolution of monetary responsibilities 
to the level of the republics. 
In the present situation an analysis of these arrangements 
should be guided above all by two criteria: their contribution 
to restoring monetary stability and to preserving intra-trade 
relations, at least for an intermediate period. The first cri-
terion is based on the trivial insight that the transition to a 
market economy cannot be achieved without a money which 
fulfils the functions of a means of exchange, store of value 
and unit of account. Thus any blueprint for a new monetary 
framework in the area of the Soviet Union has to provide 
for stringent control over the money supply. In more detail it 
has to be assessed in the light of the following two questions: 
(i) What constraints does the monetary order impose on 
central bank financing of government deficits at the 
federal level and at the republic level? Which insti-
tution(s) are responsible for exercising such limits? 
(ii) How can the monetary order cope with the problem of 
loss-making State-owned enterprises which are unevenly 
distributed among the republics? In other words, how 
can one design a monetary order for an economy where 
a genuine private sector does not exist? 
The second criterion is related to the very high degree of 
division of Jabour among the republics. There is a risk 
that an uncoordinated transition to independent republic 
currencies could lead to undue monetary impediments to 
intra-Soviet trade, which would have a negative impact on 
growth and employment in all republics. A new monetary 
order for the area of the Soviet Union should, therefore, 
provide a mechanism which keeps such frictions as low as 
possible. 
The paper does not focus on specific trade arrangements. It 
seems obvious that the models of the EEC common market 
or the EC internal market could serve as important starting 
points for any attempt to establish a market-oriented trade 
regime between the republics. 
The idea of a parallel currency, which was recently put 
forward by Soros (1991 ), is discussed in the appendix. 
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2. A Soviet economic and monetary union 
If a common currency is to be preserved for the area of the 
Soviet Union, the republics will have to agree to leave all 
monetary responsibilities at the federal level. This would 
have the direct implication that the extremely difficult task 
of monetary stabilization would be assigned to a central 
institution. The following options for the institutional set-
up of a Soviet economic and monetary union (SEMU) differ 
in the degree of discretion which the monetary order allows 
to this central institution and in the composition of the 
members of this important decision-making body. 
2.1. The draft treaty 
The model of a monetary union was suggested by the draft 
treaty of the economic union. However, the Yavlinsky paper 
said almost nothing about the concrete framework of the 
envisaged 'banking union'. Above all, it left open the status 
of the members of the main decision-making body and 
whether they would be allowed to lend to the republic 
governments. However, as the draft treaty provided for 
limitations on deficits only in the framework of 'coordinated 
budget and tax policy' (Article 19), 1 it seems likely that no 
strict limitations on central bank financing of government 
deficits were envisaged. Thus, one has to expect that the 
draft treaty would preserve the 'worst imaginable monetary 
system' (Summers, quoted in Havrylyshyn and Williamson, 
1991, p. 31 ), which presently allows each republic unlimited 
access to the printing press of the common central bank. 
Under such conditions, one should not rely on political 
'agreements' to limit fiscal deficits in a federative framework. 
The discussion on 'binding rules' for fiscal policy in the 
context of a European economic and monetary union has 
shown how difficult it is to define such rules ex ante, to 
monitor them, and to find adequate sanctions.2 Thus, with-
out constraints on fiscal deficits that are embedded in the 
central bank's constitution, the draft treaty's attempt to run 
a federative central banking system for the Soviet Union is 
not likely to change the present incentive structure, which 
makes it advantageous for each republic to run as large a 
deficit as possible (Havrylyshyn and Williamson, 1991). 
Article 19 says: 'Member States of the economic union coordinate their 
budget and tax policies, which entails commonly agreed limits on deficits 
of consolidated State budgets, taking account of extra-budgetary funds, 
and the setting of limits on the growth of the domestic debt of member 
States of the economic union. In cases where the agreed results are 
exceeded by one or more member States of the economic union, the 
excess amount will become a debt obligation of the other members, in 
accordance with agreed rules'. 
2 According to the draft treaty, this complicated task seems to be assigned 
to the Inter-State Economic Committee, whose chairman is to be elected 
by the Heads of State of member States of the economic union. 
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It is questionable whether more stringency could be created 
if the members of the 'banking union's' board were granted 
a politically independent status. The federative structure of 
the system would provide policy-makers with some protec-
tion against pressure from individual republics. However, as 
long as the central bank has the discretion to provide credit 
to the government, one has to expect that any government 
would be tempted to nominate representatives from its own 
party and that all governments would cooperate in exerting 
pressure on the members of this institution. The situation of 
the central bank's board would become especially difficult 
if its policy were to threaten to cause the bankruptcy of a 
republic. 1 
The Yavlinsky draft is also not very specific on the question 
of whether a single currency should be preserved or whether 
it would be possible for the rouble to coexist with the 
currencies of the republics. Article 15 says: 'The introduction 
by member States of the economic union of national currenc-
ies is permitted, but only on conditions which exclude the 
possibility of damage to the monetary system of the econ-
omic union.' However, one has to admit that the draft 
for a European System of Central Banks also avoids clear 
statements on this issue. The traditional definition of a 
currency union, which dates back to the Werner Report 
presented in 1970, makes no distinction between a single 
currency and a system of national currencies with 'absolutely 
fixed exchange rates'. In fact, even the banknotes of the 
United States can be differentiated according to the specific 
Federal Reserve Bank which issues them. Thus, banknotes 
of the republics could coexist with rouble banknotes as long 
as there was common control over their issue and it was 
agreed that they would always be exchanged at an absolutely 
fixed exchange rate by the common central bank system. 
2.2. SEMU according to the model of EMU 
A higher degree of fiscal stringency could be achieved if a 
Soviet monetary union were designed as a Soviet System of 
Central Banks (SSCB) along the lines of the draft statute 
for a European System of Central banks (ESCB). Basing the 
discussion on this approach would also provide solutions to 
many other open issues, e.g. the distribution of seigniorage. 
In such a system, each republic would have its own central 
bank, which would be legally independent but subject to the 
decisions of the SSCB council. At the union level, an SSCB 
board would be installed, which would have to monitor 
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(1991). 
policy implementation by the republic central banks.2 The 
members of the board and the presidents of the republic 
central banks would constitute the SSCB council, which 
would be the supreme decision-making body.3 The members 
of the council should be independent from all political direc-
tion. 
Adopting the statutes of the ESCB for an SEMU would set 
very tight financial constraints for the union and the republic 
governments, as the draft statute of the ESCB completely 
excludes central bank financing of government deficits. The 
central bank could create money only via the purchase of 
foreign exchange or of bills issued by commercial banks or 
State-owned enterprises. 
Under this framework, the republic governments could run 
deficits only if they could find private investors willing to 
buy their securities. In the discussion on EMU a major 
concern was that private markets would not exert enough 
discipline on member countries with an unsustainable fiscal 
position, which eventually would need to be bailed out by 
the rest of the Community. In the case of the Soviet Union 
the risk of such an externality seems not to be very high, at 
least for the foreseeable future. It is unlikely either that 
foreign investors would be very interested in buying a signifi-
cant amount of bonds issued by one of the republics, or that 
the residents of one republic would be eager to invest their 
money in bonds of other republics. Compared with a pro-
spective EMU, one would not have to fear a lack of discipline 
exerted by private markets. On the contrary, there is a risk 
that too rigid fiscal constraints could lead to the insolvency 
of some republics, which are not accustomed to living with-
out unlimited access to central bank financing. 
The situation in an SSCB would also be different from an 
ESCB because of the lack of a genuine private sector. In its 
credit policy, the SSCB would be confronted with the task 
of setting financial constraints for loss-making State-owned 
firms, which means that its policy would have not only 
global but also regional and structural implications. The 
easiest way out would be an accommodative policy stance, 
such as was adopted in the reforming countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, allowing the survival of all loss-making 
firms by indirect central bank financing of the 'soft budget 
In the case of the Soviet Union, it might be appropriate for the board 
to have the responsibility for specific operational tasks, above all foreign 
exchange market interventions. This would be different from the US 
Federal Reserve model, but similar to the Bundesbank model. 
In the draft statute for the ESCB no weighting of the votes is envisaged. 
In the case of the Soviet Union it seems unlikely that the Russian 
Republic would agree to be represented in the same way as a small 
republic. 
constraint'. This approach would perpetuate inflation as 
well as microeconomic inefficiencies. Thus, a comprehensive 
stabilization effort of the central bank is not possible without 
a reduction of its real credit to the banking system. Such a 
policy would require that the central bank ration its refinan-
cing credit. In the situation of the Soviet Union, where a 
money market is absent 1 and where one cannot trust in 
the market mechanism for the regional allocation of the 
monetary base,2 the most difficult problem would be the 
determination of a criterion for the regional allocation of 
central bank liquidity. 
It is obvious that any such criterion would be more or less 
arbitrary. Therefore, serious conflicts over the allocation of 
central refinancing credit to the commercial banks in the 
individual republics would be likely, especially as this policy 
could determine the speed of economic restructuring in the 
individual republics. 3 Further difficulties would arise from 
the simultaneous creation of strict financial constraints on 
the government sector, which would generate a strong tend-
ency to transfer public deficits to the regional State-owned 
enterprises. 
In sum, compared with the draft treaty, an SEMU based on 
the EMU model would have the advantage that it would 
considerably strengthen the central bank's position in the 
political process by excluding any discrimination in credit 
policy towards the government sector. A major problem of 
this approach is that immediate implementation of such a 
stringent constraint on the public sector could lead to the 
bankruptcy of some republics. In addition, the regional 
allocation of credit to the 'private' sector might become a 
very serious issue, leading to conflicts between the members 
of the central bank council. 
2.3. SEMU as a currency board 
The remaining degree of freedom could be eliminated if the 
SEMU were modelled as a currency board, which would 
mean that any expansion of the monetary base of the com-
mon monetary institution would have to be matched by an 
The analogy with EMU would also require that the republics do not 
impose restrictions on private capital transactions across their borders. 
Even if such transactions do not seem very likely at the moment, one 
could imagine that SEMU could also be established with controls on 
capital movements. 
Banks that do not operate under hard budget constraints might be 
willing to bid very high interest rates in order to obtain as much central 
bank liquidity as possible. 
Enterprise losses have to be financed by commercial bank credits. Thus, 
the amount of commercial bank credit available determines the number 
of unprofitable enterprises that can be kept alive. 
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increase in its net foreign assets. If the currency board were 
designed in such a way that the central bank was not obliged 
to convert its banknotes into foreign exchange,4 it would 
not be necessary for the outstanding.money stock to have a 
100 % foreign-exchange backing. It would be sufficient that 
additional money could be issued only if the foreign-ex-
change reserves of the central bank were to rise by the same 
amount. A major attra<::tion of currency boards is that a 
country still obtains seigniorage, because foreign-exchange 
reserves can be held in the form of interest-bearing assets. 
In an SEMU designed as a currency board, the money 
supply and lending to the enterprise sector would be mainly 
determined by the current-account situation: enterprises 
with export earnings in convertible currencies are obliged to 
transfer them to the banking system, which can use these 
assets to obtain central bank liquidity. This money supply 
mechanism has the effect that the central bank has no 
discretion in its lending to the banking sector. Thus, the 
money supply process would be completely isolated from 
political considerations, which might eliminate the regional 
conflicts that seem likely in any other federative monetary 
system for the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the simul-
taneous introduction of very rigid constraints for public and 
'private' borrowers, who are used to living with 'soft budget 
constraints', could lead to a massive contraction of the real 
economy without any leeway for discretionary measures. 
This leads to a general problem which is associated with any 
restrictive monetary policy in a framework of economic 
transition, during which the economy is still characterized 
by massive microeconomic distortions. It is obvious that an 
absolutely strict limit on central bank credit to commercial 
banks would initiate a selection process between profitable 
and unprofitable enterprises, which the banking system 
would have to undertake. However, one has to ask whether 
the financial sector in these economies has a comparative 
advantage in identifying those enterprises which are the most 
competitive under market conditions. The following aspects 
seem relevant in this context: (1) Banks do not have the 
experience to assess the profitability of firms. (2) Because 
there are no provisions for bad debts, capital-asset ratios 
Ii :,i 
It would not be necessary for the central bank to be obliged to convert 
its banknotes into foreign exchange. This obligation, which characterizes 
traditional currency boards, would be difficult to implement in the 
situation of the Soviet Union. Such an option could induce private 
agents to switch all their bank deposits into banknotes and then into 
foreign exchange. Because of the low reputation of the national money 
and national monetary authorities in the Soviet Union, such a run could 
be prevented only if a 100 % backing of the whole money stock were 
available. Given the relatively low stocks of foreign exchange of the 
Soviet Union, this would require an extreme devaluation of the rouble. 
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are low, and portfolios are highly concentrated on specific 
regions and sectors, banks would endanger their own sur-
vival if they let their big borrowers go bankrupt. (3) Firms 
have a debt structure which is determined by political 
decisions of the past, which means that present interest 
payments are not necessarily related to a firm's economic 
performance. (4) Firms have strong inter-enterprise credit 
relations, which could lead to the closing down of profitable 
firms, only because they have large outstanding credits to 
other firms. 
These considerations would call for a more flexible approach 
in monetary policy, at least until the process of privatization 
has started and until the banking system is restructured. 
2.4. SEMU managed by representatives of 
international institutions 
The three options for an SEMU which have been discussed 
so far have either 
(i) the disadvantage of providing too much discretion, which 
might lead to an erosion of the required financial con-
straints by strong political pressure or to serious conflicts 
over the regional impact of monetary policy, or 
(ii) the disadvantage of being too rigid in a situation which 
might require some flexibility in order to cope with all 
kinds of economic uncertainties and ongoing microecon-
omic distortions. 
This would call for an arrangement which allows some 
degree of flexibility to be preserved while at the same time 
safeguarding monetary policy from political interference as 
far as possible. A combination of these two features could 
only be obtained by modifying the EMU model in such a 
way that its supreme decision-making (central bank council) 
body included representatives of international institutions 
(IMF, World Bank, EC, OECD, EBRD), who were given a 
majority over the representatives from the republics. 1 This 
hypothetical arrangement, which would not necessarily 
require the complete prohibition of central-bank-financed 
government deficits (see the comparison of the four options 
in Table 1), would have several important advantages over 
the three other approaches: 
(i) By reducing the influence of national politicians on 
monetary policy decisions, it would enhance the credi-
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A similar approach was suggested by Soros ( 1991) for the board of the 
ECU Bank. 
bility of the central bank in general, which could contrib-
ute to reducing the costs in declining output that are 
associated with any stabilization programme. In 
addition, it would enhance the confidence of foreign 
investors and creditors. 
(ii) It would allow the central bank council more flexibility 
in its lending to public authorities and to the 'private' 
sector, which might be required in situations with 
exogenous shocks. 
(iii) It would provide a foreign scapegoat, which might be 
helpful for the republics in situations where unpopular 
decisions are unavoidable. 
Of course, such a solution seems absolutely unrealistic. As 
the more realistic approaches are either too flexible or too 
rigid, there seems to be at the moment no economically 
viable alternative to a system of republic currencies. Thus, 
the economic analysis justifies the mainly politically deter-
mined preference for independent currencies. 
2.5. Costs of abandoning a common currency 
area 
As it seems not possible to maintain a common currency 
area in the Soviet Union, the transition process will be 
impaired by the difficulties which are involved in using a 
multitude of republic currencies for the huge amount of 
inter-republic trade. 
The traditional argument against national ('republic') cur-
rencies is the reduction of transaction costs and information 
costs (in a static as well as in an intertemporal sense) which 
can be achieved by having a single currency. This presup-
poses, however, that the single currency is fulfilling the 
functions of a means of payment and of a standard of value 
(Gros and Steinherr 1991). As the rouble does not provide 
these functions in general and also not in trade among 
republics, the transition from the present monetary (dis)-
order to a system of republic currencies would have no 
negative effects on economic efficiency in the Soviet Union. 
Thus, the costs of having republic currencies can be deter-
mined only if one assumes that it would be possible to 
establish an efficient common currency for the area of the 
Soviet Union. 
Seen from this hypothetical benchmark, the introduction of 
separate currency areas creates exchange-rate uncertainty 
for transactions between the republics. Because of the high 
degree of political and economic instability, one has to 
A system of republic currencies 
Table 1 
Options for a monetary union in the Soviet Union 
Central bank credit to the republics and the union Provision of central bank liquidity to the banking system 
Yavlinsky draft discretion: decided by the board of the 
banking union; deficit limits will be set 
according to Article 19 of the treaty 
discretion : decided by the board of the 
banking union 
EMU-model prohibited 
Currency board prohibited 
discretion: purchase of bank bills or en-
terprise bills by the central bank 
rule: refinancing credit prohibited; 
money supply only via purchase of 
foreign exchange 
Internationally managed 
monetary union 
discretion: decided by representatives of international organizations 
expect that the exchange rates between the republic cur-
rencies would not be very stable. In contrast to market 
economies this would have negative effects on the very 
intensive trade relations between the republics: at least for 
an intermediate period it would be relatively difficult for the 
enterprise managers to cope with foreign-exchange fluctu-
ations. It would also take some time until the banking system 
would be in a position to provide the necessary hedging 
services. Of course, the degree of exchange-rate instability 
would also be determined by the exchange-rate arrangements 
of the individual countries and by their possible willingness 
to operate a system of fixed exchange rates within the area 
of the Soviet Union (Section 3.2). At present, the Russian 
Republic seems to favour a flexible exchange rate for the 
rouble. 
In addition, a functioning monetary union would have the 
advantage that all transactions could be handled in the 
domestic currency. This would significantly reduce the aggre-
gate reserve needs of the republics. The traditional indicator 
for assessing the reserve adequacy is the relation of reserves 
to imports. In the case of the Soviet Union, internal trade 
is about four times the size of external trade. To maintain 
the present relation of reserves to imports in a situation with 
separate currencies, the amount of aggregate reserves would 
have to increase fivefold. An additional increase in reserves 
would be required because of the reduced diversification, 
which is caused by the transition to a system with separate 
reserve holdings. While the former effect can be mitigated 
by a payments union (Section 3.3), the second could be 
influenced by the creation of a fixed exchange-rate system 
within the Soviet Union, which provided common facilities 
for intervention credit (section 3.2). 
3. A system of republic currencies 
3.1. The standard of reference 
Breaking up the Soviet Union into republic currency areas 
would transfer all monetary policy responsibilities from the 
union level to the republics. In this case it would be necessary 
to create stringent financial. constraints for the republic 
governments as well as for the loss-making enterprise sector. 
In principle, the main options mentioned above (politically 
independent system with or without prohibition of central 
bank lending to the government, currency board) are feas-
ible. In contrast to a federative system, one would not have 
the problem of how to allocate the money supply among the 
regions. However, the board of a republic central bank, all 
of whose members were nominated by the same government, 
would be much more exposed to political pressure, even if 
this were excluded by the statutes. In a purely republic 
institution it might also be politically more difficult to give 
representatives from international institutions a say in mon-
etary policy. 
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Therefore, the main characteristic of this approach is that 
fiscal stringency cannot be achieved by an external tying of 
the hands of the government.. It has to be brought about by 
the determination of each republic government to stabilize 
its economy. However, the lack of outside constraints in a 
system with separate currencies does not necessarily mean 
that the prospects for a comprehensive stabilization effort 
in the area of the Soviet Union as a whole would be dimmer. 
The outcome depends, on the one hand, on the political 
strength of each republic government, and, on the other 
hand, on the effectiveness of the constraints that can be built 
into the statutes of a monetary union. The experience of 
Poland shows that individual governments are able to reduce 
their deficits substantially if this is required to make the 
national currency convertible. However, it does not indicate 
that they are really strong enough to close down large loss-
making enterprises. 
It is, therefore, important for any comparison between a 
monetary union in the Soviet Union and a system of indepen-
dent currencies to specify in detail which concrete solution 
is regarded as the standard of reference. For instance, an 
ideal monetary union which was controlled by representa-
tives of international organizations might lead to better 
outcomes than a multitude of republic central banks in 
republics with relatively weak governments. On the other 
hand, a monetary union without efficient constraints on 
lending to republic governments and to the enterprise sector 
might be a worse solution than a system with republic 
currencies where at least some of the governments were 
strongly committed to rapid macroeconomic stabilization. 
3.2. The exchange-rate system 
The effects of the transition to separate currency areas 
depend to some extent on the exchange-rate regimes that 
the republics adopt for their currencies. 
Without a strong willingness to cooperate, most republics 
could be expected to follow the approach of Poland, Yugos-
lavia and Czechoslovakia, which pegged their national cur-
rency unilaterally at a fixed rate to a major international 
reserve currency .1 Because of the high share of intra-Soviet 
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This approach was recently suggested by the International Baltic Econ-
omic Commission (1991). Their proposal comprises the following fea-
tures: creation of national currencies for the Baltic republics, a currency 
reform for rouble deposits and rouble notes and coins, creation of a 
two-tier banking system, creation of independent central banks, which 
are not entitled to buy government debt in the primary and secondary 
market, a fixed exchange rate vis-a-vis the ecu as the main nominal 
anchor of the reform programme, and a payments union between the 
three Baltic republics, which is also the main channel for payments' 
transactions between the Baltic republics and foreign countries, includ-
ing the Soviet Union. 
trade, the republics could adopt any major international 
reserve currency as the anchor currency, as long as they all 
pegged to the same currency unit: such a common peg would 
automatically cover at least four-fifths of the republics' total 
foreign trade. For political reasons, the ecu might be es-
pecially attractive. Choosing an identical anchor for all re-
public currencies vis-a-vis the outside world would create a 
relatively homogeneous fixed-rate system within the area of 
the Soviet Union. Above all, it would avoid fluctuations 
between alternative anchor currencies (e.g. the dollar and 
the ecu) leading to undue exchange-rate fluctuations between 
the republic currencies. The implicit internal exchange-rate 
arrangement, which would be created by such an outside 
peg, would have the advantage that each republic had full 
responsibility for the external and internal stability of its 
currency. In this respect the internal exchange-rate system 
of the Soviet Union would become very similar to the inter-
national gold standard, 
• where the commitment of each member country to keep 
the value of its currency stable in terms of gold simul-
taneously created a system of fixed parities between the 
currencies of all member countries, and 
• where each member country had the sole responsibility 
for meeting its commitment to the gold convertibility of 
its currency. 
A major problem of this approach is the dismal balance-of-
payments situation of some republics, especially in the Baltic 
area. After corrections for subsidies and price distortions 
Lithuania's deficit amounts to 30 % of its GNP, in Estonia 
this ratio is 23 % (EC Commission 1990, p. 75). The deficits 
of the Central Asian republics are somewhat lower, but with 
values in the range of I O to 20 % still exceed by far the levels 
that independent States can sustain. If one assumes that such 
huge balance-of-payments disequilibria cannot be corrected 
overnight, a comprehensive system of regional transfers 
within the Soviet Union would be required even after its 
dissolution into independent currency areas. In this respect, 
the European Regional Development Fund of the EC might 
serve as a model. The question is whether the Russian 
Republic as the only major creditor would be willing to 
continue its subsidies after the transition to convertibility. 
If this is not the case, these republics will have to achieve 
the necessary internal adjustment before or simultaneously 
with the introduction of convertibility, which should not be 
impossible, at least for the Baltic republics with their high 
degree of industrialization, their good infrastructure and 
closeness to Europe, as well as the familiarity of their popu-
lations with market mechanisms.2 
For a ranking of the Soviet republics in terms of their economic strength 
see Deutsche Bank (1991). The Ukraine is assessed as the strongest 
republic, followed by the Baltic republics. 
In order to reduce the high foreign-exchange reserve needs 
which are created by a system with separate reserve holdings, 
one might alternatively consider a fixed exchange-rate sys-
tem along the lines of the exchange-rate mechanism of the 
EMS for the republics. The main difference between such 
an arrangement and a unilateral peg system is the availability 
of a pool of common reserves and intervention credits for 
countries with weak currencies: in the EMS, countries with 
strong currencies have to support weak currencies either by 
purchasing them with their own currencies or by providing 
intervention credits to the central bank with the weak cur-
rency. In the short term, such intervention credits (very 
short-term financing facility) are unlimited, but after a pre-
scribed period (three to nine months) the country with the 
weak currency is responsible for settling the balances in its 
currency acquired by other central banks and has to repay 
its intervention credits in an outside currency or the currency 
of the creditor country. An important precondition for this 
approach is a certain degree of political stability and mutual 
confidence, in order to preclude some republics using the 
intervention credits to live beyond their means for a certain 
period of time. In the present situation, it would at least 
seem necessary to set quantitative limits on the availability 
of intervention credits. 
3.3. The payments system between the republics 
The rationale of a specific payments system between the 
republics is that it can contribute to a reduction in the 
republics' aggregate transactions demand for foreign-ex-
change reserves, which-as already mentioned-is enor-
mously increased by the transition to a system of separate 
currencies. 1 
The model of the European Payments Union (Bofinger 
1991a, Kenen 1991) would suggest that the republics main-
tain convertibility restrictions (also on current-account 
transactions) vis-a-vis the outside world, but make their 
currencies convertible for intra-trade relations. A monthly 
clearing of all bilateral balances would show the multilateral 
balances of each republic. While small cumulative deficits 
would require no hard currency settlement at all, the percent-
age of settlement that had to be made in convertible currenc-
This problem would be somewhat less acute if the republics were able 
to make their currencies convertible for residents in other republics. 
Under such a framework, the banks in each republic would be willing 
to hold working balances in the currencies of the other republics, which 
would reduce the reserve needs of the central bank. For the foreseeable 
future, such mutual private reserve holdings have to be excluded, which 
means that all current-account transactions will have to be financed 
through the central bank. 
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ies would increase with the amount of the cumulative deficit. 
The flexibility of the arrangement could be increased by the 
provision of reserves from outside countries, which would 
allow a creditor country to receive a higher percentage of 
settlement in hard currency than the percentage of hard 
currency settlement which was required from the debtor. 
In the case of the Soviet Union-as well as of Eastern 
Europe-the direct application of the EPU approach does 
not seem adequate during the period of economic transform-
ation, as it would require the maintenance of current con-
vertibility restrictions vis-a-vis the outside world. It is widely 
agreed in the present discussion (Portes 1991) that this would 
conserve the existing microeconomic inefficiencies, above all 
a high degree of monopolization. distorted relative prices 
and a lack of information about the profitability of en-
terprises under world market conditions. However, one 
might consider it as an intermediate solution until a compre-
hensive reform programme is designed. 
However, another possibility would be to combine the ar-
rangement of a regional payments union with a system of 
current-account convertibility without regional limitations. 
Such a synthesis would be facilitated by the fact that as 
long as capital-account convertibility is absent, all trade 
transactions have to be recorded by the central bank. Under 
such conditions, an importer who wishes to buy a product 
from an enterprise in another republic would not need for-
eign exchange. He would simply make his payment in the 
local currency to the central bank. The exporter in the other 
republic would obtain a payment from his republic central 
bank, also in his local currency. The balance between the two 
central banks would be settled in the monthly multilateral 
clearing. For the exporter the situation would be the same 
as if he had received payment in foreign exchange, because 
under current-account convertibility he would be obliged 
to repatriate all his foreign-exchange earnings. The main 
difference between this approach and the EPU model is that 
a republic with a permanent multilateral deficit would have 
no possibility to restrict its global trade with the other 
republics. Such restrictions would simply lead to increased 
imports from outside countries and also to a loss of foreign-
exchange reserves. 
The two alternative arrangements for a payments union 
could be implemented sequentially. The EPU solution could 
be adequate as an immediate solution, preventing a break-
down of intra-Soviet trade until a comprehensive reform 
programme, which includes current-account convertibility, 
can be designed. However, because of the large structural 
bilateral deficits of several republics (Table 2), one should 
not expect too much from such an agreement. If the present 
disequilibria could not be removed rapidly. calculations by 
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Gros (1991b) indicate that the quotas of an SPU would be impact after less than two years. The speed of this adjustment 
exhausted within the first or second year of its existence. process is difficult to forecast, as the balance-of-payments 
Thus, it would not be very useful to invest much effort in the situation of the republics will be determined above all by 
construction of a scheme which ceased to have an economic the stance of their monetary policy. 
Table 2 
Current-account deficits of the republics under world market prices 
USSR: Adjustments to trade balances of the republics. 19881 
Unadjusted Turnover Consumer Trade by Adjusted World Balance 
balance tax subsidies visitors balance prices adjusted for 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5)= (6) foreign 
[(1)+(2)+ prices 
(3)+(4)] (7)= 
[(1)+(6)] 
( In billions of roubles) 
USSR -50,4 -50,4 52,3 1,9 
RSFSR -33,3 -3,4 -5,1 0,1 -41,7 64,1 30,8 
Ukraine -2,9 -1,2 1,6 -0,4 -2,9 -2,9 
Belarus 2,1 -1,1 1,7 0,6 3,3 -4,2 -2,1 
Estonia -0,7 -0,1 0,2 0,3 -0,3 -0,6 -1,3 
Latvia -0,7 -0,2 0,4 0,5 -0,6 -1,3 
Lithuania -1,5 -0,4 0,8 0,5 -0,6 -2,2 -3,7 
Moldova -1,0 0,9 0,3 0,6 0,8 -1,6 -2,6 
Georgia -0,6 0,6 -0,3 -0,7 -1,0 -1,3 -1,9 
Armenia -1,1 0,2 -0,3 -0,2 -1,4 -0,3 -1,4 
Azerbaijan 1,1 1,8 -0,4 -0,4 2,1 -1,6 -0,5 
Kazakhstan -7,3 0,2 1,0 -0,5 -6,6 0,7 -6,6 
Turkmenistan -0,3 0,5 0,1 -0,2 0,1 0,3 
Uzbekistan -1,8 1,5 -0,4 -0,8 -0,7 -2,5 
Tadjikistan -1,1 0,4 -0,1 0,2 -0,6 -0,1 -1,1 
Kyrgyzstan -1,1 0,3 0,1 0,7 -0,1 -1,0 
(As% of NMP)2 
USSR -8,0 -8,0 8,3 0,3 
RSFSR -8,6 -0,9 -1,3 -10,8 16,6 8,0 
Ukraine -2,9 -1,2 1,6 -0,4 -2,9 -2,8 
Belarus 7,9 -4,2 6,5 2,3 12,5 -16,0 -8,0 
Estonia -18,4 -2,5 4,9 7,4 -8,6 -14,8 -33,2 
Latvia -9,9 -2,8 5,7 7,1 0,1 -8,5 -18,4 
Lithuania -17,2 -4,5 9,0 5,6 -7,1 -24,3 -41,5 
Moldova -13,2 11,7 3,9 7,8 10,1 -20,2 -33,4 
Georgia -5,8 5,9 -2,9 -6,8 -9,7 -12,8 -18,6 
Armenia -19,2 3,5 -5,2 -3,5 -24,4 -4,8 -24.0 
Azerbaijan 10,2 16,5 -3,7 -3,7 19,3 -14,7 -4,5 
Kazakhstan -27,0 0,7 3,7 -1,9 -24,4 2,6 -24,4 
Turkmenistan -6,0 10,6 2,1 -4,2 2,4 6,3 0,3 
Uzbekistan -8,9 7,2 0,0 -1,9 -3,6 -3,2 -12,1 
Tadjikistan -23,7 8,4 -2,1 4,2 -13,2 1,3 -22,4 
Kyrgyzstan -23,1 6,0 2,0 0,1 -15,0 2,2 -20,9 
I Combined trade balance with other republics and in foreign trade. 
2 NMP = net material product. 
Source: Vestnik stati.stiki, Nos 3 and 4. 1990. 
Explanation of columns: 
(I) Net trade balance in existing domestic prices. 
(2) Change in trade balance if turnover tax were reallocated in proponion to labour expenditures incurred in production. 
(3) Change in trade balance if consumer subsidies were charged to consuming republic. 
(4) Change in trade balance if adjusted for sales and purchases by visitors to republic. 
(6) Change in trade balance if revalued at world market prices. 
Source: IMF et al. (1991). 
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4. Is the Soviet Union an optimum currency 
area? 
The comparison between an SEMU and a system of republic 
currencies shows that the choice of an optimum currency 
area is much more complex than the traditional arguments 
suggest. Of course, there is a risk that some of the republics 
will be hit by an asymmetric real shock in the transformation 
process, which might call, at least in the short term, for 
nominal exchange-rate adjustments (Gros 1991a). However, 
this advantage of a system of independent currencies presup-
poses that nominal wages in the republics will be inflexible 
downwards, which is difficult to assess ex ante, especially in 
view of the sizeable degree of real wage flexibility that can 
presently be observed in some countries in Eastern Europe. 
For instance, it is hard to imagine that the acceptance of a 
real wage cut in the order of magnitude of 60 %, which 
occurred in Bulgaria in 1991, can be explained only by the 
existence of money illusion. 
The paper has shown that the decision between a monetary 
union and a system of independent currencies involves sev-
eral important issues, which are not sufficiently addressed 
in the traditional literature on optimum currency areas: 
(a) The credibility of monetary policy can be increased if it 
is transferred from the republic sphere to a politically 
independent institution at the federal level. 
(b) The aggregate demand for foreign-exchange reserves can 
be reduced if the republics are willing to maintain a 
common currency for their internal trade transactions 
and a common pool of foreign assets. 
(c) The costs of exchange-rate instability for the enterprise 
sector can be avoided if a common currency is main-
tained. 
Of course all these advantages can be easily outweighed if 
the board of the common central bank system is not able to 
exert fiscal discipline on the republics and on State-owned 
enterprises. However, the only arrangement which would 
allow the operation of a monetary union for the area of the 
Soviet Union would be an internationally managed central 
bank system. As this outcome is very unrealistic, there is no 
alternative to a system with republic currencies, which is 
now increasingly favoured by the republics. The economic 
costs of this arrangement are substantial and can only very 
partially be compensated by the installation of a Soviet 
payments union. 
Is the Soviet Union an optimum currency area? 
Appendix: The rationale of a parallel currency 
The proponents of a parallel currency for the Soviet Union 
(Shafei, 1990; Kazmin and Tsimailo, 1991; Soros, 1991) 
share the view that it will not be possible to create the 
internal fiscal discipline which is required for making the 
rouble convertible. Instead of devolving monetary responsi-
bilities to the republics (or in addition to republic currencies 
(Soros)) these economists propose the introduction of a 
parallel currency which would circulate side by side with the 
rouble (or the new republic currencies). The main difference 
between the two currencies is that the rouble would remain 
inconvertible for ever, while the parallel currency would be 
designed as a stable and convertible currency from its very 
beginning. It is expected that all the advantages which are 
commonly attributed to the introduction of convertibility 
could be provided by the parallel currency alone. Soros 
proposes that the parallel currency should be issued under 
the aegis of an international institution. 
To understand the rationale of this approach, it is useful to 
analyse its effects on the stock and flow disequilibria in the 
Soviet economy. From this perspective it is difficult to see 
any room for the issuance of an additional currency, as long 
as there exists a large monetary overhang and as long as 
the supply of the national currency constantly exceeds the 
growth of potential output. This also explains why it is so 
difficult to find a criterion for the amount of money which 
should be issued in the form of a parallel currency. 
The only neutral way to issue the parallel currency would 
be by instituting a currency board, which would exchange 
the rouble against the parallel currency at a fixed exchange 
rate. However, as long as stock and flow disequilibria persist, 
the demand for the parallel currency would be infinite, 
which would be incompatible with the aim of maintaining its 
stability and convertibility. 
Kasmin and Tsimailo propose to issue the parallel currency 
by granting credits to enterprises. Such credits should be 
given to enterprises producing consumer goods and export 
goods. But if the workers in these enterprises were paid in a 
'hard' currency, while the rest of the population had to 
accept the inconvertible rouble, this would create enormous 
tensions among the population: at least in the introductory 
phase of the scheme the unlimited convertibility of the paral-
lel currency into goods would necessarily aggravate the 
shortages for the rest of the population. 
The same effect would be created by the Soros scheme, 
which proposes to offer every member of the population 
every month an amount of USO 10 to 15 as a lump-sum 
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payment. In addition, enterprises would be granted a lump-
sum loan in the parallel currency. 
The problems of the proposal can also be seen from another 
perspective. If one assumes that the government is able 
neither to control its deficit nor to reduce the monetary 
overhang, but that prices (expressed in the parallel currency 
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or the rouble) will be market determined, the outcome will 
necessarily be a hyperinflation in terms of rouble prices. The 
only difference between this and a traditional hyperinflation 
is that the part of the population which worked for the export 
and consumer goods sector would be protected against its 
consequences. Again, the social tensions associated with this 
unjustified advantage of specific groups of the population 
would lead to insurmountable political problems. 
References 
Bofinger, Peter (1991a), 'A multilateral payments union for 
Eastern Europe', Review Banca Nazionale de/ Lavoro, 
No 176, March, pp. 69-88. 
Bofinger, Peter (1991 b), 'Options for the payments and 
exchange-rate system in Eastern Europe', CEP R Discussion 
Paper Series, No 545, London. Also published in European 
Economy, Special edition No 2, 1991. 
Commission of the European Communities (1990), 'Stabiliz-
ation, liberalization and devolution', European Economy, 
No 45. 
Deutsche Bank (1991 ), Soviet Union at the crossroads: Facts 
and figures on the Soviet republics, Frankfurt am Main. 
Gros, Daniel and Steinherr Alfred (1991), 'From centrally 
planned to market economies: issues for the transition-
Problems, differences and familiarities in Central Europe 
and the Soviet Union', CEPS Paper 51, Brussels, April. 
Gros, Daniel (1991a), 'Costs and benefits of economic and 
monetary union: an application to the Soviet Union', Inter-
national Economics Research Discussion Paper, No 74, Ka-
tholieke Universiteit Leuven. 
Gros, Daniel (1991b), 'A Soviet payments union?', mimeo. 
Havrylyshyn, Oleh and Williamson, John (1991), 'From 
Soviet disunion to Eastern economic community', Institute 
References 
for International Economics, Policy analyses in international 
economics, No 35, Washington DC. 
International Baltic Economic Commission (1991), 'Monet-
ary and fiscal issues and policy alternatives', Report of 
Working Group VI (Michele Fratianni, Lawrence S. David-
son and Juergen von Hagen), mimeo. 
Kazmin, Andrei and Tsimailo, Andrei (1991), 'Toward the 
convertible rouble: the case for a parallel currency' in: 
Currency convertibility in Eastern Europe, edited by John 
Williamson, Washington DC. 
Kenen, Peter B. (1991), 'Transitional arrangements for trade 
and payments among the CMEA countries', /MF Staff 
Papers, Washington DC. 
Portes, Richard (1991), 'The path to reform in Central and 
Eastern Europe: an introduction', CEPR Discussion Paper 
Series, No 559, London. Also published in European Econ-
omy, Special edition No 2, 1991. 
Shafei, Kuroch (1990), 'Der Weg in der Convertibilitiit fiir 
die Sowjetische Wiihrung', Osteuropa-Wirtschaft, Vol. 35, 
December, pp. 327-51. 
Soros, George (1991), 'USSR: See the future, make it work', 
Wall Street Journal, September 13, 1991. 
Williamson, John (1991), 'The opening of Eastern Europe', 
Institute for International Economics, Policy analyses in 
international economics, No 31, Washington DC. 
193 

Part4 
Political economy and 
economic culture in the 
transformation process 
195 

The political economy of transition in the Soviet Union 1 
Gerard Roland 
Universite libre de Bruxelles and CEPR 
1 This version November 1991. 
Contents 
1. Introduction 
I. I. Some recent results from the literature on political economy 
2. The USSR since perestroika 
2.1. Democratization 
2.2. Privatization 
2.3. Liberalization 
3. Assessment of the current situation and urgent issues 
3.1. Price liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization 
3.2. The future economic relations between the republics 
4. Conclusion 
Appendix: Scenarios for dealing with the monetary overhang 
A. I. A Polish-type scenario 
A.2. Liberalization with limited indexation 
A.3. Liberalization with limited rationing 
A.4. A German-style currency reform 
A.5. Emergency imports 
A.6. Stabilization through privatizaton 
A.7. Parallel currency schemes 
A.8. High real interest rates for savings and fiscal orthodoxy 
References 
199 
199 
202 
202 
206 
207 
208 
210 
211 
212 
213 
213 
213 
213 
213 
214 
214 
214 
214 
216 
197 

1. Introduction 
The transition of centrally planned economies to market 
economies is a historically unprecedented case of large-scale 
change of economic institutions. This change is inseparable 
from the political process. It is quite clear in the former 
USSR where reform plans for stabilization, liberalization 
and privatization are linked to a constitutional reshaping of 
the links between Russia and the other republics. It is also 
true in other countries where national conflicts do not play 
such an important role but where the abolition of the one-
party system appeared to be a precondition for consistent 
radical economic reform. 
Quite a number of questions of a political economy nature 
are raised by the transition from a planned to a market 
economy: 
(!) Which groups will benefit from the various transition 
measures and which groups will be disadvantaged? 
(2) How will the potential opposition between different 
interest groups be reflected in the political decision-
making process, given the existing economic insti-
tutions, and how will changes in the design of political 
institutions affect the way this opposition is reflected 
and influences the feasibility of given reform packages? 
In other words, what are the required institutional 
changes in the political decision-making process necess-
ary to make the transition succeed? 
(3) What can be said about the tactics of sequencing and 
the way they take into account the dynamic political 
constraints of the transition? 
Section 1.1 surveys some results that can be derived from 
the recent literature on political economy and sketches the 
framework of the analysis that will be used. In Section 2, this 
framework is used to analyse the evolution of the transition 
process in the Soviet Union since 1985. In the framework of 
the political economy analysis, Section 3 seeks to define the 
necessary next steps of transition. 
I. I. Some recent results from the 
literature on political economy 
There is not much economic literature as yet addressing the 
specific political economy problem of the transition from a 
planned to a market economy. It is, however, useful to draw 
on some insights - derived from the recent literature on 
political economy - into related subjects. 
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I. A first important theme is that of conservative opposition, 
i.e. the extent to which particular groups who will be hurt 
by the transition process can block economic reform. This 
theme is developed by Fernandez and Rodrik (1990). In the 
context of trade reform, they show how the existence of 
transition costs and uncertainty concerning the way the gains 
and losses of reform are distributed in the population, may 
lead to a status quo bias. Trade reform implies a shift of 
labour from the import-competing to the export sector. It is 
assumed that shifting sectors implies a known investment 
cost, common to all, and an unknown transition cost, differ-
ent across individuals. Even though the overall gain from 
trade reform is unambiguously positive, one might have 
cases where the expected individual transition cost is such 
that a majority will vote against the reform, whereas, if the 
individual transition costs were known, reform would enjoy 
a majority support. Moreover, as the opposite case might 
also occur (i.e. the reform voted ex ante by a majority might 
hurt a majority ex post when transition costs are known), 
the expectation of reform reversal can tend to narrow the 
vote in favour of reform compared to a situation where 
reform is expected to be sustained. Hence a status quo bias. 
The combination of transition costs and uncertainty is also 
considered by Roland (1990a) as a potential danger to the 
success of the transition from a planned to a market econ-
omy. Two other elements are also present: failure of collec-
tive action and path-dependency. In the absence of estab-
lished democratic institutions, changes desired by a majority 
might not come about because of the public-good character 
of collective action and the free-rider incentive associated 
with it. The perception of the reduced costs of participation 
in collective action might provide an explanation for the 
rapidity of the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern 
Europe. Path-dependency might create an obstacle in a dou-
ble sense. From a deterministic point of view, initial con-
ditions of the transition might represent an obstacle to 
change to a more efficient system, as Paretp-improving but 
time-inconsistent transition measures can be rejected. From 
a stochastic point of view, unexpected events occurring dur-
ing the transition period might create a lock-in effect towards 
an undesired and inefficient set of institutions, because of 
the network externalities associated with institutions. 
2. Another important theme is that of the legitimacy of 
governments that have to govern the transition process. This 
concept is not easy to grasp analytically, but in so far as one 
may equate legitimacy with popular support, an easy way 
to understand legitimacy, especially in a democratic context, 
is to look at the probability of being re-elected, or more 
generally, the probability of remaining in power in the future. 
This probability influences government policy, as shown by 
Alesina and Tabellini (1990). In a two-party framework, 
199 
The political economy of transition in the Soviet Union 
where the two parties differ concerning the type of public 
good to be produced, it is shown that the level of public 
debt will be higher the lower the probability of re-election. 
Indeed, the current government tends less to internalize the 
future cost of issuing today's debt if it has a low probability 
of re-election. Even if it has not made a commitment to do 
so, a government with a 100% probability of being re-
elected will balance the budget. The higher the degree of 
'polarization' between the two parties, understood here as 
the extent of disagreement on the structure of public expendi-
ture, the higher the deficit bias. 1 Transposed to the general 
problem of transition from a planned to a market economy, 
these results imply that governments with low legitimacy 
will tend to be 'soft' on budget cuts and will, in general, 
refrain from taking policy measures entailing short-term 
costs to them and yielding long-term benefits that are likely 
to be reaped by their successors. 
Legitimacy and polarization are particularly important 
issues in the context of macroeconomic stabilization. Alesina 
and Drazen (1989) provide a framework to try to explain 
why stabilizations are delayed. The process leading to stabili-
zation is modelled as a 'war of attrition' between two con-
flicting groups, each trying to impose the full costs of stabili-
zation on the other group. Delaying stabilization is costly 
to each group but these costs differ and are not known by 
the other group. When these costs are known, stabilization 
occurs immediately. Otherwise, it will be delayed until it 
becomes advantageous for the weaker group to concede, 
because the cost of further delaying stabilization would 
become greater than the expected benefit from waiting. The 
more inegalitarian the distribution of income, the longer the 
delay because the perceived likelihood that the opponent 
group is weaker, and will thus give in first, is higher. How-
ever, the higher the monetization and the distortionary ef-
fects of budget deficits, the earlier the stabilization. A higher 
polarization in society also delays stabilization because its 
burden becomes more unequal. These results are highly 
relevant to the ex-Soviet case, where stabilization has become 
a key issue, and where there is great uncertainty concerning 
group-specific burdens of stabilization. 
The implications of political instability, lack of legitimacy 
and polarization for the fiscal behaviour of governments 
and delays or failures to stabilize have been shown in the 
empirical work of Cukierman et al. ( 1990) on LDCs. 
Similar results are obtained by Persson and Svensson (1989). If a 
conservative government with low preference for public expenditures 
knows it will be replaced by a left-wing government with a higher 
preference for public expenditure, then it can constrain the latter to 
lower its expenditure level by running a deficit. 
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When a minimum amount of legitimacy allows governments 
to decide on the political agenda, i.e. the order in which 
measures are proposed as well as their content, political 
constraints nevertheless continue to exist, whether through 
the possibility of parliamentary refusal or through collective 
actions that lead to a major political crisis. This agenda-setter 
framework, developed by Romer and Rosenthal (1979), is 
used by Dewatripont and Roland (1990) to analyse the role 
of political constraints on industrial restructuring in the 
transition from a planned to a market economy. Economic 
reform is presented as a shift from overall low to high 
productivity. There is a heterogeneous workforce with three 
groups of individuals characterized by different levels of 
disutility of effort, and thus different levels of rent, unknown 
to the government. Economic efficiency requires a shift 
towards a high productivity level, with only those with the 
lowest disutility of effort keeping their jobs. The impact of 
political constraints on optimal reform paths is then ana-
lysed, as well as the effect of the relaxation of political 
constraints from a unanimity to a majority rule. Two main 
ingredients of the model, besides the existence of political 
constraints, are informational asymmetry and the absence 
of government precommitment. Among the results, it is 
shown that gradual reforms can be optimal, because there 
are cases where the efficiency loss implied by gradual redun-
dancies is smaller than the budgetary cost of immediate 
reform, as gradualism allows a net gain in rent extraction 
through an incentive-compatible revelation of information. 
Another result is that under majority rule, a majority can 
vote for measures that hurt majority interests because the 
government can use the credible threat of future reform 
proposals adversely affecting a specific group to have that 
group vote a reform proposal that would hurt its interests 
less, whilst adversely affecting other groups. In other words, 
groups can be played off against each other. The agenda-
setter framework is more directly normative in so far as it 
defines optimal reform paths taking into account the dy-
namic political constraints of transition. This framework 
can be used to address other dynamic problems than the 
problem of restructuring. 
3. Another theme of political economy that is addressed in 
specific work related to the transition is that of speed. 
Lipton and Sachs (1990) analyse the transition programme in 
Poland and its implementation in 1990. Speed is important 
because the new democratic governments should use their 
legitimacy and popularity to implement rapidly measures 
that will anyhow hurt important parts of the population. 
This is especially true in the case of stabilization, where 
delay in decision-making only undermines support for the 
government and makes the subsequently required measures 
even more painful. 
Roland (1991) also emphasizes the importance that speed 
can assume in the transition period. In view of the fundamen-
tal systemic changes implied by reform, a great number of 
economic agents are thoroughly uncertain about their net 
expected individual gains or losses from the transition. As a 
result, the attitudes of these 'uninformed' agents towards 
economic reform are liable to change through time. It is 
argued that it is precisely the behaviour of this group that 
politically constrains governments in the transition period. 
The strategic position of these types of agents for or against 
reform will be determined as a function of two elements: 
balance of power changes, and the cumulative individual 
welfare impact of past and present reform measures. All 
other things remaining equal, if uninformed agents observe 
a signal of balance of power changes, say in favour of 
reform, they will tend to support reform because mimicking 
others can be rational when you are uninformed. Balance 
of power changes thus have a (weak) self-enforcing property. 
On the other hand, if these agents are only able to assess their 
individual net expected gains or losses from the measures 
proposed on the current government agenda, their attitude 
towards reform at any moment in time will depend on the 
cumulative impact of past and present reform measures on 
their individual welfare. Indeed, as a rejection of reform 
implies a reversal of already adopted reform measures, cur-
rent proposed measures will lead individuals to abandon the 
camp of reform only if their expected loss from current 
measures exceeds their cumulative benefit from past reform 
measures. Two conclusions are drawn from this analysis. 
First of all, a correct sequencing tactic for governments 
consists in first implementing measures that benefit a ma-
jority and hurt a minority, and then using this favourable 
balance of power change to implement measures that hurt 
more important interests. Conversely, wrong sequencing tac-
tics will lead to conservative and populist backlash. Second, 
speed is also important since the self-enforcing character of 
balance of power change allows a government to capitalize 
on favourable balance of power shifts by quickly im-
plementing measures that hurt more important interests. 
The failure to take advantage of such shifts can block reform 
if the implied welfare losses of the measures in prospect are 
large. Speed is thus important. Arguments for speed should 
not, however, neglect the importance of political constraints. 
On the contrary, they must be deduced from dynamic bal-
ance-of-power considerations. 
This framework of sequencing tactics leads to the formu-
lation of a four-phase sequencing: (1) democratization, 
(2) privatization, (3) liberalization, (4) restructuring. These 
are broad headings and should not be understood in a 
narrow sense. Democratization includes not only the estab-
lishment of democratic institutions, but also the institution 
of a stable and predictable legal framework for the market 
economy, as well as the setting-up of the necessary fiscal 
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and monetary institutions, including an independent central 
bank. Privatization refers not only to the sale of State assets 
into private ownership, but more generally to the introduc-
tion and extension of the private sector in the economy, as 
well as the increase of its overall share in the economy. 
Liberalization concerns the freeing of prices as well as the 
introduction of a convertible exchange rate. Restructuring 
refers to the closing of loss-making enterprises, as well as a 
shift to a new structure of production of goods and services 
adapted to an open market economy. 
These four phases should not be viewed as blocks that should 
be put one behind the other, but rather as an ordering of 
the start of the phases, each phase being continued and 
expanded when a new one is being started. 
The political logic behind this sequencing order is that re-
ferred to above. These phases are presented in order of 
decreasing popularity and increasing political difficulty. 
Democratization increases the welfare of a great number 
and hurts only very few interests. Equally, the introduction 
of a private sector gives to consumers goods and services 
that the former planning system failed to provide. On the 
other hand, it adversely affects more interests than privatiza-
tion and creates political tensions around the higher in-
equality in the distribution of income. Liberalization ad-
versely affects many groups in the population as the real 
purchasing power of many will have to be reduced. Restruc-
turing is certainly politically the most difficult phase, as 
workers will resist the closing down of their enterprises. In 
the 'shortage' economy (i.e. socialist economy) the guarantee 
of employment in the enterprise serves as the basic social 
security device. Moreover, the enterprise is also the main 
source of rent for many individuals. 
There is also an economic logic to this sequencing. Restruc-
turing cannot proceed on a large scale unless prices have 
been liberalized earlier on. Indeed, applying a rule of bank-
ruptcy is not credible unless market-clearing prices have 
been established, giving information concerning enterprises 
without a future. Price liberalization may not lead to the 
expected supply response, unless there already exists a pri-
vate sector with profit-maximizing entrepreneurs searching 
for profitable opportunities. Of course, the share of the 
private sector is necessarily limited in an economy where 
prices are not yet liberalized, and large-scale privatization 
of the economy can only be achieved after price liberaliza-
tion. Our argument, however, only implies that there should 
be, prior to price liberalization, a significant private sector 
that will be one of the main constituencies for further reform. 
Similarly, a private sector cannot develop unless there exists 
a legal framework guaranteeing the protection of private 
ownership. 
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Note that, unlike other plans for sequencing, we have not 
included stabilization. Indeed, macroeconomic stabilization 
is only necessary for certain formerly planned economies, 
where macroeconomic disequilibrium is very great. Econ-
omic logic suggests, in that case, that stabilization should 
proceed together with price liberalization. The issue of stabil-
ization as such in the early phase of transition is, however, 
not common to all formerly centrally planned economies. 
In the following sections, we will use this four-phase sequen-
cing order and its political economy framework of sequen-
cing tactics to analyse the evolution of the situation in the 
USSR since perestroika. This framework will also be used 
to analyse prospects concerning the future measures necess-
ary in the region constituted by the former Soviet Union. 
From a methodological point of view, one is confronted 
with a difficulty when trying to analyse the political economy 
problems of the transition, especially because one faces a 
changing institutional framework. Indeed, in an unchanged 
institutional environment, one might define an appropriate 
measure of political constraints: the weight of different pol-
itical parties and coalitions in parliament, votes in general 
elections, voting intentions, etc. However, in a situation 
where institutional change is endogenous and is itself at 
stake in the transformation process, it is very difficult to 
define a measure of political constraints, even though the 
empirical extent of these constraints is certainly a crucial 
factor determining the future of transition. Opinion surveys 
might prove very useful for assessing political constraints on 
certain policy measures, but the conclusions one may draw 
from such surveys are very often ambiguous. The way the 
questions are asked may influence the responses. Moreover, 
popular opposition to given measures, as revealed through 
opinion surveys, does not necessarily transform into a bind-
ing constraint on government action, unless overt organized 
action such as strikes and demonstrations, feeding into a 
political crisis, lead to government decisions being blocked. 
2. The USSR since perestroika 
2.1. Democratization 
Perestroika indeed started with political change, and this 
was certainly the most striking achievement of Gorbachev's 
leadership, compared to the dismal economic performance. 
Glasnost and the early democratization was certainly a very 
important move for overcoming the failure of collective 
action referred to above. 
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In a first phase, there was widespread scepticism concerning 
the credibility of this democratization process. Moreover, 
fears were expressed concerning the irreversibility of the first 
democratic changes that were instituted. To understand the 
dynamics of the process of democratization, one must take a 
closer look at the functioning of Soviet political institutions. 
When Gorbachev came to power in March 1985, this was 
done with the help of conservative factions inside the Polit-
buro, and it was A. Gromyko who presented the new Soviet 
leader to the Central Committee. This Central Committee 
was still essentially Brezhnevian, having been elected by the 
26th Party Congress of 1981. If we assume that Gorbachev 
had very reformist intentions from the beginning, then we 
must acknowledge the importance of political constraints, 
represented by the existing Central Committee and Politburo 
when he came to power. The first thing to do to broaden 
his power base inside the Party, was to have a new Central 
Committee elected. This is what happened at the 27th Party 
Congress in 1986 where 38% of the old Brezhnevian Central 
Committee was removed. 1 The new Central Committee still, 
however, had a very conservative profile, and Gorbachev 
was at pains in the subsequent years to have the most 
conservative elements removed.2 
During his first two years in power, Gorbachev did not give 
any tangible and credible signs that he was willing to pursue 
a policy that would basically differ from that of Andropov. 
Two of his first moves as Secretary-General were the anti-
alcohol campaign and the campaign against 'unearned in-
comes' ( netrudovye dokhody). It was only at the January 
1987 plenum that the new policy orientation towards glas-
nost was clearly put forward. The most visible effect was the 
change in the media, where articles very critical of the regime 
and the economy began to be published. 3 
Glasnost started to unleash public freedom of speech, and 
crucial issues started to be debated publicly without fear. 
See Hough ( 1988) for more details on early personnel moves of Gorba-
chev. 
Of the 307 Central Committee members elected in February 1986, 303 
were still there in February 1989. All were top officials in the army, 
government, etc.; 185 of them had reached pensionable age and 142 of 
them had worked for more than 10 years in central party bodies. 
Argumenty ifakty, 3.2.1990, p. 6. 
Shmelev's (1987) article in Novyi mir produced a great effect at that 
time on public opinion, by breaking many taboos, including the necessity 
of a huge private sector, of free issuing and sale of shares, the converti-
bility of the rouble, free trade zones and, last but not least, the necessity 
of a certain amount of unemployment in order to avoid inflationary 
tensions on the labour market. Similar articles would never have been 
published in the Brezhnev period. Moreover, their circulation as samiz-
dat would certainly have led to repressive measures against their authors, 
as was the case in the 1970s and the early 1980s. 
So-called 'non-formal' groups and organizations started to 
be established. People began to realize that they could or-
ganize.1 
However, these new freedoms established by glasnost did 
not bring about'a significant change in the political decision-
making process, in the sense of the institution of pluralist 
political institutions. The monolithic structure of the Party 
remained the same, and conservative and reformist factions 
were not allowed to be formed inside the Party apparatus. 
Moreover, public opinion became increasingly conscious of 
the fact that there was absolutely no constitutional mechan-
ism allowing the people to control the Party. 
The impetus towards political change and the move towards 
a pluralist multi-party system started at the 19th Party con-
ference in June 1988.2 Initially, the measures adopted ap-
peared very modest. First of all, a greater role in political 
decision-making was to be given to the Soviets through the 
People's Congress and the Supreme Soviet. The latter was 
to be transformed in order to perform the same functions 
as a modem parliament with full-time representatives. The 
second major decision of the 19th Party conference was to 
compel local and regional Party leaders to become candi-
dates for the Soviet elections at the different levels. Non-
Party candidates would be allowed, and the number of 
candidates would have to exceed the number of seats.3 The 
idea of compelling Party leaders to face electoral tests was 
considered an indirect way of having people control the 
Communist Party. A hated Party bureaucrat would have to 
compete with other candidates, including non-Party candi-
dates, and if he was not elected, then the Party would have 
to draw the conclusions. One realizes very easily that this is 
only a very indirect measure of democratic control over the 
Party. In the March 1989 election for the People's Congress, 
Solovyev, the Party leader from Leningrad, was not elected, 
as was the case for many Party leaders throughout the 
country.4 The Leningrad Party leadership exercised some 
self-criticism, but decided not to retire. Gorbachev had to 
Laws confirming these changes, however, came later in the process. The 
law on the press was adopted in June 1990 (Izvestia, 9.6.1990, pp. 1-3). 
The law on public associations, allowing non-violent parties was voted 
in May 1990 (lzvestia, 31.5.1990, pp. 1-4). 
Materialy XIX vsesoiuznoi konferentsii kommunisticheskoi partii sovets-
kogo soiuza, politizdat, 1988. 
This measure was initially received with some diffidence, because in the 
traditional dogmatic conception, the Party and the State were supposed 
to be separate. In reality, of course, this was never the case, and the 
State apparatus was always tightly controlled by the Party apparatus. 
Twenty per cent Party secretaries at the provincial or republican level 
failed to get a majority vote. Pravda, 16.10.1989, p. 2. 
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intervene personally in the Leningrad Party plenum to obtain 
their resignation.5 Moreover, the admission of non-Party 
candidates and the requirement that the number of candi-
dates be greater than the number of seats did not introduce 
multi-party political competition. 
However inconsequent they were, these measures initiated 
an impetus for further political change. The election cam-
paign of March 1989 revealed some genuine competition at 
different levels and in different places between conservative 
Party officials and reformist or radical candidates, whether 
belonging to the Party or not. For the first time in decades, 
this political competition aroused public curiosity and par-
ticipation. However, the representation in the People's Con-
gress did not accurately reflect the election outcome, since 
750 of the 2 250 seats were reserved for Party officials and 
members of social organizations. 6 
The First Congress of People's deputies in June 1989 was 
directly transmitted on radio and television, in the spirit of 
glasnost, and the debates were very closely followed by 
the population. In Congress itself, the parliamentary logic 
started to unravel, and a polarization process started to 
develop with the emergence of a radical, a conservative, and 
a centrist tendency. Radicals began to organize by forming 
in September 1989 the 'Inter-regional group', counting 393 
out of 2 250 deputies in the People's Congress. 7 
It appeared at this First Congress that the centre of gravity 
of political power in the Soviet Union was slowly shifting 
from the Congress and the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party to the Congress of People's deputies and to 
the Supreme Soviet. Nevertheless, it also appeared clearly at 
the July 1989 session of Congress that only a minority was 
in favour of radical economic reform, the conservative or 
moderate conservative tendency being still in the majority. 
As a consequence, even though political institutions started 
to shift towards more democracy, the political constraints to 
further economic reform appeared quite clearly in Congress. 
This led to a heated debate am·ong intellectuals in the summer 
of 1989 concerning the importance of democracy in the 
sequencing of transition. Leading intellectuals like Migran-
ian (1989) and Kliamkin (1989) advocated the need for 
strong presidential powers to go ahead with economic re-
Pravda, 13.7.1990, p. I. Gorbachev did, however, manage to use the 
results of the elections to get rid of some conservative elements in the 
Central Committee. Between February and April 1989, the number of 
CC members fell from 303 to 251. Argumenty ifakty, 9.2.1990, p. 6. 
For the official report on the elections to Congress, see lzvestia, 
26.5.1989, pp. 2-4. 
Pravda, 31.7.1989, p. 2. 
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form. Kliamkin argued very clearly in Moskovskie novosti 
that Congress would not vote for the transition to the market 
whereas Migranian, in Novyi mir, argued that all historically 
known transitions towards the market economy did not 
proceed under democratic conditions. The importance of 
conservative and moderate conservative forces in Congress 
was confirmed at the December 1989 session with the ap-
proval of the so-called Ryzhkov plan, 1 an emasculated ver-
sion of the Abalkin plan that had been published earlier, in 
October, and advocated a moderate and gradual transition 
towards a market economy.2 One feature of the Ryzhkov 
plan was its reliance on the conversion of the military indus-
try to increase the supply of consumer goods. Increasing 
supply has always been the typical reflex of central planners 
reacting to shortages and these increases in supply were 
never effective in eliminating shortages, precisely because 
they were triggered through the central plans, i.e. one of the 
main shortage-creating mechanisms (see Roland, 1990b). 
As it became clear that the Congress and the Supreme Soviet 
elected in 1989 would not support a consistent radical plan 
aimed at a market economy, the political composition of 
Congress reflected less and less the underlying balance of 
power within the population. Indeed, in the wake of the 
autumn 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe, the process of 
radicalization started to accelerate among the public. The 
press of early 1990 was full of reports on country-wide 
protest movements, fuelled by local scandals and leading to 
the resignation of Party officials. This change in the political 
atmosphere among the public was reflected in the elections 
that took place at the levels of republics and local soviets.3 
One of the major episodes of this election was the election 
of the new Parliament of the RSFSR and the subsequent 
election of B. Yeltsin as the President of the Russian Repub-
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lzvestia, 21.12.1989. 
Ekonomicheskaia gaze/a, No 43 (1989), pp. 4-7. The Abalkin plan 
represented a major advance in the reform concept compared to the 
1987 reform, as it clearly defined the introduction of the market as a 
goal, and recognized the pluralism of different forms of property, though 
private property was not explicitly mentioned in the plan. The Abalkin 
plan appeared non-credible concerning stabilization, as it advocated a 
moderate prices and incomes policy in order to correct the macro-
economic imbalances that had developed in the economy since 1985. 
The Ryzhkov plan, however, only adopted the conservative parts of the 
Abalkin plan, delaying plans for more radical economic reform to the 
distant future. 
Opinion surveys prior to the elections had shown a shift towards radical-
ism. A poll of 4 OOO urban and rural residents conducted by the Academy 
of Social Sciences in the Donetsk province, the Tatar autonomous 
republic and the non-black-earth-zone of the Russian Republic showed 
that 40% of respondents believed that all Soviet local and district 
members should be replaced. lzvestia, 30.1.1990, p. 2. 
lic.4 These elections reflected a shift towards radicalism on 
the part of the public. Candidates of the 'Inter-regional 
group' obtained a majority in the new city soviets of Moscow 
and Leningrad.5 Nearly all its candidates were elected depu-
ties in the new Russian People's Congress. By contrast, one 
of the major surprises of this election was the defeat of 
slavophile right-wing Russian nationalists. In Moscow and 
Leningrad, the 'patriotic associations' did not even manage 
to have a single candidate elected to the Russian Parliament 
and complained that their defeat was the result of electoral 
fraud against them.6 Gorbachev's failed attempt to block 
the election of B. Yeltsin by supporting Vlasov, the former 
head of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Republic, 
was also a sign that he was losing the political initiative.7 A 
few weeks earlier, in February 1989, Gorbachev had suc-
ceeded in having the Central Committee accept the sup-
pression of Article 6 of the Constitution stipulating the 
leading role of the Communist Party. Though this was a 
major success for democracy, it also was clear that this was 
not a political initiative of Gorbachev's but a result of 
a radical campaign with the notable participation of late 
academician A. Sakharov. 
What we want to emphasize here is that the so-called rise of 
the Russian Republic in the political debate actually reflected 
less a conflict between centralized versus decentralized vi-
sions of government than a shift in the balance of power 
towards reform that had occurred between the elections of 
1989 and 1990. In the Russian Parliament, there was a 
stronger base for a push towards more radical moves to 
a market economy. A similar phenomenon explains the 
emergence of non-communist local government in Moscow 
and Leningrad. We will come back later to the directly 
political dimension of nationalism, when discussing the 
problem of the dislocation of the Soviet Union. 
This movement of radicalization among the public found its 
base outside the Communist Party. Losing more and more its 
former legitimacy and power base, the Party was increasingly 
Ninety-four per cent of the I 059 deputies in the Russian People's 
Congress were elected for the first time. Compared to traditional Soviet 
institutions, the percentage of workers was very low: 5,6% of all depu-
ties. Only six rank and file farmers were elected. Pravda, 17.5.1990, 
p. I. 
In the new Leningrad city soviet, only 20% of the elected deputies 
stood on the CPSU platform, i.e. the Gorbachev political line. Pravda, 
12.4.1990, p. I. 
For more details, see lzvestia, 6.4.1990, pp. I, 3. 
In a first round of votes on 26 May, Yeltsin received 497 votes against 
473 for Polozkov and 32 for Morokin. Morokin retired and Yeltsin got 
503 votes against 458 for Polozkov. This was not enough to get a 
majority and on 29 May, a new election took place and Yeltsin got 535 
votes against 467 for Vlasov and 11 for Tsoi. lzvestia, 29.5.1990, p. I. 
being perceived as a bastion of conservatism. I It was pre-
cisely inside the Party that the conservative reaction started 
taking place, with the first Congress of the Russian Commu-
nist Party taking place shortly after the decision on German 
reunification, which must have created problems between 
Gorbachev and the Army.2 This rise of political conservatism 
inside the Russian Communist Party materialized through 
the election of I. Polozkov, a well-known conservative, as 
the leader of the Russian Party. This conservative backlash 
inside the Communist Party represented a threat to the 
Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. The Congress 
had been convened earlier than planned, when Gorbachev 
succeeded in suppressing the monopoly of the Communist 
Party, expressed in Articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution. 3 
The expectation at that time was that the shift towards 
radicalism might succeed in transforming the Communist 
Party into a modern social democratic formation, eliminat-
ing the conservatives, an operation similar to the transform-
ation of the Communist Party in Hungary. The conservative 
offensive at the Congress did not succeed in pushing through 
a conservative platform. It became clear, however, that, as 
a leader of the Communist Party, Gorbachev could at best 
restrain conservative party opposition at the price of slowing 
down the process of transition. 
The increasingly defensive position of Gorbachev towards 
the conservative camp widened the political field available 
for the proponents of more radical constituencies. Taking 
advantage of (a) his position as Russian President in the 
more radical Russian Congress and (b) the increased dis-
credit of the Communist Party, B. Yeltsin made the cour-
ageous and risky move of leaving the Party at the end of the 
Congress. 
This new situation changed the form taken by the conflict 
between conservative and reformist forces. 
On the one hand, Gorbachev's position towards the con-
servatives was greatly weakened because of his sharp decline 
Opinion surveys held in June 1989 showed that one-third of the popu-
lation and one-quarter of Party members doubted that the Party would 
be able to restructure. Pravda, 16.10.1989, p. 2. 
At the Russian Congress, conservative army officials voiced very loudly 
their protest against the change in foreign policy. Particularly aggressive 
was a speech of General Makashov, troop commander of the Volga-
Urals military district, who accused the Soviet leaders of disarming 
while the West was acting as if it was preparing an aggression against 
the Soviet Union. Pravda, 20.6.1990, p. I. A reply to this speech was 
published in lzvestia, 20.6.1990, p. I. 
Initially planned for early 1991, a Central Committee plenum decision 
advanced it to October 1990. Pravda, 20.9.1989, p. I. The March 1990 
plenum then decided to advance it to June. Pravda, 12.3.1990, p. I. 
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in popularity, as shown for example in opinion polls,4 while 
Yeltsin became the leader of the refomist forces and enjoyed 
considerable support from the public. On the other hand, 
these more radical forces lacked the infrastructure of a united 
political formation and of organized support inside the State 
administration, since Yeltsin's position as President of Rus-
sia was less a position of power than of opposition. In this 
political stalemate, in order to carry more weight in the 
bargaining with Yeltsin, Gorbachev had to seek the support 
of the apparatus and thus lean more in the direction of 
the moderate conservatives who were ready to accept his 
leadership but wanted restoration of administrative order. 
This conservative backlash became increasingly clear with 
the rejection of the Shatalin plan. Despite the weaknesses of 
this plan, inter a/ia in terms of the credibility of its stabiliza-
tion measures, it was the first economic plan advocating 
unambiguously large-scale privatization of the economy, 
and its rejection appeared clearly as a conservative victory. 
This adverse change in the balance of power had cumulative 
effects, and the next months, until April 1991, can be viewed 
as a period of backlash with conservative agenda-making 
under Prime Minister Pavlov and the new team around 
Gorbachev, the perspective of a military coup being con-
stantly possible. 
The situation became partly unblocked when, after the fail-
ure of conservative stabilization measures,5 an alliance was 
forged between Yeltsin and Gorbachev to elaborate a new 
Union Treaty that would considerably weaken the position 
of the Union vis-a-vis the republics. In reality, this was a 
major concession by Gorbachev to Yeltsin, since the latter 
had always opposed centrifugal movements in the reform 
process, but their alliance reinforced the position of the 
reformist camp, and allowed the latter to regain the initiative 
on the political agenda. The direct election. of B. Yeltsin as 
4 In 1989, opinion surveys still showed massive approval when Gorbachev 
was elected President of the Supreme Soviet. See Pravda, 26.6.1989, 
p. 3. An opinion poll conducted in July 1990 showed a decline in the 
popularity of Gorbachev as well as a clear loss of public confidence in 
the Party. Only 18% of the respondents were satisfied by Gorbachev's 
political report to the Congress; 64% agreed with the growing criticisms 
of Gorbachev, and 75% with the growing criticisms of the government. 
Only 25% thought that the 28th Congress would influence the future 
of the country. See Moskovskie novosti, No 30, 1990, for more details. 
These were the February currency reform, i.e. the withdrawal of the R 
500 banknotes, and the April administrative price increases. These 
measures were conservative because they were not accompanied by a 
price liberalization and were meant essentially to stabilize the financial 
situation in the context of continued central planning. The currency 
reform was not implemented as initially planned, because local authori-
ties fully compensated all citizens turning in their banknotes, and the 
price reform had no noticeable dishoarding effect. 
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Russian President in June 1991, and his overwhelming suc-
cess with more than 67% of the votes, proved a crucial 
success for democracy and a defeat for conservative forces 
who had previously attempted to oust Yeltsin from his post. 
The decisive advance in the democratization process came 
with the failure of the conservative putsch in August that 
abruptly ended communist rule in a similar way as in the 
other post-socialist countries. This failed putsch represented 
a historical chance for the future. 
The main advantage of the new situation was that it provided 
legitimacy to the new non-communist leaders in the different 
republics. As in Poland, exactly two years before, this major 
advance towards democracy entailed a dynamic change in 
the balance of power, allowing speed in the implementation 
of further transition measures. 
In the case of the former Soviet Union, this positive aspect 
is somewhat overshadowed by negative aspects that could 
prove fatal. To recall, in the sequencing framework proposed 
in Section 1.1, one of the main advantages of the demo-
cratization process is that it provides a stable and predictable 
framework. Nothing is less true here. First of all, the demo-
cratic forces were not very united, and were not really ready 
to seize power. One may easily conjecture that the failure of 
the August putsch was more due to the extreme incompet-
ence, division and fear of its organizers than to the organiza-
tional strength of the democratic resistance. Second, the 
numerous conflicts of authority between local and higher 
level organs makes the legal framework increasingly unclear. 
Third, the unbridled development of nationalist forces, after 
the generalized declarations of independence, provides 
ground for the most dangerous process of polarization, 
increasing the risk that continued economic crisis will de-
generate into bloody ethnic conflicts. 
2.2. Privatization 
As argued in Section 1.1, the existence of a private sector of 
a minimum size constitutes a necessary step in transition 
before proceeding to more radical moves. A similar idea was 
expressed by academician Bogomolov on the eve of the June 
1987 plenum. 1 Then, Bogomolov emphasized that those 
countries that were at that time the most advanced in econ-
omic reform (China and Hungary) had proceeded to decol-
lectivize agriculture and to promote a private sector and 
small enterprises as well as calling upon foreign capital for 
joint ventures and foreign direct investment. 
Ekonomicheskaia gaze/a, No 26, 1987. 
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From that point of view, the introduction of the so-called 
'cooperatives' constituted one of the few visible steps 
towards the introduction of a market economy. The decision 
to allow the establishment of cooperatives came nearly un-
noticed when it was decided in November 1986. In a first 
stage, people were not allowed to leave their jobs in the State 
sector to work in cooperatives. The latter were only allowed 
as an activity for pensioners, the non-active part of the 
population and for workers after working hours. This re-
striction was, however, relaxed. In May 1988 a law on 
cooperatives was voted. 
The most striking feature about the introduction of cooper-
atives was the rapid growth of this sector despite a very 
hostile political and social environment. In I 988, the Minis-
try of Finance decided on a prohibitive tax system for 
cooperatives, with marginal tax rates of 90% for incomes 
above R I 500.2 This measure was withdrawn, however, 
after public protest. But cooperatives rapidly became un-
popular with the public. Complaints concerned high prices 
for relatively low quality, and the links of some cooperatives 
with the mafia and organized crime. There were also com-
plaints that cooperatives bought consumer goods from the 
State sector to sell them at higher prices. Conservative poli-
ticians started blaming the cooperatives for the growing 
shortage of consumer goods in the economy. 
Measures against the cooperatives were adopted at different 
periods. Important restrictions on cooperative activities were 
decided by the government in December 1988.3 Price ceilings 
and prohibitive taxes were imposed in many cases on cooper-
atives, and examples abound of restrictions and prohibitions 
decided by local authorities between December 1988 and 
April 1990. 
Despite these negative measures, the cooperative movement 
has not declined and is still growing. In June 1991, 12,4 
million people were working in the cooperative and individ-
ual sector, i.e. 9,1 % of the 135 million people employed in 
the Soviet economy.4 In the Russian Republic, the corre-
sponding figures were 4,8 million people, i.e. 6,7% of 71,9 
million working people. 5 
Cooperatives, which are in most cases hiding private en-
terprises, thrive and start to create a new entrepreneurial 
class. The rapidity with which new entrepreneurs take busi-
ness opportunities in a hostile and semi-legal environment 
is very striking and seems to refute the allegations according 
Ogonek, No 29, 1988. 
lzvestia, 31.12.1988, p. 2. 
4 Ekonomika i zhizn', No 30, 1991. 
Ekonomika i zhizn', No 31, 1991. 
to which the Russian culture is viscerally incompatible with 
market institutions. The Moscow Commodity Exchange is 
gradually replacing the increasingly paralysed Gossnab State 
supply system, and private commercial banks are growing 
like mushrooms to finance these commodity exchange oper-
ations.1 
Joint ventures have also developed. Allowed since early 
1987, with legislation becoming increasingly favourable to 
Western investors, registration of joint ventures started to 
accelerate from May 1987 to July 1989, 680 joint ventures 
being created with a capitalization of R 2,1 billion.2 The 
rhythm of registration then started to settle at an average of 
285 per quarter. As yet, however, less than a quarter of joint 
ventures seem to be truly operational, most of them being 
small, under-capitalized and concentrated on supplying ser-
vices rather than manufactured output. Employment in joint 
ventures remains small, below 200 OOO people, or 0,2% of 
the workforce in the Soviet Union.3 
Despite negative popular attitudes towards cooperatives, the 
overall attitude of the population towards private activity is 
changing rapidly in a positive direction. According to opin-
ion surveys, in November 1989, 42% of the people still had 
a negative attitude towards private property against 31 % in 
favour and 27% with no opinion. In December 1990, 
negative attitudes had nearly halved, to only 26%, against 
44% in favour and 30% with no opinion.4 
The biggest failure concerning the introduction of a private 
sector is agriculture. Where decollectivization proved to be 
a success story in China and in Hungary, measures such as 
the leasing of land ( arenda) did not lead to a Chinese type 
of movement. On the contrary, the immobility of Russian 
peasants is particularly striking and is somehow reminiscent 
of the 1861 emancipation from serfdom, the 19th century 
perestroika when serfdom was formally abolished but the 
peasants did not perceive the possibility of acquiring private 
and family holdings. The April 1989 plenum of the Central 
Committee to advance reform in agriculture also proved a 
failure, as a messy compromise was decided: arenda was to 
be understood as leasing inside the kolkhoz, and it was not 
clear whether the peasants had the right to leave the kolkhoz. 
The appointment of Ligachev as the Politburo member re-
sponsible for agriculture clearly did not provide the peasants 
with a credible signal that irreversible changes were coming. 5 
Given the great economic uncertainty, credit is limited to short-term 
loans to provide liquidity for commodity exchange operations. No long-
term investment credit is being provided by the new private banks. 
Plan Econ report, 1.9.1989. 
Ekonomika i zhizn', No 43, 1991. 
Voprosy ekonomiki, No 6, 1991, p. 112. 
See Pravda, 18.3.1989, pp. 1-2. 
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The political changes since August 1991 should be used 
quickly to decollectivize and privatize the land, by sharing 
it among peasants, either directly or through some voucher 
scheme, and abolishing all restrictions on buying and selling 
land. The central authorities in the republics should send 
inspectors into the countryside to monitor the implemen-
tation of land privatization and help the peasants to fight 
against the local party nomenklatura, which still holds the 
reins of local power. New elections would probably be the 
best way to topple local despots, provided these elections 
are perceived by the farmers as a clear and credible signal 
for action in order to guarantee the regularity of the polls. 
In order to be credible, privatization of the land must go 
together with the freedom of pricing and selling, i.e. with 
the establishment of a market for land. 
2.3. Liberalization 
The objective of freeing prices and of going over to wholesale 
trade for means of production was already present in the 
1987 June plenum decisions on economic reform. Immedi-
ately, a conservative counter-offensive on prices was started, 
presenting perestroika as a trick to increase prices and to 
lower the purchasing power of the population. 
Conservative economist M. Popov (1987) launched an attack 
on hidden inflation, presented as a consequence of the relax-
ation of plan discipline since the early reforms of the 1960s. 6 
The right-wing populist Nash sovremennik, for example, 
published an article by B. Kulikov (1988) that found a 
clear echo in the public. It equated price liberalization with 
administrative price increases and called for public mobiliza-
tion against price reform in the spirit of the mobilization 
against the diversion of the Siberian rivers. 
This conservative campaign yielded results. G. Popov, the 
radical economist, reported in the press on the hostility of a 
majority of delegates to the 19th Party conference to any 
increases in retail prices and argued in his turn against 
price reform.7 Shmelev (1989) and Latsis, and other radical 
economists noted in the beginning of 1989 that it would be 
politically impossible to get through any reform in retail 
prices, in view of public hostility and of the decreased possi-
According to this economist, not only should socialism defend stability 
of prices, but it should aim for their planned reduction, in proportion to 
increases in labour productivity. Imposing price decreases on enterprises 
should force enterprises to innovate and to reduce costs, as was the case 
in the 1930s and 1950s, according to Popov. 
Ogoniok, No 33, 1988. 
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bilities of compensation because of the increase in the budget 
deficit. 1 
In December 1988, price reform was delayed and measures 
were decided to strengthen price control.2 The issue of price 
increases became a focal point of conservative opposition. 
At the March 1989 plenum, it was announced that no retail 
price changes would take place in the next two to three 
years.3 
After the big bang of January 1990 in Poland, when most 
prices were liberalized overnight, many Soviet economists 
became enthusiastic for the Polish shock therapy. This en-
thusiasm may have been the source of a new move by the 
Ryzhkov government to proceed with price reforms.4 The 
plan proposed, among other things, a I 00% increase in retail 
prices for food with 70% social compensation. A threefold 
increase in the price of bread was to occur, starting from 1 
July.5 It was presented as a gradual strategy to introduce 
a market economy, because a Polish-type reform seemed 
politically impossible to implement in view of the much 
weaker popular support for the Soviet government. 6 The 
manreuvre of Ryzhkov, who announced in May price in-
creases several months ahead of when they were to be im-
plemented, seemed a clumsy move, as it created a hoarding 
panic in the population. 7 The Ryzhkov proposal was with-
drawn in major part,8 not because it was not radical enough, 
a 'shock without therapy' as stated by P. Bunich,9 but mostly 
because of public opposition towards price increases. 
The issue of price increases had become a focal point of 
conservative opposition against perestroika. Given this focus 
and given the poverty of large parts of the population, price 
liberalization had until recently been blocked by political 
constraints. 
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Interview of 0. Latsis in Liternaturnaia gazeta, 25.1.1989. The aggressive 
tone of the interviewer was very characteristic of public attitudes. Litera-
turnaia gazeta, then not yet in the hands of the slavophiles, boasted of 
having campaigned throughout 1988 against any retail price increase. 
Pravda, 6.1.1990, p. I. 
Pravda, 13.3.1989, p. 2. 
See for example the interview of A. Orlov, a well-known economist 
and government official, expressing positive views on the Polish shock 
therapy. Izvestia, 3.4.1990, p. I. 
Pravda, 25.5.1990, pp. 1-4. 
Remarks made by L. Abalkin. Izvestia, 10.4.1990. 
Izvestia, 26.5.1990, pp. 1-2. 
The Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution on a move towards a market 
economy (Izvestia, 14.6.1990, p. 2) but rejected the proposed price 
increases. Izvestia, 15.6.1990, p. I, 3. 
lzvestia, 26.5.1990. 
Events in 1991, however, sharply changed the balance of 
power in that respect. First of all, the conservative methods 
have been tried and failed. Conservative forces had for 
several years requested a Stalinist-type currency reform to 
'confiscate' the revenues of the parallel economy. The cur-
rency reform of the conservative Pavlov government proved 
to be an organizational fiasco. Ironically, it was the same 
conservative government who decreed the April 1991 admin-
istrative price increases, precisely the focal point of previous 
conservative opposition. This shattered the last illusions of 
a possible return to former price stability under a return to 
authoritarian rule and destroyed the credibility of a con-
servative programme. ID The defence of price controls ap-
peared increasingly meaningless under the continued dislo-
cation of the planning system, since accelerating inflation 
could not be stopped anyway. However, the increasing dis-
tortions arising from the remaining price controls argued 
for a quick move to price liberalization and macroeconomic 
stabilization. Finally, the implosion of communist rule gave 
the new leaders the needed legitimacy to go ahead with 
radical measures that were resisted by the conservative camp. 
3. Assessment of the current 
situation and urgent issues 
Within the framework of Section 1.1, how can we assess the 
transition path in the Soviet Union since 1985? 
First, where do we stand, according to this framework? As 
seen in Section 2, the first two steps of the four-phase 
sequencing, democratization and privatization, have been 
initiated. The next step ahead is price liberalization, which 
we think is now politically possible and desirable. We will 
come back to the political economic conditions of its im-
plementation. As was the case in Poland in 1990, it is yet 
too soon to start with the fourth phase, that of restructuring. 
We will discuss below the consequences of this limitation, 
inter alia the probability of success of stabilization pro-
grammes. 
Second, what lessons can be drawn from the last five years 
with respect to this framework? The events do not seem to 
have refuted the political economy view of sequencing. The 
10 The day of the putsch, there was a rumour in Moscow that the 'putschists' 
decreed a two-thirds reduction in prices. 
main forces of resistance to the August putsch were those 
that were to lose from the elimination of democracy and the 
private sector. The democratic intelligentsia and associations 
of businessmen, brokers and commodity exchange em-
ployees proved particularly active in defending the White 
House. Constituencies had thus been created that had not 
existed a few years earlier, and these forces proved effective 
enough, in front of a divided and incompetent 'putschist' 
alliance. A return to the past is now totally excluded. Irre-
versible moves have been achieved, and this is a major merit 
of perestroika. The most difficult steps (price liberalization, 
and especially restructuring) are, however, clearly ahead. 
Third, how can one understand the failure of Gorbachev's 
reform strategy, despite the irreversibility that has been 
achieved? 
Gorbachev's strategy was one of gradual and pacific tran-
sition towards democracy and towards the market economy, 
inside the bounds of the Soviet Union. Starting the transition 
process from his position as leader of the Communist Party, 
he was inevitably led to oppose all processes undermining 
this position. Which politician would push forward a pro-
gramme which he knew would lead to his losing power? His 
strategy was thus necessarily biased towards compromise 
and gradual moves. By definition, when you are 'above', 
you can only reform from above. 
A first factor undermining his position was the emergence 
of centrifugal forces in the republics. Since the beginning, 
he had been aware that a disintegration of the power of 
the Union was bound to lead to nationalist conflicts. No 
territorial division could settle ethnic conflicts, given the 
existence of sizeable ethnic minorities all over the Soviet 
territory. Hence the need for a strong centralized power to 
bring about and to implement the transition towards a 
market economy. If feasible, such a pacific strategy is clearly 
more desirable. Ex post, one also understands why forms of 
Russian 'containment' were necessary to obtain relative 
peace inside the Union, through the absence of specifically 
Russian institutions, the absence of a Russian Party, special 
subsidies from Russia to the republics, etc. The disinte-
gration of the Soviet Union thus constitutes a clear failure 
of this strategy. 
A second factor was the development of democratic and rad-
ical forces outside and against the Party. In the first years 
of glasnost, Gorbachev could play these forces against the 
conservatives inside the Party, to push forward the agenda of 
reform. When these forces, however, unconstrained by the 
need to assume power inside the Communist Party, started 
gathering strength and popularity and challenged his position 
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as leader of the reform camp, his position became increasingly 
more uncomfortable, especially since he did not succeed in 
isolating conservative forces inside the Party fast enough, 
compared to the political momentum among the population. 
This also constituted a failure for Gorbachev and left a politi-
cal vacuum that was taken over by Yeltsin. 
The strategy of Yeltsin tended to support all nationalist 
movements inside the republics and all conflicts with the 
centre, so as to weaken the position of Gorbachev and to 
strengthen the power of the opposition. Starting from a 
position of opposition, it was in his interest to coalesce in 
the Soviet Congress with all opposition forces, including 
those that were pursuing independence. The pro-republic 
alliance between Russia and the other republics was set up 
for political reasons. The inter-regional group regrouping 
radicals from Russia and politicians from the other republics 
who sought independence on autonomy had the aim of 
constituting a parliamentary group in Congress able to weigh 
more in the political decision-making process. It seemed 
evident, however, that if such an alliance came to power, 
thus instituting a looser confederal structure, then, in the 
case of conflicts in non-Russian republics touching upon 
Russian interests, Russia would impose its interests and had 
the military and economic weapons to do so. With the 
breakdown of the Soviet Union after the failed putsch, and 
especially after the declaration of independence in the 
Ukraine, it was clear that this asymmetry between Russia 
and the other republics would dominate their bilateral re-
lationships, bringing conflicting national interests into direct 
confrontation, without any indirect mediation of a federative 
structure, based on principles other than nationalism. 
Was Gorbachev's strategy necessarily doomed to fail? De-
spite the evidence, it is not sure that a pacific and gradual 
transition could not have succeeded. As argued above, there 
does not seem to have been a major sequencing error. Gorba-
chev's failure is rather best explained as a speed failure. He 
failed to use the momentum created by the progress in 
democratization and in the ,growth of private activity to 
pass the Rubicon of price liberalization. As shown above, 
conservative opposition was too strong to enable such a 
decision to be taken. This could have been dealt with if 
the economy had continued along its Brezhnevian path of 
relative macroeconomic equilibrium with stagnating growth. 
After all, in China and Hungary, the gradual development 
of a private sector allowed the build-up of constituencies 
and prepared these economies to cope much better with 
the requirements of a private market economy, once the 
necessary political changes occurred or occur. However, the 
contrary happened in the Soviet Union, and Gorbachev is 
responsible for huge macroeconomic mismanagement, for 
which the Soviet people rightly blame him. 
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The causes of this growing disequilibrium are known. They 
were the early uskorenie or acceleration campaign, increasing 
investment expenditure with. the aim of modernizing the 
economy and the machine-building sector. All sorts of social 
expenditure was significantly increased. The early move 
towards decentralization of economic management resulted 
in the removal of wage controls, leading, in a situation 
of labour shortage compounded by enterprise soft budget 
constraints, to wage increases well above productivity 
growth. On the other hand, this decentralization also re-
sulted in a loss of tax revenues, as enterprises payed less tax 
than before. All these inflationary measures led to an in-
crease in overall shortages, as prices remained more or less 
frozen. Prices in cooperatives being more or less the only 
free prices in the economy, the inflationary measures led 
to a high price differential with the State sector, thereby 
increasing the political tensions on the issue of cooperatives. 
The higher the inflationary disequilibrium, the more urgent 
it became to introduce the price mechanism. Indeed, the loss 
of control over macroeconomic equilibrium reinforced the 
dislocation of the command system itself. In the absence of 
market-clearing prices, shortages tend to create important 
horizontal conflicts, blocking resource allocation decisions 
(Roland, 1990b ). These conflicts were traditionally settled 
in the last resort by the planning authorities. They, however, 
became too weak to play this mediating role any longer. The 
only legitimate authorities to emerge were local and republic 
ones, who disputed the allocative decisions of the centre and 
protested by stopping delivery of planned output or by 
reducing these deliveries, thereby making shortages even 
more acute and reinforcing this implosive mechanism. This 
tendency towards local protectionism and towards an im-
plosion of exchanges and of production has highly deleteri-
ous effects on the economy and tends to exacerbate horizon-
tal conflicts between republics, regions, etc. Gorbachev's 
macroeconomic policies thus led to the necessity either to 
accelerate a decision on price liberalization or to strengthen 
State controls. Being unable to proceed with either, he let 
the situation deteriorate, which necessarily led to increased 
polarization between conservative and reformist forces, in-
creased nationalist polarization, eventually undermining his 
own position, and losing all the popular support he had 
gained with glasnost. 
One is, however, entitled to doubt whether macroeconomic 
loss of control and disintegration of the Soviet Union were 
inevitable at all. Arguing counterfactually is never easy, and 
actual events tend to appear inevitable, with the logic of 
hindsight. Nevertheless, the above reasoning tends to show 
that early macroeconomic mismanagement such as uskorenie 
was not an 'endogenous' result of perestroika, but a plain 
policy error. Even though the emergence of nationalist press-
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ures was, to a large extent, inevitable, it was and is still 
reinforced by macroeconomic mismanagement. Moreover, 
in line with the agenda-setter hypothesis of Section I.I, 
keeping control over the political agenda is crucial in circum-
stances of such great transformations, and speed failures 
lead precisely to loss of agenda control. Applied to the 
nationalist issue, this implies two things. First of all, early 
initiatives for constitutional reform could have been a way 
of keeping the initiative. Second, if there had not been a 
speed failure, the flow of transition measures and economic 
change would have been impressive enough to keep the 
nationalist issue partially off the political agenda. In politics 
as in war, keeping the initiative yields strategic advantages. 
Now that the Soviet Union has disintegrated and that com-
munist rule has been eliminated, what are the urgent issues, 
what are the political constraints, and what role should the 
West play in the new situation? 
The biggest risk facing the former Soviet Union in the near 
future is the repetition of the CMEA implosion, leading to 
a breakdown of trade and to a catastrophic depression. 
3.1. Price liberalization and 
macroeconomic stabilization 
The disintegration of the Union makes price liberalization 
even more urgent than ever. The introduction of free market 
prices lifts all suspicions and accusations concerning who is 
subsidizing whom. Quarrels on the terms of trade otherwise 
lead very quickly to a retention of exports on both sides. As 
the experience with the breakdown of the CMEA in 1991 
showed, price liberalization is a necessary, though not suf-
ficient, condition for avoiding trade disruption and autarkic 
implosion. A sustainable international payments mechanism 
is needed. 
We assume that all independent republics will want to estab-
lish their own currency. However anachronistic it may seem 
to West Europeans, the establishment of national currencies 
will enjoy popular support, as they will represent a symbol 
of the break with the communist past in Russia and of the 
new sovereignty in the other republics. The establishment of 
national currencies can be a good point of departure for 
establishing macroeconomic stability. 
Even in a favourable political environment, price liberaliza-
tion and macroeconomic stabilization must go together with 
social measures that prevent significant segments of the 
population falling below the poverty level. Different scen-
arios try to cope with the problem of the monetary overhang. 
In the appendix, we briefly review them. 
The next question is how to maintain macroeconomic stab-
ility. The first priority is to achieve balanced budgets. This 
is not sufficient, however, and the experience of Poland and 
Yugoslavia gives ground for some scepticism concerning the 
possibility of keeping inflation at a low level, even when 
budgets are formally balanced. The big difficulty is how to 
keep monetary policy under control when capital markets 
are not developed and as long as the phase of restructuring 
has not been initiated. Indeed, as shown by the experience 
of Poland and Yugoslavia, one of the main inflation-creating 
mechanisms is spontaneous inter-enterprise credit. When a 
tight monetary policy is applied, and enterprises are refused 
access to credit, they simply stop paying their suppliers, 
thereby generating a chain of virtual bankruptcies, which 
amounts, however, to wild credit formation, as deliveries 
continue to take place, and nobody insists on having their 
debts repaid. In that context, higher interest rates lead only 
to higher prices, as credit demand is not curbed. The only 
way to stop this uncontrolled creation of money is to im-
plement bankruptcy rules. However, not only is this politi-
cally difficult in the absence of a capital market, since the 
enforced exits will not be compensated by appropriate en-
tries, but the chain of inter-enterprise credit threatens to 
tum a local bankruptcy into generalized bankruptcies and 
bank crashes. Incomes policies are thus certainly needed to 
compensate for the difficulty of implementing tight monetary 
policies. However, one must acknowledge the possibility 
that, even though inflationary expectations must be broken 
through appropriate stabilization measures, the 'natural' 
rate of inflation might remain high, in the absence of higher 
exit and entry rates in the economy, which will take a certain 
amount of time. In other words, as long as the enforcement 
of bankruptcies in obsolete industries is subject to political 
constraints, subsidies, in an open fiscal form or in an indirect 
form through uncontrolled credit, will have to keep these 
enterprises alive, thereby representing a serious obstacle to 
breaking inflation. Only when the final stage of transition 
has been completed, i.e. that of restructuring, will full stabil-
ization be achievable. 
Note also that, even in a context of free prices, the subsidiz-
ing of loss-making industries introduces a distortion in rela-
tive prices. 
Note finally that, even when political constraints are less 
pregnant, immediate and full bankruptcies of obsolete indus-
tries may not be optimal, since a too heavy decline in output 
reduces the value of enterprises that are candidates for priva-
tization, in a situation where macroeconomic information is 
one of the only indicators from which to estimate this value. 
In any event, there is a low probability that, even when 
hyperinflation is broken, inflation may be brought below 
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two-digit levels. Moreover, there are chances that the in-
flation rate will differ across republics. It is thus of extreme 
importance to examine what exchange-rate regime will pre-
vail between the newly established national currencies. A 
repetition of the CMEA disaster of 1991 would represent 
the biggest imaginable negative output shock, given the 
interdependence and specialization that has prevailed for so 
long. We will not discuss here what the exchange-rate regime 
should be, but raise a few questions concerning the relation-
ships between the republics in the future. 
3.2. The future economic relations 
between the republics 
Is the disintegration of the Soviet Union going to lead to a 
looser confederation of States, that might resemble in any 
way the European Community? 
Though the idea of a new confederation of States giving 
itself institutions similar to those of the EEC, based on the 
subsidiarity concept, might seem very tempting, one should 
note at least three differences between European unification 
and the prospects for such a new Soviet confederation. 
First of all, compared to the EEC, the Soviet Union finds 
itself in a process of disintegration, not of integration. The 
continued conflict between republics and nationalities will 
tend to divide and not to unite them. The disadvantages of 
conflict and sovereignty have not yet been experienced. As 
a consequence, the costs associated with national sovereignty 
in a disintegrated Union tend to be underestimated while 
the benefits of independence tend to be overestimated. Even 
when the costs of disintegration are clearly perceived, it is 
not clear at all why the process of disintegration should stop. 
Given the non-cooperative nature of conflictual relations 
between republics, and in so far as they h~ve the structure 
of a prisoners' dilemma, it is not clear why disintegration 
should stop unless some sort of mechanism is put in place 
that creates confidence and institutes more cooperative atti-
tudes. 
Second, compared to the EEC, the costs of blocked decisions 
are greater. Indeed, as often happens in the EEC, decisions 
may be blocked or delayed because no consensual agreement 
on a given decision can be reached. This is partly a conse-
quence of the loose confederal institutions requiring such a 
consensual agreement, on a symmetric basis between the 
partners. However, when decisions are blocked or delayed, 
no major economic catastrophe ensues inside the EEC. The 
former Soviet Union on the contrary finds itself in the middle 
of the process of the transition towards a market economy. 
Here the costs of blocked decisions are greater because, 
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institutionally, the economy is in a highly unstable situation 
between two opposed economic systems. 
Third, compared to the EEC, blocked decisions in a new 
confederal Union are unlikely to appear, because of the 
asymmetry between the partners, and the dominance of 
Russia. Therefore, the republic governments will be highly 
suspicious of any form of coordination, whereas the absence 
of coordination might lead to disastrous results. 
Let us give just one example. Imagine that an EMS-type 
system is built between the different republics with fixed 
exchange rates and bilateral agreements to revise the parities. 
Assume that Russia has a higher inflation rate than Ukraine, 
thus more than offsetting Russia's current account surplus 
with Ukraine. Assume, moreover, that Russia is unwilling 
to devalue vis-a-vis the Ukrainian currency. Russia will run 
a current account deficit vis-a-vis Ukraine, but this means 
increased exports from Ukraine to Russia. This might not 
be welcome to a public opinion facing a harsh transition in 
Ukraine. Moreover, Russia could later default on its debt 
vis-a-vis Ukraine. Monetary cooperation on a free basis is 
therefore not very likely. In the case of floating exchange 
rates, the different parties would probably have an incentive 
either to appreciate or to depreciate their currency, de-
pending on their policy objectives. In the absence of cooper-
ation, 'beggar thy neighbour' exchange-rate policies are 
highly likely, exacerbating nationalist conflicts. 
This is just an example of a more general phenomenon. The 
different republics will all have heavy transition costs to bear 
and each republic's share in the overall transition cost is not 
easily identifiable. There will therefore be, precisely as in the 
Alesina-Drazen model, a big temptation to shift parts of 
one's own transition costs onto other republics, thereby 
leading to dangerous and sustained stalemate and prolonged 
delay in the implementation of reform programmes. 
4. Conclusion 
Cooperation between the former republics is unlikely and 
absence of cooperation will probably lead to disastrous 
economic results. This conclusion is rather dismal, even 
though the argument was sketched very roughly. There is, 
however, a way out if Western help for transition creates 
the necessary incentives for cooperation. Help should be at 
the same time generous and heavily conditional. In our view, 
this is perhaps the only way to create long-term commitment 
to the institutional stability that is so necessary for the 
success of the transition period. Without going into any 
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detail, we will sketch here the basic elements needed to help 
create credible commitment to reform. 
The West should not insist on any particular institutional 
agreement among the republics, but it should insist that any 
feasible agreement accepted by the parties, be it concerning 
trade, exchange-rate regimes, fiscal cooperation, etc. should 
remain stable, otherwise all Western help should be with-
drawn. 
Transition programmes should be drawn up in collaboration 
with the international organizations, and a consensus should 
be reached on the given policy. An international consensus 
on reform would give it a necessary dose of legitimacy. 
Any deviation from its implementation would lead to the 
withdrawal of help. 
The West should insist that stabilization packages include 
far-reaching disarmament and cuts in military spending, and 
offer large amounts of assistance for every dollar's-worth 
less in the military budget. 
It should offer all the technical assistance in legal, political, 
accounting, financial matters, etc., on the condition of reach-
ing an international consensus on reform. 
It should offer sizeable credit lines for international payment 
mechanisms between the former republics and the CMEA 
countries, which would be conditional on the continuation 
of domestic policy packages. 
Western governments should offer special guarantees to 
private multinational banks wishing to establish themselves 
on domestic credit markets and to extend their operations 
to the new domestic private sector. 
Politically, special help should be devoted to Russia. Cruel 
and bloody as they are, existing civil wars between conflicting 
ethnic groups threaten global world peace less than do fascist 
dictatorship or ethnic chaos involving Russia. Privileged ties 
with the West, generous conditional help, the encouragement 
of trade and investment would link Russia to the West and 
create expectations of peace, growth and welfare in the whole 
region. On the contrary, it would be illusory to think that a 
prosperous central Europe could develop with civil wars 
raging at its eastern frontier. 
The European Community has a privileged role to play in 
meeting this new challenge. The attitude towards assistance 
to the former Soviet Union will be a test of the ability of 
the Community countries to cooperate in the definition of 
assistance packages. 
Appendix: Scenarios for dealing 
with the monetary overhang 
A. I. A Polish-type scenario 
The first possibility is that of a Polish-type liberalization, 
using nominal wages as an anchor in order to use the 
reduction in real wages as an anti-inflationary device. Under 
a Polish-type scenario, there would be temporary high price 
increases, unmatched by an equivalent rise in nominal in-
come. Although Polish-type stabilization would reduce pur-
chasing power, and especially real consumption, it would 
allow richer parts of the population, endowed with savings, 
to smooth their intertemporal consumption pattern. For 
those parts of the population, the real shock of stabilization 
would be less great, though the price increases would be 
equivalent to confiscation of large parts of their savings. 
However, the poorest parts would be hurt in real terms and 
would face a reduction in their real consumption level. Given 
the great poverty of large parts of the Soviet population, 
this scenario has evident dangers. One must, however, note 
here that a full and immediate liberalization is less dangerous 
than a half-way Pavlov-type stabilization with administrat-
ive price increases without market-clearing prices. Indeed, in 
the former case, the immediate vanishing of queues somehow 
mitigates the negative effects of the price increases, whereas 
in the latter case, we have both queues and higher prices. 
A.2. Liberalization with limited indexation 
It might, however, be possible to cushion a Polish-type 
stabilization through some forms of compensation. One such 
form might be an indexation of incomes limited to the lowest 
incomes. Indexation would have to be very limited so as to 
reduce its inflationary effects. There is, however, one prob-
lem with indexation: as there is always some lag between 
the observed price increases and the income indexation, 
indexation might prove to be a very poor tool for protecting 
real incomes, especially if rapid inflationary processes are 
unleashed. · 
A.3. Liberalization with limited rationing 
Given the uncertainties of indexation, it might be wiser to 
guarantee to the poorest parts of the population a minimum 
consumption level in kind. This is the idea underlying the 
egalitarian rationing schemes set up or proposed by econom-
ists like G. Popov1 or V. Makarov, head ofTSEMI (1989, 
In his electoral campaigns since 1989, Popov has argued that rationing 
is preferable to market-clearing price increases. See for example Moskov-
skie novosti, No 4, 1989, p. 13. 
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1990). Citizens would receive coupons guaranteeing them a 
minimum amount of basic foodstuffs and commodities. 
Apart from this minimum consumption basket, all prices 
would be liberalized. A major advantage of this type of 
scheme is its egalitarian character that might buy popular 
acceptance of price liberalization. 
Rationing schemes through coupons are, however, in general 
allocatively inefficient. Some efficiency should therefore be 
obtained by introducing a limited transferability of these 
coupons, as proposed by these economists. 2 
A more serious disadvantage of this type of rationing scheme 
is that it needs a huge bureaucracy in order to manage 
this system of distribution. Centralized monitoring is indeed 
necessary to ensure that the given goods are produced and 
distributed as planned. The danger is that this might lead to 
tendencies to recentralize and give back more power to 
the bureaucracy, leading to a restoration of some form of 
traditional central planning. This danger might not be so 
great if rationing concerns only a small part of GNP. This 
is however not the case in the former USSR where providing 
a minimum consumption level to all citizens through ration-
ing would need the mobilization of a majority of the re-
sources available for consumption. 
Besides the great danger of restoration of central planning, 
it might also be politically very divisive. The extent of what 
should be rationed would certainly be liable to great political 
debate, and this debate would be unnecessarily divisive, as 
the goals of efficiency and distributional justice would ap-
pear directly antagonistic. An extension of rationing would 
appear as egalitarian but inefficient, whereas a reduction of 
the extent of rationing would appear as promoting efficiency 
but as inegalitarian. 
A.4. A German-style currency reform 
A fourth scenario for stabilization would be the implemen-
tation of a currency reform similar to the German currency 
reform of 1948. This could be implemented at the same time 
as the introduction of national currencies. One variant of 
such a currency reform would be to freeze all savings of the 
population for a certain time, for example two years, and 
to ask people to hand over all their rouble cash balances to 
be converted into the new strong national currency. Such a 
currency reform would have several advantages. It would be 
rapid, as the overnight creation of a shortage of money 
would rapidly bring goods back onto the shelves. There 
See the interview with G. Popov in Izvestia, 28.6.1990, p. 3. 
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would be a general behaviour of dishoarding, and the flight 
from money would cease immediately, giving rise to a less 
pathological demand for money behaviour. It would im-
mediately solve the stock dimension of the monetary over-
hang. Another advantage of a currency reform is that it 
would allow price liberalization to proceed in a non-in-
flationary context. A currency reform might also gain some 
popular support. Indeed, it would be egalitarian, as all 
citizens would receive an equal limited amount of the new 
roubles. On the other hand, it might appear partly as a blow 
against the mafia, since, provided there are effective controls, 
part of the illegal money would not be handed over. The 
extent to which the mafia would be hurt by such a currency 
reform would of course be necessarily limited as the part of 
its wealth held in money holdings is limited. 
A disadvantage of a currency reform is its predatory charac-
ter. To be effective, it must necessarily present itself as 
confiscatory of parts of the cash holdings of the population. 
Moreover, the confiscatory measures would hurt more the 
richer parts of the population, i.e. the capitalists of tomor-
row, and this might have a discouraging effect. A measure 
that might be considered concerning frozen parts of savings 
is the indexation of the nominal interest rate on savings 
deposits. Pavlov, however, made a try at a predatory cur-
rency reform in a conservative context and it would be 
politically unwise for the new governments to do something 
similar, even in a context of price liberalization, unless it 
were associated with the creation of a new national currency. 
A.5. Emergency imports 
An alternative measure that is often proposed to cushion the 
adverse effects of price liberalization is a resort to emergency 
imports, financed either through an increasing external defi-
cit or, partly at least, through transfers from the inter-
national community. 
We will just note here two drawbacks related to the issue of 
emergency imports. First of all, the Soviet economy is in 
such a state of disorganization, especially the transport and 
distribution network, that these imports might simply be 
wasted and not even reach the consumers who need them. 
These are the dismal lessons to be drawn from the increased 
import of consumer goods since the miners' strike of 1989. 
Another potential drawback of emergency imports is that it 
might have adverse incentive effects on domestic producers, 
especially if these imports compete with domestic products. 
Under price liberalization, a large and rapid supply of for-
eign goods on the Soviet market would tend to depress 
relative prices for domestic substitutes, thereby reducing the 
incentive for local producers to increase supply. 
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A.6. Stabilization through privatization 
Another alternative for getting rid of the monetary overhang 
is the massive sale of State assets: land, apartments, en-
terprises, etc. 
One should note here that privatization serves essentially 
the goal of economic efficiency. It is perhaps not the best 
instrument to deal with the macroeconomic problem of 
stabilization. As privatization might serve the goal of stabil-
ization only through the sale of State assets, i.e. not through 
give-away schemes, 1 this brings to the forefront the tricky 
issue of valuation: how is it possible to give a meaningful 
value to assets before liberalization? Partial give-away 
schemes for housing and land might prove very popular, 
and might therefore be introduced together with harsher 
measures in order to extract the necessary popular accept-
ance for the latter. 
A. 7. Parallel currency schemes 
Another proposal for stabilization is the introduction of a 
parallel currency, as advocated by N. Petrakov (1989) or 
Belkin et al. (1988). This idea replicates somehow the cur-
rency reform of 1923-24 when the sovznak rouble was gradu-
ally replaced by the Chervonetz rouble. This proposal is in 
a certain sense close to the proposal of a coupon scheme in 
that the old rouble would be used in the State sector and in 
those segments of the economy that still work according to 
the logic of central planning, whereas the directly convertible 
new currency would be used in all market transactions. 
A major criticism of the parallel currency scheme is that it 
would not be stable, and most probably, as in the Chervonetz 
episode, would rapidly end in the hyperinflationary demise 
of the old rouble. 
A.8. High real interest rates for 
savings and fiscal orthodoxy 
One might argue, in view of all the proposals for getting rid 
of the monetary overhang, that there is no need for special 
policy measures to cope with the monetary overhang, and 
that appropriate changes in expectations and fiscal and 
monetary incentives might be sufficient to get rid of that 
part of savings which is forced. The sale of financial assets, 
One can argue that give-away schemes are fiscally equivalent to privatiz-
ation through sales, since future taxes can compensate for the_ ~urr~nt 
loss in sale proceeds. This might be intertemporally true, but _stab1hzau~n 
requires current credible measures bringing about a drastic change m 
expectations formation. 
for example State bonds, at real interest rates that are high 
enough, possibly indexed, does divert part of intended con-
sumption spending. 
In the Soviet case, the following dimensions should, however, 
be considered. It is not certain that even indexed bonds 
issued by the State would reduce money demand signifi-
cantly. First of all, even though indexed bonds may signal the 
commitment of the State to protect savings from inflation, it 
does not eliminate the possibility of default of State debt. 
Second, the decision to save depends partly on uncertainty 
concerning future income. Workers expecting to be unem-
ployed in the future would save to smooth their expected 
intertemporal income stream, as is observed in the former 
Appendix - Scenarios for dealing with the monetary overhang 
GDR. However, as long as unemployment does not appear 
as a credible prospect, and if workers expect that they will 
keep their guaranteed jobs in the State sector, then the 
precautionary motive for saving becomes weaker. Third, 
accumulated frustration of consumers would most certainly 
lead to huge spending sprees in response to increased avail-
ability of consumer goods. Given this accumulated frus-
tration, and given the extremely low credibility any govern-
ment will be likely to face, monetary and fiscal management 
does not seem to be sufficient to tackle the problem of the 
monetary overhang. 
This lack of credibility implies that only immediate measures 
are effective, such as a currency reform or a Polish-type 
stabilization. 
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Introduction 
Nowadays Soviet economists have discovered that, accord-
ing to the main indicators used to determine levels of devel-
opment, their country is not only far from competing with 
the West but stands on the same footing as the countries of 
the Third World. The conditions for transition to a market 
economy cannot be ensured only by appropriate stabiliza-
tion and liberalization processes. They also comprise econ-
omic restructuring, through importing of investment and 
technology, as well as accompanying changes in the mode 
of life and major institutions. 
This does not mean transforming the economic area which 
constituted the Soviet Union.into a11 area where theoretical 
concepts of transition economics can be applied, but relates 
to a statement made by one of its founders: 
'If evaluation of investment projects should take into con-
sideration changes in the mode oflife and major institutions, 
it may tum out that some projects will seem more profitable 
not only because of their physical effectiveness, [but] mainly 
because of their influence on decision-making, on the inter-
ests of politicians and businessmen, on attitudes towards 
labour, on formation, amendment, the destruction of cus-
toms, traditions and inspirations of employees and em-
ployers .... 
As a conclusion it may be summed up that if additional and 
persistent measures are not present on a wide scope as yet, 
investments may fail; despite increases in production, the 
capital index, as well as the impact of investments on other 
projects and undertakings and frequently on the actions 
taken by businessmen and the State, may grow endlessly 
and become negative in relation to the additional capital 
expenses.'1 
Without any doubt, in the Soviet Union (or the new forma-
tions which have sprung up in its place) the mode of life 
and economic institutions cannot be considered to be well-
adapted to the development of a market economy. Besides, 
the Soviet Union is rather specific, which makes it difficult 
to transfer the experience in influencing the mode of life 
and economic institutions that has been accumulated and 
successfully applied in South-East Asia and other regions. 
If at the beginning the 'classical' model of an underdeveloped 
economy was characterized by such features as immobility, 
the prevalence of agriculture, and commune consciousness 
and values - in a word, illustrations to K. Polanyi's works 
Myrdal G. Asian, Drama. An inquiry into the poverty of nations, New 
York, 1968, Supplement II, p. 6. 
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- the Soviet economy was characterized by regular intro-
duction of innovations, the prevalence of industry and a 
rather high educational level. As for consciousness and 
values, they present a real 'cocktail' of levelling tendencies, 
power relations, dependence of the feudal kind and concepts 
of a distorted market. 
The aim of the present article is to provide the reader with 
a systematized picture of Soviet traditions and institutions 
which hinder the execution of market reforms, and to suggest 
how they can be adapted to the requirements of a modem 
economy. To meet this purpose, a category of economic 
culture is introduced which in an aggregated form expresses 
the state of 'non-material factor' in the economy. 
The analysis presented here is a very first attempt. It contains 
a number of important limitations. First, there is the short-
age of statistical and sociological data. Data are used as 
illustrations in the general context presented by my analytical 
position.2 Second, there are a lot of questions which I could 
only mention (for example, region-specific and generational 
problems or contents of theoretical economic culture). 
The concept of economic culture 
Economic culture (EC) represents a combination of insti-
tutionalized methods of activity by which concrete societies, 
groups and individuals adapt themselves to the economic 
conditions of their existence. Economic culture consists of 
behaviour stereotypes and economic knowledge (in its value 
and instrumental aspects).3 
Levels (subjects) of EC 
Mass economic consciousness (consumer and labour motiv-
ations); culture of decision-makers in the State, public and 
private (enterprise) structures; theoretical culture (re-
The results of sociological polls on the basis of the VTSIOM centre of 
sociological research, AON, and the Bureau of Sociological Research 
of GosKomStat were used. In the cases with no reference to the sources 
the reader deals with my own estimates, checked by at least two other 
experts. 
There are many definitions of culture. For example, culture 'as a whole 
consists of knowledge, religion, art, moral norms, regulations, customs 
and any other abilities and habits acquired by a man as a member of 
society' (Tailor, E. Primeval culture, 1939, p. l); culture is 'a common 
and accepted mode of thinking and acting' (Young, K. Introductory 
sociology, New York, 1934, p. xiii); Merrill defines culture as something 
socially acquired (as opposed to biologically inherited) in a person's 
behaviour, such as something which can be learned (Merrill, F. Society 
and culture, New Jersey, 1962, pp. 25-46). 
In defining economic culture, I am inclined not to use broad definitions 
which include material elements in culture. It would be difficult to 
differentiate between the EC sphere and the sphere of material objects 
traditionally included in the subject of economic science. 
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searchers and teachers). In each society of the 20th century 
EC can be structured as a pyramid. 
Theoretical EC 
EC of decision-makers J 
~----
Mass economic consciousness 
A further subdivision can be made by distinguishing within 
theoretical EC the culture of researchers and the culture of 
teachers (this is significant for the USSR, where these two 
spheres are largely separated); within the culture of decision-
makers there are: (a) the EC of managers, (b) the EC of 
State bureaucrats, and (c) the EC of economist-executives. 
It is possible to place economic journalists and analysts in 
the same level of EC. Mass economic culture may be classi-
fied into industrial and consumer, etc. 
A useful model of understanding specific roles of different 
levels of EC has been proposed by J. Pearce. It uses the 
analogy of economic agents as car drivers. 
'Most people are able to drive a car quite competently 
without knowing how the internal combustion engine works. 
They find out what makes the car go forwards/backwards, 
right/left, faster/slower, and the rest is learning by doing. 
Only a small minority of people need to know about the 
engine, but even many of them require mainly skill-specific 
training (people who work in car factories, car mechanics), 
rather than theoretical knowledge, which is required only by 
a tiny minority (engine designers). 
When large numbers of people drive around in cars, some 
rules are necessary to minimize the risk of traffic jams and 
accidents. 
Again, only a small number of people are needed who 
understand the theory underlying the rules (transport plan-
ners); a rather larger number is needed to ensure that the 
rules are observed (policemen, traffic wardens); and for the 
great majority, it is sufficient that they know what the rules 
are and that they regard them as fair and in their general 
interest'. 1 
J. Pearce's letter to the author, 20 November 1991. 
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J. Pearce's model is elegant, but it describes only one side 
of EC, i.e. instrumental skills and knowledge. The picture 
would be incomplete without the other side, the values. 
This 'hidden side of the moon' usually isn't analysed in the 
framework of an economics approach. Indeed we need to 
turn to specific sociological methods to keep the data and 
understand the present state and tendencies of values de-
termining human behaviour in the economy. 
The situation could be presented as follows: the greater the 
competence in instrumental skills and knowledge the less the 
importance of 'pure values' in the EC of a particular cohort 
of economic agents. So, the values on the lowest level (i.e. 
mass economic consciousness) have maximum influence on 
that group's economic behaviour, those on the next level 
have less, and the values on the 'academic level' have least. 
But it isn't so. Economic values in any conditions have very 
strong links with people's instrumental means in the real 
economy. The values level arises as a separate problem of 
EC when a gap appears (i) between the traditional values 
and the new economic institutions and personal roles in the 
economy or (ii) between required and existing levels of 
the instrumental skills. In any case there is a problem of 
transition. 
A similar dilemma in the present theory of culture is the 
problem of excessiveness (of adaptive potential) in EC.2 To 
concentrate on our specific subject, we may assert that the 
EC of societies with a high level of education and a market 
economy possesses a greater potential for adapting to chang-
ing conditions at each level. The EC of societies with a low 
level of general education and a pre-market or anti-market 
economy is less abundant and hence not equal to a complete 
change in regime.3 The experience of perestroika, despite the 
high level of general education in the USSR, has demon-
strated the failure of 'autoreforming' efforts of Soviet so-
ciety, let alone the Soviet economy. Shortfalls in EC should 
be compensated by building it up from imported elements 
which in an economic sense means direct investment in EC. 
The concept of culture excessiveness can be found in Markaryan's 
works; 'Culture should always be excessive to carry out efficiently its 
adaptive functions. In other words, it should be permanently capable 
not only of meeting minimal demands of the environmental conditions, 
but of bearing a necessary potential to achieve an adaptive effect 
in new, sometimes sharply changing conditions.' (Markaryan, E. S. 
'Correlation between formation and local historical types of culture', 
Ethnographic research of culture development. Moscow, 1985, p. 19). 
This rule was corroborated by modern theory of growth which main-
tained that only developing countries with a sufficient level of education 
could cut the distance between them and developed ones. 
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1. The state of economic culture and 
the difficulties in adapting it 
to the market economy 
1.1. Soviet economic culture: 
three historical layers 
Does Soviet economic culture exist as some positive entity? 
Or are the former republics of the Union similar to each 
other only in the following negative feature: absence of the 
institutions, knowledge and values necessary for a market 
economy? The answer to this question is of more than purely 
academic interest. It entails (i) the necessary presence of 
culture in creating a new economic community and (ii) 
possibilities for working out some common policy to develop 
EC (together with Western help) for the whole Soviet sphere. 
The Soviet Union existed for 73 years (the Baltic republics 
for 50 years); but the regions included in it had belonged to 
the Russian Empire long before 1917. Central Asia under-
went the least 'russification' (since the late 19th century); the 
Baltic States had constituted part of Russia since the 18th 
century but they had preserved an important cultural 
autonomy. 
State and community tradition. For a thousand years Russia 
didn't know the State based on the rule of law and civil 
society. Any authority (whose legitimacy was based on 
power or charisma) meant more than any law in the people's 
everyday life. 
In the 19th century Russia was still a feudal country with 
the hypertrophic role of the State. Such features of the 
national tradition as, on the one hand, egalitarianism, aspir-
ations to conduct economic activities within a group, a habit 
to provide gratuitous help and, on the other hand, passivity 
and looking to the Supreme Power during economic diffi-
culties, have roots of non-Marxist origin. 
State-communist tradition. Marxism strengthened those very 
archaic features of the national character, dressing them up 
with an image of modern values. Meanwhile the State-
communist tradition in mass psychology expressed approval 
of technological and social innovations, high social mobility 
and improvements in living standards. The conflict between 
the people's social demands generated by the communist 
system and its inability to satisfy those demands within a 
centrally planned economy led first to perestroika and then 
to the complete bankruptcy of the system. 
National market tradition. The second economy has increas-
ingly entered into the functioning of the main economic 
units (enterprises and family undertakings) during the past 
10 years, giving rise to a specific distorted market1 and a 
corresponding EC layer. The latter included both value 
and instrumental elements. The instrumental elements are: 
business initiative, an ability to collect and use local econ-
omic information (mainly through personal contacts and 
informal channels), rational behaviour. The negative aspects 
are: weak development of business ethics, lack of legal basis 
for deals, identification of 'personal profit' with 'income of 
the firm'. 
1.2. Regional particularities 
It is possible to distinguish three metanational (regional) 
types of Soviet economic culture: Slavonic, Baltic and Mus-
lim. The qualitative differences between the types appear 
only on the 'first level' of the pyramid, that is in the sphere 
of mass economic consciousness. The differences in the econ-
omic culture of decision-makers and in their theoretical 
economic culture have a quantitative character and are con-
sidered in the present article. 
The Slavonic type (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and northern 
Kazakhstan, along with Moldova and the agrarian popu-
lation of the Caucasian Christian republics) is characterized 
by a high level of general education which is rarely used for 
economic activities. Traditional values frequently approve 
of innovations and personal success but individual personal 
adaptation mainly goes on within a group. Also, the level 
of professional and labour ethics is not enough. 
The Baltic type (Baltic republics) is the closest to Europe. It 
is characterized by widely spread individualistic values and 
respect for private property.2 A high level of general edu-
cation is combined with good professional qualifications; 
See, for example, Panagaria, A. The parallel market in centrally planned 
economies: a dynamic analysis', Journal of comparative economics, 14, 
pp. 353-371 (1990); Ericson, R. 'On the allocative role of the second 
Soviet economy' in Desai, P., id: Marxism. central planning and the 
Soviet economy, Cambridge, 1983, pp. 110-132; O'Heam, D. 'The con-
sumer second economy: size and its effects', Soviet studies, 32, pp. 218-
234 (April 1980). 
At the end of 1990 the positive attitude to the values of a market 
economy and private ownership was displayed by a 1,5 to 2 times larger 
number of Estonian respondents than the number of respondents in 
Russia and the Ukraine. 16% of Estonian and 10% of Ukrainian 
respondents consider wealth to be connected with hard work, 31 % and 
16% respectively with talent, 28% and 12% respectively with enterprise. 
44% of Estonians and 24% to 25% of Russians and Ukrainians dis-
played a positive attitude to the processes of asset differentiation. The 
example of the difference in instrumental knowledge is illustrated by 
the following fact: to the question about the attitude towards purchasing 
stocks, 13% of those polled in Russia, 14% in the Ukraine, and only 
6% in Estonia answered 'I don't know what it means'. The Estonians 
are also characterized by the more rational views on risks and profits 
connected with the purchasing of stocks. See Obshestvennoe Mnenie V 
Tsifrakh. Informational Bulletin. Issue 10 'The attitude of the population 
to economic reform', Part III, pp. 12, 13 and 18. VTSIOM, Infor-
mational Agency data, Moscow, 1991. 
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here labour and professional ethics are developed more than 
anywhere else in the USSR. This type of EC is almost 
completely free of traces of the State-communist tradition. 
The Muslim type (Central Asia, the agricultural regions of 
Azerbaijan and southern Kazakhstan) is characterized by 
conserved community values and archaic forms of individual 
economic adaptation. As a rule, a person does not imagine 
himself outside a certain community or a tribal group and 
is afraid to leave it. The norms of economic behaviour 
presuppose authoritarian management. Social and techno-
logical innovations may be introduced from outside but 
opposition (presence of internal fundamental values) is not 
strong enough to reject them. 1 An important feature of the 
Muslim type is a very low level of instrumental skills for 
market activities. 
1.3. Methods intended to change the Soviet 
economic culture 
(a) Institutional change is essential to changes in EC. This 
includes: 
(i) a legal and regulatory framework for economic ac-
tivity, to ensure the necessary change in public and 
decision-makers' behaviour; 
(ii) a system of information and communication which 
has two components: the institutional one and the 
technological one;2 
(iii) economic and financial institutions. 
Law reforms and setting up new economic institutions 
must, however, be implemented against the background 
of the existing EC of the people and decision-makers. 
Then, the efforts of the changing EC itself must be 
synchronized with that process. 
(b) In the context of values, the main problem lies in putting 
forward an ideology capable of uniting society around 
the values of economic freedom and private property. 
Nevertheless, the absence of middle-class people (the 
people possessing property enabling them to choose 
between own business initiative and a job as an em-
ployee) presents the main difficulty. It will take 10 years 
to form such a middle class under favourable conditions. 
Personality has been formed under the influence of feudal public insti-
tutions which were intended to preserve fixed social economic relations. 
Bringing up was based on community psychology whereby each person 
comprehended himself as a part of 'we'. The community both protected 
and punished; it regulated all sides of the life. During the years of 
socialist development a farmer's psychology restricted by the community 
was not significantly transformed. A farmer comprehending the signifi-
cance of his own self did not emerge (Lychagina, N. I., Chamkin, 
A.S. (1989) 'Influence of oriental traditions on economic activities'. 
Sociological Research, No 4, p. 14). 
I will not analyse the wide problem of the Soviet technological culture 
here; it does, however, constrain future changes in the Soviet area, 
including our subject. 
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(c) The problem on the instrumental level (lack of positive 
knowledge, skills, institutions) lies in an inability to 
overcome this lack on our own without substantial inter-
national aid. 
EC can be formed effectively only from the top to the 
bottom. I mean that it is the top of EC, its 'ebony tower', 
personified by the academic society of researchers and teach-
ers, that is to be changed in the first place. In the Soviet 
society their number may run to thousands, even tens of 
thousands. Naturally it is easier to modify the top than the 
foundation of the pyramid; it might even be completely 
changed. 
If attention is not paid to the state of theoretical EC, its 
present representatives (to be more exact, those of them who 
adapt less to changes and remain in academic society) may 
hurt the process of transition in two ways: 
(i) the conservative group of academics will become the 
ideological centre of consolidation of anti-market tend-
encies in society. This is especially dangerous for provin-
cial regions where the only economic experts are teachers 
of political economy and planning; 
(ii) the radical but half-educated academics are already as-
suming the role of experts in the regions and even in the 
centre. The result is the low quality of the political and 
economic decisions that have been adopted. 
The 'second level' (decision-makers and economists with 
practical experience) will constitute several million people. 
It is impossible to discuss seriously any controlled training 
of this layer by whatever means. We may consider only some 
indirect influence (supply of information, help in setting up 
main market institutions) and selective support provided to 
a limited number of firms chosen as exemplary. 
Practically the entire population (more precisely its economi-
cally active part) forms the 'pyramid foundation'. In fact, 
this is the most inert part of the system. Unlike the 'upper 
levels' EC, where instrumental skills and knowledge consti-
tute a main share, traditional values and aspirations play 
the most significant role in mass EC. The situation may 
tempt us into exerting massive ideological influence aimed 
to bring home market values to mass consciousness. But 
there are some hidden factors that, if not considered, may 
make a complete fiasco of this policy. On the one hand, mass 
consciousness is largely inert: it is impossible to eliminate 
traditional values by talking people out of them. People 
(several generations) will have to be convinced by practical 
experience of the feasibility and justice of market values. On 
the other hand, nowadays the Soviet population feels allergic 
to any ideology: their positive attitude towards the market 
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economy is strongly influenced by the total bankruptcy of 
the planned system and by information about the well-being 
of the people living in the countries with a market economy. 
Broad propagation of market values will inevitably proceed 
at the same time as the living conditions of major population 
groups deteriorate as a result of stabilization. It may result 
in the positive attitude towards the market economy chang-
ing to the opposite one. 
1.4. The necessity to invest in economic culture 
I presume that investments allocated to reform institutional 
and spiritual structures of a society ( Jc) will make up not 
more than a few per cent of production investments (Ip) 
and stabilizing human aid ( lh) (in the framework of 'invest-
ments in reforms'): 
Jc= k (Ip+ lh), where k < 0,05 (I) 
Such an evaluation is based on the following grounds: 
(i) a significant part of changes in economic culture, as a 
variable dependent on the changes in economic insti-
tutions and relations, will take place automatically. For 
example, appearance of a market instead of State-
guaranteed sales makes manufacturers adapt themselves 
to its requirements resulting in working out correspond-
ing skills; 
(ii) Jc in an aggregated form possesses the effect of a multi-
plier: limited investments into certain key areas of econ-
omic culture may result in a chain reaction of changes 
on a wide scope. For example, preparation of a 'critical 
mass' of researchers and teachers with a world level 
of education and organization of their promotion to 
independent positions in the academic society will lead 
to the creation of self-generating scientific schools in 
some four to six years. 
The present moment may be characterized by a sharp re-
duction in the volume of free material and financial resources 
which are available for the Union Government (republic 
and regional governments are in an analogous, if not worse, 
situation). Investment activity slows down. That is why 
Western aid and Western investment acquire greater signifi-
cance in the total volume of expenses in the USSR. They 
may result in a more significant effect in case of their correct 
distribution. 
To achieve a multiplied effect from Jc it is necessary to 
determine correctly the targets for investment and to set 
attainable aims. Meanwhile it is impossible to prefer any 
level of the pyramid, but policy should consider their mutual 
influence. 
2. The problems of setting up a legal framework 
and economic institutions 
As was said before, the reason for the consequent change of 
mass economic insight and EC of the second stage is the 
creation of a legal framework and market institutions. It is 
important to ensure an appropriate framework for creating 
and organizing the activity of newly founded market insti-
tutions: stock exchange, banks, insurance companies, audit-
ing companies. The main purpose is to ensure equal oppor-
tunities for any company or individual to enter the market 
and to start business activity in a market economy. 
In other words, the legal system and institutions must secure 
'fair play' in the emerging market. 
2.1. Essential features 
The essential features of the new legal and regulatory frame-
work are: 
(i) Clearness, i.e. easiness to understand and apply by any 
economic agent. This is the problem of the educational 
level of people on the one side, and the qualification of 
experts and providing information on the other. 
(ii) Commanding general respect. This is a real problem for 
the Soviet area (save the Baltic countries). Today we do 
not have the necessary background in the mass con-
sciousness to be easy in the mind about future observ-
ance of the laws and rules. The new standards of public 
behaviour based on respect for the rule of law and the 
usual standards of economic ethics could not form in a 
short period; so, the Soviet countries perforce will pro-
vide the necessary respect for the laws by their citizens 
on the basis of power. I do not think that we could 
avoid a return to the same type of strong, even strict, 
regimes in most of the former USSR. But the strong 
order (i.e. based on some kind of fear rather than on 
conscious keeping to laws and public standards) may be 
founded either on law or on fear. Support from the 
world community will be of the utmost importance. 
(iii) Having single meaning. Until the end of 1991 the pro-
longed 'war of laws' was causing the situation of 'alter-
native sources of power'. Today (December 1991) the 
historic 'Union-republics' match is over because Gorba-
chev's government has disappeared. But the permanent 
changes of laws and norms go on, especially at the local 
level. The Moscow government presents the most odious 
examples in the sphere of privatization. Instability in 
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the laws and norms currently in force produces the 
atmosphere of uncertainty in the Soviet economy. Mean-
while, the efforts to spread the foundations of market 
EC are suffocating in this atmosphere. 
In my opinion the specific negative features in the Soviet 
area are produced by two factors: 
(a) the process of disintegration, compounded by the multi-
national character of the USSR; 
(b) the low level of political culture of Soviet intelligentsia 
founded on traditions of confrontation but not com-
promise. 
2.2. Inequality of opportunity 
Nowadays, the economy is characterized by an inequality 
of opportunity of its agents; this is due only to institutional 
factors. 
First, State enterprises are initially not equal because of the 
absence of freedom in decision-making on rationalizing the 
shares of factors of production and on using the workforce 
more effectively. Legislation and institutional standards in 
the hiring of employees in fact grant the worker his job, 
and it does not depend on whether he makes a positive 
contribution. At the same time the liberalized sector of the 
economy is able to ignore existing labour law using civil law 
arguments. 
Second, a large number of potential entrepreneurs (who are 
employees today) do not take up opportunities because they 
lack access to information, to production factors, to markets 
and to the system of credits for small businesses. 
At present there appear two extremes in setting up market 
institutions: 
(I) The creation of market institutions from 'above', 
through the efforts made by the Government of the 
USSR and the republics, goes on with great difficulty 
and with distortion of two kinds. On the one hand, an 
attempt is made to adapt newly created market insti-
tutions to the command economy distribution system 
existing on the macro level, which raises doubt about 
the future competence of the new structures set up by 
the State (these may be called 'semi-market'). On the 
other hand, these structures provide shelter to the bu-
reaucrats of the ministries and other organizations of 
the existing command economy system. That leads to 
inefficiency of the 'semi-market' institutions from the 
standpoint of their unjustifiably huge staff and the inad-
equate level of qualifications of those staff. 
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(2) Nowadays similar institutions are frequently created 
from 'below', when local governments support private 
initiative. Meanwhile, priority of personal interests, so 
natural for private initiative, sometimes distorts the 
character of the new structures' functioning by giving 
rise to their own commercial orientation. For example, 
most of the stock and commodity markets that have 
appeared during the last one and a half years were 
established not by brokers' offices but by the local autho-
rities, non-trade organizations and private persons. They 
are interested in dividends as 'owners of an organized 
market' and not in getting the trade profit as agents of 
bargaining. Dividends are coming from commissions 
derived from bargaining. For example, Rosyiskaya Tov-
arno-Sirievaya Birga (Russian commodity and raw ma-
terial market) during June to November 1991 received 
R 200 million from auction selling of brokers' working 
places. The average price of a broker's working place 
was R 8, I million. The rate of selling of broker places 
on other stock markets in 1991 was also very high, 
fluctuating from 3 to 5 to 10 to 20 times their face value 
(Moscow commodity market, Tyumen and Kaliningrad 
stock-commodity markets, Surgut commodity and raw 
material market). 1 The tendency to maximize profits, 
characteristic of private structures, frequently makes the 
new market institutions inaccessible to the masses of 
candidate consumers, who, for example, have not ac-
cumulated enough capital to purchase a place at the 
stock exchange.2 In its turn, the 'monopoly of the rich' 
establishes contacts with local governments. 
Apparently it will be impossible to avoid any impact of these 
factors on the market institutions' activity. 
2.3. A common system of economic 
information 
To ensure effective functioning of the economy both on the 
macro level and on the micro level it is vital to reconstruct 
the common system of economic information, destroyed in 
the course of the devolution of power from the Union 
structures to the republic ones. It should cover the whole 
economic area of the former USSR or at least the rouble 
zone. Such a system can be created both from 'below' (corn-
Yakovlev, A. 'RTSB - 200 million roubles for "selling the air", MN 
business No 0/1, December 1991, p. 2. 
The tendency gives rise to actions undertaken by the businessmen of the 
'second wave' against the businessmen of the 'first wave' who have 
monopolized commanding positions. 
mercial information) and from 'above' (State and inter-State 
statistics, the system of legal information). No effort should 
be spared to provide the majority of organizations and 
population with a necessary minimum of economic infor-
mation on the part of the State, so as to ensure propitious 
conditions for them to join the market. The availability of 
information should be guaranteed (a certain minimum 
should be distributed free of charge or for some token 
payment, but the main volume of commercially significant 
information should be distributed at prices sufficient to cover 
costs), as well as, and more importantly, its quality. 1 
Some possible practical measures are listed below: 
(i) to conclude inter-republic agreements on the standards 
of economic information and its obligatory provision 
on a non-commercial basis; 
(ii) inside the republics - to oblige all organizations to 
supply necessary information to the State statistics office 
(protection of commercial interests provided); 
(iii) to issue State certificates for commercial activity based 
on distribution of economic information: 
(iv) if necessary, to subsidize producers and consumers of 
economic information. 
All the problems stated require technical assistance on the 
part of international economic institutions. 
3. Modification of mass economic consciousness 
3.1. Slavonic and Baltic types of mass economic 
culture 
Positive features: 
(i) A fairly high level of general education, though special-
ized education is unsatisfactory in some places: 
The lack or economic information has become a characteristic phenom-
enon or the Soviet economy starting from the perestroika period. On 
the one hand, the requirements for databases for economic decisions 
have changed drastically. The State statistics foll behind those require-
ments because or its inertia. On the other hand, information distribution 
has become the first commercialized sphere or the Soviet economy (like 
other 'new' products, information was restricted to a lesser extent). 
Commercialized information was contaminated at once by the two 
traditional diseases or the 'Soviet market or the first generation': low 
quality and inaccessibility because or price. 
Modification of mass economic consciousness 
. (ii) Relatively high labour mobility, which has acquired a 
centrifugal character common to the rest of the USSR. 
Citizens migrate in pursuit of a higher standard ofliving: 
a village - a small town - a large city - the capital. 
If shortages begin to disappear, this type of migration 
may be replaced by horizontal migration to regions with 
a high demand for labour. 
A stable feature of the Slavonic mass EC (unlike the Baltic 
one, where this feature occurs very rarely) is the 'spontaneous 
collectivism' - the tendency to join a certain group or a 
larger structure (corporation), out of fear of acting alone. 
To a certain extent it results from community traditions, but 
to a greater extent it is the legacy of unguaranteed property 
and civil rights which were very traditional in Russia and in 
the USSR. Under such conditions a person strives to obtain 
stable protection from a strong group or structure.2 This 
particularity has both a value and an instrumental signifi-
cance. 
For example, many private businessmen prefer to act under 
the label of a cooperative; 1990 and 1991 witnessed a strong 
tendency to set up numerous unions and associations of 
businessmen and private owners; the informal 'supporting 
structures' of the new businesses are much more significant 
than the visible ones and often include representatives of 
local government. 
The present level of mass consciousness is characterized by 
levelling stereotypes, by hostile attitudes towards others' 
economic success, together with a strong emphasis on State 
(enterprise) obligations to any employee, with no reference 
to their positive contribution. These stereotypes are being 
gradually destroyed but are unlikely to disappear in the 
coming five to seven years. We may call those phenomena, 
related to a particular 'inertia' of the human mind, 'irrational 
expectations' (unlike 15 to 20 years ago when most expec-
tations were quite rational). Here an especially significant 
role is played by levelling dependent stereotypes which are 
widespread among employees of State enterprises and organ-
izations. They may seriously hinder commercialization of 
State enterprises (especially in the light of preserved 'rights 
of a working collective' in the process of privatization). 
Another peculiarity of mass economic consciousness is too 
high a level of social (consumer) expectations (irrational 
On the specific character or Soviet corporate structures and their role 
in the economy, see Kuzminov, Y. I. and Soukhomlinova, 0. 0. 'The 
civil society: political and economic factors or the formation', Social 
Sciences, No 5, Moscow, 1990. 
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expectations) on the one hand, and discontent at the low 
level of wages, together with poor job satisfaction on the 
other. I It is characteristic of the Slavonic republics and is 
weakly developed in the Central Asian republics. 
3.2. The Muslim type of mass economic culture 
On the level of values a significant role is played by the 
requirement, characteristic of the Muslim culture, which is 
to obey unquestioningly superiors both in age and in position 
and to observe scrupulously standards of behaviour accepted 
in the community in everything concerning choice of occu-
pation and acquisition of social status.2 The phenomenon 
of irrational expectations is practically non-existent but, in 
my opinion, the dynamic potential of the society is lower 
than in the regions with unsatisfied economic expectations. 
According to available estimates there were 2 million unem-
ployed in 1989, or 13% of the region's workforce.3 
The instrumental aspect of mass EC is characterized by a 
low level of education of the majority of the population (in 
the rural areas general secondary education has a token 
character). Fast penetration of necessary instrumental skills 
(knowledge of the fundamentals of economics, an ability to 
evaluate data and take rational decisions) should not be 
expected. 
Without qualitative changes in the mode of life and in the 
general culture of the population the transition to a market 
economy in these regions will give birth to a type of 'mar-
A similar situation was described earlier as a marginal type of labour 
alienation in the socialist economy, See Kuzminov, Y. I., Nabioulina, 
E. S., Radaev, Vad. V., Soubbotina, T. P. 'Labour alienation: history 
and modern times', Economica, Moscow, 1989. 
According to Lychagina and Chamkin, in the agricultural regions of 
Central Asia 'a person often presumes in his actions the priority of 
assessment and actions of the surrounding people, orients himself on 
the traditions even if they contradict his personal interests and his 
personal profit. According to the special investigation, in many cases 
not only a farmers' community but any other modern small group 
(relations, neighbours, friends, colleagues) is guided by certain patterns 
of behaviour based on the traditional norms. Let's take school graduates 
as an example. It would have seemed more rational and attractive for 
them to move to the regions of new settlements (for example, to the 
Karshin and Dzhizak steppe), to the cities where new industrial plants 
are being constructed. It would have provided them with a perspective 
to receive an interesting and substantial job, to be promoted, to live 
separately from their parents at a new place. But social environment ... 
leaving their native kishlak (village) for a city or other region is con-
sidered to be a violation of ancient traditions and is condemned for this 
reason'. (Lychagina, Chamkin, op. cit., p. 15). The phenomenon of 
excessive labour force in Central Asia can be explained mainly by the 
level of mass EC. It should be taken into consideration in decision-
making concerning investment. 
Morozova, G. 'Trudoizbitochna Ii srednyaya aziyaa?' (The problems of 
abundance of workforce in Central Asia), Sociological research 1989, 
No 6. 
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ginal' person well known in Third World countries.4 With 
regard to EC the phenomenon of marginality is determined 
only in one sense: a person is mastering new instrumental 
roles (an employee, a businessman) in the market economic 
system; but the values (the mode of life outside his job, the 
system of social ties and obligations) remain traditional and 
are preserved. 
3.3. Changes in mass consciousness 
These changes occur extremely unevenly: 'Communist 
values' may disappear, but people's behaviour is still deter-
mined by levelling and dependent stereotypes. People adapt 
gradually to the market economy (they start to react posi-
tively to such abstract notions and words as 'market', 'pri-
vate property', 'business initiative'), but the old psychology 
and values do not disappear. 5 
People react positively to the 'abstract market economy', to 
the promised outcome. Simultaneously they react negatively 
to the present situation (far from being perfect as regards 
the necessary level of services available and social justice). 
4 Park defined a marginal person as a person belonging to a certain 
culture but made to live up to new social roles existing in the framework 
of a different culture. (Park, R. Race and culture. London, 1964, pp. 
354-356). 
In December 1990, according to data from VTSIOM, only 16% of 
respondents fully supported the transition of the Soviet Union to a 
market economy (Obshestvennoye mneniye v tsifrakh. Issue 11, (Attitude 
of the population to economic reform), Part IV, Moscow, 1991); 57% 
supported the idea of privatization of small shops, factories and cafes 
and 70% privatization of farm land (Part II, p. 9). A positive attitude 
to private enterprises was displayed by 43% of respondents and a 
negative attitude by 26% (p. 12); In this respect there is an interesting 
comparative sociological investigation of the attitude towards the free 
market and market values which was conducted in New York in May 
1990 (Shiller, R., Boycko, M. and Korobov, V. 'Popular attitude 
towards free markets: the Soviet Union and the United States com-
pared', American Economic Review, June 1991, pp. 385-400). According 
to its results there is no crucial difference between the values of the 
Soviet and American respondents. As a rule, the former differ in their 
more restrained attitude towards market values. It goes without saying 
that the significance of the conducted investigation was limited by the 
choice of respondents exclusively in Moscow. The provincial population 
is less positive in its attitude towards modern economic values. But 
according to the results of some other investigations these 'market 
expectations' are based on an abstract imagination of 'market', which 
is the totality of positive characteristics - the image of 'rich countries' 
influencing respondents. At the same time a great number of respondents 
are not prepared for possible negative consequences of the transition to 
a market economy. See Zaslavskay, T. 'The real optimism is based on 
realism', Researches in sociology, 1989, No 6; Radaev, V. 'Adaptation 
to current socioeconomic changes in changing work and income oppor-
tunities', European Coordinating Centre for Research and Documenta-
tion in Social Sciences, Vienna, 1991. 
The sphere of practical skills and knowledge remains un-
touched and there is scant 'instrumental' adaptation to a 
market economy. In the long run, many people reject the 
values of a market economy because they feel helpless to 
cope with it. 
At the end of 1990 the answers of respondents to the ques-
tion: 'Why are you not willing to become the owner of an 
enterprise, a firm or a farm?' were distributed as shown in 
the table below (as percentages). 
Groups of answers (i), (ii) and (iii) could be related to 
instrumental and institutional factors; those answers explain 
most of the passivity of respondents. Groups of answers 
(iv) and (v), which are less important, relate to constraints 
stemming from the State or community values. 
It is interesting to mention the very low differentiation in 
the answers of representatives of high- and low-educated 
groups of the population; the reason for the passivity seems 
to be the weakness of institutions and the lack of special skills 
and knowledge necessary to undertake activity in market 
conditions. 
That is why failure to intervene to develop mass economic 
consciousness may result in a permanent political threat to 
the development of a market economy. 
Total Age 
under 24 24-54 over 55 
Modification of mass economic consciousness 
In the battle of ideas about the market economy in this 
country, those who support the transition cannot rely on 
improving living standards - the economic crisis is too 
deep. In fact, during the first years (the most dangerous 
years in a political sense) the creation of a sound economy 
will impose costs rather than confer benefits. Justice may 
serve as the only argument, but it should be ensured. 
3.4. The existing threat 
The specific feature of market formation in the USSR during 
the period of perestroika, which created possibilities of estab-
lishing free prices, receiving unregulated profits only for a 
limited sector of the economy ( cooperatives since 1987, joint 
ventures later), while the economic position of State en-
terprises remained unchanged, has led to unprecedented 
differences in incomes and standards of living. The source 
of this tendency was a perverted gradualism of the Soviet 
Government's reform plans since 1987. The aim was to avoid 
a sharp, socially unacceptable adjustment of real wages and 
output. But the coexistence of planned and market sectors 
in the economy caused abnormal speculation by new private 
Education 
higher advanced ordinary 9 classes 
(i) I've got no money for that and I don't know where to get it 
34 
24 
20 37 37 33 34 33 34 
(ii) I've got no skills, knowledge or abilities 
20 24 26 20 23 24 25 
(iii) There are too many troubles with creating an enterprise (seeking accommodation, problem of registration, land 
leasing) 
18 15 20 15 18 18 19 16 
(iv) I'm not sure that the State would not close the enterprise or farm 
18 13 21 14 20 20 20 13 
(v) I'm afraid that people around me would misunderstand 
4 3 4 5 2 3 4 5 
(vi) I've got other reasons 
9 3 7 18 7 5 5 15 
Source: Produced on the basis of VTSIOM (Pan. II. p. 17). 
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enterprises, on the one side, and the stagnation and fall of 
output and real wages in the old sectors, on the other. Today 
there is a clear division between those who have access to 
hard currency, with a monthly income of up to R 2 OOO, 
which enables them to improve their standard of living, and 
those who have a monthly income in the range of R 200 to 
I OOO, which is falling behind the increase in the cost of 
living. 
The new businessmen are not interested in getting involved in 
manufacturing basic consumer goods and developing retail 
trade in such goods because of the very low effective 
demand. 1 
Mass consciousness is beginning to react negatively to the 
commercial structures and business initiative existing in the 
USSR: (a) most citizens as consumers derive no benefit from 
the activity of the new structures because those on relatively 
low incomes and without access to hard currency still face 
shortages; (b) against the background of shortages of basic 
consumer goods and growing absolute impoverishment, con-
spicuous consumption by those employed in the free sectors 
causes great irritation; economic success appears to be ran-
dom: access to the highly profitable sector does not depend 
For seven months in 1991 money spent on foodstuffs increased to 70% 
for consumers with an average income and 85% for consumers with a 
low income. The tendency towards 'absolute impoverishment' of the 
first stage of consumers (and they constitute, by the author's accounts, 
rhe overwhelming mass of employees - not less than 90%) cuts the 
perspectives for productional structures oriented towards that market. 
Note: the share of the family budget given over to foodstuffs in the 
USSR in 1988 amounted to 32,2% in the State sector, and to 35,4% in 
the collective-farm sector (Narodnoye Khosyaistvo v SSSR, 1988, pp. 90 
and 92). According to the data of VTSIOM, only I 0% of families spend 
less than half their income on foodstuffs (Ogonyok, No 5, 1990). 
Particularities of employment in the new sectors and the emerging 
types of EC 
The market sector consists of two sharply contrasting subsec-
tions: 
Subsection A 
Private enterprises, joint-stock companies, small enterprises, 
cooperatives 
Good and improving standard of living 
Employees of young and middle age 
Business ethics (low level) 
Tendency to maximize cash profit and to consume conspicuously 
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on achieving a high professional level, nor on working dili-
gently, and high profits are also haphazard. There is no 
positive image of a businessman as a hard worker, but 
there is an image of a businessman (and his dependants) as 
'playboys'. 
We may face the danger of a dual social-economic structure 
of society with an isolated sphere of leisure, shops, way of 
life and, moreover, with entry apparently barred to the rest 
of society. It is worth remembering that a similar situation 
occurred in the 1920s during the 'new economic policy' 
period, and in the Jong run it brought about social tension 
which became one of the leading forces causing the closing 
down of private and commercial structures and the transition 
to a command economy. 
Development of natural property differences into those of 
class and caste may obliterate the positive image of a market 
economy that resulted from the destruction of State social-
ism. 2 The risk will be intensified if conditions of impoverish-
ment cause access to education to become the monopoly of 
the rich and powerful. 
'The development of capitalism in Russia' 100 years after 
Lenin may create real classes forgotten in the West -
isolated groups of people differentiated by lifestyle and prop-
erty level. The possibility exists of a second upsurge of 
Bolshevism in a society where egalitarianism has been deeply 
embedded. 
Some objective results of this process are described by G. Roland: 'A 
higher polarization in society ... delays stabilization because its burden 
becomes more unequal. These are highly relevant to the Soviet case, 
where stabilization has become a key issue, and where there is great 
uncertainty concerning group-specific burdens of stabilization' (Roland, 
G. 'Report to the EEC on the political economy of the transition period 
in the Soviet Union', November 1990, p. 4). 
Lack of information, but a tendency to seek it, willing to take 
commercial risks and inclined to innovate 
Average and high professional level 
Fast promotion 
Subsection B 
Individual labour activities, farmers, cooperatives 
Poor and deteriorating standard of living 
Old- and middle-aged employees 
Labour ethics (average level) 
Tendency to ensure a standard consumption budget 
No information, tendency to avoid commercial risk and serious 
innovations 
Average and high professional level 
Slow promotion or no promotion at all 
4. Decision-makers in the economy 
In Soviet society decision-makers are divided into two main 
groups: managers of State enterprises and 'new businessmen' 
(representing the private and cooperative sectors). 
4.1. State enterprise managers 
As a rule, the official duties, status and even salary of State 
enterprise managers are severely regulated. Even though 
formal restrictions have been abolished, they continue to be 
regulated by inertia. 
EC is characterized by the following features: 
(i) a low level both of skill-specific training for managerial 
and business activity and of basic economic knowledge 
(the majority of State enterprise general managers and 
general managers' deputies have received an engineer's 
education); 
(ii) a lack of competence in special economic problems, 
resulting in their wish to pass the functions of per-
forming technical and economic calculations, preparing 
contracts, regulating internal staff relations to econom-
ists and legal advisers of the lowest level. As a conse-
quence preparing decisions and making decisions are 
separated; 
(iii) a defensive attitude towards innovations in the econ-
omic sphere, because they are aware of their own incom-
petence.1 
Under these conditions the phenomenon of'private property 
in the work place' and the aspiration to maximize personal 
income leads to management decisions that are irrational 
from the standpoint of the enterprises' interests:2 for exam-
ple, intensive international negotiations (especially on the 
part of the 'second echelon' managers) are accompanied by 
frequent business trips abroad, payment of per diem ex-
penses and receipt of gifts (sometimes equivalent to several 
months' salary). 
According to the results received during sociological research conducted 
by Ryvkina's group in 1987 only 15-20% of managers in the agriculture 
sphere were prepared (felt competent) for the new economic condition 
(Ryvkina, R. V. et al. Managing cadres of agricultural industrial complex: 
orientation and behaviour, readiness for perestroika. Reprint, Novosi-
birsk, 1987, pp. 32-39). Due to some expertise, the level of managers' 
competence in industrial and financial branches is twice as high (30-
40% ). I consider the data on 1987-88 to be most exemplary because 
evaluation of the latest sociological research has to make allowance for 
respondents overestimating their competence due to two reasons: (I) 
fear of being fired in the near future and (2) token economic education 
having spread in 1989-91 in the form of numerous commercial schools 
and courses. 
See Kuzminov, Y. I. 'Is staunchness to disasters to be developed?', 
Socialist Industry, December 1989. 
Decision-makers in the economy 
The traditional type of State enterprise managers' economic 
behaviour corresponds to the conditions of the command 
economy based on shortage and cannot be changed over-
night. For example, it might be expressed in the hoarding 
of natural resources (stocks of raw materials and equipment 
exceeding any standard, excessive facilities, excessive labour 
force). As a result, the behaviour of State enterprise leaders 
in a market economy is usually irrational. Thus, if traditional 
outlets (provided by a branch ministry) are no longer avail-
able, a typical decision may be to reduce output, rather than 
to seek new outlets. According to IEP 'most of the leaders 
are not likely to increase their production prices, and they 
avoid selling in commodity exchanges, auctions, etc. because 
they are frightened ofacquiring the reputation of profiteer'. 3 
It should be expected that most State enterprise managers 
will retain their positions in the forthcoming round of privat-
ization. 
4.2. New businessmen 
The roles of an owner and a manager are largely identical, 
and this makes for an undistorted system of priorities. 
At the same time negative features of the Soviet market 
tradition are strongly expressed in the economic behaviour 
of the new businessmen: lower business ethics, lack of infor-
mation, a tendency to conspicuous consumption, low confi-
dence in State institutions, legal norms and obligations, 
resulting in their own negligence. The so-called 'two hump' 
function is characteristic of the investment policies executed 
by the majority of the new structures: priority is given to 
short-term projects for their quick pay-off or to grandiose 
long-term projects where merely participating creates a pres-
tigious image or may be explained by an inability to control 
investments rationally. 
As one can judge by the diagrams below, which are based 
on sociological research by S. V. Malakhov (Institute of 
Economic Policy), the investment priorities of new So~iet 
businessmen do not coincide with the priorities of Western 
businessmen. This presents obstacles to setting up business 
cooperation. 
Loan capital is alien to the new business structures not only 
because of the underdevelopment of lending institutions, but 
also because of their low confidence in the new businessmen. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that poor access to infor-
mation and lack of instrumental skills are also serious 
impediments. 
IEP, p. 94. 
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GRAPH I: Distribution of investment activities among 
new Soviet businessmen 
Investment activity 
Time horizon of projects 
As a rule, business, managerial and economic education is 
absent. In the mean time the need for general and specialized 
economic knowledge, methods of analysing information and 
decision-making procedures is huge and it will grow along 
with the development of competition. 
4.3. Business and management schools 
The last few years saw a real boom in various business and 
management schools run on a commercial basis. In Moscow 
alone there are more than 50. As a rule their effectiveness is 
low because they offer a very short period of retraining and 
because of the low standard of teaching. Lecturers lack any 
special training and are selected at random, basically through 
personal contacts. Training curricula are not geared to 
equipping students with concrete practical skills. When 
Western methods are used they are not adapted to the 
current state of the Soviet economy. 
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GRAPH 2: Distribution of investment activities among 
Western businessmen 
Investment activity 
Time horizon of projects 
5. Economic culture of State administration 
5.1. 'Politicians' 
The upper layers (ministers, managers of republic and re-
gional bodies) have a contradictory EC: 
(i) they proclaim the values of neoliberals, declaring their 
intention to manage the economy through exclusively 
indirect methods; 
(ii) in their practical decisions, however, they tend to use 
tested administrative methods. For example, instead of 
liquidated branch industries, which are totally monopol-
istic, they set up 'corporations' . The initiative to set up 
corporations by those who used to be ministers is easily 
explained by their aspiration to keep commanding (ad-
ministrative) positions, and these projects receive con-
sent because they help to retain the customary methods 
of control at the macro level. Regional leaders act as 
the 'engines' of the process of progressive decline of the 
old economic unanimity: since they are able to get less 
and less from the centre (Union or republic), their ac-
tivity aims more and more at keeping a monopoly over 
the resources that they have on the regional level. 
With regard to the instrumental aspects of EC, the process 
of devolution has resulted in an unbelievably low level of 
qualification in the administration of republics and large 
regions, as well as of the advisers and consultants involved. 
This can be explained by two factors: 
(a) A sharp change of personnel in the highest levels of 
administration (the new wave of democrats and 
nationalists replaced the party-State establishment) has 
resulted in it being staffed by people with no practical 
experience in managing the economy at this level. That 
experience played the main stabilizing role in the man-
agement of the economy in the past, preventing risky 
decision-making. 
(b) The Soviet Union has long had only a very thin layer 
of experts in international economic relations and with 
experience of Western economics. It is concentrated in 
Moscow. The uncompromising quest for economic 
sovereignty brought international economic policy 
(trade balance, hard currency market, etc.) within the 
scope of the republics, but the majority of them simply 
do not have experts in this field. 1 
5.2. 'Bureaucrats' 
Bureaucrats are characterized by low efficiency even in the 
framework of the existing administrative system of control. 
The main reason is lack of office equipment and hardware, 
low qualifications (more precisely, lack of specialized qualifi-
cations and of provision for these specialities in the education 
system), unsatisfactory information support and the poor 
opinion which the public has of them. 
Under the conditions of transition to a market economy the 
existing negative factors are compounded by new ones. There 
are no specialists capable of executing control through in-
According to witnesses, when preparing the agreement on the economic 
community the high representatives of some republics, tired of discussing 
the details of the future federal allocative system, suggested discussing 
first the main details. 
Economists with practical experience of a lower level 
direct means, respecting property rights. There is no concrete 
conception of public interest within the system of a market 
economy which is to be defended by State officials. There is 
no specialization in social work. 
The Soviet bureaucratic environment is characterized by 
'bureaucratism', a weak sense of responsibility, low social 
prestige and low self-esteem. The State employees' salaries 
do not ensure their material independence and aspiration to 
hold their office. Nowadays, clerks regard their workplaces 
as temporary and seek to prepare for a move into commercial 
activities by establishing contacts, providing services. Those 
clerks who have no opportunities to move try 'to gather 
honey' in their workplace. This factor impacts extremely 
negatively on the formation of a civilized market economy. 
6. Economists with practical experience 
of a lower level 
In 1990 in the USSR there were more than 3.8 million people 
with a university or college education in economics. The 
majority operate not as managers or other decision-makers 
but as administrators and advisers. 
In 1990 0,9 million of these people worked in enterprises 
and almost 3 million in other State organizations and bodies. 
The majority of these specialists are employed to carry out 
routine, tedious work. Only a small proportion are engaged 
in analysis and forecasting activity (as a rule, the latter is 
performed by the head of the economics department; the 
results of analyses and prognoses are not discussed within the 
department but reported straight to the enterprise manager). 
(a) The lack or inefficiency of computer-aided data-pro-
cessing means that economists have to perform time-
consuming mechanical reporting. In the course of time 
this results in the loss of some of their skills. 
(b) According to the results of the Perm research in 1989, 
35,3% of economists' jobs were performed by people 
without specialist education.2 
According to a sociological research survey conducted at enterprises in 
the Perm region, 81,2% of the enterprises' economists 'admitted that 
they did not have the slightest notion how the complete self-financing 
principle would be implemented at their enterprises' and 10% of the 
respondents expressed the wish to find a simpler job. (Antipiev, A. G. 
'An economist in the manufacturing process', Organization and econ-
omics of a manufacturing process, No 8, 1990, pp. 8-10). 
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(c) The system for retrammg specialists is totally inad-
equate. Retraining courses are provided for 25 to 40% 
of specialists during a five-year period and are inef-
ficient; the study of other enterprises' experience is spor- · 
adic; enterprise managers do not monitor economists' 
efforts to retrain themselves. 
As a result, the majority of functioning economists are 
hardly adapting to the market system. They continue in 
their posts thanks to inertia and to the extreme shortage of 
economists. 
Nevertheless, along with the main mass of semi-qualified 
employees there exists a limited layer (not more than 10%) 
of highly qualified economists with practical experience who 
readily handle information in their branch and are inclined 
to perform analyses. 
The main way to change the situation is to sift out the least 
qualified economists of the current corps by introducing 
computer programs into economic calculations, by de-
veloping and adapting these programs, and by implementing 
modern office operating principles and standards of econ-
omic information. 
Centres for retraining and re-educating should be set up for 
the following specialities: (a) accountancy and analysis of 
economic activity, (b) marketing, (c) labour markets and 
wage determination, (d) legal aspects of economic activity, 
(e) methods of handling foreign economic information. 
Economists should be extensively redeployed: the least quali-
fied economists should be dismissed and replaced by more 
qualified economists from the dissolving vertical control 
structures. In the end, in the main regions independent 
consulting firms will spring up and will gradually attract 
well-qualified personnel. Furthermore, there should be a 
radically new approach to education and retraining of 
specialists in economics. Since there exists a significant and 
well-paid demand for highly experienced specialists in econ-
omics, they could be trained on a commercial basis. Western 
partners may provide methodological help to the vital econ-
omic universities. 
7. Economic journalism 
The economic journalists are not directly involved in econ-
omic decision-making or in advising on or implementing it. 
However, they play a key role in the process of economic 
decision-making and in determining its acceptance by so-
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ciety. Three main functions of economic journalism can be 
emphasized: 
(i) influencing the values of mass economic understanding 
and also using existing values to generate support for, 
or opposition to, economic policy decisions; 
(ii) reflecting the interests of social groups and the social 
climate as a whole. The mass media are not only taking 
sociological polls and taking part in the activities of 
political movements, but are an important indicator of 
current interests and moods; 
(iii) translating economic decisions, the results of scientific 
research and economic information to the level of under-
standing of the population at large. 
Economic journalists can be regarded as the nervous system 
of the 'EC body'. 
Nowadays in the USSR economic journalism is developing 
quickly and reaching a rather professional level. From 1985 
to 1990 the mass media contributed to the process of reforms 
and maybe even acted as the main instrument of reforms in 
EC itself. 
Three types of economic journalism can be distinguished: 
(i) specialized mass economic and business media; 
(ii) general mass media with qualified economic journalists 
on their staff. It is a serious problem that no conser-
vative newspaper can be placed in this cohort; 
(iii) media without enough qualified journalists which try 
to exploit the sensational side of economic events rather 
than to analyse them and provide explanations for their 
readers. 
The main negative features in Soviet economic journalism 
today are: · 
(i) the lack of objective information, leading to wordy 
discussions and fantasizing in economic articles; 
(ii) inadequate economic education, leading to difficulties 
in drawing on international experience and poor 
interpretation of events and prospects; 
(iii) scant motivation to educate readers; 
(iv) 'pro-market propaganda' is very monotonous and has 
negative effects on mass consciousness. Over-enthusi-
astic reports on the affluence of the new capitalists 
irritate people. 
Well-qualified economic journalists tend to focus on macro-
economic issues, whereas most people's interest in the econ-
omy relates to microeconomic problems and events. The 
economic journalists could attract more attention if they 
related their analyses to microeconomic concerns. 
It would be useful to bring into economic journalism more 
people trained in modern Western economics and in econ-
omic history. Also important is to establish appropriate 
channels of communication between journalists and govern-
ment departments, including a regular supply of data, brief-
ings, and so on. 
8. Economic and social science 
The theoretical EC is formed and supported by the scientific 
community and the education system. It includes the follow-
ing groups of subjects: general and applied economic science; 
economic and civil laws; main branches of sociology and 
social psychology. We shall consider only the first group, 
mainly because of its central position and also because of 
the limited number of specialists representing 'related' social 
sciences in the USSR. 
In the late 1980s there were 110 OOO economists in the USSR, 
representing 7,6% of the total number of people with scien-
tific qualifications in this country. They include: (i) em-
ployees of the research institutes under the USSR Academy 
of Science and the Union and republic governments; (ii) 
employees of branch economic institutes which used to be-
long to the ministries and are independent now; (iii) re-
searchers in universities; (iv) researchers in economic labora-
tories based in major organizations. 
The current situation is one of crisis in scientific society 
resulting from the transition from orthodox Marxist theory 
with purely ideological content to Western economic theory. 
The depth of the crisis differs as between theory and applied 
economics. 
8.1. Theory 
Theory is represented by the abovementioned groups (i) and 
(ii). The scientific community numbers approximately I O OOO 
people, of whom not more than 15% are theoreticians, 
while the rest perform teaching (in colleges) and secondary 
(research institutes) roles. 
Economic and social science 
In the domain of general theory the division between Soviet 
science and world economic science is profound. In the 
USSR during the past 70 years, general theory was mainly 
understood as political economy. I 
Soviet political economy, based on an assortment of 'holy' 
texts by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, 'programme' decisions of 
the Communist Party and supplements with comments on 
them by political economists, had only the veneer of a 
scientific theory. On the one hand, it lacked any standard 
database and its relationship with reality was only token 
(the facts were used only as illustrations, and available 
official statistics comprised several distorted indices). On the 
other hand, from the very beginning, the groups who held 
power set purely ideological tasks. Political economists had 
to prove the advantages of socialism as compared with 
capitalism, and to justify economic policy which they played 
no part in designing. That is why it is meaningless to discuss 
the crisis of political economy as a scientific theory: in fact, 
we are witnessing the crisis of a scientific community that 
has realized that the body of theory which united them for 
such a long time is not theory at all. 
During the first years of perestroika (until 1989) the Soviet 
Government and society as a whole did not realize the 
complete bankruptcy of their economic science: on the con-
trary, they laid great hopes on it. The scientific community 
had only to try and explain the actual realities applying 
the available Marxist theoretical apparatus. That led to 
laughable and fruitless attempts to create, for example, a 
theory of market, useful only when applied exclusively on 
the basis of the labour theory of prices. It invented not only 
a wooden bicycle, but a wooden bicycle with square wheels. 
The current state of economic science is a reaction to the 
preceding scholastic philosophizing: the majority of Soviet 
researchers use neither the old nor the new (Western) theor-
etical apparatus in the form of abstract general laws and 
categories, let alone attempt to systematize them. But since 
a theory cannot exist without an apparatus the notions 
borrowed from 'everyday life' are put forward as categories: 
as a rule, the forms of the existing economic mechanism 
(cost, profitability, total output, etc.) and the most general 
notions of categories developed by world economic practice 
The o~ly ~xception wa~ the SOEF school-System of Optimal Economy 
Functlomng, set up m the 1960s under the Central Economic and 
Mathematical Institute of the USSR Academy of Science. SOEF differed 
from the official political economy not only in applying econometrics 
and _the. theory of. li?lited usefulness (which in its tum presupposed 
apphcat_10n of statistical data), but in the first place in its pragmatic 
tendencies. Unfortunately, on the level of meta-economic conceptions, 
SOEF theoreticians (Fedorenko, Shatalin, Petrakova) had in common 
with the political economy the paradigm of the centrally planned com-
mand economy. 
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(goods, market, capital, profit, interest). However, the latter 
are taken outside their definitions, outside the concrete con-
text developed by the efforts of many scientific schools 
- so to speak on an approximate level. In fact, the scientific 
community finds itself on a pre-theoretical level of forth-
coming economic analysis, having receded to the times of 
the mercantilists and William Petty. 
This makes communication with the world economic com-
munity difficult: most Soviet research reports submitted to 
international conferences and seminars attract some interest 
only as the initial generalization of new empirical material. 
Theoretical concepts are barely indicated. 
The crisis of the academic community is evident in the sharp 
decline of interest in publishing in academic publications. 
Even the leading journals feel the 'shortage of papers'. The 
interest (of authors and readers) has switched to current 
publications (mainly of a pragmatic or establishing charac-
ter) in weekly and daily newspapers. Three or four years ago 
the chance to publish in any academic publication, of which 
there are very few, was considered an opportunity not to be 
missed. 
Institutional problems 
(i) Most scientific researchers are concentrated in major 
research institutes, which function very ineffectively. 
They have weak ties with the world scientific com-
munity. The salaries of scientific workers are on the 
whole very low (they probably have a symbolic charac-
ter), and they are determined according to the post and 
length of service. 
(ii) There are barriers to communication. There are no as-
sociations of researchers or they are of a spurious 
character, being a comfortable place for the unknown 
administrator (e.g. the All-Union Economic Com-
munity). The scientific community has almost no oppor-
tunity to influence the organizational structures and 
financing of their work; they can only join in discussions 
in the mass media or appeal to the leadership. It is clear 
that those methods are not satisfactory because they do 
not provide concrete results or legitimize decisions. 
(iii) Nowadays only two groups of scientists are involved 
in intensive international contacts: administrators and 
young researchers, oriented to MA or Ph.D degrees. But 
there is no scientific exchange (if we understand this as 
contacts between researchers aimed at discussions or the 
joint working-out of concepts). 
(iv) Weak ties with universities and economic colleges. The 
Soviet Union is characterized by the 'Prussian' system 
of science organization, which separates research from 
teaching. Despite the efforts undertaken over the last 
10 years to establish contacts between academic science 
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and places of higher education, not more than 10% of 
the USSR Academy of Science staff give lectures in 
colleges. 
Infrastructure of research 
(i) Absence of an adequate statistical and sociological base 
to perform theoretical analyses. Transition to empirical 
research is hindered in most research organizations by 
the lack of databases and the inefficient handling of 
data-processing and applied tools. 
(ii) Basic research is extraordinarily badly equipped. 1 
(iii) A very poor database (the shortage of hard currency cut 
off the volume of scientific literature purchased abroad 
while the shortage of paper and the unsatisfactory state 
of the polygraphic base practically stopped the pub-
lishing of scientific literature). 
Personnel problems 
(i) A low percentage of English-speaking economists in the 
academic community. According to my accounts not 
more than 10% of colleagues often use foreign scientific 
literature in their work and not more than 5% try to 
write in English.2 
(ii) Mass departure of qualified specialists to the commercial 
sector (there are two types of migration: apparent mi-
gration and hidden migration, where a scientist is legally 
on the staff of some scientific institute while the main 
part of his working time is spent working on commercial 
structures) and an intention to emigrate. The main rea-
son for this crisis lies in the very low salaries paid, 
especially in fundamental sciences. 
(iii) Inadequate knowledge or complete ignorance of inter-
national economic science. In the USSR Academy of 
Science the share of scientific researchers at least familiar 
with the basic level of world economic theory within 
their own speciality make up not more than 15 to 20%. 
For example, the USSR Academy of Science, where the author of the 
present article works and which is staffed with 400 people, has only 
13 personal computers, none of which can be used for carrying out 
standard calculating programs and none of which is provided with E-
mail. 
Knowledge of English is now one of the main initial requirements to 
the scientific workers expecting to take part in the world market for 
academic economists. According to experts this problem is also crucial 
for Western Europe, 'An English-speaking economist who works to 
acquire fluency in a continental European language soon discovers that 
this brings virtually no academic reward except the goodwill of one's 
colleagues, unless one wishes actually to study the relevant economy. 
Aside the country-specific applied research, the best economists publish 
in English, because anything published only in another language will 
vanish. The professional discipline of economics is international, the 
international language is now English, and anyone who remains aloof 
from that discourse will not progress within it, nor aid its progress.' 
(Portes, R. 'Economics in Europe', European Economic Review 3/ (1987) 
p. 1335). 
The share is tending to decrease due to the mass escape 
of specialists from scientific domains. 
(iv) The system of training and State certification of re-
searchers in higher-education establishments (post-
graduates in scientific research institutes and universit-
ies) is of a formal character. There is almost no control 
over the work of postgraduates, and their acceptance 
into the academic community depends on chance. The 
requirements in the submitted topics differ because of 
the level of Council, but the awarded degrees are har-
monized at State level and they are formally awarded 
not by the university of the research institute but by 
the bureaucratic structure - the Supreme Certification 
Commission of the USSR. 
8.2. Applied economic science 
In general, applied economics is better placed than theoreti-
cal economics, both with respect to financing and with 
respect to attracting and keeping specialists. Even before 
perestroika, 'applied' scientists discovered ways of earning 
extra money by setting up small groups specializing in tasks 
undertaken for organizations and enterprises. They have 
accumulated significant experience of microeconomic re-
search under the conditions of constantly changing economic 
mechanisms. 
Soviet applied science has been commercialized, both on the 
level of new research groups and traditional institutes. Self-
financing groups and temporary working groups gave rise 
to a great number of private firms providing consultancy 
and information services. 
There is also a tendency to deviate from theory and an 
inability and unwillingness to use and adapt Western applied 
economics to Soviet conditions. The favoured position of 
many groups on the market results, as a rule, not from the 
quality of their research but from their privileged access to 
fresh economic information. State clerks participate in the 
operation of many similar groups selling a specific type of 
know-how - many of these documents being unavailable 
to the rest. 
8.3. Perspectives 
The resources available to the Soviet Union and the republics 
are quite limited. Besides, the existing system of financing 
and organizing science (large institutes with a permanent 
staff and a traditional employment system which keeps on 
poorly qualified employees who lack the motivation to seek 
promotion) impedes effective renovation. 
Economic and social science 
On the other hand, there is a real danger that the Soviet 
Union will be left without a fundamental science in three to 
four years (that is, the existing scientific community will 
have broken down) but with applied economics relegated to 
commercial consulting firms. 
To ward off this danger it will be necessary to promote 
the integration of Soviet economic science with the world 
economic community; to update prevailing concepts and 
retrain scientific staff; to improve the information basis of 
research; to set up an infrastructure to support fundamental 
sciences in the USSR; and to encourage specialists to remain 
in the USSR rather than emigrate. 
Also important will be the creation of a new nucleus of the 
academic community which is educated to international 
standards, is able to compete with the world scientific com-
munity and is rewarded commensurately with the quality of 
its research. 
Problems of paradigm 
Not all parts of the Soviet academic community have ac-
cepted the recent transformation of the leading theoretical 
paradigm. Among the various points of view are: 
(a) Conservative. The main argument is 'What can Western 
economics contribute to the analysis of our own econ-
omic realities save some well-known conclusions?' This 
group of academics does not have any familiarity with 
Western economics and continues trying to work within 
the framework of the Marxian paradigm. The present 
accumulation of real 'class contradictions' in the Soviet 
area creates some new possibilities for prolonging the 
life of the Soviet political economy approach, but its 
irrelevance to economic events other than social revol-
utions will cut its influence in the long term. 
(b) Synthetic. Those who hold this opinion acknowledge the 
bankruptcy of Soviet political economy and admit the 
inevitability (necessity) of a fundamental renewal of the 
paradigm on the basis of world economic theory, but 
lay stress on parallel borrowing from two sources: 
(i) positive trends (traditions) of Russian and early 
Soviet economic thought; 
(ii) sociology, social philosophy, social psychology and 
history (i.e. crucial extension of subject of economic 
theory). Supporters of this point of view are dis-
tinguished by their broad culture. Maybe they are 
the best representatives of the Soviet economic 
theory tradition: more historical than mathematical. 
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(c) Colonial. This strand of opinion is characterized by 
nihilistic attitudes to domestic economic science and the 
academic community: 'An abnormal economy had an 
. abnormal science; both must be forgotten as soon as 
possible'. The way out is seen in borrowing the Western 
theoretical paradigm as a whole (as a rule without dis-
tinguishing different approaches within it). Most of those 
in this group are economists with a good mathematical 
background. Many of them are now engaged in elaborat-
ing government economic policy as macroeconomic ex-
perts. The only weakness in their position is their insuf-
ficient grounding in Western economic theory. 
The fundamental precondition for the restoration of the 
Soviet academic community is to learn existing Western 
science. We must understand and try to apply elaborate 
approaches before creating something new. But it is not a 
rule for all Soviet academics to become educated only in the 
framework of world economics; more fruitful for a number 
of our colleagues may be retraining and specialization as 
sociologists, economic historians, political scientists and re-
searchers in public policy, industrial relations and social 
science and administration (but the last discipline does not 
exist in the Soviet area yet). In any case we need a period 
of learning. 
Institutional problems 
(a) It is necessary that the State, local governments and 
enterprises provide a certain level of investment in funda-
mental (partially applied) science, but it is also necessary 
to end the existing dependence on the State, to transform 
ineffective administrative organizations into modern 
scientific research institutes. This will entail organizing 
scientific research, as in the rest of the world, in univer-
sities where research activities interact with teaching and 
simultaneously select future researchers, I and in inter-
university research centres employing specialists on a 
contract basis. Linking of research with teaching is more 
than making the transition to a naturally self-regener-
ating form of academic community. Under Soviet con-
ditions it is the main means of changing the existing 
situation; the effect of small groups of economists edu-
cated in the West may be multiplied, if those groups 
start to regenerate themselves by teaching. 
(b) The financing of research institutes should be based on 
a system of grants. However, since the whole situation in 
the Soviet scientific community is unfavourable, grants 
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Meanwhile, some of the existing scientific research institutes could be 
transformed into universities. For example, it would be possible to set 
up a University of Economics based on the Economics Department of 
the USSR Academy of Science. 
should be awarded according to international criteria 
with an obligatory participation of Western scientists. It 
is important to prevent interest groups in the present 
academic community from monopolizing financial re-
sources. It also requires that a great amount of financing 
be provided to science, in the first instance to fundamen-
tal science. 
(c) It would be important and desirable to create inter-
national research groups and centres. Joint research ac-
tivities will quickly raise the level of theoretical EC in 
the republics of the former USSR. 
Selecting, retaining and retraining specialists 
Theoretical EC can be quickly renovated if there is a radical 
renovation of the scientific community. Of the I 500 to 2 OOO 
people concerned, the critical mass of 'Western-thinking' 
researchers may make up some 300 to 500 people. Such a 
number of researchers can be trained in the West during a 
maximum period of three to four years. But the task is to 
ensure their return to this country and to science and teach-
ing and not to commercial structures. For this it will be 
indispensable to ensure a necessary level of basic salary for 
scientific researchers on behalf of the State. 
9. Economic education 
9.1. Specialist education 
During the period from 1963 to 1990 the number of technical 
college students studying economic subjects increased 
2,2 times and the number of university students 3 times.2 
Their education was, however, invariably of low quality. 
(a) Economics teaching 
Standard courses for students studying economics invariably 
included a detailed study of Karl Marx's Das Kapital and 
several works of later Marxist political economy (imperial-
ism and socialism). In fact, there is no historical and econ-
omic learning: the history of economic analysis and econ-
omic history are taught very formally. Teaching does not 
employ micro and macro models, and students are not 
taught to use economic information. 3 
According to the official data of the USSR State Statistical Committee. 
With the exception of students trained in the specialities of 'economic 
cybernetics' (econometrics) and 'national economy planning' in the 
leading colleges of Moscow, St Petersburg and Novosibirsk. 
During the past two years a number of colleges have under-
taken drastic efforts to restructure economics courses, re-
placing the traditional political economy with Western econ-
omics. They seem to have failed for the following reasons: 
(i) most lecturers have not adapted to Western economics; 
(ii) as a rule, courses in economics have not been adapted, 
or only to a limited extent (on the basis of Samuelson 
and Nordhaus); (iii) students have few opportunies to get 
acquainted with educational material because of the shortage 
of textbooks. 
(b) Applied economics teaching 
This has a normative character. The present courses use 
narrow methods and introduce the subject by merely describ-
ing economic mechanisms without even trying to define 
comparative effectiveness of different forms and institutions 
of economic organization. This is evident from any textbook: 
Industry economics, Finance and credits, etc. 
Students have to learn by heart the existing forms of the 
economic mechanisms (including the predetermined re-
porting by enterprises, the main economic and technical 
indices, etc.). Since the existing textbooks become out of 
date in two to three years, students are being taught the 
obsolete norms of yesterday, which, moreover, no longer 
exist. Little attention is devoted to the dynamic aspects of 
manufacturing development, to the concrete ratio of its 
factors and case studies. Furthermore, students are not 
taught the theory and practice of taking management de-
cisions. 
9.2. General economic education1 
The Soviet educational system teaches only 'political econ-
omy', which is no more than a scholastic Marxist version of 
economic theory, in senior forms of secondary schools, in 
universities and in colleges. 'Political economy' courses tra-
ditionally have been ideologically oriented. The teaching 
staff has been trained accordingly: most jobs (especially in 
colleges) are held by people without any specialized edu-
cation, for example, retired army political officers. Univer-
sity graduates employed by the departments of political 
economy have no opportunities to conduct scientific re-
search. 
It has become clear in the course of the past few years that 
'political economy is dead'. Yet, even in a situation where 
The economic education of students studying other subjects. 
Assistance in transforming economic culture 
ideological aspirations have changed totally, the ex1stmg 
teaching corps is able only to repeat the prevailing slogans. 
Students do not need to be assured of the advantages of the 
market economy and private property: they should get access 
to knowledge with some instrumental significance. Such 
requirements cannot be satisfied by the present teaching 
corps. 
In effect, general economic education hardly exists even in 
universities, let alone colleges and secondary schools. The 
traditional economic education is mostly staffed by weak 
and dogmatic thinkers. The system of economic education 
continues to generate people who are ill-prepared to work 
in a market economy, whereas it should be giving a lead to 
reform developments in other spheres of life. It is character-
istic for all sectors of economic education as well as for 
science that there is a tendency for the most qualified staff 
to transfer to commercial institutes. 
To change this situation it will be necessary over the course 
of the next five years to reform radically the teaching of 
general economics. It will be important to involve people 
from the West not only in teaching but also in planning 
courses, advising in teaching methods and designing examin-
ations. Distance learning, of the sort developed by the Open 
University in the United Kingdom and already applied to 
management teaching in the Soviet Union, could make a 
major contribution. At the same time a new generation of 
good-quality Soviet teachers should be trained. Provision of 
Western textbooks, particularly those that apply economic 
theory to issues that arise in the context of the transition to 
a market economy, would also be essential. 
10. Assistance in transforming economic culture 
Many international institutions, and in particular the Euro-
pean Community, are developing programmes of technical 
assistance. The great advantage of these programmes is the 
significant financial resources that they contribute in hard 
currency and the access they provide to Western know-how. 
Their drawbacks are the somewhat cumbersome procedures 
for taking and implementing decisions (though this applies 
to most intergovernmental initiatives) and their relatively 
short time horizon. In view of these characteristics, technical 
assistance should be directed to areas requiring a mass effect 
over a short period of time. Suitable tasks would be to 
organize the retraining of Soviet specialists in the West or 
to transform the specialized publications and information 
base of existing economics institutes in the Soviet Union. 
Initiatives along these lines would have a significant and 
lasting impact. 
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Eastern Europe and the USSR 
THE CHALLENGE OF FREEDOM 
GILES MERRITT 
EASTERN 
EURC>IPE 
AND 
THE US!S.R 
The sparks of unrest 
that leapt from Berlin in 
November 1989 to 
Moscow's Red Square 
in August 1991 are 
firing an explosion of 
political and economic 
change. Out of the 
ashes of Communism is 
emerging the shape of 
a vast new European 
market-place stretching 
from the Atlantic to the Pacific. 
In his fascinating account of 
Europe's fast-changing East-West 
relationships, Giles Merritt argues 
that a massive rescue operation must 
be mounted to ensure the success of 
these changes. The upheaval of Com-
munism's collapse is 'The challenge 
of freedom'. 
Written with the cooperation and 
support of the European Commis-
sion, this book sets out to identify the 
key policy areas where a new part-
nership is being forged between the 
countries of Eastern and Western 
Europe. It offers a privileged insight 
into the current thinking of European 
256 pp. - Price: ECU 14.30 (excluding VAT) 
CM-71-91-655-EN-C 
Community officials, poli-
ticians and industrial 
leaders, and analyses 
the factors that will 
determine whether the 
emerging market econ-
omies of Eastern Europe 
can truly be absorbed 
into a single European 
economy. 
Immensely readable and 
often disturbing, this important book 
contains much up-to-date and hith-
erto unpublished information on 
such major East-West problem areas 
as energy, environmental control, 
immigration, trade relations, agricul-
ture and investment. It also examines 
the arguments surrounding a 'Mar-
shall Plan' for Eastern Europe that 
would emulate the famous US aid 
programme that helped relaunch the 
economies of Western Europe in the 
aftermath of World War II. 
For anyone concerned about the 
future of Eastern Europe and the 
USSR, whether from a political, 
social or economic standpoint, this 
book is essential reading. 
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Bulletin 
of the European 
Communities 
The Bulletin of the European Communities, which is issued 10 times a 
year (monthly, except for the January/February and July/August 
double issues), is an official reference publication covering all spheres 
of Community activity. 
It is compact, easy to consult (with an index and copious references to 
the Official Journal and to previous issues), logically structured (to 
reflect the main fields of Community policy) and wholly reliable. The 
Bulletin is an essential reference tool, describing the passage of Com-
munity legislation through all its stages from presentation of a pro-
posal by the Commission to final enactment by the Council. 
Thanks to its topical commentaries on the month's major events, it 
provides the student of European integration and other interested 
readers with up-to-date and accurate information about the most re-
cent developments in Community policy - the creation of a single 
market, economic and social integration, the Community's role in 
international affairs, etc. 
Supplements to the Bulletin are published from time to time, contain-
ing important background material on significant issues of the day. 
Recent Supplements have covered German unification, the Commis-
sion's programme for 1992 and European industrial policy for the 
1990s. 
The Bulletin and its Supplements are produced by the Secretariat-
General of the Commission, 200 rue de la Loi, B-1049 Brussels, in the 
nine official languages of the Community, and can be ordered from the 
Community sales agents. 
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INF092 
National 
Implementing 
Measures 
to give ettecr to the White Paper 
of the Commission on the Completion 
of the Internal Market 
SltuaUon at 30 April 1991 
The Community database focusing on the obiectives and the 
social dimension of the single market _ 
As a practical guide to the single market, INF092 contains vital infor-
mation for all those determined to be ready for 1992. 
INF092 is really a simple market scoreboard, recording the state of play 
on the stage-by-stage progress of Commission proposals up to their 
adoption by the Council, summarizing each notable development and 
placing it in context, and keeping track of the transposition of directives 
into Member States' national legislation. 
Using INF092 is simplicity itself. It can be consulted on-screen by means 
of a wide range of everyday equipment connected to specialized data-relay 
networks. Fast transmission, the virtually instant updating facility (several 
times a day, if necessary) and dialogue procedures requiring no prior 
training make INF092 ideal for the general public as well as for business 
circles and the professions. 
The system offers easy access to information thanks to the choice of 
menus available and to the logical presentation modelled on the structure 
of the White Paper, the Social Charter and the decision-making process 
within the institutions. 
Enquiries may also be made to the Commission Offices in the Member 
States or - for small businesses - the Euro-Info Centres now open in all 
regions of the Community. 
Eurobases Helpdesk { Tel.: (32-2) 295 00 03 
Fax : (32-2) 296 06 24 
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Official Journal of the European Communities 
DIRECTORY 
OF COMMUNITY LEGISLATION IN FORCE 
and other acts of the Community institutions 
The Community's legal system is of direct concern to the 
individual citizen as much as to the Member States themselves. 
Both lawyers and non-lawyers, then, need to be familiar not just 
with national law, but also with Community legislation, which 
is implemented, applied or interpreted by national law and in 
some cases takes precedence over it. 
To make Community legislation more accessible to the public, 
the Commission of the European Communities 
publi~hes a Directory, updated twice a year, 
covering: 
- binding instruments of secondary legislation 
arising out of the Treaties establishing the three 
Communities (regulations, decisions, directives, 
etc.); 
- other legislation (internal agreements, etc.); 
- agreements between the Communities and non-
member countries. 
Each entry in the Directory gives the number and 
title of the instrument, together with a reference to 
the Official Journal in which it is to be found. Any 
amending instruments are also indicated, with the 
appropriate references in each case. 
The legislation is classified by subject matter. 
Instruments classifiable in more than one subject 
area appear under each of the headings concerned. 
The Directory proper (Vol. I) is accompanied by 
1 064 pp. - ECU 83 
ISBN 92-77-77093-7 (Volume I) 
ISBN 92-77-77094-5 (Volume II) 
ISBN 92-77-77095-3 .(Volume I and II) 
FX-86-91-001-EN-C 
FX-86-91-002-EN-C 
two indexes (Vol. II), one chronological by 
document number and the other alphabetical by keyword. 
The Directory is available in the nine official languages of the 
Community. 
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EUROPEAN 
ECONOMY 
European Economy appears four times a 
year, in March, May, July and November. 
It contains important reports and com-
munications from the Commission to the 
Council and to Parliament on the 
economic situation and developments, as 
well as on the borrowing and lending 
activities of the Community. In addition, 
European Economy presents reports and 
studies on problems concerning economic 
policy. 
Two supplements accompany the mam 
periodical: 
- Series A - 'Economic trends' appears 
monthly except in August and describes 
with the aid of tables and graphs the 
most recent trends of industrial pro-
duction, consumer prices, unemploy-
ment, the balance of trade, exchange 
rates, and other indicators. This supple-
ment also presents the Commission 
stafrs macroeconomic forecasts and 
Commission communications to the 
Council on economic policy. 
Series B - 'Business and consumer 
survey results' gives the main results of 
opinion surveys of industrial chief 
executives (orders, stocks, production 
outlook, etc.) and of consumers (econ-
omic and financial situation and 
outlook, etc.) in the Community, and 
other business cycle indicators. It also 
appears monthly, with the exception of 
August. 
Unless otherwise indicated, the texts are 
published under the responsibility of the 
Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial A ff airs of the Commission of the 
European Communities, 200 rue de la Loi, 
B-1049 Brussels, to which enquiries other 
than those related to sales and sub-
scriptions should be addressed. 
Subscription terms are shown on the back 
cover and the addresses of the sales offices 
are shown on the third page of the cover. 
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Success in business 
depends on the decisions you make ... 
which depend on the information you receive 
Make sure that your decisions are based on information that is 
accurate and complete! 
In a period of rapid adjustment, with national economies merging 
into a single European economy under the impetus of 1992, reliable 
information on the performance of specialized industry sectors is 
essential to suppliers, customers, bankers and policymakers. 
Small and medium-sized enterprises, in particular, need easy access 
to information. 
The market must be defined, measured and recorded. Information 
is needed on production capacities, bottlenecks, future develop-
ments, etc. 
Panorama of EC industry 1991-1992 
Current situation and outlook for 180 sectors 
of manufacturing and service industries 
in the European Community 
I 400 PP·* ECU 110 * ISBN 92-826-3103-6 * C0-60-90-321-EN-C 
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OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
2, rue Mercier-L-2985 Luxembourg [Tel. (352) 499 28-1] 
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ENERGY 
A CHALLENGE FOR EUROPE AND THE WORLD 
Since it first appeared in 1985 Energy in Europe has become recognized as an 
invaluable source of information on both the policy-making and the operational 
aspects of European Community energy policy. Subscribers include leaders of 
energy-consuming and energy-producing industries and other decision-makers in 
the private and public sectors, as well as major consultancies and research institutes 
in and outside the Community. 
In the present situation within the Community, itself at the eve of the single market, 
and vis-a-vis the huge energy problems, as well as the potential, of our neighbours 
in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Commonwealth of Independent States, 
the energy sector is of the greatest strategic importance. An understanding of it is 
indispensable in many areas of economic activity. It also constitutes a crucial factor 
within a debate of truly global importance, namely the protection of the environ-
ment, including the global warming issue. 
Energy in Europe continues to keep its readers abreast of the ongoing situation as 
regards overall policy, markets, energy planning, and the constant quest for cleaner 
and more efficient energy technology. 
Market trends and perspectives are covered in two regular issues each year, and also 
in a Short-term energy outlook appearing in the first half of the year and an Annual 
energy review at the end of the year which includes the world energy situation by 
region including EC Member States, the short-term energy outlook for the 
Community, and a review of trends in main indicators over 10 years. Further 
Special Issues are also produced in connection with major developments or events, 
including international conferences on or relevant to the energy sector. 
Energy in Europe appears in English but each issue also contains translations into 
French, German or Spanish of articles from the preceding issue. 
28/05/93 
Also available: 
Treaty on European Union 
253 pp. • ECU 9 • ISBN 92-824-0959-7 • Rx:~73-92-796-EN-C - 1992 
Conradh ar an Aontas Eorpach 
~3 pp.• ECU 9 • ISBN 92-824-0964-3 • RX-73-92-796-GA-C - 1992 
;cc 
National implementing measures to give effect to the White Paper 
of the Commission on the completion of the internal market 
Situation at 31 October 199 2 
448 pp. • ECU 47 • ISBN 92-826-4973-3 • CM-76-92-875-EN-C - 1992 
Reports of Commission Decisions relating to competition - 1989/1990 
247 pp. • ECU 12 • ISBN 92-826-3868-5 • CV-73-92-772-EN-C - 1992 
Harmonization of company law in the European Community -
Measures adopted and proposed - Situation as at 1 March 1992 
118 pp. • ECU 54 • ISBN 92-826-4314-X • Cl-74-92-831-EN-C - 1992 
Green Paper on the development of the single market for postal 
services (Communication from the Commission) - COM(91) 476 final 
371 pp. • ISBN 92-77-45007-X • CB-C0-92-263-EN-C - 1992 
The European Community and human rights 
(, 
F-
~.1 pp. • ECU 8 • ISBN 92-826-5083-9 • CM-76-92-407-EN-C - 1993 
t-
it'. 
~e opening-op of public procurement 
46 pp. • ECU 6 • ISBN 92-826-5130-4 * C0-77-92-085-EN-C - 1993 
Farm take-over and farm entrance within the EEC 
t.~ 
148 pp. • ECU IS • ISBN 92-826-3667-4 • CM-73-91-376-EN-C - 1992 
F:. 
topyrigbt and information limits to the protection of literary and 
pseudo-literary works in the Member States· of the EC 
g62 pp.• ECU 27 • ISBN 92-826-3666-6 • CM-75-92-049-EN-C - 1992 
1·, 
~cial security for persons moving within the Community -
$ocial Europe 3/92 
:{r, 
r54 pp.• ECU 19 • ISSN 0255-0776 • CE-AA-92-003-EN-C - 1992 
:{, 
28/05/93 
Urban social development - Social Europe - Supplement 1/92 
125 pp. • ECU 9 • ISBN 92-826-4013-2 • CE-NC-92-001-EN-C - 1992 
Enterprise and people aspects in the information technology sector 
to the year 2000 - Social- Europe - Supplement 2/92 
lll pp. • ECU 9 • ISBN 92-826-4537-1 • CE-NC-92-002-EN-C - 1992 
Towards a Europe of solidarity: housing - Social Europe .- Supplement 3 /92 
142 pp.• ECU 9 • ISBN 92-826-4567-3 • CE-NC-92-003-EN-C - 1992 
The regulation of working conditions in the Member States of the 
European Community - Volume I - Social Europe - Supplement 4/92 
114 pp. • ECU 9 • ISBN 92-826-4996-2 • CE-NC-92-004-EN-C -1992 
XXVIth General Report on the Activities of the European 
Communities - 1992 · 
520 pp. • ECU 20 • ISBN 92-826-5340-4 • CM-76-92-681-EN-C - 1993 
EUR 13914 - European cooperation in the field of scientific and 
technical research, 
COST secretariat with the assistance of J. L. Roland 
93 pp. • ECU 16.50 • ISBN 92-826-4371-9 • CG-NA-13914-EN~C - 1992 
EUR 14006 - Thesaurus guide - Second edition, prepared by EUROBrokerS 
1033 pp.• ECU 78 • ISBN 92-826-4956-3 • CD-NA-14006-EN-C - 1993 
EUR 14197 - Evaluation of economic effects: relevance and impacts 
of EC programmes promoting industrial R&D with special emphasis 
on small and medium-sized enterprises. (pilot methodological study) 
K. HORNSCHILD, F. MEYER-KRAHMER 
129 pp. * ECU 13.50 • ISBN 92-826-3817-0 • CD-NA-14197-EN-C - 1992 
EUR 14198 - Evaluation of the impact of European Community 
research programmes upon the competitiveness of European industry -
concepts and approaches 
J. S. METCALFE, L. GEORGHIOU, P. CUNNINGHAM, H. M. CAMERON 
44 pp. • ECU 6.00 • ISBN 92-826-3818-9 * CD-NA-14198-EN-C - 1992 
EUR 14326 - The European market for value analysis 
139 pp. * ECU 15 • ISBN 92-826-4130-9 * CD-NA-14326-EN-C - 1992 
28/05/93 
)-,,·" ,'~'.'.f:.X;\.:~~,,.."t~~~~y,,,~~~:,,4ivsL<;',~'.,.:,-:>%t~S~,,, v'-:¥>;,.« ,, .... ,3J\;.,$1,,":f.;~',,,,~,.,,;.x,;,;·"'V'\~" ... ,-,;,;,:.,,.,~., .. , ., ..; .. c: ... , 
Employment in Europe - 1992 
i pp. • ECU 11.25 • ISBN 92-826-4559-2 • CE-75-92-106-EN-C - 1992 
Focus on the East - Energy in Europe 
157 pp. • ECU 19 • ISSN 1017-6705 • CS-BI-92-001-4H.C - 1992 
A view to the future - Energy in Europe 
l?6 pp. • ECU 19 • ISBN 92-826-3665-8 • CS-75-92-841-EN-C - 1992 
The finances of Europe, Daniel STRASSER 
439 pp. • ECU 18.50 • ISBN 92-826-2306-8 • CM-60-90-280-EN-C - 1992 
XXIst Report on Competition Policy - 1991 
446 pp. • ECU 29 • ISBN 92-826-3850-2 • CM-73-92-247-EN-C - 1992 
Europe in figures - Third edition 
256 pp. • ECU 16.50 • ISBN 92-826-3371-1 • CA-70-91-895-EN-C - 1992 
Inventory of taxes levied in the Member States of the European 
Communities - 14th edition 
726 pp. • ECU 80 • ISBN 92-826-0417-9 • CM-59-90-855-EN-C - 1992 
A common market for services - Current status 1 january 1993 
Banking• Insurance• Transactions in securities• Transport services• New 
technologies and services • Capital movements • Free movement of labour 
and the professions 
(Internal market - Volume I) 
184 pp. • ECU 19 • ISBN 92-826-5257-2 • C0-10-93-001-EN-C - 1993 
ibe elimination of frontier controls - Current status 1 january 1993 
Control of goods • Control of individuals • Value-added tax • Excise duties 
(Internal market - Volume 2) 
128 pp. • ECU 19 • ISBN 92-826-5268-8 • C0-10-93~002-EN-C - 1993 
Conditions for business cooperation - Current status 1 january 1993 
fompany law • Intellectual property • Company taxation - Public 
procurement 
Internal market for energy 
(Internal market - Volume 3) 
104 pp. • ECU 19 • ISBN 92-826-5277-7 • C0-10-93-003-EN-C - 1993 
··-;.;,- ~". 
28/05/93 
-'.·:, ,:i~'';j:{.t),.~;;~':,u,;:_.,:.J::,f.,f, )!j#&j&k-J::":":"-1·• !. 
Community social policy - Labour market • Employment and pay • 
Improved living and working conditions • Free movement of workers • Social 
protection • Freedom of association and collective bargaining • In/ ormation, 
consultation and participation of employees • Equal treatment for men and 
women • Vo<;ational training • Health and safety at work • Rights and 
protection of children and adolescents • The elderly • The disabled 
(Completing the internal market - Volume 6) 
308 pp. • ECU 34 • ISBN 92-826-3609-7 • C0-62-91-006-EN-C - 1992 
The current situation, evolution and future prospects 
for agriculture in Yugoslavia 
128 pp. • ECU 12 • ISBN 92-826-3485-X • CM-72-91-899-EN-C - 1992 
A practical guide to cross-border cooperation 
112 pp. • ECU 10 • ISBN 92-826-3143-5 • CT-70-91-992-EN-C - 1992 
1992: a pivotal year (address by Jacques Delors, President of the 
Commission, to the European Parliament) - From the· Single Act to 
Maastricht and beyond: the means to match our ambitions - The 
Commission's programme for 1992 - Supplement 1/92 - Bull. EC 
45 pp. • ECU 5 • ISBN 92-826-3841-3 • CM-NF-92-001-EN-C - 1992 
Research after Maastricht: an assessment, a strategy -
Supplement 2/92 - Bull. EC 
49 pp.• ECU 5 • ISBN 92-826-4307-7 • CM-NF-92-002-EN-C - 1992 
Europe and the challenge of enlargement - Supplement 3/92 - Bull. EC 
24 pp. • ECU 5 • ISBN 92-826-4524-X • CM-NF-92-003-EN-C - 1992 
The creation of the internal market in insurance, Bill POOL 
126 pp. • ECU 10.50 • ISBN 92-826-0246-X • CB-58-90-336-EN-C - 1992 
European Economy - No 44 - One market, one money -
An evaluation of the potential benefits and costs of forming an 
economic and monetary union 
351 pp. • ECU 18 • ISSN 0379-0991 • CB-AR-90-044-EN-C - 1992 
European Economy - The economics of EMU - Background studies 
for European Economy No 44 'One market, one money' 
Special edition No 1 - 1991 
248 pp. • ECU 18 • ISBN 92-826-1996-6 • CM-60-90-208-EN-C - 1992 
28/05/93 
European Economy - No 51 - The climate challenge - Economic 
aspects of the Community's strategy for limiting C02 emissions 
253 pp. • ECU 23.50 • ISSN 0379-0991 • CM-AR-92-051-EN-C - 1992 
Practical guide to legal aspects of industrial subcontracting within the 
European Community - Volume I - The subcontract 
118 pp.• ECU 11.25 • ISBN 92-825-9593-5 • CB-27-89-001-EN-C - 1992 
Practical guide to legal aspects of industrial subcontracting in the 
European Community - Volume II - The legal framework of 
subcontracting in the twelve Member States 
70 pp. • ECU 9 • ISBN 92-826-4651-3 • CB-27-89-002-EN-C - 1992 
The rules governing medicinal products in the European Community -
Volume I - The rules governing medicinal products for human use in 
the European Community - Revised edition/ September 1991 
228 pp. • ECU 20 • ISBN 92-826-3166-4 • C0-71-91-631-EN-C - 1992 
The rules governing medicinal products in the European Community -
Volume II - Notice to applicants for marketing authorizations for 
medicinal products for human use in the Member States of the 
European Community 
186 pp. • ECU 16.50 • ISBN 92-825-9503-X • CB-55-89-293-EN-C - 1992 
The rules governing medicinal products in the European Community -
Volume III - Addendum No 2 - May 1992 - Guidelines on the quality, 
safety and efficacy of medicinal products for human use 
206 pp. • ECU 23 • ISBN 92-826-4550-9 • C0-75-92-558-EN-C - 1992 
The rules governing medicinal products in the European Community -
Volume IV - Good manufacturing practice for medicinal products 
177 pp. • ECU 19.50 • ISBN 92-826-3180-X • C0-71-91-760-EN-C - 1992 
The rules governing medicinal products in the European Community -
Volume V - Veterinary medicinal products 
158 pp. • ECU 14.25 • ISBN 92-825-9643-5 • CB-55-89-972-EN-C - 1992 
28/06/93 
,,,.,,'$) . ._ '_,,,, ,· :<,'.(, 
The rules governing medicinal products in the European Community -
Volume VI - Establishment by the European Community of maximum 
residue limits (MRLs) for residues of veterinary medicinal products in 
foodstuffs of animal origin 
127 pp. • ECU 13.50 • ISBN 92-826-3173-7 • C0-71-91-768-EN-C - 1992 
Credit Institutions - Community measures adopted or 
Situation as at August 1992 
proposed j 
i 
;~ 
356 pp. • ECU 37 • ISBN 92-826-4842-7 • Cl-76-92-293-EN-C - 1992 
New information technology in education - France 
110 pp.• ECU 13 • ISBN 92-826-4771-4 • CY-03-92-007-EN-C - 1992 
New information technology in education - Germany 
124 pp. • ECU 13 • ISBN 92-826-4683-1 • CY-03-92-004-EN-C - 1992 
New information technology in education - Denmark 
138 pp. • ECU 14 • ISBN 92-826-4681-5 • CY-03-92-003-EN-C - 1992 
New information technology in education - The Netherlands 
108 pp. • ECU 12 • ISBN 92-826-4779-X • CY-03-92-011-EN-C - 1992 
New information technology in education - Luxembourg 
122 pp. • ECU 13 • ISBN 92-826-4777-3 • CY-03-92-010-EN-C - 1992 
Removal of tax obstacles to the cross-frontier activities of companies - Supplement 4/91 - Bull. EC 
67 pp. • ECU 4.25 • ISBN 92-826-3025-0 • CM-NF-91-004-EN-C - 1992 
Agriculture in Europe 
97 pp. • ECU 7 • ISBN 92-826-0476-4 • CM-60-90-418-EN-C - 1992 
Telecommunications in Europe, Herbert UNGERER with the collaboration of Nicholas P. COSTELLO 
Revised edition, 1990 
257 pp. • ECU 10 • ISBN 92-826-1640-1 • CM-59-90-346-EN-C - 1992 
European Economy - No 35 - The economics of 1992 
222 pp. • ECU 16 • ISSN 0379-0991 • CB-AR-88-035-EN-C - 1992 
European Economy - No 40 - Horm,ntal mergers and competition policy in the European Community 
98 pp. • ECU 16 • ISSN 0379-0991 • CB-AR-89-040-EN-C - 1992 
European Economy - No 45 - Stabilization, liberalization and devolution - Assesmlent of the economic situation and 
reform process in the Soviet Union 
191 pp. • ECU 18 • ISSN 0379-0991 • CB-AR-90-045-EN-C - 1992 
European Economy - No 50 - Annual Economic Report 1991-92 - Strengthening growth and improving convergence 
285 pp. • ECU 20 • ISSN 0379-0991 • CM-AR-91-050-EN-C - 1992 
European Economy - Social Europe - The impact of the internal market by industrial sector: the challenge for the 
Member States - Special edition - 1990 
340 pp. • ECU 18 • ISBN 92-826-1818-8 • CM-59-90-887-EN-C - 1992 
Social Europe 3/91 - Equal opportnnities for women and men 
202 pp. • ECU 18 • ISSN 0255-0776 • CE-AA-91-003-EN-C - 1992 
28/05/93 
Guide to the reform of the Community's structural Funds 
104 pp. • ECU 11.25 • ISBN 92-826-0029-7 • CB-56-89-223-EN-C - 1992 
The rights of working women in the European Community, Eve C. LANDAU 
244 pp. • ECU 5.25 • ISBN 92-825-5341-8 • CB-43-85-741-EN-C - 1992 
European Economy - No 36 - Creation of a European financial area - Liberalization of capital movements 
and financial integration in the Community 
212 pp. • ECU 16 • ISSN 0379-0991 • CB-AR-88-036-EN-C - 1992 
1992: the European social dimension, Patrick VENTURINI 
119 pp. • ECU 9.75 • ISBN 92-825-8703-7 • CB-PP-88-B05-EN-C - 1992 
Research on the 'cost of non-Europe' - Basic findings 
Volume I - Basic studies: Executive summaries 
578 pp. • ECU 53.25 • ISBN 92-825-8605-7 • CB-PP-88-B14-EN-C - 1992 
Volume 2 - Studies on the economics of integration 
652 pp. • ECU 57 • ISBN 92-825-8616-2 • CB-PP-88-Cl4-EN-C - 1992 
Volume 3 - The completion of the internal market: 
A survey of European industry's perception of the likely effects 
309 pp. • ECU 25.50 • ISBN 92-825-8610-3 • CB-PP-88-D14-EN-C - 1992 
Volume 4 - The 'cost of non-Europe': 
Border-related controls and administrative formalities -
An illustration in the road haulage sector 
280 pp. • ECU 22.50 • ISBN 92-825-8618-9 • CB-PP-88-EI4-EN-C - 1992 
Volume 5 (Parts A + B) 
The 'cost of non-Europe' in public-sector procurement 
Part A: 552 pp. • ISBN 92-825-8646-4 • CB-Pl-88-Fl4-EN-C - 1992 
Part B: 278 pp. • ISBN 92-825-8647-2 • CB-P2-88-Fl4-EN-C - 1992 
Parts A + B: ECU 120 • ISBN 92-825-8648-0 
Volume 6 - Technical barriers in the EC: An illustration by six industries 
The 'cost of non-Europe' : Some case studies on technical barriers 
242 pp. • ECU 21 • ISBN 92-825-8649-9 • CB-PP-88-GI4-EN-C - 1992 
Volume 7 - The 'cost of non-Europe' : Obstacles to transborder business activity 
154 pp. • ECU 12.75 • ISBN 92-825-8638-3 • CB-PP-88-Hl4-EN-C - 1992 
Volume 8 - The 'cost of non-Europe' for business services 
140 pp. • ECU 13.50 • ISBN 92-825-8637-5 • CB-PP-88-I14-EN-C - 1992 
Volume 9 - The 'cost of non-Europe' in financial services 
494 pp. • ECU 120 • ISBN 92-825-8636-7 • CB-PP-88-114-EN-C - 1992 
Volume 10 - The benefits of completing the internal market for telecommunication 
services equipment in the Community 
197 pp. • ECU 17.25 • ISBrJ 92-825-8650-2 • CB-PP-88-Kl4-EN-C - 1992 
Volume 11 - The EC 92 automobile sector 
350 pp. • ECU 27.75 • ISBN 92-825-8619-7 • CB-PP-88-L14-EN-C - 1992 
Volume 12 (Parts A + B) 
The 'cost of non-Europe' in the foodstuffs industry 
Part A: 424 pp.• ISBN 92-825-8642-1 • CB-Pl-88-Ml4-EN-C - 1992 
Part B: 328 pp. • ISBN 92-825-8643-X • CB-P2-88-Ml4-EN-C - 1992 
Parts A + B: ECU 120 • ISBN 92-825-8644-8 
Volume 13 - «Le coOt de la non-Europe» des produits de construction 
168 pp. • ECU 14.25 • ISBN 92-825-8631-6 • CB-PP-88-Nl4-FR-C - 1992 
Volume 14 - 'The cost of non-Europe' in the textile-clothing industry 
256 pp. • ECU 21.75 • ISBN 92-825-8641-3 • CB-PP-88-014-EN-C - 1992 
Volume 15 - 'The cost of non-Europe' in the pharmaceutical industry 
182 pp. • ECU 13.50 • ISBN 92-825-8632-4 • CB-PP-88-Pl4-EN-C - 1992 
Volume 16 - The internal markets of North America - Fragmentation and integration in the USA and Canada 
176 pp. • ECU 13.50 • ISBN 92-825-8630-8 • CB-PP-88-Ql4-EN-C - 1992 
Special price for the complete series: ECU 360 
28/05/93 
Commission of the European Communities 
OFFICES 
EIRE - IRELAND 
Dublin 
Commission of the European Communities 
Office in Ireland 
Jean Monnet Centre 
39 Molesworth Street 
Dublin 2 
Tel. (353-1) 71 22 44 
Fax (353-1) 71 26 57 
Telex (0500) 93827 EUCO EI 
UNITED KINGDOM 
London 
Commission of the European Communities 
Office in the United Kingdom 
Jean Monnet House 
8 Storey's Gate 
London SWlP 3AT 
Tel. (44-71) 973 19 92 
Fax (44-71) 973 19 00/19 10 
Telex (051) 23208 EURUK G 
Belfast 
Commission of the European Communities 
Office in Northern Ireland 
Windsor House 
9/15 Bedford Street 
Belfast BT2 7EG 
Tel. (44-232) 24 07 08 
Fax (44-232) 24 82 41 
Telex (051) 74117 CECBEL G 
Cardiff 
Commission of the European Communities 
Office in Wales 
4 Cathedral Road 
Cardiff CF! 9SG 
Tel. (44-222)37 16 31 
Fax (44-222) 39 54 89 
Telex (051) 497727 EUROPA G 
Edinburgh 
Commission of the European Communities 
Office in Scotland 
9 Alva Street 
Edinburgh EH2 4PH 
Tel. ( 44-31) 225 20 58 
Fax (44-31) 226 41 05 
Telex (051) 727420 EUEDING 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Washington 
Commission of the European Communities 
External Delegation 
2100 M Street, NW (Suite 707) 
Washington DC 20037 
Tel. (1-202) 862 95 00 
Fax ( 1-202) 429 17 66 
Telex (023) 64215 EURCOM NW 
New York 
Commission of the European Communities 
External Delegation 
3 Dag Hammarskjold Plaza 
305 East 47th Street 
New York NY 10017 
Tel. (1-212) 371 38 04 
Fax (1-212) 758 27 18 
Telex (023) 012396 EURCOM NY 
JAPAN 
Tokyo 
Commission of the European Communities 
External Delegation 
Europa House 
9-15 Sanbancho 
Chiyoda-Ku 
Tokyo 102 
Tel. (81-3) 239 04 41 
Fax (81-3) 239 93 37 
Telex (072) 28567 COMEUTOK J 
28/05/93 
BELGIQUE/BELGIE 
Bruxelles/Bnmel 
Commission des Communautes 
europeennes 
Commissie van de Europese 
Gemeenschappen 
Bureau en Belgique/Bureau in Belgie 
Rue Archimedestraat 73 
B-1040 Bruxelles/Brussel 
Tel.: (32-2) 295 38 44 
Fax: (32-2) 295 01 66 
Telex: 26657 COMINF B 
DANMARK 
Ksbenbavn 
Kommissionen for De Europreiske 
Frellesskaber 
Kontor i Danmark 
H0jbrohus 
0stergade 61 
Postbox 144 
DK-1004 K0benhavn K 
Tif.: (45-33) 14 41 40 
Telefax: (45-33) 11 12 03/14 13 92 
Telex: (055) 16402 COMEUR DK 
FRANCE 
Paris 
Commission des Communautes 
europeennes 
Bureau de representation en France 
288, boulevard Saint-Germain 
F-7 5007 Paris 
Tel.: (33-1) 40 63 38 00 
Fax: (33-1) 45 56 94 17/18/19 
Telex: (042) 202271F 
Marseille 
Commission des Communautes 
europeennes 
Bureau a Marseille 
2, rue Henri-Barbusse 
F-13241 Marseille Cedex 01 
Tel.: (33) 91 91 46 00 
Fax: (33) 91 90 98 07 
Telex: (042) 402538 EURMA 
LUXEMBOURG 
Commission des Communautes 
europeennes 
Bureau au Luxembourg 
Batiment Jean Monnet 
Rue Alcide De Gasperi 
L-2920 Luxembourg 
Tel.: (352) 43 01 
Fax: (352) 43 01 44 33 
Telex: 3423/3446/3476 COMEUR LU 
SUISSE/SCHWEIZ/SVIZZERA 
Geneve 
Commission des Communautes 
europeennes 
Bureau de presse et d'information 
Kommission der Europiiischen 
Gemeinschaften 
Presse- und Informationsbiiro 
Commissione delle Comunita europee 
Ufficio stampa e informazione 
Case po stale 19 5 
37-39, rue de Vermont 
CH-1211 Geneve 20 CIC 
Tel.: (41-22) 734 97 50 
Fax: (41-22) 734 22 36 
Telex: (045) 414 165 ECOM CH 
BR DEUTSCHLAND 
Bonn 
Kommission der Europiiischen 
Gemeinschaften 
Vertretung in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland 
ZitelmannstraBe 22 
D-53113 Bonn I 
Tel.: (49-228) 53 00 90 
Fax: (49-228) 530 09 50/12 
Telex: (041) 886648 EUROP D 
Berlin 
Kommission der Europiiischen 
Gemeinschaften 
Vertretung in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland 
AuBenstelle Berlin 
Kunurstendamm 102 
D-W-10711 Berlin 31 
Tel.: (49-30) 896 09 30 
Fax: (49-30) 892 20 59 
Telex: (041) 184015 EUROP D 
Miinchen 
Kommission der Europiiischen 
Gemeinschaften 
Vertretung in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland 
Vertretung in Miinchen 
ErhardtstraBe 27 
D-80331 Miinchen 2 
Tel.: (49-89) 202 10 11 
Fax: (49-89) 202 10 15 
Telex: (041) 5218135 
ESPANA 
Madrid 
Comision de las Comunidades 
Europeas 
Oficina en Espaiia 
Calle de Serrano, 41, 5• planta 
E-28001 Madrid 
Tel.: (34-1) 435 17 00 
Telecopia: (34-1) 576 03 87/577 29 23 
Telex: (052) 46818 OIPE E 
Barcelona 
Comision de las Comunidades 
Europeas 
Oficina en Espaiia 
Avenida Diagonal, 407 bis, 18' planta 
E-08008 Barcelona 
Tel.: (34-3) 415 81 77 
Telecopia: (34-3) 415 63 11 
Telex: (052) 97524 BOC E 
VENEZUELA 
Caracas 
Comision de las Comunidades 
Europeas 
Delegacion 
Calle Orinoco, Las Mercedes 
Apartado 67 076, 
Las Americas 1061 A 
Caracas 
Tel.: (58-2) 91 51 33 
Telecopia: (58-2) 91 88 76 
Telex: (031) 27298 COMEU VC 
EAAAAA 
AllfJvn 
Eimpom'l to>V EupolllDiJCrov 
Kmvot~tcov 
fpmpEio <rnJV EHalln 
Bncn)..icrcn,, :Eoq,in, 2 
T9 30284 
GR-10674 AlliJvn 
TriL (30-1) 724 39 82/83/84 
Tt4q,n~: (30-1) 724 46 20 
Tt4~: (0601) 219324 ECAT GR 
ITALIA 
Roma 
Commissione delle Comunita europee 
Ufficio in Italia 
Via Poli, 29 
1-00187 Roma 
Tel.: (39-6) 699 11 60 
Telecopia: (39-6) 679 16 58 / 679 36 52 
Telex: (043) 610184 EUROMA I 
Milano 
Commissione delle Comunita europee 
Ufficio a Milano 
Corso Magenta, 59 
I-20123 Milano 
Tel.: (39-2) 48 01 25 05 
Telecopia: (39-2) 481 85 43 
Telex: (043) 316200 EURMIL I 
NEDERLAND 
Den Haag 
Commissie van de Europese 
Gemeenschappen 
Bureau in Nederland 
Korte Vijverberg 5 
2513 AB Den Haag 
Nederland 
Tel.: (31-70) 346 93 26 
Telecopie: (31-70) 364 66 19 
Telex: (044) 31094 EURCO NL 
PORTUGAL 
Lisboa 
Comissiio das Comunidades 
Europeias 
Gabinete em Portugal 
Centro Europeu Jean Monnet 
Largo Jean Monnet, 1-10.' 
P-1200 Lisboa 
Tel.: (351-1) 350 98 00 
Telecopiador: (351-1) 350 98 01/2/3 
Telex: (0404) 18810 COMEUR P 
28/05/93 



Cl) 
,tJ 
C: 
~ 
E 
Q) 
-c.. 
c.. 
::::, 
en 
~ "'C 
et: C: 
0 ea 
u. > 
a: E 0 w C: 0 0 
a: CJ 
0 w 
C: 
m 
Cl) 
°" 0 
~ t-
:::l 
w 
~ 
0 
'f,,a 
t-
ORDER FORM 
European Economy ISSN 0379-0991 
Price annual subscript ion (4 issues per year) : 
ECU 70 
European Economy + Supplements A and B 
Price combined annual subscription: 
ECU 105 
Name and address: 
Date: .. .......... .... .. ..... ....... .............. Signature: 
ORDER FORM 
Supplements to 'European Economy' . 
Series A - Recent economic trends 
Price annual subscription (11 issues per year) : 
ECU 28.50 
Series B - Economic prospects - business survey 
results 
Price annual subscription (11 issues per year) : 
ECU 28.50 
Price both supplements: 
ECU 57 
Name and address : 
Number 
of copies : 
Number 
of copies: 
Date: ... .... .... ... ..... ...... ........ .... ..... .. Signature: ..... .... .. ........................................... .. .... .... . 
ORDER FORM 
Eu ropean Economy ISSN 0379 -0991 
Price annual subscription (4 issues per year): 
ECU 70 
European Economy + Supplements A and B 
Price combined annual subscription: 
ECU 105 
!'Jame and address: 
Date : ..... .............. ...... ... .. .. ... ... .. .... Signature: 
Number 
of copies: 
Office des 
publications officie lles 
des Communautes europeennes 
L-2985 Luxembourg 
Off ice des 
pub li cations offic iell es 
des Communautes europeennes 
L-2985 Luxembourg 
Office des 
publications officielles 
des Communautes europeennes 
L-2985 Luxembourg 
Venta y suscripciones • Salg og abonnement • Verkauf und Abonnement • nwA110£11:; KOi ouvl>poµtc; 
Sales and subscriptions • Vente et abonnements • Vendita e abbonamenti 
BELGIQUE/ BELGlt 
Moniteur beige / 
Belgisch Staatsblad 
Rue de Louvain 42 / Leuvenseweg 42 
8-1 OOO Bruxelles / 8-1 OOO Brussel 
Tel. (02) 512 00 26 
Fax (02) 511 01 84 
Autres distributeurs / 
Overige verkooppunten 
Librairie europ8enne/ 
Europese boekhandel 
Rue de la Loi 244/Wetstraat 244 
B-1040 Bruxelles / B-1 040 Brussel 
Tel. (02) 231 04 35 
Fax (02) 735 08 60 
Jean De Lannoy 
Avenue du Rei 202 /Koningslaan 202 
B-1060 Bruxelles / B-1 060 Brussel 
Tel. (02) 538 51 69 
Telex 63220 UNBOOK B 
Fax (02) 538 08 41 
Document delivery: 
Credoc 
Rue de la Montagne 34 / Bergstraat 34 
Bte 11 / Bus 11 
8-1 OOO Bruxelles / 8-1 OOO Brussel 
Tel. (02) 511 69 41 
Fax (02) 513 31 95 
DANMARK 
J. H. Schultz Information A/S 
Herstedvang 1 0-12 
DK-2620 Albertslund 
Tit. 43 63 23 00 
Fax (Sales) 43 63 19 69 
Fax (Management) 43 63 19 49 
DEUTSCH LAND 
Bundesanzeiger Verlag 
Breite StraBe 78-80 
Postfach 1 0 05 34 
D-50445 Koln 
Tel. (02 21) 20 29-0 
Telex ANZEIGER BONN 8 882 595 
Fax 2 02 92 78 
GREECE/E/\1\AllA 
G.C. Eleftheroudakis SA 
International Bookstore 
Nikis Street 4 
GR-10563 Athens 
Tel. (01) 322 63 23 
Telex 219410 ELEF 
Fax 323 98 21 
ESPANA 
Boletfn Oficial del Estado 
Trafalgar. 29 
E-28071 Madrid 
Tel. (91) 538 22 95 
Fax (91) 538 23 49 
Mundi-Prensa Libros, SA 
Castell6, 37 
E-28001 Madrid 
Tel. (91) 431 33 99 (libros) 
431 32 22 (Suscripciones) 
435 36 37 (Direcci6n) 
Telex 49370-MPLI-E 
Fax (91) 575 39 98 
Sucursal: 
Librerla Internacional AEDOS 
Consejo de Ciento, 391 
E-08009 Barcelona 
Tel. (93) 488 34 92 
Fax (93) 487 76 59 
Llibreria de Ja Generalitat 
de Catalunya 
Rambla dais Estudis, 118 (Palau Meja) 
E-08002 Barcelona 
Tel. (93) 302 68 35 
302 64 62 
Fax (93) 302 12 99 
Verkoop en abonnementen • Venda e assinaturas 
FRANCE 
Journal official 
Service des publications 
des Communautlts europltennes 
26, rue Desaix 
F-75727 Paris Cedex 15 
Tel. (1) 40 58 75 00 
Fax (1) 40 58 77 00 
IRELAND 
Government Supplies Agency 
4-5 Harcourt Road 
Dublin 2 
Tel. (1) 6613111 
Fax (1) 47 80 645 
!TALIA 
Licosa SpA 
Via Duca di Calabria 1/1 
Casella postale 552 
1-50125 Firenze 
Tel. (055) 64 54 15 
Fax641257 
Telex 570466 LICOSA I 
GRAND-DUCHE DE LUXEMBOURG 
Messageries du livre 
5, rue Raiffeisen 
L-2411 Luxembourg 
Tel. 40 10 20 
Fax 40 10 24 01 
NEDERLAND 
SDU Overheidsinformatie 
Externe Fondsen 
Postbus 20014 
2500 EA 's-Gravenhage 
Tel. (070) 37 89 911 
Fax (070) 34 75 778 
PORTUGAL 
-------------
1 m pre n s a Nacional 
Casa da Maeda, EP 
Rua D. Francisco Manuel de Melo, 5 
P-1 092 Lisboa Codex 
Tel. (01) 69 34 14 
Distribuidora de Livros 
Bertrand, Ld. a 
Grupo Bertrand, SA 
Rua das Tarras dos Vales, 4-A 
Apartado 37 
P-2700 Amadora Codex 
Tel. (01) 49 59 050 
Telex 15798 BERDIS 
Fax 49 60 255 
UNITED KINGDOM 
HMSO Books (Agency section) 
HMSO Publications Centre 
51 Nine Elms Lane 
London SWB 5DR 
Tel. (071) 873 9090 
Fax 873 8463 
Telex 29 71 138 
OSTER REICH 
Manz'sche Verlags-
und Universitatsbuchhandlung 
Kohlmarkt 16 
A-1014 Wien 
Tel. (0222) 531 61-133 
Telex 112 500 BOX A 
Fax (0222) 531 61-181 
SUOMJ/FINLAND 
Akateeminen Kirjakauppa 
Keskuskatu 1 
PO Box 128 
SF-00101 Helsinki 
Tel. (0) 121 41 
Fax (O) 121 44 41 
NORGE 
Narvesen Info Center 
Bertrand Narvesens vei 2 
PO Box 6125 Etterstad 
N-0602 Oslo 6 
Tel. (22) 57 33 00 
Telex 79668 NIC N 
Fax (22) 68 19 01 
SVERIGE 
BTJAB 
Traktorvi:igen 13 
S-22100 Lund 
Tel. (046) 18 00 00 
Fax (046) 18 01 25 
30 79 47 
SCHWEIZ /SUISSE/ SVIZZERA 
OSEC 
StampfenbachstraBe 85 
CH-8035 Zurich 
Tel. (01) 365 54 49 
Fax (01) 365 54 11 
CESKA REPUBLIKA 
NIS CR 
Havelkova 22 
130 00 Praha 3 
Tel. (2) 235 84 46 
Fax (2) 235 97 88 
MAGYARORSzAG 
Euro-Info-Service 
Club Sziget 
Margitsziget 
1138 Budapest 
Tel./Fax 1 111 60 61 
1 1116216 
POLSKA 
Business Foundation 
ul. Krucza 38/42 
00-512 Warszawa 
Tel. (22) 21 99 93, 628-28-82 
International Fax&Phone 
(0-39) 12-00-77 
ROMANIA 
Euromedia 
65, Strada Dionisie Lupu 
70184 Bucuresti 
Tel./Fax O 12 96 46 
BALGARIJA 
Europress Klassica BK Ltd 
66, bd Vitosha 
1463 Sofia 
Tel./Fax 2 52 74 75 
RUSSIA 
CCEC 
9,60-letiya Oktyabrya Avenue 
117312 Moscow 
Tel./Fax (095) 135 52 27 
CYPRUS 
Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry 
Chamber Building 
38 Grivas Dhigenis Ave 
3 Deligiorgis Street 
PO Box 1455 
Nicosia 
Tel. (2) 449500/462312 
Fax (2) 458630 
MALTA 
Miller distributors Ltd 
Scots House, M.A. Vassalli street 
PO Box 272 
Valletta 
Tel. 24 73 01 
Fax 23 49 14 
TURKIYE 
Pres Gazete Kitap Dergi 
Pazarlama DaQitim Ticaret ve sanayi 
A$ 
Narlibahc;:e Sokak N. 15 
Jstanbul-Cagaloglu 
Tel. (1) 520 92 96 - 528 55 66 
Fax 520 64 57 
Telex 23822 DSVO-TR 
ISRAEL 
ROY International 
PO Box 13056 
41 Mishmar Hayarden Street 
Tel Aviv 61130 
Tel. 3 496 108 
Fax 3 544 60 39 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA/ 
CANADA 
UNJPUB 
4611-F Assembly Drive 
Lanham, MD 20706-4391 
Tel. Toll Free (BOO) 274 4888 
Fax (301) 459 0056 
CANADA 
Subscriptions only 
Uniquement abonnements 
Renouf Publishing Co. Ltd 
1294 Algoma Road 
Ottawa, Ontario K1 B 3WB 
Tel. (613) 7414333 
Fax (613) 741 54 39 
Telex 0534783 
AUSTRALIA 
Hunter Publications 
SBA Gipps Street 
Collingwood 
Victoria 3066 
Tel. (3) 417 5361 
Fax (3) 419 7154 
JAPAN 
Kinokuniya Company Ltd 
17-7 Shinjuku 3-Chome 
Shinjuku-ku 
Tokyo 160-91 
Tel. (03) 3439-0121 
Journal Department 
PO Box 55 Chitose 
Tokyo 156 
Tel. (03) 3439-0124 
SOUTH-EAST ASIA 
Legal Library Services Ltd 
STK Agency 
Robinson Road 
PO Box 1817 
Singapore 9036 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Satto 
5th Floor, Export House 
Cnr Maude & West Streets 
Sandlan 2146 
Tel. (011) 883-3737 
Fax (011) 883-6569 
AUTRES PAYS 
OTHER COUNTRIES 
ANDERE LANDER 
Office des publications officielles 
des Communautes europ8ennes 
2, rue Mercier 
L-2985 Luxembourg 
Tel. 499 28-1 
Telex PUBOF LU 1324 b 
Fax 48 85 73/48 68 17 
7/93 
11111! Ill 1111111111 ~111111111111! 11111 
